

s. 22(1)(a)(ii)

From: Smith, Brant
Sent: Thursday, 18 June 2026 10:47 PM
To: Osborne, Luke; Prattley, Rochelle
Subject: Fw: Preliminary crisis management arrangements - suspect H5 detection in WA [SEC=OFFICIAL]
Attachments: CONOPS - Emergency Animal Disease crises.pdf; 20260106 National H5 Response Communication Strategy_NBCEN updates.docx

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FYI. Not for onforwarding.

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From: Wellington, Michelle
Sent: Thursday, June 18, 2026 10:34 pm
To: Anderson, Victoria ; Lowe, Matt ; Collins, Monica ; Crosthwaite, Kerren ; Cookson, Beth ; Smith, Brant ; Finnin, Peter ; Palfreyman, Louise ; Hamilton, Sam ; Ireland, Cassandra
Cc: Ipkendanz, Chris ; **s. 47E(d)** **s. 47E(d)**
Subject: Preliminary crisis management arrangements - suspect H5 detection in WA [SEC=OFFICIAL]

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Good evening

Further to the earlier notification provided by Beth, I have summarised the current actions and next steps in terms of the DAFF crisis management response.

It is important to note that a significant amount of preparation has been undertaken for this scenario. The trigger for activation of these arrangements has **not yet been met** as it requires 'confirmation of a positive result from the Australian Centre for Disease Preparedness (ACDP)'.

To ensure we are ready to activate if needed, the following actions have been commenced/completed:

1. **Crisis and Incident Response Plan (CIRP):**
 1. move to the **ALERT** phase on the basis that there is a reasonably held suspicion that a coordinated departmental response will be required – **in progress.**
 2. bring capabilities to an enhanced level of readiness for activation – **in progress.**
2. **Concept of Operations – Emergency Animal Disease crises** (attached)
 1. notify key incident management personnel (incident controller, public information lead, planning lead) for possible activation – **completed.**
 2. prepare Incident Control Centre for possible activation – **standing readiness.**
 3. commence crisis appreciation and strategic planning (CASP) in readiness for a coordinated response – **to commence 0800 AEST on 19 June 2026 (tomorrow).**
3. **Crisis Communications**
 1. brief minister's office about pre-prepared communication arrangements – **completed.**
 2. prepare for activation of H5 communication strategy (attached) if required – **completed.**

Pending outcomes of the diagnostic from ACDP, we are well positioned to quickly respond if needed.

Kind regards,

Michelle Wellington PSM

Chief Strategy, Performance and Engagement Officer | First Assistant Secretary | **s. 47F(1)**
 Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry

Strategy, Performance and Engagement Division | Strategy, Enterprise and Engagement Group
Brisbane Regional Office, 42-44 Qantas Drive, Eagle Farm, Queensland, 4000
GPO Box 858, Canberra ACT 2601, Australia

We work flexibly at DAFF. *If you have received an email from me outside of normal business hours, I'm sending it at a time that suits me. I'm not expecting you to read or reply until normal business hours.*

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We acknowledge the continuous connection of First Nations Traditional Owners and Custodians to the lands, seas and waters of Australia. We recognise their care for and cultivation of Country. We pay respect to Elders past and present, and recognise their knowledge and contribution to the productivity, innovation and sustainability of Australia's agriculture, fisheries and forestry industries.

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Concept of Operations (CONOPS)

Emergency Animal Disease (EAD) Crisis

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Version Control

Reference	Responsible	Branch
D23/771188	Chris Ipkendanz, Assistant Secretary	Crisis and Emergency Management

Version	Date of issue	Author	Comments
1.0	4 August 2023	Crisis and Emergency Management	Initial version
2.0	30 November 2023	Crisis and Emergency Management	Various updates
3.0	2 December 2025	Crisis and Emergency Management	Incorporating AGCMF (v4) updates Adjusted for H5 HPAI. Incorporating CIRP (v4.1) updates

1 Parameters

Purpose	This CONOPS provides a framework for the Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry to manage the strategic and operational elements of an emergency animal disease (EAD) crisis in Australia. It supports the mobilisation of departmental resources and facilitates interoperability with other jurisdictions and agencies.
Scope	This CONOPS applies to post-border EAD incidents that: • are of significant scale or have potentially major or catastrophic consequences • require substantial coordination across multiple jurisdictions and agencies to manage.
Trigger	Confirmation of a positive EAD result from the Australian Centre for Disease Preparedness (ACDP).
Strategic Intent	To minimise social, economic, animal welfare and environmental impacts of the EAD crisis, and maintain public trust in government, trade and Australia's biosecurity system.
Objective	Define the roles, responsibilities of departmental officers for managing the response to an EAD crisis.
End State	An effective response to the EAD has been coordinated between the Australian Government, states/territories and industry, enabling a return to routine agricultural and trade conditions, while maintaining public confidence and trust in Australia's biosecurity system and government.

2 Authority

The *Biosecurity Act 2015* (the Act) provides the Director of Biosecurity and the department with the legislative authority to manage biosecurity risks. It also provides the Minister with powers to manage biosecurity risks during an emergency period and declare a Commonwealth body, part of a Commonwealth body or the Australian Defence Force to be a national response agency.

The Australian Government Crisis Management Framework (AGCMF) designates the department as the Australian Government Coordinating Agency for domestic biosecurity crises.

The Australian Government Biosecurity and Agricultural Response Plan (AUSBIOAGPLAN) outlines how the department fulfils its role as Australian Government Coordinating Agency, including the coordination arrangements between Australian Government agencies. The Secretary (or person nominated by the Secretary) has the authority to activate AUSBIOAGPLAN.

The Australian Veterinary Emergency Plan (AUSVETPLAN) contains the nationally agreed approach for responding to EAD incidents in Australia. The plan is captured in a series of manuals and supporting documents and is managed by Animal Health Australia on behalf of its members.

The Crisis and Incident Response Plan (CIRP) outlines the department's internal emergency response arrangements. The Secretary (or person nominated by the Secretary) has the authority to activate the CIRP. The decision to activate the CIRP is informed by advice from the lead business area and Assistant Secretary, Crisis and Emergency Management Branch.

Prior to confirmation of a positive EAD result from the ACDP, the department uses the Lean Forward Protocol for an EAD to guide responses where an EAD is strongly suspected or there is a rumoured detection of an EAD.

This CONOPS describes how a departmental response will be conducted in support of the CIRP arrangements following a positive EAD result from the ACDP.

3 Operating Concept


A tiered command, control and coordination structure will be used to ensure a flexible and scalable response across the strategic, operational and tactical levels (see Figure 1). The tiered structure comprises:

- a strategic level **Response Coordination Group (RCG)**
- an operational level **Incident Management Team (IMT)**
- tactical level **field teams** (if deployed).

The CIRP outlines the coordination arrangements and responsibilities of these tiers and provides an indicative briefing pathway.

[Appendix A](#) lists the key actions the department should take in the first 24 hours after a positive diagnostic confirmation from the ACDP.

Figure 1: Tiered structure and functional alignment



3.1 Response Coordination Group (RCG) [Strategic]

The RCG provides leadership and strategic oversight of the department's response efforts. The RCG comprises relevant senior executives ([Appendix B](#)).

Relative to the scale and complexity of the incident, the RCG will meet regularly to maintain shared situational awareness across the department.

3.2 Incident Management Team (IMT) [Operational]

The IMT controls the department's response and reports to the RCG. The IMT comprises officers deployed from within the department to fulfil specific functional roles set out in [Appendix C](#).

The initial command and control structure for the IMT is set out in [Appendix D](#).

The appointed Incident Controller (IC) manages workflow and tasking within the IMT. Tasks are completed by the IMT functional areas or referred by the IC to the appropriate business area through their Assistant Secretary.

The appointed IC has the authority to obtain relevant staffing resources for the response as outlined in Section 4.6 of the CIRP. The IC will establish a battle rhythm. An indicative battle rhythm is provided at [Appendix E](#).

4 Appendices

[Appendix A – Emergency Animal Disease \(EAD\) initial actions protocol](#)

[Appendix B – Response Coordination Group \(RCG\) membership](#)

[Appendix C – Incident Management Team \(IMT\) functional roles](#)

[Appendix D – IMT control and command structure](#)

[Appendix E – Indicative battle rhythm](#)

Appendix A – Emergency Animal Disease (EAD) initial actions protocol

Officer	0 - 2 hours	2 - 6 hours	6 - 12 hours	12 - 24 hours	+ 24 hours
Australian Chief Veterinary Officer (ACVO)	☐ Receive confirmation of positive EAD result from the Australian Centre for Disease Preparedness (ACDP) ☐ Notify Deputy Secretary Biosecurity, Operations and Compliance and provide verbal situation report ☐ Notify state and territory Chief Veterinary Officers (CVOs) of positive result ☐ Notify relevant technical counterparts within the department and Australian Government ☐ Convene Consultative Committee on Emergency Animal Diseases (CCEAD)	☐ Chair CCEAD meeting and brief CCEAD members on current Australian Government response actions ☐ Prepare for initial media engagements as Australian Government agency spokesperson ☐ Announce nationally significant EAD outbreak ☐ Deliver press conferences with Minister and/or other spokespersons as appropriate	☐ Issue notifications for international reporting ☐ Coordinate with state and territory counterparts as appropriate ☐ Chair additional CCEAD meetings as required ☐ Attend additional NMG meetings as required ☐ Brief international counterparts, including formal notifications as appropriate ☐ Consider International Animal Health Emergency Reserve (IAHER) arrangements	☐ Coordinate with Australian, state and territory counterparts as appropriate. ☐ Chair additional NMG meetings as required ☐ Chair additional RCG meetings as required ☐ Co-chair additional NCM meetings as required	LEX-36384 7 of 349
Deputy Secretary Biosecurity, Operations and Compliance	☐ Notify Secretary and provide verbal situation report ☐ Advise Secretary to activate department Crisis and Incident Response Plan (CIRP) and appoint Incident Controller and Response Coordinator ☐ Advise Secretary to activate Australian Government Biosecurity and Agricultural Response Plan (AUSBIOAGPLAN) if required. ☐ Consider likelihood that a biosecurity emergency declaration needs to be made by Governor-General and advise Secretary	☐ Chair initial Response Coordination Group (RCG) meeting ☐ Convene NMG meeting ☐ Notify Deputy Coordinator-General Emergency Management and Response, National Emergency Management Agency (Deputy CG EMR, NEMA) of AUSBIOAGPLAN phase change	☐ Chair NMG meeting and brief members on expected Australian Government response actions, lines of effort and any support required ☐ Consider if National Coordination Mechanism (NCM) is needed	☐ Co-chair National Coordination Mechanism (NCM) with Deputy CG EMR, NEMA (if required) ☐ Brief NCM on situation, response actions, expected lines of effort and any support required	
Secretary / Director of Biosecurity	☐ Activate CIRP and AUSBIOAGPLAN if required. ☐ Appoint Incident Controller and Response Coordinator ☐ Notify Minister and provide verbal situation report	☐ Notify Secretary of Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet and secretaries of agencies with equity (e.g. Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade) ☐ Notify Agriculture Senior Officials and provide verbal situation report	☐ Agree to suspend certificates for the export of relevant prescribed and non-prescribed that do not meet Importing Country Requirement ☐ Notify key industry players on a confidential basis	☐ Provide briefings to Minister as required, including considerations of biosecurity emergency declaration ☐ Coordinate with Australian, state and territory counterparts as appropriate ☐ Prepare to brief other Australian Government bodies (Cabinet etc)	

Officer	0 - 2 hours	2 - 6 hours	6 - 12 hours	12 - 24 hours	+ 24 hours
Deputy Secretary Agricultural Trade and Regulation	☐ Identify any exports of live animals that won't meet Importing Country Requirements that are about to depart or on the water, contact exporters and advise products will not be allowed to depart / must return to Australia ☐ Request status of processing establishments and live animal exports and confirm animal welfare arrangements in hand ☐ Advise Chief Executive Officer of Food Standards Australia New Zealand of positive detection	☐ Prepare recommendation to suspend certificates for the export of relevant prescribed and non-prescribed that do not meet Importing Country Requirements for consideration and agreement of Minister (through Secretary) ☐ Identify exports of high value goods that won't meet Importing Country Requirements that are about depart or on the water, contact exporters and advise products will not be allowed to depart / may be returned to Australia. ☐ Prepare systems to only issue manual certificates for the export of relevant prescribed and non-prescribed goods ☐ Prepare letters to trading partners to advise of measures being undertaken and the prescribed and non-prescribed goods that may be affected	☐ Confirm Minister's agreement to suspend certificates for the export of relevant prescribed and non-Importing Country Requirements ☐ Suspend certificates for the export of relevant prescribed and non-Importing Country Requirements	☐ Coordinate with international, Australian, state and territory food regulators counterparts as appropriate ☐ Send initial advice to Agriculture Counsellors ☐ Confirm arrangements in place with state and territory counterparts relevant to the department's role in domestic food monitoring	☐ Provide briefings to Minister and Secretary as required ☐ Provide ongoing communication to Agriculture Counsellors
Incident Controller	☐ Establish an IMT and an Incident Control Centre ☐ Brief Response Coordinator and IMT functional managers on the current situation ☐ Initiate rapid risk assessment to inform response options	☐ Approve initial Incident Action Plan (IAP) ☐ Brief RCG on situation, response actions, expected lines of effort and any support required ☐ Activate crisis communications playbook via Public Information function of IMT, including appointment of Australian Government agency spokesperson ☐ Approve national talking points	☐ Finalise rapid risk assessment ☐ Determine whether <i>Biosecurity Act</i> 2015 powers are required to manage the biosecurity risks ☐ Prepare decision brief for Minister and draft biosecurity emergency declaration and/or direction to the Director of Biosecurity	☐ Handover to incoming Incident Controller (if 24/7 operations)	☐ Manage department response via IMT ☐ Consider amendments to risks assessment based on evolving situation
Australian Chief Environmental Biosecurity Officer - if EAD potential hosts include wildlife	☐ Receive briefing from ACVO	☐ Attend initial CCEAD meeting as observer ☐ Support ACVO brief CCEAD members on Australian Government response actions	☐ Attend initial NMG meeting as observer ☐ Support ACVO to provide verbal situation report to NMG ☐ Support response activities as requested	☐ Support response activities as requested	☐ Attend additional CCEAD meetings as observer as required ☐ Attend additional NMG meetings as observer as required ☐ Coordinate with state and territory counterparts as appropriate through Environment and Invasives Committee (EIC) ☐ Support response activities as requested
First Assistant Secretary (FAS) Biosecurity Strategy and Reform	☐ Notify NMG members		☐ Attend NMG meeting as Australian Government representative	☐	☐ Attend additional NMG meetings as required

Officer	0 - 2 hours	2 - 6 hours	6 - 12 hours	12 - 24 hours	+ 24 hours
FAS Strategy, Performance and Engagement	☐ Facilitate arrangements for initial RCG meeting	☐ Attend RCG meeting and provide specialist communication and emergency management advice ☐ Coordinate with interagency crisis communication senior official	☐ Coordinate with interagency crisis communication senior officials	☐ Coordinate with interagency crisis communication senior officials	☐ Coordinate with interagency crisis communication senior officials
Assistant Secretary (AS), Crisis and Emergency	☐ Provide advice to Deputy Secretary Biosecurity, Operations and Compliance and Secretary about activation of CIRP and/or AUSBIOAGPLAN	☐	☐	☐	☐
All SES	☐ Receive briefing from relevant Deputy Secretary ☐ Release staff to support response	☐ Support response activities as requested	☐ Support response activities as requested	☐ Support response activities as requested	☐ Support response activities as requested
Minister	☐ Receive briefing from Secretary ☐ Brief the Prime Minister ☐ Contact other Ministers as appropriate (such as Ministers for Foreign Affairs, Trade, Finance, Health) ☐ Contact state and territory Ministers for Agriculture (as appropriate)	☐ Receive briefings from the department ☐ Agree on proposed communications strategy, particularly Minister's involvement as key Australian Government spokesperson ☐ Agree to suspend certificates for the export of relevant prescribed and non-prescribed that do not meet Importing Country Requirements ☐ Deliver press conferences with key Australian Government agency spokesperson and/or other spokespersons as appropriate	☐ Receive briefings from the department ☐ Agree to suspend certificates for the export of relevant prescribed and non-prescribed that do not meet Importing Country Requirements ☐ Deliver press conferences with key Australian Government agency spokesperson and/or other spokespersons as appropriate	☐ Receive briefings from the department ☐ Sign decision brief: ☐ Determine the need for and recommend to the Governor-General to declare a biosecurity emergency under the <i>Biosecurity Act 2015</i>, where required ☐ Declare national response agencies ☐ Direct national response agency heads and Director of Biosecurity to take specific actions	☐ Receive briefings from the department ☐ Sign decision brief: ☐ Determine the need for and recommend to the Governor-General to declare a biosecurity emergency under the <i>Biosecurity Act 2015</i>, where required ☐ Declare national response agencies ☐ Direct national response agency heads and Director of Biosecurity to take specific actions
Governor General	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐ Make biosecurity emergency declaration, where required
National response agency	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐ Delegate decision makers and provide risk assessment

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Definitions of key terms and acronyms:

ACDP: Australian Centre for Disease Preparedness. Provides Australian Government definitive testing for EADs.

ACEBO: Australian Chief Environmental Biosecurity Officer

ACVO: Australian Chief Veterinary Officer

AgriCCC: Agriculture Crisis Coordination Centre. Function maintained by Crisis and Emergency Management Branch (Strategy, Enterprise and Engagement Group) which is the primary information conduit between the department and the National Situation Room (NSR).

AUSBIOAGPLAN: Australian Government Biosecurity and Agricultural Response Plan. Articulates how DAFF, as Australian Government Coordinating Agency for biosecurity crises coordinates with other agencies.

CCEAD: Consultative Committee for Emergency Animal Diseases. Chaired by ACVO and comprising jurisdictional Chief Veterinary Officers and relevant industry partners. Provides technical input to response planning/activity.

CIRP: Crisis and Incident Response Plan. Describes departmental emergency response arrangements for incidents.

CONOPS: Concept of Operations. An overview of how response operations will be conducted. Describes the coordination arrangements should an incident occur, including how the department's capabilities can be employed to achieve the desired end state.

CVO: Chief Veterinary Officer. Individual holding the position of Chief Veterinary Officer in their jurisdiction.

IAHER: International Animal Health Emergency Reserve. Formal arrangement providing participating countries (Australia, Canada, Ireland, New Zealand, United Kingdom, United States of America) access to additional human resources in the event of an emergency animal disease outbreak.

IAP: Incident Action Plan. The plan used to describe the incident objectives, strategies, resources and other information relevant to the control of an incident. An IAP will generally have application for a single operational period (e.g. 12 hrs, 24 hrs, 72 hrs).

IMT: Incident Management Team. Led by a senior department official. Manages department operational response.

National response agency: Agriculture department and all biosecurity officers and biosecurity enforcement officers; or a body declared (by the Agriculture Minister) under the *Biosecurity Act 2015* to be a national response agency for the purposes of the act.

NBCEN: National Biosecurity Communication and Engagement Network. Provides strategic advice to CCEAD and NMCG, comprising all states/territories and the Australian Government focused on national communications.

NCM: National Coordination Mechanism. Co-chaired by Deputy CG EMR, NEMA and Deputy Secretary Biosecurity, Operations and Compliance. Comprising relevant Australian Government and state/territory agencies and industry.

NCM-AusGov: National Coordination Mechanism – Australian Government. Co-chaired by Deputy CG EMR, NEMA and Deputy Secretary Biosecurity, Operations and Compliance. Comprising relevant Australian Government agencies only.

NMCG: National Management Group. Chaired by Deputy Secretary Biosecurity and comprises senior jurisdictional officials and affected industry parties. Agrees response plan and cost-sharing arrangements.

NSR: National Situation Room. A function maintained by the National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA) which centrally coordinates the Australian Government's response efforts and maintains the National Joint Common Operating Picture.

RCG: Response Coordination Group. Chaired by a senior department official and comprising key senior department officials. Provides strategic guidance to the department operational effort and support for a department lead into the NCM.

Appendix B – Response Coordination Group (RCG) membership

Group	Position
Biosecurity, Operations and Compliance (BOC)	Deputy Secretary; Biosecurity, Operations and Compliance (Response Coordinator)
	Australian Chief Veterinary Officer
	Australian Chief Environmental Biosecurity Officer (if potential EAD hosts include wildlife)
	First Assistant Secretary; Biosecurity Animal
	First Assistant Secretary; Biosecurity Operations
	First Assistant Secretary; Biosecurity Strategy and Reform
Agricultural Trade and Regulation (ATR)	Deputy Secretary; Agricultural Trade and Regulation
	First Assistant Secretary; Trade and International
	First Assistant Secretary; Exports and Veterinary Services
	First Assistant Secretary; Plant and Live Animal Exports, Welfare and Regulation
Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry Policy (AFF)	Executive Director; ABARES
	First Assistant Secretary; Agricultural Policy
Strategy Enterprise and Engagement (SEE)	First Assistant Secretary; Strategy, Performance and Engagement
	Chief Counsel; Legal
	Chief People Officer; People, Property and Security
	Chief Finance Officer; Finance and Investment
	Incident Controller [appointed by the Secretary]
Any	Co-opted or observe as appropriate


Appendix C – Incident Management Team (IMT) functional roles

Note: The size and structure of the IMT should reflect the size and complexity of the EAD crisis and must be adaptable and scalable

Position	#/shift	Function	Lead Division/Branch
Incident Controller	1	Control	s. 47E(d)
Management support officer	2	Control	s. 47E(d)
Liaison Lead	1	Control	s. 47E(d)
Deputy Incident Controller	1	Control	s. 47E(d)
Public Information Officer	1	Public Information	Crisis and Emergency Management Branch
Media Lead	1	Public Information	s. 47E(d)
Media officer	2	Public Information	s. 47E(d)
External Communication Lead	1	Public Information	s. 47E(d)
Social media	2	Public Information	s. 47E(d)
Website	1	Public Information	s. 47E(d)
Advertising	1	Public Information	s. 47E(d)
Internal Communication	1	Public Information	s. 47E(d)
Call Centre Lead	1	Public Information	s. 47E(d)
Call Centre support	4	Public Information	s. 47E(d)
Planning Officer	1	Planning	s. 47E(d)
Strategic Planning Lead	1	Planning	s. 47E(d)
Planning support	2	Planning	s. 47E(d)
Planning support (health)	1	Planning	s. 47E(d)
Planning support (environment)	2	Planning	s. 47E(d)
Planning support (agriculture)	1	Planning	s. 47E(d)
Action Planning Lead	1	Planning	s. 47E(d)
Planning support	2	Planning	s. 47E(d)
Resource Planning Lead	1	Planning	s. 47E(d)
Planning support	1	Planning	s. 47E(d)
Legal support	-	Planning	s. 47E(d)
Legal (via point of contact)	2	Planning	s. 47E(d)
Intelligence Officer	1	Intelligence	s. 47E(d)
Situation and Analysis	2	Intelligence	s. 47E(d)
Mapping and GIS	1	Intelligence	s. 47E(d)
Data, Modelling and Prediction	2	Intelligence	s. 47E(d)
Epidemiology Lead	1	Intelligence	s. 47E(d)
Epidemiologist	2	Intelligence	s. 47E(d)
Operations Officer	1	Operations	s. 47E(d)
Trade Lead	1	Operations	s. 47E(d)
Exports	2	Operations	s. 47E(d)
International	2	Operations	s. 47E(d)
National Coordination Lead	1	Operations	s. 47E(d)
NMG Secretariat	1	Operations	s. 47E(d)
CCEAD Secretariat	1	Operations	s. 47E(d)
NEBRA Secretariat	1	Operations	s. 47E(d)

Position	#/shift	Function	Lead Division/Branch
Logistics Officer	1	Logistics	s. 47E(d)
Facilities officer	1	Logistics	s. 47E(d)
Human resource officer	1	Logistics	s. 47E(d)
ICT support	1	Logistics	s. 47E(d)
National Biosecurity Deployment Coordinator (NBDC)	1	Logistics	s. 47E(d)
Logistics support	2	Logistics	s. 47E(d)
Finance Officer	1	Finance	s. 47E(d)
Accounts support officer	1	Finance	s. 47E(d)
Procurement support officer	1	Finance	s. 47E(d)

Functional alignment



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Australian Government
Department of Agriculture,
Fisheries and Forestry

National H5 avian influenza (bird flu) response communication strategy

June 2026

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Executive summary

This strategy sets out how the Australian Government will communicate during a confirmed outbreak of H5 avian influenza (bird flu). It applies only to the response phase, activated by the Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry when an incursion is confirmed, and provides nationally consistent guidance on communication roles, objectives and arrangements.

The strategy draws heavily from the Biosecurity Incident Public Information Manual (BIPIM), ensuring alignment with established public information (PI) management arrangements under the Australian Government Crisis Management Framework (AGCMF) and the National Coordination Mechanism (NCM). It provides disease-specific guidance for H5 bird flu, focusing on relevant priority audiences, messaging and communication tactics.

The strategy is also informed by the Verian Behavioural Insights Research conducted in 2025 to better understand public attitudes, behaviours, and awareness gaps around H5 bird flu.

Communication objectives for the response phase are to:

1. Deliver timely, accurate and nationally consistent information to the public, stakeholders and international partners.
2. Maintain trust in the Government's response through clear, calm and culturally appropriate communication.
3. Support awareness of and compliance with response measures by ensuring messages are practical and actionable.

The strategy is supported by separate living documents, including National Talking Points, Day 1-3 communication products and response toolkits — which provide the operational content needed during an outbreak.

How to use this strategy

This strategy is activated **only in the event of a confirmed H5 bird flu incursion in Australia or an Australian external territory**. It provides nationally consistent communication objectives, roles, and guidance, building on the BIPIM.

Use this document to understand:

- Who leads communication during a response and how responsibilities shift between the Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry (DAFF), the Department of Health Disability and Ageing and the Australian Centre for Disease Control (DHDA/CDC), the Department of Climate Change, Energy, Environment and Water (DCCEEW), and the states and territory biosecurity agencies.
- What the response communication objectives are and how agencies will work together.
- How the response is coordinated, including principles, governance, priority audiences and the range of communication tactics available.

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For the latest messaging, templates or collateral, refer directly to the linked toolkits and National Talking Points (NTPs).

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Purpose and context

Purpose

This response communication strategy provides nationally consistent guidance on how Australia will communicate during a confirmed outbreak of H5 bird flu. It applies only to the response phase and is activated when an incursion is confirmed by the Australian Government. The strategy ensures communication is rapid, accurate, clear and coordinated across all jurisdictions.

Scope and activation triggers

The strategy comes into effect when H5 bird flu is confirmed in Australia by the Australian Chief Veterinary Officer (ACVO), whether in commercial poultry, backyard birds, wild birds, or other affected species. It guides communication activities for the Australian Government, in partnership with states, territories, industry and stakeholder organisations throughout the response.


This document does not cover preparedness activities in detail. These are addressed in the H5 Bird Flu Preparedness Communication Action Plan, which supports early awareness and readiness before a detection occurs. It is likely that some activities may cross over between the 2 phases.

Alignment with national frameworks

The strategy draws heavily on the BIPIM which sets out national PI management arrangements for biosecurity incidents. It adapts those arrangements to the specific challenges of H5 bird flu, particularly in relation to priority audiences, messaging and communication tactics.

The strategy is also aligned with the Australian Government Crisis Management Framework (AGCMF) and operates under the NCM, through which communication activities are coordinated across agencies and jurisdictions.

Strategic public information decision making and tactical implementation will be achieved through the following networks, which align with the AGCMF:



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Governance and coordination

Roles and responsibilities

Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry (DAFF)

DAFF is the lead agency for national communication during an animal health incursion. It coordinates whole-of-government messaging, develops and clears national products such as NTPs and toolkits, and ensures consistency across jurisdictions.

Department of Health, Disability and Ageing (DHDA)/Australian Centre for Disease Control (CDC)

DHDA/CDC leads communication if human-to-human transmission occurs. During animal-only outbreaks, or where animal to human transmission occurs, DHDA/CDC works closely with DAFF to align public health messaging with national animal health communication.

Department of Climate Change, Energy, the Environment and Water (DCCEEW)

DCCEEW provides communication support on biodiversity, conservation and environmental impacts, specifically focused on species listed under the *Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act (1999)* working with DAFF and state and territory agencies on relevant messaging.

States and territories

States and territories lead the operational response within their jurisdictions and are responsible for delivering communication locally. This includes engaging with local media, communicating directly with affected communities, and providing operational messaging to support on-the-ground activities. While they adapt national messaging to local contexts, alignment with the national position is maintained through the National Biosecurity Communication and Engagement Network (NBCEN) and environment and health communication networks.

Oversight and coordination mechanisms

Communication during an H5 bird flu outbreak is coordinated at 3 levels:

1. National coordination

At the national level, communication is guided by the AGCMF and the NCM. The NCM Communication Domain ensures whole-of-government alignment across agencies and portfolios. NBCEN and environment and health networks link the Commonwealth with state and territory governments, ensuring nationally consistent messaging while supporting local delivery.

2. Across the Australian Government

Communication across the Australian Government is coordinated through the Communication Domain under the NCM. Led by DAFF, the group brings together senior communication representatives from Commonwealth portfolios including agriculture, health, environment and emergency management. The Communication Domain integrates and aligns communication priorities, coordinates public messaging, and provides clear direction to agencies responsible for delivering public information activities.

3. Within agencies

Each department or agency applies its internal incident or crisis communication processes to manage response activities. For DAFF, this is normally through an Incident Management Team (IMT) structure, with the PI function coordinating day-to-day operations. Other

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agencies, such as DHDA/CDC and DCCEEW, use their own established processes to ensure communication products are cleared quickly, messaging is consistent, and advice is provided to ministers and stakeholders without delay.

Escalation and clearance pathways


All H5 bird flu response communication must follow agreed clearance processes to ensure accuracy, consistency and national alignment. Pre-prepared products—such as the Day 1–3 (0–72 hours) communication resources and the NTPs—are designed to enable rapid communication but still require approval before release.

Clearance and escalation processes are shown in the communication clearance flowcharts (included in this section) and supported by the roles and responsibilities (RACI) summary in Appendix B.

Clearing officers during a response


- **DAFF** – IMT Incident Controller
- **DCCEEW** – Threatened Species Commissioner
- **DHDA/CDC** – Assistant Secretary, Strategic Communication, Australian Centre for Disease Control

National talking points – process in response



* Each agency responsible for seeking internal agency feedback and clearance

Other communication products development – process in response



PI section from each agency responsible for seeking internal agency feedback

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Response objectives and approach

Response communication objectives

During a confirmed H5 bird flu outbreak, communication activities will focus on 3 core objectives:

1. Deliver rapid, accurate and nationally consistent information to the public, stakeholders and international partners.
2. Maintain trust and confidence in the government's response through clear, calm and culturally appropriate communication.
3. Support awareness of and compliance with response measures by ensuring messages are practical, actionable and reinforced through trusted channels.

Guiding principles

Communication will be guided by principles that are consistent with the BIPIM adapted here to the specific challenges of H5 bird flu.



Communication principles are also informed by behavioural insights research from July 2025 and aim to overcome the identified barriers to engaging with response measures. General population insights include:

- Willingness to comply with potential response measures is likely to be fairly high, but is shaped by a combination of perceived legitimacy, response efficacy, and morality. There is a need to use trusted voices and channels and provide clear rationales and logic for response measures.
- There is a lingering emotional toll from COVID-19, which creates a need to instil a sense that the H5 strain is serious but not necessarily on a 'pandemic' human health scale, to avoid fear and overwhelm.

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- People feel a sense of helplessness surrounding H5 bird flu, so there is a need to communicate that there are positive things the community can do. Knowing that there are small things people can do helps them to feel less helpless and engage more with H5 bird flu.

For a summary of priority audience insights, including information needs and preferred channels, see Appendix A: Audience Insights.

Strategic approach

The communication response will be delivered through a layered, scalable approach:

- **Pre-prepared resources** – activation of NTPs and Day 1 products immediately upon confirmation of an outbreak, ensuring rapid release of first messages.
- **National alignment** – DAFF, DHDA/CDC and DCCEEW will coordinate through the Whole-of-Australian-Government H5 Bird Flu Communications Working Group, supported by NBCEN for state and territory alignment.
- **Specialist engagement** – agencies with established connections to First Nations and CALD audiences will be engaged as required to ensure cultural appropriateness and reach.
- **Campaign activation** – if needed, the government may deliver paid, targeted information and advertising campaigns.
- **Countering misinformation** – monitoring tools (e.g. Sprinklr) will detect and assist agencies respond to misinformation and disinformation rapidly.

All activities will be guided by the BIPIM, ensuring they reflect established national arrangements while tailoring delivery to the specific risks and challenges of H5 bird flu.

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Priority external audiences and messaging

Primary audiences

During a H5 bird flu outbreak, communication will focus on external audiences most directly affected or critical to the response. Audience insights guiding the tailored approaches are informed by the Verian Behavioural Insights Research (2025) and captured in Appendix A: Audience insights.

Audience	Communication focus
1. General public	Inform and reassure about health, food safety, everyday impacts and how you can help (i.e. backyard chickens, wildlife etc.)
2. Commercial poultry and egg industry	Inform and involve (through Industry Liaison Officer) to ensure compliance with response measures and provision of business-critical information
3. Backyard poultry and bird owners (including peri-urban and hobby farmers)	Inform to raise awareness of risks, biosecurity actions and reporting requirements
4. Veterinarians and animal health professionals	Inform and consult (through ACVO / policy line area) to share trusted technical advice for both industry and the public
5. First Nations communities	Inform to provide culturally safe and locally relevant communication, particularly in northern and regional areas
6. CALD communities	Inform with information tailored to language and cultural needs
7. Wildlife and environment groups, and bird enthusiasts	Inform with support for surveillance and reporting, and adoption of safe practices such as avoiding handling dead birds, using protective equipment when required, and reporting unusual wild bird deaths through official channels
8. Hunters	Inform with guidance on disease risks in wild birds, safe handling and disposal practices, use of personal protective equipment, and reporting requirements

Secondary audiences

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These groups are less directly affected but play important roles in influencing outcomes or perceptions:

Audience	Communication focus
1. Aged care and health sector organisations	Inform regarding human health risks and infection control
2. Animal welfare groups	Inform to acknowledge the impact of the disease and of control measures on animals and wildlife
3. Trading partners	Inform to provide clear information on response arrangements, food safety assurances, work toward Proof of Freedom etc
4. Local governments and NGOs	Inform to provide support for local engagement and information flow
5. Pet owners	Inform as required regarding disease risk between animals e.g. dogs, cats and birds
6. Supply chain	Inform regarding supply shortages (e.g. eggs or chicken meat) and economic impacts (e.g. increased retail and wholesale pricing). Include supermarkets / green grocers / butchers, consumers, bakeries, restaurants etc.
7. Grain and broader agricultural industry (including industry groups and organisations)	Inform as required regarding mixed farming operations that may grow / supply grain for poultry feed.

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Message hierarchy

All outbreak communication will flow from a nationally consistent set of core lines:

- NTPs – the primary reference for spokespeople and communication products.
- Media and public releases – drawing directly from NTPs to ensure alignment across governments.
- FAQs, collateral and stakeholder updates – tailored to specific audiences but grounded in the same NTPs.

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- State and territory communication – adapted to local context while remaining aligned through NBCEN.

Living documents

This strategy does not contain detailed messaging. Instead, messaging is maintained and updated in:

- NTPs – managed separately and updated as the situation evolves.
- H5 bird flu response communication plan (Day 1-3) and resource kit – containing guidance on key activities for the first 72 hours of a response and pre-prepared products for use by the Australian Government and jurisdictions.

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Communication tactics

Effective response communication will use a coordinated mix of channels, spokespeople, products and pre-prepared resources. This section describes the core tactics to be used during an H5 bird flu response.

Detailed templates and pre-drafted products are contained in the Day 1–3 (0–72 hours) Communication Resource Kit.

Coordinated communication will be essential when delivering public messaging during a H5 bird flu response. Within DAFF, an IMT will be stood up, with the Public Information Manager (PIM) responsible for outbreak communication and supported by the PI function. See Appendix B.

Media

Media will remain a primary channel in the early stages of the response. Consistent NTPs will underpin all media releases, media enquiries, interviews and press conferences, ensuring alignment across Australian Government portfolios and states and territories. Media monitoring will provide near real-time insights to inform adjustments.

Spokesperson framework

Well briefed and aligned expert spokespeople are essential to maintaining public trust during an outbreak. The framework identifies the key ministerial and technical leads at both the Australian Government and state/territory levels.

Level	Ministerial spokespeople	Technical spokespeople
DAFF	Minister for Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry (national response)	Chief Veterinary Officer (animal health)
DHDA/CDC	Minister for Health and Aged Care (if human-to-human transmission occurs)	TBC
DCCEEW	Minister for the Environment and Water (Matters of National Environmental Significance)	Threatened Species Commissioner (if required)
States and Territories (including external territory partners)	Agriculture Minister (jurisdictional response)	Chief Veterinary Officer (animal health), Chief Health Officer (human health), Environment spokesperson (as appropriate)

Spokespeople will be supported by the NTPs and briefed regularly during the outbreak to maintain consistency.

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OFFICIAL**Social media**

Social media platforms will be critical for rapid public communication. Pre-prepared posts from the resource kit will be published soon after public announcement of the detection on DAFF social media platforms and stakeholder organisations will be encouraged to share our posts. Monitoring tools will identify emerging misinformation and disinformation, allowing for fast and targeted counter-messaging. Where required, geotargeted content will be used to reach affected communities.

Websites

The outbreak.gov.au website (managed by DAFF) will serve as the primary source of truth during an H5 bird flu response, particularly for poultry and wider agriculture industry audience groups. It will provide real-time updates, official announcements, and urgent public health and animal health information. All Commonwealth and state/territory agencies will link back to this site to ensure nationally consistent messaging.

The birdflu.gov.au website (managed by DAFF) will remain a central information hub for the public and house advertising campaign material (including Accountable Authority certification). During the response, it will direct visitors to outbreak.gov.au for all live updates and response-specific information. It will provide fast action links to relevant government websites with background information on bird flu, preparedness resources, and broader awareness content including human health advice.

Rapid website publishing templates are included in the resource kits to ensure consistent branding, design and content across all platforms.

Paid advertising

A national response campaign advertising plan has been developed to enable rapid activation of public notices and behavioural change advertising if required. This plan enables paid placement of public information notices to commence quickly following an outbreak, and the rapid development and launch of a behavioural change campaign drawing on the insights gathered through the behavioural research project.

All paid advertising will be delivered in consultation with combat states to ensure it complements and supports jurisdictional public information activities, which may also include advertising at the local or state level.

Specialist agencies will be engaged as required to ensure communication materials that are culturally appropriate and effective are created for First Nations and CALD audiences.

Collateral and factsheets

FAQs, infographics, posters and stakeholder packs will be used to provide accessible information. Pre-drafted materials are included in the Day 1–3 (0–72 hours) Communication Resource Kit, with flexibility for adaptation by states, territories, industry and organisational partners.

Call centres

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The DAFF call centre or National Emergency Call Centre Surge Capability (if required) will use pre-prepared scripts and FAQs, included in the Day 1–3 (0–72 hours) Communication Resource Kit. Updates will be pushed regularly from National Talking Points to maintain alignment with other channels.

Stakeholder engagement

Direct communication with key stakeholders — including industry bodies, local governments, NGOs and community leaders — will be supported through stakeholder packs and briefing templates. The NBCEN will remain the primary coordination channel with states and territories.

A notification protocol sets out who needs to be informed, what information they require, and in what order. This ensures that critical stakeholders (such as industry leaders, peak bodies, influential non-government organisations, and state and territory partners) are informed before a public announcement is made. Applying this protocol maintains trust, avoids surprises, and enables stakeholders to support and reinforce public messages.

Internal communication

Staff across DAFF, DHDA/CDC, DCCEEW and other relevant agencies will receive regular updates to ensure visibility, consistent information and readiness.

Pre-drafted communication resources

A Day 1–3 (0–72 hours) Communication Resource Kit has been developed to enable rapid activation of pre-drafted materials in the critical first 3 days of a response. The kit includes a holding statement, media release, FAQs, call centre scripts, website and social media content, stakeholder notification templates, and internal communication products.

The kit is supported by a Day 1–3 Communication Plan, which is pre-drafted to guide the DAFF PIM on what to use and when. The plan sets out:

- Day 1 (first 24 hours): activities required immediately following confirmation, when information may be incomplete and operational tempo is highest. This includes activating NTPs, applying the notification protocol, releasing a first media statement, briefing call centres, updating outbreak.gov.au, issuing internal staff messages, and holding an initial press conference and social posts as required.
- Day 2–3 (24–72 hours): activities that extend and reinforce communication once the initial announcements are in place. These include updated FAQs and call centre scripts, further media releases and press conferences if required, updated NTPs, expanded web content, stakeholder briefings, rollout of collateral (posters, factsheets, social media tiles), and engagement with First Nations and CALD audiences.

The Day 1–3 Communication Plan specifies audiences, responsibilities, timing and sequencing, providing a structured roadmap for the PIM and communication teams. The plan ensures that critical activities are prioritised, and key stakeholders are informed before public announcements.

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Detailed operational checklists for public information activities are provided in the BIPIM. This strategy references those arrangements and provides a H5 bird flu-specific plan to complement them. A summary of the plan is available in Appendix C.

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Risks and mitigations

The table below outlines the key risks and the strategies in place to manage them.

Risk	Mitigation
Misinformation and disinformation	- Active monitoring (e.g. Sprinklr) of media and social media by media section/embedded media officer. - Rapid correction of misinformation in media or in social media comments by social media section/embedded social media officer. - Use of pre-prepared Day 1–3 resources (including FAQs) to ensure accurate information is provided quickly, and before an information vacuum can form.
Inconsistent messaging across jurisdictions or response stages	- National Talking Points provide a consistent communication foundation while allowing jurisdictions to adapt messaging to local circumstances and response stages. - Ongoing consultation with combat states and territories to ensure messaging reflects operational realities and support local requirements. - Coordination through NBCEN to align communication products, stakeholder engagement and public messaging across jurisdictions. - Regular review and update of communication products as the response evolves.
Delayed communication	- Streamlined clearance processes with pre-approved templates and mapped escalation pathways. - Use of pre-drafted Day 1–3 resources to reduce development time. - Stand up IMT and PI function to coordinate communication development and approvals.
Negative public sentiment (e.g. mass depopulation, restrictions)	- Transparent messaging with clear rationale and justification (underpinned by morality, legitimacy and efficacy – based on behavioural insights research) for response actions. - Early acknowledgement of impacts and compassionate messaging targeted to those most impacted.
Limited reach to diverse audiences	Translation of vital information into languages other than English with high populations who report low English language proficiency.

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	• Engagement of external specialist agencies (as part of paid advertising campaign) and targeted outreach to First Nations and CALD communities. • Incorporate accessible language and communication formats to meet the needs of individuals with low literacy.
Loss of stakeholder trust due to poorly timed, mis-targeted or overwhelming information.	• Pre-incursion identification and agreement on priority stakeholder groups, including sequencing and timing of engagement. • Application of the agreed notification protocol to brief key stakeholders ahead of, or in parallel with, public announcements where appropriate. • Phased release of information aligned to response stages (Day 1–3 and beyond) to avoid overloading audiences with unnecessary or premature detail. • Tailoring of messages and channels to stakeholder needs, roles and level of decision-making authority.

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Monitoring and evaluation

Monitoring and evaluation will ensure that communication activities remain effective, responsive, and aligned with national objectives throughout the response.

Monitoring

- Media monitoring will track coverage, accuracy and tone in real time.
- Social media monitoring tools (e.g. Sprinklr) will provide daily insights into public sentiment, emerging misinformation, and priority issues.
- Stakeholder feedback will be captured through NBCEN, industry bodies, and community networks to identify concerns early.
- Call centre reporting will provide data on enquiry volumes, trends and key questions.

Evaluation

Effectiveness of communication activities will be measured against the strategic objectives.

Objective	Key measures	Data sources	Frequency
Deliver rapid, accurate and nationally consistent information	• Time from confirmation to first public release • Consistency of messaging across agencies and jurisdictions	Media monitoring reports NBCEN feedback Clearance records	Daily during response
Maintain trust and confidence in the government's response	• Public sentiment trends • Accuracy and tone of media coverage • Stakeholder confidence (qualitative feedback)	Social listening (Sprinklr) Media monitoring Stakeholder feedback via NBCEN/industry channels	Daily/weekly
Support compliance with response measures	• Awareness and understanding of key actions • Reported compliance behaviours • Enquiry volumes on control measures	Call centre data State/territory compliance reporting	Weekly/fortnightly
Reach diverse audiences (First Nations, CALD)	• Access to tailored materials • Use of translated/culturally appropriate resources	Website/social analytics NBCEN/community networks	Weekly/fortnightly
Counter misinformation and disinformation	• Volume and type of misinformation detected • Response time to correct inaccurate information • Effectiveness of counter-messaging	Sprinklr reporting Media monitoring	Daily

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Appendix A: Audience insights

The July 2025 H5 bird flu behavioural insights research identified key communication audiences. The table below summarises their concerns, information needs, and preferred communication approaches. This provides the foundation for all messaging and products developed under this strategy.

Audience	Concerns / attitudes	Information needs	Preferred channels / approaches
General public	Fear of human health impacts; food safety concerns; shock /grief at wildlife impacts, confusion about risks	Clarity on health risk to people; food safety (eggs/poultry safe to eat); how you can help biodiversity; what to do if they see sick/dead birds	Mass media, government websites (outbreak.gov.au), social media, FAQs, call centre
Commercial poultry and egg industry	Economic impact; risk of depopulation; trade/export restrictions	Clear instructions on response measures; compensation and business support; international trade status	Direct briefings through industry bodies; agriculture media; tailored factsheets
Backyard poultry owners	Emotional attachment to birds; limited knowledge of biosecurity	Simple guidance on reporting and control measures; reassurance on safety	Local councils; community groups; NBCEN channels; easy-to-read factsheets
Veterinarians and animal health professionals (including wildlife carers)	Concern for animal welfare and human mental health; high workload; role as trusted advisors	Technical detail on detection, reporting, and response protocols	Professional associations; direct email alerts; technical webinars
First Nations communities	Connection to Country and native species; food security concerns (remote communities) reliance on local networks	Locally relevant information; culturally safe messaging; trusted community voices	First Nations communication agencies; ranger networks; radio and community media
CALD communities	Language barriers; reliance on cultural networks	Translated resources; clear information on risks, safety and actions	Specialist multicultural agencies; translated factsheets; social and ethnic media
Wildlife and environment groups	Concern about impacts on wild birds and biodiversity (individuals, populations and species)	Surveillance information; role of wild birds; advice on reporting	NGOs, conservation groups, environment department networks

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Trading partners	Risk of trade restrictions; perception of Australia’s response	Clear communication on outbreak status, control measures, and food safety	DAFF trade and market access channels; ministerial statements
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Appendix B: Roles and responsibilities

The table below outlines responsibilities for communication during an H5 bird flu outbreak. It reflects the role of the Australian Government, led by DAFF as the combat lead agency, alongside supporting portfolios (DHDA/CDC, DCCEEW) and state/territory Public Information functions.

Within DAFF, an Incident Management Team (IMT) will be stood up, with the Public Information Manager (PIM) responsible for outbreak communication and supported by the PI function.

Task	Responsible	Accountable	Consulted	Informed
National Talking Points (NTPs)	DAFF IMT – PI function (PIM)	Australian Chief Veterinary Officer (OCVO) / IMT Controller	DHDA/CDC, DCCEEW, NBCEN	Ministers, states/territories, stakeholders
Media release – national	DAFF IMT – PI (draft); DAFF Media (approval/dispatch)	DAFF Minister / Exec	DHDA/CDC, DCCEEW, combat state/territory (if relevant)	States/territories, stakeholders
Media release – state/territory	State/territory IMT – PI	State/territory Chief Veterinary Officer (CVO) / Minister	DAFF IMT – PI; NBCEN	DAFF, DHDA/CDC, DCCEEW
Spokespeople coordination	DAFF IMT – PI	DAFF IMT Controller / Exec	DHDA/CDC, DCCEEW, state/territories	Media, stakeholders
Stakeholder notification (protocol)	DAFF IMT – PI	DAFF IMT Controller	States/territories, industry reps	Ministers, wider stakeholders
Website – outbreak.gov.au	DAFF IMT – PI (web team)	DAFF IMT – PIM	DHDA/CDC, DCCEEW	States/territories, public
Website – jurisdictional	State/territory IMT – PI	State/territory PIM	DAFF IMT – PI (for alignment)	NBCEN, public
Social media – national	DAFF IMT – PI (social team)	DAFF IMT – PIM	DHDA/CDC, DCCEEW	States/territories, stakeholders

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Social media – jurisdictional	State/territory IMT – PI	State/territory PIM	DAFF IMT – PI (for alignment)	NBCEN
Call centre scripts – national	DAFF IMT – PI	DAFF IMT Controller	Services Australia, DHDA/CDC	States/territories
Call centre scripts – jurisdictional	State/territory IMT – PI	State/territory PIM	DAFF IMT – PI (for consistency)	NBCEN
Stakeholder briefings – national	DAFF IMT – PI; NBCEN	DAFF IMT Controller	DHDA/CDC, DCCEEW, combat state/territory	Industry, NGOs, councils
Stakeholder briefings – jurisdictional	State/territory IMT – PI	State/territory CVO / Exec	DAFF IMT – PI (for alignment)	NBCEN, industry
Internal staff updates	DAFF IMT – PI; agency internal comms	DAFF Executive / IMT Controller	DHDA/CDC, DCCEEW	All staff

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Appendix C: Day 1–3 (0–72 hours) Communication plan

This plan provides a high-level sequence of communication activities for the first 72 hours of an H5 bird flu response. It is designed to guide the PIM and PI function through critical early actions. *[Insert link to H5 bird flu response Day 1–3 (0–72 hours) communication plan]*

Timing	Activity	Audience	Responsibility
Day 1 (0–24 hours)	Activate NTPs	Agencies, NBCEN, stakeholders	DAFF IMT – PI (PIM responsible)
	Apply notification protocol (before public release)	Ministers, combat state, industry	DAFF Executive / PIM
	Issue first media statement	Media, general public	DAFF IMT – PI (draft); DAFF Media (dispatch)
	Initial press conference	Media, public	DAFF IMT – PI (Media team)
	Update outbreak.gov.au	Public	DAFF IMT – PI (web team)
	Push first social posts	Public	DAFF IMT – PI (social team)
	Issue call centre scripts	Call centre staff	DAFF IMT – PI
	DAFF staff internal update	Internal staff	DAFF IMT – PI / Internal Comms
Day 2–3 (24–72 hours)	Update FAQs and call centre scripts	Public, media	DAFF IMT – PI
	Issue further media release(s) if required	Media, stakeholders	DAFF IMT – PI / DAFF Media
	Update NTPs	States/territories, stakeholders	DAFF IMT – PI
	Hold additional press conference(s) if required	Media, public	Ministers / spokespeople
	Conduct stakeholder/industry briefings	Industry bodies, councils, NGOs	DAFF IMT – PI; NBCEN
	Expand web content beyond Outbreak.gov.au	Public	DAFF IMT – PI (web team)
	Roll out collateral (posters, factsheets, tiles)	Public, community groups	DAFF IMT – PI; states/territories
	Begin targeted comms for First Nations and CALD audiences	First Nations and CALD communities	Specialist agencies / DAFF IMT – PI

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s. 22(1)(a)(ii)

From: s. 22(1)(a)(ii)
Sent: Friday, 19 June 2026 3:53 PM
To: Prattley, Rochelle; Osborne, Luke; s. 22(1)(a)(ii)
Subject: FW: Tasking on H5 [SEC=OFFICIAL:Sensitive]
Attachments: HPAI trade insights piece - DRAFT.docx

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Can probably populate our points into this

OFFICIAL: Sensitive

From: s. 22(1)(a)(ii)
Sent: Friday, 19 June 2026 3:48 PM
To: s. 22(1)(a)(ii)
Cc: s. 22(1)(a)(ii)
Subject: RE: Tasking on H5 [SEC=OFFICIAL:Sensitive]

OFFICIAL: Sensitive

Hi all,

Please find attached for your comment TID's first draft at this piece. We've done our best to include relevant information from the briefs and previous work you all passed through, but welcome feedback and additional insights.

I will aim to get this into Jared around 5-5:30, so any input you can provide before then would be greatly welcomed! Noting that he is aware this will be a draft and additional work/changes will come through next week.

Thanks again,
s. 22(1)(a)(ii)
Director a/g | Trade Data and Economic Security

Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry
Trade and International Division | Asia, Middle East, Africa and Trade Information Branch
70 Northborne Avenue
GPO Box 858 Canberra ACT 2601 Australia

agriculture.gov.au

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From: s. 22(1)(a)(ii) [<@aff.gov.au>](mailto:@aff.gov.au)
Sent: Friday, 19 June 2026 1:33 PM

To: s. 22(1)(a)(ii) @aff.gov.au>; s. 22(1)(a)(ii) @aff.gov.au>
Cc: s. 22(1)(a)(ii) @aff.gov.au>; s. 22(1)(a)(ii) @aff.gov.au>;
s. 22(1)(a)(ii) @aff.gov.au>; s. 22(1)(a)(ii) @aff.gov.au>
Subject: RE: Tasking on H5 [SEC=OFFICIAL:Sensitive]

OFFICIAL: Sensitive

Thanks ^{s. 22(1)(a)(ii)}, your email came through just before I was hitting send on mine!

Please see attached some of our HPAI trade impact analysis in case helpful – note that the data is from 2022/23

We are working on points addressing potential trade impacts for Biosecurity Animal commodities for the following threshold issues, namely HPAI detection in: 1. non-poultry (ie wild birds), 2. poultry non-production (ie backyard poultry), 3. production poultry, and 4. other (ie livestock, other live animals).

Note that Biosecurity Animal has policy responsibility for exports of live animals and germplasm – so inclusive of live birds, day old chicks, hatching eggs, avian genetics and specific pathogen free (SPF) eggs. Exports Standards covers basically everything else. We will review our points with ^{s. 22(1)(a)(ii)} ahead of providing them to you

Thanks and happy to chat,


^{s. 22(1)}

s. 22(1)(a)(ii)

Director | International Strategy and Regionalisation | s. 22(1)(a)(ii)

Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry
Animal Strategy and Coordination Branch | Biosecurity Animal Division
Agriculture House, 70 Northbourne Ave, Canberra ACT 2601 Australia
GPO Box 858 Canberra ACT 2601 Australia

agriculture.gov.au



We acknowledge the continuous connection of First Nations Traditional Owners and Custodians to the lands, seas and waters of Australia. We recognise their care for and cultivation of Country. We pay respect to Elders past and present, and recognise their knowledge and contribution to the productivity, innovation and sustainability of Australia's agriculture, fisheries and forestry industries.

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From: s. 22(1)(a)(ii) @aff.gov.au>

Sent: Friday, 19 June 2026 12:36 PM

To: s. 22(1)(a)(ii) @aff.gov.au>; s. 22(1)(a)(ii) @aff.gov.au>
Cc: s. 22(1)(a)(ii) @aff.gov.au>; s. 22(1)(a)(ii) @aff.gov.au>
Subject: RE: Tasking on H5 [SEC=OFFICIAL:Sensitive]

OFFICIAL: Sensitive

G'day ^{s. 22(1)} and ^{s. 22(1)(a)(ii)},

Just sending this email to link up all the relevant points of contact working on this. I've attached my email chain with s. 22(1)(a)(ii) for a bit of additional context, but the long and short of it is:

- Jared Greenville has asked us for a joined-up intel piece on potential impacts, with a first pass draft ideally in by **EOD today** (aware that may be pushing it and happy to push back on behalf of the group as required)
- I will pass through TID's first draft on the trade data and intel side of things after lunch once we have cleaned it up a bit
- Keen to see what everyone else is pulling together and work as a group to get single united piece up to exec
- If you could pass through existing analysis Luke mentioned below, that would be great and I'll start weaving it into the piece we're working on

Let me know what timelines look like on your end, and happy to try and get some time in the calendar for us to reconvene later today (or just keep comms on email)

Thanks all,
s. 22(1)(a)(ii)
Director a/g | Trade Data and Economic Security

Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry
Trade and International Division | Asia, Middle East, Africa and Trade Information Branch
70 Northborne Avenue
GPO Box 858 Canberra ACT 2601 Australia

agriculture.gov.au

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From: Osborne, Luke <Luke.Osborne@aff.gov.au>
Sent: Friday, 19 June 2026 12:13 PM
To: s. 22(1)(a)(ii) @aff.gov.au>
Cc: Carr, Rossana <Rossana.Carr@aff.gov.au>; s. 22(1)(a)(ii) @aff.gov.au>; s. 22(1)(a)(ii) @aff.gov.au>; s. 22(1)(a)(ii) @aff.gov.au>; s. 22(1)(a)(ii) @aff.gov.au>; Prattley, Rochelle <Rochelle.Prattley@aff.gov.au>
Subject: RE: Tasking on H5 [SEC=OFFICIAL:Sensitive]

OFFICIAL: Sensitive

Hi ^{s. 22(1)(a)(ii)}

s. 22(1)(a)(ii) and s. 22(1)(a)(ii) as PoCs please.

This is coverage across both areas.

We have existing analysis on poultry commodities we're responsible which can be shared and happy to contribute to the other elements.

Thanks
Luke

OFFICIAL: Sensitive

From: s. 22(1)(a)(ii) <[s. 22\(1\)\(a\)\(ii\)@aff.gov.au](mailto:s.22(1)(a)(ii)@aff.gov.au)>
Sent: Friday, 19 June 2026 11:15 AM
To: Osborne, Luke <Luke.Osborne@aff.gov.au>; Prattley, Rochelle <Rochelle.Prattley@aff.gov.au>
Cc: Carr, Rossana <Rossana.Carr@aff.gov.au>; s. 22(1)(a)(ii) <[s. 22\(1\)\(a\)\(ii\)@aff.gov.au](mailto:s.22(1)(a)(ii)@aff.gov.au)>;
Subject: FW: Tasking on H5 [SEC=OFFICIAL:Sensitive]

OFFICIAL: Sensitive

Hi Luke, Rochelle,

If available, grateful for suitable points of contact for my team to work with on preparing the intel piece described by Jared in the trail below,

Thanks ^{s. 22(1)(a)(ii)}

s. 22(1)(a)(ii) (he/him/his)
(a) Assistant Secretary, Asia Middle East Africa and Trade Information | s. 22(1)(a)(ii)
Trade and International Division
Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry
Ngunnawal Country
✉ s. 22(1)(a)(ii) <[s. 22\(1\)\(a\)\(ii\)@aff.gov.au](mailto:s.22(1)(a)(ii)@aff.gov.au)> (P)



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From: Carr, Rossana <Rossana.Carr@aff.gov.au>
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To: s. 22(1)(a)(ii) <[s. 22\(1\)\(a\)\(ii\)@aff.gov.au](mailto:s.22(1)(a)(ii)@aff.gov.au)>; Somerville, Anna <Anna.Somerville@aff.gov.au>
Subject: RE: Tasking on H5 [SEC=OFFICIAL:Sensitive]

OFFICIAL: Sensitive

Hi ^{s. 22(1)(a)(i)}

My branch is getting together some information relating to consignments that may be affected.

Trade and market access work for live animals is done by the Animal Biosecurity Branch via Rochelle Prattley, so it would be worth reaching out to her - or even to Luke Osborne in the Animal Strategy & Coordination branch.

Thanks
Rossana

OFFICIAL: Sensitive

From: s. 22(1)(a)(ii) @aff.gov.au
Sent: Friday, 19 June 2026 10:50 AM
To: Carr, Rossana <Rossana.Carr@aff.gov.au>; Somerville, Anna <Anna.Somerville@aff.gov.au>
Subject: FW: Tasking on H5 [SEC=OFFICIAL:Sensitive]

OFFICIAL: Sensitive

Hi Rossana, Anna,

My team's working on this at the moment, grateful for advice on whom they should work with/reach out to from each of your areas

Thanks ^{s. 22(1)(a)(ii)}

OFFICIAL: Sensitive

From: Greenville, Jared <Jared.Greenville@aff.gov.au>
Sent: Friday, 19 June 2026 10:43 AM
To: s. 22(1)(a)(ii) @aff.gov.au; Somerville, Anna <Anna.Somerville@aff.gov.au>; Carr, Rossana <Rossana.Carr@aff.gov.au>
Cc: Garner, David <David.Garner@aff.gov.au>; Black, Tom <Tom.Black@aff.gov.au>; McDonald, Andrew <Andrew.McDonald@aff.gov.au>
Subject: RE: Tasking on H5 [SEC=OFFICIAL:Sensitive]

OFFICIAL: Sensitive

To provide some details for the timing.

Still to be confirmed but a release is likely late this afternoon and a standup tomorrow morning.

Jared.Greenville@aff.gov.au
s. 47F(1) | s. 47F(1)

OFFICIAL: Sensitive

From: Greenville, Jared

Sent: Friday, 19 June 2026 9:51 AM

To: s. 22(1)(a)(ii) <[REDACTED]@aff.gov.au>; Somerville, Anna <Anna.Somerville@aff.gov.au>; Carr, Rossana <Rossana.Carr@aff.gov.au>

Cc: Garner, David <David.Garner@aff.gov.au>; Black, Tom <Tom.Black@aff.gov.au>; McDonald, Andrew <Andrew.McDonald@aff.gov.au>

Subject: Tasking on H5

Hi s. 22(1)(a)(ii), Rossana, Jemma and Anna,

With this H5, to get ahead of questions I thought we could usefully pull together a short intel bit across our areas. Noting that it is still just an isolated case in 1 wild bird.

What I was thinking for pulling together a product that is information/intel based that:

- What trade is happening in products that would be affected if it got into the production system – poultry-related and those where certificates have a link to H5
 - Value/Volume/Pattern over the year/what markets
- Our assessment (intel) on scope for a notification to trigger a trade response from those markets on the possible directly impact products given it is **not in the production system**
- Our assessment for any spillover scope on other products s. 47E(d) given it is **not in the production system**.

The latter two have big caveats, and happy for these to be around if it got into the production system then it could be like x.

Suggest if we can, have a point person and will offer my crew to build this into the one doc. Won't make it long and the idea is just to be proactive to avoid getting random requests down the line

If we could, lets try and **get a product by COB** (70-80% draft).

Cheers

Jared

Dr Jared Greenville PSM

First Assistant Secretary | Trade and International Division

s. 47F(1) | s. 47F(1)

Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry

GPO Box 858 Canberra ACT 2601 Australia

The department acknowledges the traditional custodians of Australia and their continuing connection to land, sea, environment, water and community. We pay respect to the traditional custodians, their culture, and elders both past and present.

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Australian Government
Department of Agriculture,
Fisheries and Forestry

19 June 2026

*Trade and International, Biosecurity Animal, Export and Veterinary Services*

High Pathogenic Avian Influenza Detection s. 47E(d)

Key Points

- Australia has confirmed its first case of H5N1 High Pathogenic Avian Influenza (HPAI) in a wild bird in Western Australia, it is not yet in the production system.
- The majority of Australia's poultry meat exports come from South Australia, Victoria and Queensland.
- s. 33(a)(iii)

Background

In mid-June 2026, Australia reported its first confirmed case of H5N1 HPAI in a wild bird in Western Australia. This has the potential to cause significant disruption to Australia's wildlife and poultry production and may result in significant trade barriers being introduced by Australia's trading partners for poultry meat. Following an outbreak of H7-strain HPAI in Victoria in 2025, Australia lost access to several markets for poultry and related products for several months, and experienced a domestic shortage of eggs due to large scale chicken culls. Despite the detection of H5N1, Australia remains free of H7N8 following eradication efforts in the wake of the 2025 detection.

Australia has successfully contained and eradicated H7 HPAI a number of times in the past 50 years and prior to this detection, Australia was the only continent free of H5N1 HPAI. The Commonwealth had invested \$100 million to strengthen surveillance, preparedness and response capability for H5 bird flu in alignment with a 'One Health' approach. There are well practised and nationally agreed procedures, plans and arrangements in place to respond to animal disease incursions.

The Commonwealth has delivered a series of 3 national HPAI exercises as part of 'Exercise Volare' which simulated a detection of H5 bird flu in wildlife in Australia. This involved state and territory governments, and key industry and non-government stakeholders to strengthen Australia's preparedness to inform management of H5 bird flu and Australian government investments.

The Commonwealth has also:

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Australian Government
Department of Agriculture,
Fisheries and Forestry



- o established a dedicated taskforce led by the agriculture, environment, health and emergency management portfolios to ensure a whole-of-government approach to this disease threat,
- o activated the National Coordination Mechanism to support national H5 bird flu preparedness activities, ensuring a coordinated approach across governments and non-government stakeholders, and
- o collaborated with key relevant sectors through summits, round tables, webinars, exercises and other events, to improve preparedness.

On 1 November 2024, Agriculture Ministers agreed as a priority to develop a national agreement to support governance and cost-sharing for a response to this cross-sectoral disease threat, partnering in national investments to strengthen response capability and continued national collaboration on preparedness including integrated communications. The Commonwealth is focused on implementing these activities with relevant stakeholders.

The National Management Agreement for H5 bird flu in wildlife will provide a clear framework for governance and cost-sharing during a response. The agreement was signed by the Commonwealth on 7 March 2025 and has been sent to jurisdictions.

s. 33(a)(iii)

¹ Based on ABS data, retrieved June 2026

OFFICIAL: Sensitive

FICIAL: Sensitive



Australian Government
Department of Agriculture,
Fisheries and Forestry



s. 33(a)(iii)

s. 33(a)(iii)

[REDACTED]

s. 33(a)(iii)

s. 33(a)(iii)

OFFICIAL: Sensitive



Australian Government

Department of Agriculture,
Fisheries and Forestry



s. 33(a)(iii)

[Redacted text block]

Conclusion

- Following the recent H5N1 HPAI detection, s. 33(a)(iii)
- Australia is well prepared to work through an outbreak of H5N1 HPAI, following previous historical outbreaks of other stains, and investment in preparedness across the biosecurity and government network.
- s. 33(a)(iii)

Contact

Please contact Trade Data and Economic Security (s. 47E(d)) for further information.

s. 33(a)(iii)

² Based on ABS data, retrieved June 2026

Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry

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Department of Agriculture,
Fisheries and Forestry

Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry

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OFFICIAL: Sensitive



Australian Government
Department of Agriculture,
Fisheries and Forestry



s. 33(a)(iii)

s. 33(a)(iii)

OFFICIAL: Sensitive



Australian Government
Department of Agriculture,
Fisheries and Forestry



s. 33(a)(iii)

s. 22(1)(a)(ii)

From: s. 22(1)(a)(ii)
Sent: Friday, 19 June 2026 6:52 PM
To: Osborne, Luke; Prattley, Rochelle
Subject: Fw: Tasking on H5[SEC=PROTECTED]
Attachments: 20260619 Trade impact points for TID.docx

PROTECTED

For visibility

PROTECTED

From: s. 22(1)(a)(ii) @aff.gov.au>
Sent: Friday, June 19, 2026 5:31 pm
To: s. 22(1)(a)(ii) @aff.gov.au>; s. 22(1)(a)(ii) @aff.gov.au>; s. 22(1)(a)(ii) @aff.gov.au>
Cc: s. 22(1)(a)(ii) @aff.gov.au>; s. 22(1)(a)(ii) @aff.gov.au>; s. 22(1)(a)(ii) @aff.gov.au>
Subject: RE: Tasking on H5[SEC=PROTECTED]

PROTECTED

Hi s. 22(1)(a)(ii)

Thank you for sharing the draft piece and for your team's work in pulling together

BAD and ESB have been also working on a similar document, please see attached for reference and incorporating into your document please.

As a note we need to be clear throughout documents that this remains a suspect positive case and has not been confirmed.

Thanks

s. 22(1)(a)(ii)

Assistant Director | International Strategy and Regionalisation
Animal Strategy and Coordination Branch | Biosecurity Animal Division

☎ 1800 900 090 | ☎ s. 22(1)(a)(ii) (From Outside Australia)

Email: [s. 22\(1\)\(a\)\(ii\)@aff.gov.au](mailto:s.22(1)(a)(ii)@aff.gov.au)

Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry
70 Northbourne Avenue, Canberra ACT 2601 Australia
GPO Box 858 Canberra ACT 2601 Australia
aff.gov.au



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PROTECTED

From: s. 22(1)(a)(ii) @aff.gov.au>
Sent: Friday, 19 June 2026 3:48 PM
To: s. 22(1)(a)(ii) @aff.gov.au>; s. 22(1)(a)(ii) @aff.gov.au>; s. 22(1)(a)(ii) @aff.gov.au>
Cc: s. 22(1)(a)(ii) @aff.gov.au>; s. 22(1)(a)(ii) @aff.gov.au>; s. 22(1)(a)(ii) @aff.gov.au>; s. 22(1)(a)(ii) @aff.gov.au>
Subject: RE: Tasking on H5 [SEC=OFFICIAL:Sensitive]

OFFICIAL: Sensitive

Hi all,

Please find attached for your comment TID's first draft at this piece. We've done our best to include relevant information from the briefs and previous work you all passed through, but welcome feedback and additional insights.

I will aim to get this into Jared around 5-5:30, so any input you can provide before then would be greatly welcomed! Noting that he is aware this will be a draft and additional work/changes will come through next week.

Thanks again,

s. 22(1)(a)(ii)

Director a/g | Trade Data and Economic Security

Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry
 Trade and International Division | Asia, Middle East, Africa and Trade Information Branch
 70 Northborne Avenue
 GPO Box 858 Canberra ACT 2601 Australia

agriculture.gov.au

OFFICIAL: Sensitive

From: s. 22(1)(a)(ii) @aff.gov.au>
Sent: Friday, 19 June 2026 1:33 PM
To: s. 22(1)(a)(ii) @aff.gov.au>; s. 22(1)(a)(ii) @aff.gov.au>
Cc: s. 22(1)(a)(ii) @aff.gov.au>; s. 22(1)(a)(ii) @aff.gov.au>; s. 22(1)(a)(ii) @aff.gov.au>; s. 22(1)(a)(ii) @aff.gov.au>
Subject: RE: Tasking on H5 [SEC=OFFICIAL:Sensitive]

OFFICIAL: Sensitive

Thanks ^{s. 22(1)(a)(ii)}, your email came through just before I was hitting send on mine!

Please see attached some of our HPAI trade impact analysis in case helpful – note that the data is from 2022/23

We are working on points addressing potential trade impacts for Biosecurity Animal commodities for the following threshold issues, namely HPAI detection in: 1. non-poultry (ie wild birds), 2. poultry non-production (ie backyard poultry), 3. production poultry, and 4. other (ie livestock, other live animals).

Note that Biosecurity Animal has policy responsibility for exports of live animals and germplasm – so inclusive of live birds, day old chicks, hatching eggs, avian genetics and specific pathogen free (SPF) eggs. Exports Standards covers basically everything else. We will review our points with ^{s. 22(1)(a)(ii)} ahead of providing them to you

Thanks and happy to chat,


^{s. 22(1)}

s. 22(1)(a)(ii)

Director | International Strategy and Regionalisation | **s. 22(1)(a)(ii)**

Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry
Animal Strategy and Coordination Branch | Biosecurity Animal Division
Agriculture House, 70 Northbourne Ave, Canberra ACT 2601 Australia
GPO Box 858 Canberra ACT 2601 Australia

agriculture.gov.au



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OFFICIAL: Sensitive

From: **s. 22(1)(a)(ii)** @aff.gov.au>

Sent: Friday, 19 June 2026 12:36 PM

To: **s. 22(1)(a)(ii)** @aff.gov.au>; **s. 22(1)(a)(ii)**

@aff.gov.au>

Cc: **s. 22(1)(a)(ii)** @aff.gov.au>; **s. 22(1)(a)(ii)**

@aff.gov.au>

Subject: RE: Tasking on H5 [SEC=OFFICIAL:Sensitive]

OFFICIAL: Sensitive

G'day **s. 22(1)(a)(ii)**,

Just sending this email to link up all the relevant points of contact working on this. I've attached my email chain with **s. 22(1)(a)(ii)** for a bit of additional context, but the long and short of it is:

- Jared Greenville has asked us for a joined-up intel piece on potential impacts, with a first pass draft ideally in by **EOD today** (aware that may be pushing it and happy to push back on behalf of the group as required)
- I will pass through TID's first draft on the trade data and intel side of things after lunch once we have cleaned it up a bit
- Keen to see what everyone else is pulling together and work as a group to get single united piece up to exec
- If you could pass through existing analysis Luke mentioned below, that would be great and I'll start weaving it into the piece we're working on

Let me know what timelines look like on your end, and happy to try and get some time in the calendar for us to reconvene later today (or just keep comms on email)

Thanks all,

s. 22(1)(a)(ii)

Director a/g | Trade Data and Economic Security

Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry
Trade and International Division | Asia, Middle East, Africa and Trade Information Branch
70 Northborne Avenue
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From: Osborne, Luke <Luke.Osborne@aff.gov.au>

Sent: Friday, 19 June 2026 12:13 PM

To: **s. 22(1)(a)(ii)** <@aff.gov.au>

Cc: Carr, Rossana <Rossana.Carr@aff.gov.au>; **s. 22(1)(a)(ii)** <@aff.gov.au>; **s. 22(1)(a)(ii)** <@aff.gov.au>; **s. 22(1)(a)(ii)** <@aff.gov.au>; **s. 22(1)(a)(ii)** <@aff.gov.au>;

Prattley, Rochelle <Rochelle.Prattley@aff.gov.au>

Subject: RE: Tasking on H5 [SEC=OFFICIAL:Sensitive]

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Thanks
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OFFICIAL: Sensitive

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s. 22(1)(a)(ii) (he/him/his)
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Trade and International Division
Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry
Ngunnawal Country
✉ s. 22(1)(a)(ii) <@aff.gov.au> (P)



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OFFICIAL: Sensitive

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OFFICIAL: Sensitive

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s. 47F(1) | s. 47F(1)

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Cc: Garner, David <David.Garner@aff.gov.au>; Black, Tom <Tom.Black@aff.gov.au>; McDonald, Andrew <Andrew.McDonald@aff.gov.au>
Subject: Tasking on H5

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If we could, lets try and **get a product by COB** (70-80% draft).

Cheers

Jared

Dr Jared Greenville PSM

First Assistant Secretary | Trade and International Division

s. 47F(1) | **s. 47F(1)**

Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry

GPO Box 858 Canberra ACT 2601 Australia

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Suspected H5 high pathogenicity avian influenza (HPAI) detection in Australia – potential trade impacts for poultry and poultry products

Key points:

- On 19 June 2026, the department was made aware of a suspect detection of H5 high pathogenicity avian influenza (HPAI) in a wild migratory bird in Western Australia.
 - This is the first suspect detection of H5 HPAI in Australia.
 - The suspect detection is currently limited to a single wild bird
 - There has been no report of a detection in commercial poultry.
- The suspect detection being in wild birds, this means that Australia remains free from HPAI in accordance with the World Organisation for Animal Health (WOAH).
- The department has undertaken extensive risk assessments for beef and pasteurised dairy and considers that these commodities are safe and do not present a risk of H5 HPAI

Scenarios of trade impacts of a H5 HPAI detection in avian species

1. Wild birds

- Should the detection be confirmed the department will notify the WOAH.
- HPAI in wild birds will not affect Australia's official HPAI status.
- WOAH standards stipulate that WOAH members should not impose bans on the international trade of any commodities in response to notifications in wild birds.
- However, trading partner reactions are difficult to predict, and some partners may nonetheless impose restrictions.
- Should there be further detections it is more likely that there may be further specific commodity implications

2. Captive birds other than birds which meet the WOAH code definition of poultry (e.g. backyard poultry, pet birds)

- This scenario is similar to wild birds with regards to notification to WOAH with significant uncertainty as to the reactions of trading partners
- WOAH standards stipulate that WOAH members should not impose bans on the international trade of any commodities in response to such notifications.
- **s. 33(a)(iii)**

3. Poultry

- Any detection in commercial poultry and subsequent notification to WOAHP would result in significant trade impacts for a range of commodities.
- Australia's most recent HPAI outbreaks of in poultry were the H7 HPAI outbreaks in 2024 and 2025 in Victoria, NSW and the ACT. These outbreaks involved significant trade impacts on poultry and poultry products. See below for export markets, values and volumes for live poultry and germplasm for 2022-23.
- Zoning (also known as regionalisation) was utilised to facilitate trade from unaffected parts of Australia during the 2024 and 2025 outbreaks with some trading partners, [s. 33\(a\)\(iii\)](#)
- Other export markets were restored following Australia's self declaration of freedom from HPAI in poultry to WOAHP, effective 13 June 2025. Some markets have requested further information from Australia and are yet to be restored (at June 2026) in some notable markets these restrictions date to the 2020 outbreaks in Victoria.

[s. 22\(1\)\(a\)\(ii\)](#)

Export summary and values: Australia exports approximately \$28 billion worth of animal based products each year, with less than 0.05% (\$14 million) being poultry commodities where BAD has policy and regulatory responsibilities.

s. 22(1)(a)(ii)

s. 22(1)(a)(ii)

s. 22(1)(a)(ii)

From: s. 22(1)(a)(ii)
Sent: Friday, 19 June 2026 4:38 PM
To: Osborne, Luke
Subject: FW: URGENT - IDC at 11am [SEC=OFFICIAL:Sensitive]

OFFICIAL: Sensitive

Hi Luke,

Louise asked me to send these through to you.

Kind Regards,

s. 22(1)(a)(ii)

OFFICIAL: Sensitive

OFFICIAL: Sensitive

From: Lowe, Matt <Matt.Lowe@aff.gov.au>
Sent: Thursday, 18 June 2026 9:18 PM
To: Minister Collins <Minister.Collins@aff.gov.au>; julie.collins.mp@aph.gov.au
Cc: Benson, Stuart <Stuart.Benson@aff.gov.au>; s. 22(1)(a)(ii) <[s.22\(1\)\(a\)\(ii\)@aff.gov.au](mailto:s.22(1)(a)(ii)@aff.gov.au)>;
Anderson, Victoria <Victoria.Anderson@aff.gov.au>; Collins, Monica <Monica.Collins@aff.gov.au>;
Cookson, Beth <Beth.Cookson@aff.gov.au>; Curran, Alison <Alison.Curran@aff.gov.au>
Subject: Suspect H5 positive seabird (skua) in WA coastline [SEC=OFFICIAL:Sensitive]

OFFICIAL: Sensitive

Minister,

Further to advice from CVO Beth Cookson below, **key points** to note at this stage are:

- One wildlife vagrant bird (Brown Skua) **has tested positive to H5 Influenza A in a WA laboratory**. This bird has died and a second bird (Petrel) has been taken into care, showing similar symptoms (testing results pending).
- Samples will be provided to the Australian Centre for Disease Preparedness (ACDP) for confirmatory testing.
- If confirmed, this will be the first positive case of H5 HPAI in Australia, and the implication is that the disease has an arrival pathway in Australia.
- Further testing will confirm if it is the Highly Pathogenetic variety, and if it is the clade that is known to be impacting wild birds around the globe.

Next steps

- WA will lead the response.
- If ACDP testing confirms, the Consultative Committee on Emergency Animal Disease (CCEAD) will be convened to notify them of the report.
- A surveillance plan will need to be implemented.

- We will work with you and your office to advise media and community, with a call to the public to report any sick wildlife.

Will update you further as information becomes available.

Matt Lowe (he/him)
Acting Secretary
Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry Policy Group
Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry
Email: matt.lowe@aff.gov.au
Ph: **s. 47F(1)**

OFFICIAL: Sensitive

From: Cookson, Beth <Beth.Cookson@aff.gov.au>
Sent: Thursday, 18 June 2026 8:21 PM
To: Anderson, Victoria <Victoria.Anderson@aff.gov.au>; Lowe, Matt <Matt.Lowe@aff.gov.au>; Collins, Monica <Monica.Collins@aff.gov.au>; Smith, Brant <Brant.Smith@aff.gov.au>; Finnin, Peter <Peter.Finnin@aff.gov.au>; Crosthwaite, Kerren <Kerren.Crosthwaite@aff.gov.au>; Wellington, Michelle <Michelle.Wellington@aff.gov.au>; Ipkendanz, Chris <Chris.Ipkendanz@aff.gov.au>; Palfreyman, Louise <Louise.Palfreyman@aff.gov.au>; Hamilton, Sam <Sam.Hamilton@aff.gov.au>; Ireland, Cassandra <Cassandra.Ireland@aff.gov.au>
Cc: **s. 47E(d)**
Subject: Suspect H5 positive seabird (skua) in WA coastline [SEC=OFFICIAL]
Importance: High

OFFICIAL

Dear all

- I was advised earlier this evening by the WA CVO of a single vagrant skua (species of seabird with known distribution through subantarctic) east of Esperance that has tested positive at WA DPIRD laboratory for H5 Influenza A. The skua was found sick on 14/6 with clinical signs of leg paralysis, weakness and dehydration. It subsequently died overnight after being treated in isolation at Esperance wildlife centre.
- A sick petrel, also with a distribution to subantarctic has also been taken into care at the same wildlife hospital and tested. Preliminary results tomorrow.
- Samples from the skua are en route to the Australian Centre for Disease Preparedness for confirmatory testing.
- There are no other reported sick birds or other animals in the vicinity. It is possible that individual infected animals can arrive and not establish infection in local populations, however if confirmed, would raise concern about active pathways.
- Petrels and skuas are known to arrive periodically as vagrant species, any onward spread (if confirmed) is undetermined at this stage.

Next steps

- ACDP need to complete a series of tests before confirmation of the strain of Influenza A will be known.
 - Samples should arrive from WA tomorrow morning. If this happens as expected, we should have preliminary test results from ACDP by early afternoon tomorrow

confirming whether test positive for H5 Influenza A. We will not have confirmation of the strain being high pathogenicity and the clade of concern for another 24-28 hours following this, however I would treat it as highly suspicious that it is the H5 strain of concern given the species and location if ACDP confirm the WA lab results of H5 positive.


- I will work with the WA CVO on the timing for the Consultative Committee on Emergency Animal Disease to meet which is the next step. It is likely this will occur after the test results from ACDP are received tomorrow.
- Industry have not been advised. We will do this as part of the CCEAD meeting requests, following ACDP preliminary test results.

I will keep you informed as we have new information. **s. 47B(a)**

We'll prepare media holding lines,
if needed.

Beth.

Dr Beth Cookson BVSc (Hons), EMPA, MANZCVS (Epidemiology)
Chief Veterinary Officer
Australian Government Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry
T. **s. 47F(1)** E. beth.cookson@aff.gov.au
agriculture.gov.au



We acknowledge the continuous connection of First Nations Traditional Owners and Custodians to the lands, seas and waters of Australia. We recognise their care for and cultivation of Country. We pay respect to Elders past and present, and recognise their knowledge and contribution to the productivity, innovation and sustainability of Australia's agriculture, fisheries and forestry industries.

OFFICIAL

s. 22(1)(a)(ii)

From: Greenville, Jared
Sent: Friday, 19 June 2026 9:44 PM
To: s. 22(1)(a)(ii); s. 22(1)(a)(ii); s. 22(1)(a)(ii) s. 22(1)(a)(ii) O/S Bangkok;
s. 22(1)(a)(ii) O/S Beijing; s. 22(1)(a)(ii) s. 22(1)(a)(ii) - O/S Beijing; s. 22(1)(a)(ii)
s. 22(1)(a)(ii) s. 22(1)(a)(ii) - Counsellor (Agriculture) to Seoul;
s. 22(1)(a)(ii) s. 22(1)(a)(ii) s. 22(1)(a)(ii); s. 22(1)(a)(ii) s. 22(1)(a)(ii) (DFAT);
s. 22(1)(a)(ii) s. 22(1)(a)(ii); s. 22(1)(a)(ii) (DFAT); s. 22(1)(a)(ii) s. 22(1)(a)(ii) -
DFAT; s. 22(1)(a)(ii) (DFAT)
Cc: Garner, David; McDonald, Chris; s. 22(1)(a)(ii) ; Osborne, Luke; s. 22(1)(a)(ii);
s. 22(1)(a)(ii) s. 22(1)(a)(ii); s. 22(1)(a)(ii) ; Passer, Daniel
Subject: RE: FOR INFO: Suspected H5 Avian Influenza case in Australia[SEC=PROTECTED]
Attachments: 260619 H5 Bird Flu National Talking Points APPROVED.docx

PROTECTED

Hi All,

Further to Nick's update, please find attached the current TPs

Cheers
Jared

Jared.Greenville@aff.gov.au

s. 47F(1) | s. 47F(1)

PROTECTED

From: s. 22(1)(a)(ii) <s. 22(1)(a)(ii)@aff.gov.au>
Sent: Friday, 19 June 2026 7:32 PM
To: s. 22(1)(a)(ii) @dfat.gov.au; s. 22(1)(a)(ii) @dfat.gov.au; s. 22(1)(a)(ii) - O/S Bangkok s. 22(1)(a)(ii)@dfat.gov.au; s. 22(1)(a)(ii) - O/S Beijing s. 22(1)(a)(ii) @dfat.gov.au; s. 22(1)(a)(ii) @aff.gov.au; s. 22(1)(a)(ii) - O/S Beijing s. 22(1)(a)(ii) @dfat.gov.au; s. 22(1)(a)(ii) @dfat.gov.au; s. 22(1)(a)(ii) @dfat.gov.au; s. 22(1)(a)(ii) - Counsellor (Agriculture) to Seoul s. 22(1)(a)(ii) @dfat.gov.au; s. 22(1)(a)(ii) @dfat.gov.au; s. 22(1)(a)(ii) @dfat.gov.au; s. 22(1)(a)(ii) @dfat.gov.au; s. 22(1)(a)(ii) @dfat.gov.au; s. 22(1)(a)(ii) @aff.gov.au; s. 22(1)(a)(ii) @dfat.gov.au; s. 22(1)(a)(ii) r@dfat.gov.au; s. 22(1)(a)(ii) s. 22(1)(a)(ii) @dfat.gov.au; s. 22(1)(a)(ii) @dfat.gov.au
Cc: Greenville, Jared <Jared.Greenville@aff.gov.au>; Garner, David <David.Garner@aff.gov.au>; McDonald, Chris <Chris.McDonald@aff.gov.au>; s. 22(1)(a)(ii) @aff.gov.au; Osborne, Luke <Luke.Osborne@aff.gov.au>; s. 22(1)(a)(ii) @aff.gov.au; s. 22(1)(a)(ii) @aff.gov.au; s. 22(1)(a)(ii) @aff.gov.au; Passer, Daniel <Daniel.Passer@aff.gov.au>
Subject: RE: FOR INFO: Suspected H5 Avian Influenza case in Australia[SEC=PROTECTED]

PROTECTED

- Further on Minister's H5 interview attached
- s. 47E(d)

Regards

From: s. 22(1)(a)(ii)

To: s. 22(1)(a)(ii) @dfat.gov.au; s. 22(1)(a)(ii) @dfat.gov.au; s. 22(1)(a)(ii) @dfat.gov.au; s. 22(1)(a)(ii) - O/S Beijing s. 22(1)(a)(ii)@dfat.gov.au; s. 22(1)(a)(ii) @aff.gov.au; s. 22(1)(a)(ii) - O/S Beijing s. 22(1)(a)(ii)@dfat.gov.au; s. 22(1)(a)(ii) @dfat.gov.au; s. 22(1)(a)(ii) @dfat.gov.au; s. 22(1)(a)(ii) (Agriculture) to Seoul s. 22(1)(a)(ii)@dfat.gov.au; s. 22(1)(a)(ii) @dfat.gov.au; s. 22(1)(a)(ii) @dfat.gov.au; s. 22(1)(a)(ii) @dfat.gov.au; s. 22(1)(a)(ii) @dfat.gov.au; s. 22(1)(a)(ii) @aff.gov.au; s. 22(1)(a)(ii) @dfat.gov.au; s. 22(1)(a)(ii) @dfat.gov.au; s. 22(1)(a)(ii), s. 22(1)(a)(ii) @dfat.gov.au; s. 22(1)(a)(ii) @dfat.gov.au

Cc: Greenville, Jared <Jared.Greenville@aff.gov.au>; Garner, David <David.Garner@aff.gov.au>; McDonald, Chris <Chris.McDonald@aff.gov.au>; s. 22(1)(a)(ii) @aff.gov.au; Osborne, Luke <Luke.Osborne@aff.gov.au>; s. 22(1)(a)(ii) @aff.gov.au; s. 22(1)(a)(ii) @aff.gov.au; s. 22(1)(a)(ii) @aff.gov.au; s. 22(1)(a)(ii) @aff.gov.au; Passer, Daniel <Daniel.Passer@aff.gov.au>

Subject: FOR INFO: Suspected H5 Avian Influenza case in Australia [SEC=PROTECTED]

Dear Counsellors

Australian media has been reporting on H5 this afternoon ([SBS](#), [Sky News](#)). In brief, there has been a suspected case of H5 avian influenza in Australia, which, if confirmed, would represent the first detection of this virus on the Australian mainland.

I will provide a further update once the release, talking points and further details are available.

Regards

PROTECTED



Australian Government

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

H5 avian influenza (bird flu) suspect case

National talking points – 19 June 2026

APPROVED

Key messages

- The Western Australia (WA) Department of Primary Industries and Regional Development (DPIRD) is investigating a suspect detection of avian influenza (or bird flu) in a single wild bird found sick in an isolated area in southern WA, in Cape Le Grand National Park.
- Confirmatory testing is underway.
- Australia is well prepared to respond quickly to H5 bird flu to protect poultry production and reduce impacts on wildlife and communities.

What we know

- On 18 June 2026, initial state-based testing detected avian influenza in a wild brown skua (pronounced skew-ah), a type of seabird, that was found sick on an isolated beach in Southern WA, on 14 June and later died while being cared for in isolation.
- We do not know yet if this is the highly pathogenic H5 bird flu strain that has spread worldwide.
- Confirmatory testing is underway at the CSIRO's Australian Centre for Disease Preparedness to determine if this is H5 bird flu. Results are expected on Saturday 20 June 2026.
- DPIRD is also testing a sick giant petrel from the same region. These species are migratory seabird species that occasionally visit southern Australia.
- There have been no detections in poultry and there is no evidence of other species mortalities at this time.
- H5 bird flu is a low health risk to the public as it rarely affects humans.
- Bird flu is not a food safety risk for chicken meat and eggs if they are handled and cooked correctly.

What we're doing

- DPRID has responded swiftly to the detection.
- WA, as the lead jurisdiction, will coordinate response activity with national coordination led by the Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry.
- Australia is well prepared to respond to H5 bird flu and has well-established national response arrangements in place to respond to animal disease incidents.
- WA as the lead jurisdiction, will coordinate response activity with national coordination led by the Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry. This will include enhanced general surveillance undertaken on a regional basis and with targeted extension and engagement with the poultry industry, veterinarians and wildlife carers.
- The Australian Government has committed more than \$113 million to strengthen surveillance, preparedness and response capability for a potential incursion. This includes:
 - \$43.9 million to enhance national coordination of response arrangements and communications, strengthen surveillance and boost biosecurity capacity and capability.
 - \$47.1 million to accelerate protective action for threatened species and priority biodiversity.
 - \$22.1 million to increase the amount of ready-to-use pandemic flu vaccines and antivirals in the National Medical Stockpile (NMS).

- A dedicated Australian Government taskforce was established in 2024 to strengthen preparedness for a possible incursion, jointly led by DAFF, Department of Climate Change, Energy, the Environment and Water (DCCEEW), the Australian Centre for Disease Control (CDC) on behalf of the Department of Health, Disability and Ageing (DHDA) and the National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA).
- Australian governments have worked together to strengthen national governance and establish cost-sharing arrangements in the event of an outbreak in wildlife and have tested these arrangements through scenario-based exercises.
- Planning has been carried out for key areas including national parks and Australia's external territories such as Christmas Island and Cocos (Keeling) Islands, Norfolk Island, and the Australian Antarctic Territory.
- The Australian Government is actively working through regulatory and policy arrangements for the potential vaccination of some priority native bird species. Government and industry are also jointly reviewing the policy for vaccination of poultry.
- The Communicable Diseases Network Australia developed the [National guideline for avian influenza: protecting people who work with birds and wildlife](https://www.cdc.gov.au/healthcare-providers/infectious-diseases/avian-influenza) (cdc.gov.au). The guidelines provide general advice for employers on protecting workers from all types of bird flu.
- Australian governments are engaging with First Nations people and community leaders to ensure community needs are met before and during any outbreak of H5 bird flu. Access to Country may be temporarily impacted in affected areas to prevent disease spread and protect human health. Culturally and economically important species could also be impacted.

What you can do

- The community is encouraged to report any dead or sick birds or animals showing [signs of bird flu](#).
- If you see multiple sick or dead birds or other animals, do not touch them.
- **Avoid** contact. **Record** what you see. **Report** it to the **Emergency Animal Disease Hotline** on **1800 675 888** from anywhere in Australia.
- Keep pets away from wildlife, including preventing cats from roaming and keeping dogs on leads in wildlife areas.
- When going to and from national parks, reserves or farms, clean your footwear, clothing and vehicle to help prevent spreading diseases between places.
- If you own, care for, or work with birds or chickens, you should:
 - prevent wild birds from mingling with your birds, and accessing their feed and water
 - keep pens, aviaries, feeders and equipment clean
 - wash hands thoroughly with soap before and after handling birds
 - monitor birds for signs of disease or sudden deaths.
- Poultry producers are reminded that on-farm biosecurity practices are crucial to protect the health of their flocks.

Find out more

- Information about H5 bird flu is available at birdflu.gov.au

s. 22(1)(a)(ii)

From: Somerville, Anna
Sent: Friday, 19 June 2026 7:23 PM
To: Osborne, Luke; Carr, Rossana; s. 22(1)(a)(ii)
Cc: Prattley, Rochelle; s. 22(1)(a)(ii)
Subject: RE: FOR INFO: Suspected H5 Avian Influenza case in Australia[SEC=PROTECTED]

PROTECTED

Thanks Luke, yes please it would be good if s. 22(1)(a)(ii) could attend to provide trade coverage. Regards
 Anna

PROTECTED

From: Osborne, Luke <Luke.Osborne@aff.gov.au>
Sent: Friday, 19 June 2026 5:02 PM
To: Somerville, Anna <Anna.Somerville@aff.gov.au>; Carr, Rossana <Rossana.Carr@aff.gov.au>
Cc: Prattley, Rochelle <Rochelle.Prattley@aff.gov.au>
Subject: FW: FOR INFO: Suspected H5 Avian Influenza case in Australia[SEC=PROTECTED]

PROTECTED

Hi

For visibility and also that CCEAD is being convened for 8am tomorrow.

I left you a message Anna if you/ s. 22(1)(a)(ii) are looking to be involved there from the outset otherwise I'm happy to rep on trade for that as needed given the current nature of this.

Be good to discuss approach to that this evening if you can come back to me.

Thanks
 Luke

PROTECTED

From: s. 22(1)(a)(ii) @aff.gov.au
Sent: Friday, 19 June 2026 4:46 PM
To: s. 22(1)(a)(ii) @dfat.gov.au; s. 22(1)(a)(ii) @dfat.gov.au; s. 22(1)(a)(ii) - O/S Bangkok s. 22(1)(a)(ii)@dfat.gov.au; s. 22(1)(a)(ii) - O/S Beijing s. 22(1)(a)(ii) @dfat.gov.au; s. 22(1)(a)(ii) @aff.gov.au; s. 22(1)(a)(ii) - O/S Beijing s. 22(1)(a)(ii) @dfat.gov.au; s. 22(1)(a)(ii) @dfat.gov.au; s. 22(1)(a)(ii) @dfat.gov.au; s. 22(1)(a)(ii) - Counsellor (Agriculture) to Seoul s. 22(1)(a)(ii) @dfat.gov.au; s. 22(1)(a)(ii) @dfat.gov.au; s. 22(1)(a)(ii) @dfat.gov.au; s. 22(1)(a)(ii) @dfat.gov.au; s. 22(1)(a)(ii) @dfat.gov.au; s. 22(1)(a)(ii) @dfat.gov.au; s. 22(1)(a)(ii) @dfat.gov.au; s. 22(1)(a)(ii) (DFAT) s. 22(1)(a)(ii) @dfat.gov.au; s. 22(1)(a)(ii) @aff.gov.au; s. 22(1)(a)(ii) @dfat.gov.au; s. 22(1)(a)(ii) (DFAT) s. 22(1)(a)(ii)@dfat.gov.au; s. 22(1)(a)(ii) - DFAT s. 22(1)(a)(ii) @dfat.gov.au; s. 22(1)(a)(ii) (DFAT) s. 22(1)(a)(ii) @dfat.gov.au
Cc: Greenville, Jared <Jared.Greenville@aff.gov.au>; Garner, David <David.Garner@aff.gov.au>; McDonald, Chris

<Chris.McDonald@aff.gov.au>; s. 22(1)(a)(ii) @aff.gov.au>; Osborne, Luke
<Luke.Osborne@aff.gov.au>; s. 22(1)(a)(ii) @aff.gov.au>; s. 22(1)(a)(ii) @aff.gov.au>;
s. 22(1)(a)(ii) @aff.gov.au>; s. 22(1)(a)(ii) @aff.gov.au>; s. 22(1)(a)(ii)
@aff.gov.au>

Subject: FOR INFO: Suspected H5 Avian Influenza case in Australia[SEC=PROTECTED]

PROTECTED

Dear Counsellors

Australian media has been reporting on H5 this afternoon ([SBS](#), [Sky News](#)). In brief, there has been a suspected case of H5 avian influenza in Australia, which, if confirmed, would represent the first detection of this virus on the Australian mainland.

I will provide a further update once the release, talking points and further details are available.

Regards ^{s. 22(1)(a)(ii)}

PROTECTED

PROTECTED

s. 22(1)(a)(ii)

From: Ipkendanz, Chris
Sent: Friday, 19 June 2026 9:32 PM
To: Anderson, Victoria; Collins, Monica; Curran, Alison; s. 22(1)(a)(ii); Preece, Jason; Cookson, Beth; Hamilton, Sam; Vivian-Smith, Gabrielle; Smith, Brant; Palfreyman, Louise; s. 22(1)(a)(ii); s. 22(1)(a)(ii); Osborne, Luke; Finnin, Peter; Gavin, David; Granton-Smith, Rachel; Hutchison, Tina; Greenville, Jared; Black, Tom; McDonald, Andrew; Lowe, Matt; Galeano, David; Denny, Paul; Crosthwaite, Kerren; Ireland, Cassandra; Sanson -Fisher, Jadd; Simpson, Tim; Geysen, Matthew; Curran, Carmel; s. 22(1)(a)(ii) ; s. 22(1)(a)(ii) ; Ipkendanz, Chris; Ag Media
Cc: Benson, Stuart; s. 22(1)(a)(ii) s. 47F(1) ; s. 47F(1)
Subject: Situation Update – Suspect H5 bird flu – Western Australia – 20260619 – 2000 AEST [SEC=OFFICIAL:Sensitive]
Attachments: 260619 H5 Bird Flu National Talking Points APPROVED.docx

OFFICIAL: Sensitive

Good evening,

Please see below a short summary of the current situation and actions taken today in response to the suspected detection of H5 bird flu in WA. Also attached are the current National Talking Points (NTPs) for reference.

NB: reporting formats and distribution lists will be further refined as the response progresses.

Situation Update – Suspect H5 bird flu – Western Australia – 20260619 – 2000 AEST

Current situation

- On 18 June 2026, initial state-based testing detected avian influenza in a wild brown skua (seabird) that was found sick on an isolated beach in Southern WA and later died while being cared for in isolation.
- On 19 June 2026, the Australian Centre for Disease Preparedness (ACDP) confirmed a positive PCR result for Influenza A (H5), but sequencing testing remains in progress.
 - Sequencing testing will confirm the virus's clade, pathogenicity and level of relatedness with other Antarctic and sub-Antarctic detections.
 - Sequencing results are expected to be available at midnight tonight.
- DAFF will consider implications for international reporting (including to the World Organisation for Animal Health) informed by ACDP's diagnostic results tonight.

Completed Actions

- DAFF Crisis and Incident Response Plan to moved ALERT phase in anticipation of high pathogenicity avian influenza (HPAI) H5 being confirmed.
- Convened HPAI Interdepartmental Committee (IDC) to provide situation update.
- Provided support to Minister Collins to deliver a doorstep on the suspected detection.
- The Australian Chief Veterinary Officer (ACVO) chaired a situation update meeting with members and observers of the Consultative Committee for Emergency Animal Disease (CCEAD).
- National Talking Points developed and circulated via National Biosecurity Communication and Engagement Network (NBCEN) (attached).

Planned Actions (next 24hrs)

- Scheduled meetings

- 0800 AEST – CCEAD meeting
- 1200 AEST – DAFF Response Coordination Group (RCG) meeting
- 1230 AEST – HPAI IDC meeting
- 1330 AEST – National Biosecurity Committee (NBC) meeting (to be confirmed)
- Media and communication
 - 0930 AEST – Press conference – Minister Collins and ACVO
 - Media Release following confirmation of results by ACDP (to be confirmed)
 - National Talking Points to be updated
- Planning and reporting
 - Embed daily situation reporting into operational tempo
 - Finalise crisis appreciation and strategic plan following ACDP confirmation
 - Progress scenario-based contingency planning

Regards,

Chris Ipkendanz

Assistant Secretary | Crisis and Emergency Management Branch | **s. 47F(1)**

Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry
Strategy, Performance and Engagement Division
Agriculture House, 70 Northbourne Avenue, Canberra ACT 2601 Australia
GPO Box 858 Canberra ACT 2601 Australia

OFFICIAL: Sensitive

s. 22(1)(a)(ii)

From: Cookson, Beth
Sent: Friday, 19 June 2026 9:42 AM
To: Anderson, Victoria
Cc: Palfreyman, Louise; Smith, Brant; Hamilton, Sam
Subject: A short explanation of HPAI and LPAI [SEC=OFFICIAL]

OFFICIAL

Hi Vic

As discussed. With thanks to Louise.

Avian influenza virus strains

- Avian influenza virus strains are described as low pathogenicity (LPAI) or high pathogenicity (HPAI). These terms **refer to the pathogenicity (severity/infectiousness) of the strain in domestic poultry**, not wild birds or humans.
- Avian influenza viruses are also described according to their clade – the one causing concern globally is called **H5 HPAI clade 2.3.4.4b**.
- In Australia, low pathogenicity viruses are naturally carried by wild birds, usually waterfowl such as ducks, without causing apparent signs of disease and usually have minimal consequences for wild birds and poultry (including low pathogenic H5 and H7 strains). Occasionally these **LPAI strains can evolve into HPAI strains** when they spread among poultry – this is what we've seen occur in previous **H7 HPAI** outbreaks in Australia.

What is unique about the H5 HPAI strain of concern

- A key difference with current H5 HPAI clade 2.3.4.4b is the ability of **wild birds to carry the HPAI strain, for it to cause disease and death in the wild birds, and to directly infect HPAI** to other birds including poultry without the necessity of a virus mutation.
- This strain has also impacted many more species than other strains - over 560 bird species and over 100 mammalian species have been affected by H5 HPAI clade 2.3.4.4b.
- Outbreaks overseas have led to extensive losses of poultry, and mass mortalities of wild birds and mammals, particularly marine mammals and mammals that prey or scavenge on birds.

Beth.

OFFICIAL

OFFICIAL

s. 47B(a)

s. 47B(a)

s. 22(1)(a)(ii)

From: s. 22(1)(a)(ii)
Sent: Friday, 19 June 2026 7:24 PM
To: Cookson, Beth
Cc: s. 47E(d) Hamilton, Sam
Subject: CCEAD meeting for tomorrow - Chair notes [SEC=OFFICIAL:Sensitive]
Categories: Action

OFFICIAL: Sensitive

Thanks Beth, the agenda has just gone out along with the meeting invite for tomorrow's CCEAD meeting.

We have prepared chair's notes to support your and Sam's chairing of the meeting:

 [CCEAD_H5_Teleconference01_Chair Agenda_DRAFT_EADRA.docx](#)

Please let us know if you have any issues accessing the document, and note that we may make some minor updates between now and tomorrow morning (e.g. to align the notes with Michelle's paper when she sends it over).

Happy to discuss if you have any questions.

Thanks
s. 22(1)(a)(ii)

OFFICIAL: Sensitive

From: Cookson, Beth <Beth.Cookson@aff.gov.au>
Sent: Friday, 19 June 2026 6:30 PM
To: s. 22(1)(a)(ii) @aff.gov.au>
Cc: s. 47E(d) @aff.gov.au>; Hamilton, Sam <Sam.Hamilton@aff.gov.au>
Subject: RE: CCEAD meeting for tomorrow - draft agenda for clearance [SEC=OFFICIAL:Sensitive]

OFFICIAL: Sensitive

Thanks s. 22(1)(a)(ii) – agenda looks good – noting I have to be at APH for briefing/media at 9am so will need to leave after the first 15ish mins. We'll need to ask Sam to step in to finish chairing again. And yes, comfortable with attendance proposed below.

OFFICIAL: Sensitive

From: s. 22(1)(a)(ii) @aff.gov.au>
Sent: Friday, 19 June 2026 5:58 PM
To: Cookson, Beth <Beth.Cookson@aff.gov.au>
Cc: s. 47E(d) @aff.gov.au>
Subject: RE: CCEAD meeting for tomorrow - draft agenda for clearance [SEC=OFFICIAL:Sensitive]

OFFICIAL: Sensitive

Hi Beth,

We just wanted to follow up on this, particularly the questions in the email below re attendance. Happy to talk through this if easier.

Also, just noting I've made a slight update to the draft agenda as I now understand from Louise/Sam H that the meeting will be for half an hour.

 [CCEAD_H5_Teleconference01_Agenda_DRAFT_EADRA.docx](#)

Thanks

s. 22(1)(a)(ii)

OFFICIAL: Sensitive

From: s. 22(1)(a)(ii)

Sent: Friday, 19 June 2026 3:50 PM

To: Cookson, Beth <Beth.Cookson@aff.gov.au>

Cc: s. 47E(d) @aff.gov.au

Subject: CCEAD meeting for tomorrow - draft agenda for clearance

Hi Beth,

At the situation update this afternoon, it was confirmed that there will be a CCEAD meeting at 8am AEST (6am Perth time) tomorrow and that this would run for one hour. It was also confirmed that this will be held irrespective of the sequencing results from ACDP tonight.

To support convening the CCEAD meeting, we have prepared a draft agenda for your clearance (see attached). We would appreciate it if you could confirm your clearance of this agenda (noting there are a few details like attendees and paper/attachments that we are confirming) so that we can send it out as part of the meeting invite for the CCEAD meeting.

In terms of attendance at the CCEAD meeting, could confirm whether:

- Members can bring 1-2 advisors with them to the meeting (a few members have asked if they can bring two advisors). This would align with the CCEAD meeting arrangements for the 2025 HPAI outbreak response in Victoria.
- The Commonwealth H5 NMA custodian could be invited as an observer, given the possibility for the H5 NMA to be activated.
- Two reps from AHA (s. 47F(1) and s. 47F(1)) could attend the meeting. s. 47F(1) has asked if s. 47F(1) can also be invited. This would align with the CCEAD meeting arrangements for the 2025 HPAI outbreak response in Victoria.
- Two members from the Commonwealth NBCEN secretariat/comms team could attend the meeting (s. 22(1)(a)(ii) and s. 22(1)(a)(ii)). s. 22(1)(a)(ii) has asked if she and s. 22(1)(a)(ii) could both attend, noting comms will be a strong theme in the meeting.

Thanks

s. 22(1)(a)(ii) (he/him)

Director | Animal Health Projects

Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry
Animal Health Policy Branch, Biosecurity Animal Division
1-21 Dean Street, Moonee Ponds VIC 3039
GPO Box 858, Canberra ACT 2601
M: s. 22(1)(a)(ii) | E: s. 22(1)(a)(ii)@aff.gov.au

aff.gov.au



The department acknowledges the Traditional Custodians of Australia and their continuing connection to land, sea environment, water and community. We pay our respect to the Traditional Custodians, their culture, and elders both past and present.

s. 22(1)(a)(ii)

From: s. 47E(d)
Sent: Friday, 19 June 2026 4:00 PM
To: s. 47F(1) s. 47F(1) s. 47F(1) s. 47F(1) s. 47F(1)
s. 47F(1) s. 47F(1) s. 47F(1)
Cc: s. 47E(d) Palfreyman, Louise; Cookson, Beth; Hamilton, Sam; s. 47F(1) s. 47F(1)
s. 47F(1) s. 47F(1) s. 47F(1)
Subject: s. 47F(1)
FOR IMMEDIATE ACTION: Please confirm member and permanent advisor details
for CCEAD H5 Avian Influenza - WA - by 5PM (AEST), Fri 19 June 2026
[SEC=OFFICIAL:Sensitive]
Attachments: CCEAD Operating Guidelines_February 2021.pdf
Importance: High

OFFICIAL: Sensitive

This email has been sent IN-CONFIDENCE.

Dear AHC members

CCEAD will convene on 8am (AEST) 20 June 2026 to discuss a confirmed diagnosis of H5 Avian Influenza in wild birds in Western Australia.

Please complete the table below and return to CCEAD secretariat by **5pm (AEST), Friday, 19 June 2026**.

1. Confirm CCEAD member details and advise of any known upcoming changes (leave, acting arrangements).
2. Advise any **permanent** CCEAD advisors in the table in accordance with the below instructions and guidance included in the attached *CCEAD operating guidelines v1*.

Secretariat will add the people nominated in the table to its email distribution list for meeting invitations and papers and provide them access to the [CCEAD GovTEAMS site](#), once this has been setup. Further information on CCEAD attendee roles and responsibilities and using the GovTEAMS site are attached to this email.

Instructions to nominate permanent advisors

- Non-combat jurisdictions and ACDP may be accompanied by **1** advisor at each CCEAD meeting. Combat jurisdictions may be accompanied by **more than 1** advisor at meetings, but numbers must be kept to the essential minimum.
- If the advisor/s is/are expected to remain consistent throughout the CCEAD and attend all meetings to support their member, they may be considered as a **permanent CCEAD advisor**.
- Secretariat will add permanent CCEAD advisors to its distribution list so they will receive meeting invitations and papers directly from the secretariat and provide them access to CCEAD GovTEAMS.
- If a small number of staff (2 or 3) will rotate the position of advisor, and it would be appropriate for them to receive all meeting invitations and papers (e.g. as they will attend a large proportion of the meetings) – they may be nominated as permanent advisors with the designation (*rotating*).
- If the member will not be accompanied by an advisor, or, they may be, but it won't necessarily be a consistent person – do not nominate any 'permanent advisors.'

Table 1 CCEAD member and permanent advisor nominations

CCEAD Member	CCEAD member name. <i>Default is AHC member. Please indicate</i>	CCEAD permanent advisor/s name and email
--------------	--	--

	<i>any expected changes – e.g., acting arrangements, known leave</i>	<i>If rotating, include the designation (rotating) after the name.</i>
EXAMPLE 1	[Member A] <i>A non-combat jurisdiction with one permanent advisor</i>	[CCEAD advisor name], CCEADadvisor@email.com
EXAMPLE 2	[Member B] <i>A non-combat jurisdiction with two permanent advisors who will attend alternate meetings</i>	[CCEAD advisor 1 name] (rotating), CCEADadvisor1@email.com [CCEAD advisor 2 name] (rotating). CCEADadvisor2@email.com
ACDP	s. 47F(1)	
ACT	s. 47F(1)	
Commonwealth	Secretariat to contact separately	
NSW	s. 47F(1)	
NT	s. 47F(1)	
QLD	s. 47F(1)	
SA	s. 47F(1)	
TAS	s. 47F(1)	
VIC	s. 47F(1)	
Affected Industry Parties	Secretariat to contact separately	


Thank you

Consultative Committee on Emergency Animal Diseases Secretariat

s. 47E(d) | s. 22(1)(a)(ii)

Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry
Animal Health Policy | Biosecurity Animal
Ngunnawal Country
70 Northbourne Avenue, Canberra ACT 2601 Australia
GPO Box 858, Canberra City ACT 2601 Australia

agriculture.gov.au



We acknowledge the continuous connection of First Nations Traditional Owners and Custodians to the lands, seas and waters of Australia. We recognise their care for and cultivation of Country. We pay respect to Elders past and present, and recognise their knowledge and contribution to the productivity, innovation and sustainability of Australia's agriculture, fisheries and forestry industries.

OFFICIAL: Sensitive

s. 22(1)(a)(ii)

From: Hamilton, Sam
Sent: Friday, 19 June 2026 5:41 PM
To: Cookson, Beth
Cc: Smith, Brant; **s. 22(1)(a)(ii)** ; Palfreyman, Louise; Fiona FRASER; **s. 47F(1)**
Subject: For urgent clearance: national talking points for H5 bird flu suspect case

Dear Beth

Brant has reviewed the national talking points. For your clearance please.

This is consistent with the information disclosed in the WA minister's press conference.

 [260619 H5 Bird Flu National Talking Points DRAFT.docx](#)

Sam

Sam Hamilton

Deputy Australian Chief Veterinary Officer

P: **s. 47F(1)**

E: sam.hamilton@aff.gov.au

Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry

GPO Box 858 Canberra ACT 2601 Australia

s. 22(1)(a)(ii)

From: Biosecurity NBCEN
Sent: Friday, 19 June 2026 8:15 PM
To: Cookson, Beth; Hamilton, Sam; Ag Media; s. 47E(d)
 Ipkendanz, Chris; Wellington, Michelle; Smith, Brant; s. 47E(d) Clegg,
 Narelle; Curran, Alison; Curran, Carmel; Palfreyman, Louise; s. 22(1)(a)(ii) Black,
 Tom; s. 22(1)(a)(ii); s. 22(1)(a)(ii) ; s. 22(1)(a)(ii) ; s. 22(1)(a)(ii) ; s. 22(1)(a)(ii)
 ; s. 22(1)(a)(ii) ; s. 22(1)(a)(ii); externalcommunication;
 Langford, Deb; Biosecurity NBCEN; s. 22(1)(a)(ii) s. 22(1)(a)(ii) ; s. 22(1)(a)(ii)
 ; s. 22(1)(a)(ii)
Cc: s. 47F(1) @health.gov.au; s. 47F(1) @health.gov.au;
 s. 47E(d) @health.gov.au; s. 47E(d) @health.gov.au;
 s. 47F(1) @health.gov.au; s. 47F(1)@dfat.gov.au;
 s. 47F(1) @foodstandards.gov.au; s. 47B(a)@swa.gov.au; s. 47E(d)@scolexia.com.au;
 s. 47E(d)@eggfarmersaustralia.org; s. 47F(1) @dfat.gov.au;
 s. 47F(1)@dfat.gov.au
Subject: FW: APPROVED: H5 Bird Flu NTPs [SEC=OFFICIAL]
Attachments: 260619 H5 Bird Flu National Talking Points APPROVED.docx

OFFICIAL

Good evening

FYI – updated H5 NTPs have been shared with the NBCEN group, with a request for any updates or input by 1400 AEST tomorrow for inclusion in subsequent versions..

Kind regards

s. 22(1)(a)(ii)

Director | Crisis Communication | s. 22(1)(a)(ii)
 Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry
 Strategy, Performance and Engagement | Crisis and Emergency Management Branch
 Agriculture House, 70 Northbourne Ave, Canberra ACT 2601 Australia
 GPO Box 858 Canberra ACT 2601 Australia
agriculture.gov.au



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OFFICIAL

From: Biosecurity NBCEN <NBCEN@aff.gov.au>
Sent: Friday, 19 June 2026 8:11 PM
To: s. 22(1)(a)(ii) n@aff.gov.au; s. 22(1)(a)(ii) @aff.gov.au; s. 47F(1)
 @csiro.au; s. 47F(1) @csiro.au; s. 47F(1) @animalhealthaustralia.com.au; s. 47F(1)
 @wildlifehealthaustralia.com.au; s. 47F(1) @agriculture.vic.gov.au;

s. 47F(1) @deeca.vic.gov.au>; s. 47F(1) @deeca.vic.gov.au;
s. 47F(1) @agriculture.vic.gov.au; s. 47B(a) @agriculture.vic.gov.au; s. 47F(1)
@sa.gov.au>; s. 47B(a) @sa.gov.au; s. 47F(1) @regional.nsw.gov.au;
s. 47F(1) @dpird.nsw.gov.au; s. 47F(1) @lls.nsw.gov.au; s. 47F(1) @dpird.nsw.gov.au;
s. 47F(1) @nt.gov.au' s. 47F(1) @nt.gov.au>; s. 47B(a) @nt.gov.au; NT Media DAF
s. 47B(a) @nt.gov.au>; s. 47F(1) @dpi.qld.gov.au>; s. 47B(a) @dpi.qld.gov.au' s. 47F(1)
@nre.tas.gov.au>; s. 47F(1) @nre.tas.gov.au>;
@agric.wa.gov.au>; s. 47F(1) @dpird.wa.gov.au; s. 47F(1) @act.gov.au;
s. 47F(1) @act.gov.au; s. 47B(a)@act.gov.au; s. 47F(1)@chicken.org.au;
s. 47F(1) @australianeggs.org.au; s. 47F(1) @iinet.net.au; s. 47F(1) @health.gov.au; CDC
Communications s. 47E(d) @health.gov.au>; s. 47F(1) @dcceew.gov.au>; s. 47F(1)
@dcceew.gov.au>; Fiona.Fraser@dcceew.gov.au; s. 47F(1) @dpi.qld.gov.au'
s. 47F(1) @dpi.qld.gov.au>
Cc: s. 47E(d) @dcceew.gov.au; s. 47B(a)@environment.nsw.gov.au; s. 47B(a) @act.gov.au;
s. 47B(a) @sa.gov.au; s. 47B(a)@deeca.vic.gov.au; s. 47B(a) @nre.tas.gov.au; s. 47B(a) @nt.gov.au;
s. 47B(a)@des.qld.gov.au; s. 47B(a)@dbca.wa.gov.au.; s. 47B(a) @nt.gov.au

Subject: APPROVED: H5 Bird Flu NTPs

Good evening,

Please see attached: **APPROVED** updated H5 bird flu National talking points.

Please provide any updates or input by 1400 AEST tomorrow for inclusion in subsequent versions.

Kind regards

s. 22(1)(a)(ii)

Director | Crisis Communication | s. 22(1)(a)(ii)

Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry

Strategy, Performance and Engagement | Crisis and Emergency Management Branch

Agriculture House, 70 Northbourne Ave, Canberra ACT 2601 Australia

GPO Box 858 Canberra ACT 2601 Australia

agriculture.gov.au



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OFFICIAL

S. 47E(d)

S. 47E(d)

S. 47E(d)

s. 22(1)(a)(ii)

From: Hamilton, Sam
Sent: Friday, 19 June 2026 7:39 PM
To: Palfreyman, Louise
Subject: FW: H5 HPAI process flow re NMA [SEC=OFFICIAL:Sensitive]
Attachments: Concurrent Decision Making Process Flow v0.2.pptx

Hi Louise

Sincere apologies only just saw this.

Sam

Sam Hamilton

Deputy Australian Chief Veterinary Officer

P: **s. 47F(1)**

E: sam.hamilton@aff.gov.au

Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry

GPO Box 858 Canberra ACT 2601 Australia

From: **s. 22(1)(a)(ii)** @aff.gov.au>
Sent: Friday, 19 June 2026 4:21 PM
To: Hamilton, Sam <Sam.Hamilton@aff.gov.au>; Finnin, Peter <Peter.Finnin@aff.gov.au>
Cc: Gavin, David <David.Gavin@aff.gov.au>; **s. 47E(d)**
Subject: H5 HPAI process flow [SEC=OFFICIAL:Sensitive]

OFFICIAL: Sensitive

Hi all,

On request of David Gavin, please see attached process flow for concurrent decision making within the H5 NMA and EADRA.

Ngaityalya (thank you),

s. 22(1)(a)(ii) she/her)

Director | National Biosecurity Emergency Response | **s. 22(1)(a)(ii)**

Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry

Biosecurity Response and Reform Branch | Biosecurity Strategy and Reform Division

Kaurna Country

Adelaide International Airport, Sir Donald Bradman Drive, Export Park SA 5950

GPO Box 858, Canberra ACT 2601, Australia

agriculture.gov.au



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OFFICIAL: Sensitive



Concurrent Decision Making Process Flow

Step-by-Step Process for Concurrent Decision Making under EADRA and H5 NMA

STEP	ACTIVITY	LEAD	RESPONSE AGREEMENT
1	Initial detection confirmed by state laboratory	Combat jurisdiction	EADRA
2	ACDP confirmatory testing initiated	ACDP	EADRA
3	Report to ACVO within 24 hours	Combat jurisdiction	EADRA
4	CCEAD under EADRA and under H5 NMA convened within 24 hours	CCEAD Secretariat	EADRA
5	CCEAD under EADRA advises outbreak not TFE; recommends managed outside EADRA	CCEAD under EADRA	EADRA
6	CCEAD under H5 NMA reviews and endorses EADRsPs	CCEAD under H5 NMA	H5 NMA
7	NMG convened within 24 hours to consider EADRA and H5 NMA advice	NMG Secretariat	EADRA/H5 NMA
8	NMG notes CCEAD advice under EADRA and agrees to manage the incursion under the H5 NMA	NMG	EADRA
9	NMG approves H5 NMA response, sets Upper Limit and agrees on comms	NMG	H5 NMA
10	EADRsPs implemented; ongoing CCEAD and NMG oversight	CCEAD/NMG	H5 NMA

Process flow for Concurrent Decision Making under EADRA and H5 NMA

ACVO is notified of a H5 bird flu detection in wildlife.

CCEAD is convened to consider the detection

EADRA CCEAD:
recommends to the NMG
the detection in wildlife is
not TFE and should be
managed under the H5
NMA.

H5 NMA CCEAD:
recommends to the NMG
that the detection should
be managed under the H5
NMA and endorses any
initial EADRsPs

NMG is convened to consider the advice from the CCEAD

EADRA NMG:
agrees the detection in
wildlife is not TFE, that no
response under the EADRA
be initiated, and that the
incursion be managed
under the H5 NMA.

H5 NMA NMG:
agrees to cost-share a
response under the H5
NMA and sets the Upper
Limits, approves an initial
EADRsPs and comms.

s. 22(1)(a)(ii)

From: Hamilton, Sam
Sent: Friday, 19 June 2026 8:02 PM
To: Palfreyman, Louise; Smith, Brant
Subject: Fw: Meeting with Hon Roger Cook MLC, Premier of WA [SEC=OFFICIAL:Sensitive]

Note revised Sunday deadline!

Sam Hamilton

Deputy Australian Chief Veterinary Officer

P: **s. 47F(1)**

E: sam.hamilton@aff.gov.au

Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry

GPO Box 858 Canberra ACT 2601 Australia

From: **s. 22(1)(a)(ii)** @aff.gov.au>
Sent: Friday, 19 June 2026 16:49:38
To: Palfreyman, Louise <Louise.Palfreyman@aff.gov.au>; **s. 22(1)(a)(ii)** @aff.gov.au>
Cc: Smith, Brant <Brant.Smith@aff.gov.au>; Hamilton, Sam <Sam.Hamilton@aff.gov.au>; Cookson, Beth <Beth.Cookson@aff.gov.au>; **s. 22(1)(a)(ii)** @aff.gov.au>; **s. 47E(d)**

Subject: FW: Meeting with Hon Roger Cook MLC, Premier of WA [SEC=OFFICIAL:Sensitive]

OFFICIAL: Sensitive

FYI

OFFICIAL: Sensitive

From: DLO Collins <**s. 47E(d)**>
Sent: Friday, 19 June 2026 4:44 PM
To: DLO Collins <**s. 47E(d)**>; Collins, Monica <Monica.Collins@aff.gov.au>; Cookson, Beth <Beth.Cookson@aff.gov.au>; **s. 22(1)(a)(ii)** aff.gov.au>; **s. 47E(d)**
s. 47F(1) Smith, Brant <Brant.Smith@aff.gov.au>; 'NORRIS, Wez' <wez.norris@afma.gov.au>; **s. 47E(d)** s. 22(1)(a)(ii)
 @afma.gov.au>; **s. 47E(d)** @aff.gov.au>
Cc: **s. 47E(d)** Ipkendanz, Chris
 <Chris.Ipkendanz@aff.gov.au>
Subject: RE: Meeting with Hon Roger Cook MLC, Premier of WA [SEC=OFFICIAL:Sensitive]

OFFICIAL: Sensitive

Hi again all,

Please also note additional attendees added:

- Daniel Smith, Chief of Staff
- **s. 47F(1)** Director Environmental Policy

Many thanks

s. 22(1)(a)(ii)

Departmental Liaison Officer | Office of Julie Collins MP
Minister for Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry

M: **s. 22(1)(a)(ii)** E: **s. 47E(d)**

Parliament House, Canberra, ACT 2600 Australia

OFFICIAL: Sensitive

From: DLO Collins <**s. 47E(d)** >
Sent: Friday, 19 June 2026 4:39 PM
To: Collins, Monica <Monica.Collins@aff.gov.au>; DLO Collins **s. 47E(d)** Cookson, Beth
 <Beth.Cookson@aff.gov.au>; **s. 22(1)(a)(ii)** @aff.gov.au; **s. 47E(d)**
 Smith, Brant <Brant.Smith@aff.gov.au>; 'NORRIS, Wez' <wez.norris@afma.gov.au>;
s. 47F(1) @afma.gov.au; **s. 47E(d)** **s. 22(1)(a)(ii)**
 @aff.gov.au>
Cc: **s. 47E(d)** Ipkendanz, Chris
 <Chris.Ipkendanz@aff.gov.au>
Subject: RE: Meeting with Hon Roger Cook MLC, Premier of WA [SEC=OFFICIAL:Sensitive]

OFFICIAL: Sensitive

Hi all,

We have been advised that the brief scope is to be expanded to include points on:

- **s. 22(1)(a)(ii)** (@NORRIS, Wez **s. 47F(1)** **s. 47E(d)**
- **s. 22(1)(a)(ii)** (**s. 22(1)(a)(ii)**)

Due to this, the brief must now be provided by **9am tomorrow morning**.

BIG thank you in advance everyone for the quick work that will be required tonight

s. 22(1)(a)(ii)

Departmental Liaison Officer | Office of Julie Collins MP
Minister for Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry

M: **s. 22(1)(a)(ii)** E: **s. 47E(d)**

Parliament House, Canberra, ACT 2600 Australia

OFFICIAL: Sensitive

From: Collins, Monica <Monica.Collins@aff.gov.au>
Sent: Friday, 19 June 2026 4:33 PM
To: DLO Collins **s. 47E(d)** Cookson, Beth <Beth.Cookson@aff.gov.au>; **s. 22(1)(a)(ii)**
 @aff.gov.au; **s. 47E(d)** Smith, Brant <Brant.Smith@aff.gov.au>
Cc: **s. 47E(d)** Ipkendanz, Chris
 <Chris.Ipkendanz@aff.gov.au>
Subject: RE: Meeting with Hon Roger Cook MLC, Premier of WA [SEC=OFFICIAL:Sensitive]

OFFICIAL: Sensitive

Copying to Brant too for action please.
Thanks
Monica

Monica Collins
Acting Deputy Secretary
Biosecurity Operations and Compliance Group
Department of Agriculture Fisheries and Forestry
M. s. 47F(1)

OFFICIAL: Sensitive

From: DLO Collins s. 47E(d)
Sent: Friday, 19 June 2026 4:19 PM
To: Cookson, Beth <Beth.Cookson@aff.gov.au>; Collins, Monica <Monica.Collins@aff.gov.au>; s. 22(1)(a)(ii) @aff.gov.au>; s. 47E(d)
Subject: Meeting with Hon Roger Cook MLC, Premier of WA [SEC=OFFICIAL:Sensitive]
Importance: High

OFFICIAL: Sensitive

Hi team,

Requesting an **Meeting Brief** from OCVO, due 10 am Sunday 21 June.

The Minister is meeting with Hon Roger Cook MLC, Premier of WA.

Timing: Monday, 22 June 2026 8:30 AM-9:00 AM
Location: APH

Happy to discuss.
s. 22(1)(a)(ii)

s. 22(1)(a)(ii)
Departmental Liaison Officer | Office of Julie Collins MP
Minister for Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry

M: s. 22(1)(a)(ii) E: DLO.Collins@aff.gov.au
Parliament House, Canberra, ACT 2600 Australia

OFFICIAL: Sensitive

s. 22(1)(a)(ii)

From: Palfreyman, Louise
Sent: Thursday, 18 June 2026 9:26 PM
To: Cookson, Beth; Smith, Brant
Cc: Hamilton, Sam
Subject: FW: notification and exec breifing packs [SEC=OFFICIAL:Sensitive]
Attachments: Executive-emergency-management-briefing-pack (1).pdf; DRAFT - H5 HPAI Day 1 Response Notification Process WILDLIFE.docx

OFFICIAL

Hi Beth and Brant

This was our draft planning for H5 Day one notifications.
Aspects will not be quite right for this incident, but it is a good starting point to consider all the steps.

Hope it helps.
Louise

Louise Palfreyman
s. 47F(1)

OFFICIAL

From: Palfreyman, Louise
Sent: Thursday, 18 June 2026 8:56 PM
To: Cookson, Beth <Beth.Cookson@aff.gov.au>
Subject: notification and exec breifing packs

Hi Beth

The exec pack - Pages 88-89 has the notification protocols for EAD events.

I am tidying up the H5 specific version.

Louise

OFFICIAL**Australian Government****Department of Agriculture,
Fisheries and Forestry**

Executive Emergency Management Briefing Pack

Presented by**Crisis & Emergency Management Branch****OFFICIAL**

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Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry arrangements

All hazards arrangements

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Business Continuity

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Biosecurity specific – links only

Emergency Animal Disease Response Agreement (EADRA)	
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- Australian Veterinary Emergency Plan (AUSVETPLAN)
- Australian Aquatic Veterinary Emergency Plan (AQUAVETPLAN)

Emergency Plant Pest Response Deed (EPPRD)

- Australian Emergency Plant Pest Response Plan (PLANTPLAN)

National Environmental Biosecurity Response Agreement (NEBRA)

- Emergency Marine Pest Plan (EMPPlan)

Interstate Deployment Arrangements for Biosecurity Responses



Job card: Secretary

1 Role

The Secretary provides leadership and overarching strategic direction for the response. This includes high-level oversight to ensure that:

- the department effectively discharges its responsibilities under relevant legislation and agreements
- the Minister is appropriately briefed and supported
- the department contributes effectively to whole of government arrangements
- actions are appropriately authorised and organisational resources are reprioritised as needed.

2 Appointment

The Secretary is a designated position within the department.

3 Responsibilities

Responsibilities may vary depending on the situation. The Secretary may undertake the following actions.

Role	Trigger	Actions
Receive	Event occurs	• Receive advice on potential or suspected incident • Receive briefing from a Deputy Secretary
Authorise	Advice from business area	• Authorise phase change/activation of relevant emergency plans on advice of lead business area and Assistant Secretary, Crisis and Emergency Management Branch • Appoint a Response Coordinator and/or Incident Controller • Instruct business areas to release staff to support response activities (as appropriate) • Authorise actions under relevant legislation such as the <i>Biosecurity Act 2015</i> as Director of Biosecurity or the <i>Export Control Act 2020</i> (as appropriate)
Brief	Emergency plan activation	• Brief the Minister for Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry or Minister's Office (as appropriate)
Notify	Emergency plan activation	• Notify other Secretaries (as appropriate) • Notify key industry players on a confidential basis (as appropriate)
Monitor	Incident response	• Maintain awareness of situation and escalate/deescalate as necessary • Receive briefings from Response Coordinator and/or Incident Controller • Provide leadership, strategic direction and advice to the Response Coordinator or Incident Controller • Brief the Minister or Minister's Office as appropriate

Crisis and Incident Response Plan (Job Cards)

Job card: Secretary – Version 4.1 – FINAL 20251020

Role	Trigger	Actions
		– Provide Minister with decision brief and draft biosecurity emergency declaration (Legal to advise as appropriate) • Implement Ministerial directions • Brief other senior officials and key industry players (as appropriate) • Consider business continuity issues with deputy secretaries
Scale down	Enhanced coordination no longer required	• Authorise phase change/deactivation of relevant emergency plan on advice of the lead business area and Assistant Secretary, Crisis and Emergency Management Branch • Brief the Minister on deactivation of response arrangements (as appropriate) • Notify other officials of deactivation of response arrangements (as appropriate) • Participate in incident debriefs or after-action reviews, if required

4 Version detail

Version	Date of issue	Authorisation	Comments
1.0	December 2004	Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry	
2.0	December 2009	Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry	Review of parts 1 and 2
3.0	April 2014	Department of Agriculture	Review of all parts
4.0	December 2023		Draft cleared by A/g Assistant Secretary Crisis and Emergency Management branch
4.1	20 October 2025	Assistant Secretary, Crisis and Emergency Management Branch	Update to align with CIRP response arrangements version 4.1



Job card: Deputy Secretary

1 Role

Deputy Secretaries provide high-level strategic oversight of the response relevant to their usual responsibilities. The relevant Deputy Secretary provides strategic leadership, direction and support for the response as appropriate.

2 Appointment

The Deputy Secretaries are designated positions within the department.

3 Responsibilities

Responsibilities may vary depending on the situation. The Deputy Secretary responsible for the Lead Business Area may undertake the following actions.

Role	Trigger	Actions
Receive	Event occurs	• Receive advice on potential or suspected incidents • Consult with lead business area and Assistant Secretary, Crisis and Emergency Management Branch on response options
Brief	Briefing from SES officers	• [Lead] Brief Secretary (and other Deputy Secretaries as appropriate)
Seek authorisation	Impact advice	• [Lead] Brief Secretary seeking phase change/activation of relevant emergency plans • [Lead] Advise Secretary to appoint a Response Coordinator (RC) and/or Incident Controller (IC)
Authorise	Activation of departmental plan or response escalation	• Approve release of resources to support response activities (where appropriate)
Brief	Incident response	• Assist Secretary with briefing Minister or Minister's Office • [Lead] Notify other Australian Government agencies (through the Agriculture Crisis Coordination Centre, AgriCCC) of Australian Government Biosecurity and Agricultural Incident Response Plan (AUSBIOAGPLAN) phase change
Respond	Activation of departmental plan	• [Lead] Provide high-level strategic oversight of the incident • [Lead] If appointed as Response Coordinator: – Establish a Response Coordination Group (RCG), chair RCG meetings, determine ongoing RCG membership – Provide oversight of the incident response – Brief the Secretary to ensure shared situational awareness – Ensure the National Situation Room and/or relevant Australian Government agencies are notified (through the AgriCCC) when CIRP is transitioned between phases (as appropriate) • Participate in RCG (as appropriate) and implement agreed actions

Crisis and Incident Response Plan (Job Cards)

Job card: Deputy Secretary – Version 4.1 – FINAL 20251020

Role	Trigger	Actions
		• Brief other senior official counterparts and equivalent level key industry players (as appropriate) • Represent the department at high-level meetings on policy issues and high-level committees established during a response
Participate	Activation of Australian Government crisis coordination arrangements	• [Lead] Coordinate with National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA) on the need for National Coordination Mechanism (NCM) meeting • [Lead] Co-chair NCM meetings with the relevant Deputy at NEMA when DAFF is the Australian Government Coordinating Agency • [Lead] Represent the department at NCM meetings, if required
Chair	National biosecurity arrangements	• [Deputy Secretary Biosecurity, Operations and Compliance] Chair National Management Group (as required)
Scale down	Situation resolved	• Receive advice from RC or IC on scale down activities when the incident has been resolved or can be effectively managed without enhanced coordination • [Lead] Brief Secretary seeking phase change/deactivation of relevant emergency plans • [Lead] If appointed Response Coordinator, Refer remaining actions to relevant business units • Notify other officials of deactivation of response arrangements as appropriate • Participate in incident debriefs or after-action reviews, if required • [Lead] Request incident debriefs or after-action reviews be conducted

4 Version detail

Version	Date of issue	Authorisation	Comments
4.0	DRAFT 5 December 2023	Draft cleared by A/g Assistant Secretary Crisis and Emergency Management branch	Interim CIRP (i-CIRP) while substantive CIRP under review
4.1	20 October 2025	Assistant Secretary, Crisis and Emergency Management Branch	Update to align with CIRP response arrangements version 4.1



Job card: Lead Business Area

1 Role

The Lead Business Area conducts the initial assessment of an event that is, or could become, an incident. It provides briefing and coordinates actions internally and externally until the Secretary approves a phase change of the relevant departmental or Australian Government response plan.

The Lead Business Area implements incident response arrangements and provides resources for the response. This includes for secretariat and other administration activities. Divisions with specific responsibilities contribute staff and other resources.

2 Appointment

The Lead Business Area has primary responsibility for responding to an incident relevant to their usual responsibilities. The lead First Assistant Secretary may undertake the following actions.

3 Responsibilities

Role	Trigger	Actions
Monitor	Risk management	• Monitor activities according to their divisional responsibilities and advise the Secretary/Deputy Secretary of any emerging issues that may require an incident response
Receive	Event occurs	• Receive information from internal or external sources of events that may impact on business operations
Assess	Information received	• Seek advice from Assistant Secretary, Crisis and Emergency Management Branch (AS CEMB) on response options • Assess impacts and determine whether: – a coordinated incident response is required – enhanced coordination is required
Respond	Impact assessment	• Brief lead business area Deputy Secretary and/or Minister's Office (as appropriate) • Request authorisation of phase change/activation of relevant emergency plans in consultation with the AS CEMB • Implement Secretary or Deputy Secretary directions and decisions • Provide staff for Response Coordination Group (RCG) and Incident Management Team (IMT) • Ensure that supporting resources and services for the RCG or IMT are available • Ensure operational aspects of the response are carried out effectively, working collaboratively with staff including those in other divisions and external stakeholders

Crisis and Incident Response Plan (Job Cards)

Job card: Lead Business Area – Version 4.2 – FINAL 20251204

4 Version detail

Version	Date of issue	Authorisation	Comments
4.0	5 December 2023	Draft cleared by A/g Assistant Secretary Crisis and Emergency Management branch	Interim CIRP (i-CIRP) while substantive CIRP under review
4.1	20 October 2025	Assistant Secretary, Crisis and Emergency Management Branch	Update to align with CIRP response arrangements version 4.1
4.2	4 December 2025	Assistant Secretary, Crisis and Emergency Management Branch	Include consultation with AS CEMB

Notification Protocol – events impacting departmental operations

1 Parameters

Purpose	This protocol establishes a consistent and repeatable approach to notifying departmental officials of events that may impact upon business operations. It also provides the ability to coordinate departmental input to whole-of-government mechanisms.
Scope	This protocol applies to events in which the department has a role, and may: • have hazard management responsibilities • be directly impacted by the consequences • be expected to support other agencies in managing the hazard or consequences.
Triggers	Notification of an event received by the Agriculture Crisis Coordination Centre (AgriCCC) or Business Continuity team.
End State	All relevant senior officers are notified of events in which the department has a role.

2 Definitions

Term	Definition
Consequence	The outcome of an event or situation described as the effects on persons, society, the environment and the economy.
Crisis	An event that exceeds business as usual emergency management or business continuity systems or capability design parameters.
Emergency	An event, actual or imminent, which endangers or threatens to endanger life, property or the environment, and which requires a significant and coordinated response.
Event	An incident or situation, which occurs in a particular place during a particular interval of time.
Hazard	A process, phenomenon or human activity that may cause loss of life, injury or other health impacts, property damage, social and economic disruption or environmental degradation.

3 Authority

The department maintains a suite of emergency management and business continuity arrangements to respond to events that require enhanced coordination. These may be activated in response to internal or external events.

The Australian Government Crisis Management Framework (AGCMF) sets out the Australian Government's whole-of-government coordination arrangements to prepare for, respond to and recover from crises. It identifies lead ministers and agencies for response to a range of possible hazards. Through the National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA), notifications of hazard events are circulated to Australian Government agencies.

4 Activation

This protocol will be activated when the Crisis and Emergency Management Branch, through the Agriculture Crisis Coordination Centre (AgriCCC) or Business Continuity functions, receives notification of:

- an internal event that requires enhanced coordination to effectively manage, or
- an external event in which the department has a role in hazard or consequence management.

5 Notification process

Phase	Business Area	Actions
Event occurs	All areas	☐ Become aware of an event that may require additional coordination ☐ Notify the AgriCCC / Business Continuity functions
Receive	AgriCCC / Business Continuity	☐ Receive notification from relevant business area or another agency ☐ Inform Assistant Secretary, Crisis and Emergency Management Branch
Assess	AgriCCC / Business Continuity	☐ Determine if DAFF has role and if a response is required ☐ Identify anticipated impacts and business area(s) likely to be affected ○ Refer Attachment A – Hazard notification matrix
Notify	AgriCCC / Business Continuity	☐ Notify lead business area and other identified business areas (if required) ☐ Provide information received with initial notification, a concise situation report, assessment of anticipated impacts and advice on any next steps ☐ Determine if coordination support is required
Respond	Lead/affected business area(s)	☐ Receive notification from AgriCCC / Business Continuity functions ☐ Assess impacts on business area and determine whether emergency/business continuity plan needs to be activated ☐ Implement business area contingency measures ☐ Attend relevant coordination mechanism as required (Attachment B) ☐ Brief relevant Deputy Secretary and/or Minister's Office (as appropriate) ☐ Remain available to receive or contribute to situation updates
Brief	Deputy Secretary (lead business area)	☐ Brief the Secretary and Minister for Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry (as appropriate)
Monitor	All areas with a role	☐ Maintain situational awareness and escalate/de-escalate as necessary
Review	Crisis and Emergency Management Branch	☐ Conduct after action review (AAR) following resolution of the event ☐ Update protocol to incorporate lessons identified

6 Notification method

The AgriCCC / Business Continuity function will notify relevant business area contacts via:

- a. a telephone call to the lead business area, if unanswered a voicemail will be left and the secondary contact called
- b. an email to all business areas with a role.

7 Review

The Crisis and Emergency Management Branch will regularly review this protocol, including after any activation.

8 Attachments

- A: Hazard notification matrix
- B: Australian Government coordination mechanisms

Attachment A: Hazard notification matrix

Hazard / Consequence (example)	Lead Division	Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry Policy	Agricultural Trade and Regulation	Biosecurity, Operations and Compliance	Strategy, Enterprise and Engagement
Biosecurity – animal (animal pest or disease)	☐ Australian Chief Veterinary Office (Australian Chief Veterinary Officer)	☐ Farm Performance, Biosecurity and Information Branch	☐ Trade and International Division ☐ Export and Veterinary Services Division ☐ Live Animal Export Branch ☐ Animal Welfare and Regulation Stewardship Branch	☐ Biosecurity Animal Division ☐ Biosecurity Response and Reform Branch ☐ Investigations Branch ☐ Science and Surveillance Branch	☐ Communication and Media Branch ☐ Financial Management and Investment Branch ☐ Legal Division
s. 47E(d)					

Hazard / Consequence (example)	Lead Division	Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry Policy	Agricultural Trade and Regulation	Biosecurity, Operations and Compliance	Strategy, Enterprise and Engagement
s. 47E(d)					

Hazard / Consequence (example)	Lead Division	Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry Policy	Agricultural Trade and Regulation	Biosecurity, Operations and Compliance	Strategy, Enterprise and Engagement
s. 47E(d)					

Attachment B: Australian Government coordination mechanisms

The Australian Government Crisis Management Framework (AGCMF) provides three key mechanisms that facilitate whole-of-government coordination in response to or recovery from crisis.

National Coordination Mechanism (NCM)

Function	Brings together relevant Australian Government, state and territory government and/or private sector representatives for coordination, communication and collaboration for domestic crises. Co-chaired by Deputy Coordinator General NEMA and the relevant Deputy Secretary (or delegate) of the Australian Government Coordinating Agency.
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Interdepartmental Emergency Taskforce (IDETF)

Function	Is the peak senior officials' crisis coordination mechanism during Australian Government responses to international crises. Chaired by Deputy Secretary Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT). The relevant Deputy Secretary PM&C may co-chair.
-----------------	---

These whole-of-government coordination arrangements support the Australian Government Coordinating Agency ensure effective:

- **situational awareness:** to provide accurate, timely and relevant intelligence on the current and forecast situation, including a common operating picture
- **impact and consequence monitoring:** to maintain visibility of impact and consequences of the crisis across all sectors, including broader consequences affecting government and the community
- **crisis communication and public information:** to coordinate the development and dissemination of timely, tailored and relevant whole of Australian Government crisis communication and public messaging
- **strategic coordination:** to support sector specific arrangements and ensure senior officials and agencies collaborate to support timely briefing of ministers.
- **strategic planning:** to establish and facilitate agreement to whole of Australian Government coordination priorities and objectives, and coordinated cross-government advice to relevant ministers.

The Crisis and Emergency Management Branch, through the AgriCCC and Business Continuity functions, provides a central point of contact into the department for these mechanisms. It also provides advice to business areas about the operative functions of these mechanism and can support participation as necessary.



Australian Government

Department of Agriculture,
Fisheries and Forestry

SES contact list

Please refer to the monthly [SES contact list](#). The contact list is on the [SES information hub](#).

Please update any hard copies and/or backup downloaded electronic copies with the new list each month.



Australian Government
**Department of Agriculture,
Fisheries and Forestry**

Crisis and Incident Response Plan

Version 4.1



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Cataloguing data

This publication (and any material sourced from it) should be attributed as: DAFF 2025, *Crisis and Incident Response Plan*, Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry, Canberra, August. CC BY 4.0.

Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry

GPO Box 858 Canberra ACT 2601

Telephone 1800 900 090

Web agriculture.gov.au

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Acknowledgements

The authors thank divisions and areas for their input. Thanks to the Crisis and Emergency Management Network for its help.

Acknowledgement of Country

We acknowledge the continuous connection of First Nations Traditional Owners and Custodians to the lands, seas and waters of Australia. We recognise their care for and cultivation of Country. We pay respect to Elders past and present, and recognise their knowledge and contribution to the productivity, innovation and sustainability of Australia's agriculture, fisheries and forestry industries.

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1 Authority

The Crisis and Incident Response Plan (CIRP) derives its authority from the [Australian Government Crisis Management Framework](#) (AGCMF). The AGCMF is the policy that frames Australia's national crisis management arrangements.

The Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry's [Crisis and Emergency Management Framework and Policy](#) outlines our approach to establish and maintain appropriate crisis and emergency management capabilities and arrangements to effectively discharge our responsibilities under the AGCMF.

The CIRP is subordinate to the framework and policy and supports DAFF to fulfil its responsibilities.

The Secretary, Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry approved CIRP on 12 August 2025.

The Crisis and Emergency Management Branch (CEMB) maintains this plan. See [Document control](#) for version control and update information.

2 Introduction

The CIRP describes DAFF's arrangements to respond to and recover from crises and emergencies impacting Australia's agricultural sector (agriculture, fisheries and forestry) and environmental biosecurity.

2.1 Purpose

The CIRP defines roles, responsibilities, and coordination arrangements, and demonstrates how DAFF supports broader Australian crisis and emergency management frameworks.

2.2 Scope

The CIRP applies to any incident that requires enhanced coordination to effectively manage.

DAFF uses the CIRP to manage incidents such as:

- biosecurity incidents (such as plant or animal pest or disease outbreaks)
- natural disasters (such as bushfires, floods and cyclones)
- environmental incidents (such as pollution incidents, chemical spills or hazardous material releases)
- technological incidents (such as cyber-attacks or systems outages) that could disrupt agricultural operations or supply chains
- agricultural trade disruptions
- other incidents that affect the agricultural sector that require enhanced coordination.

2.2.1 In scope

The CIRP applies when the Lead Business Area needs support to respond to an incident, including when the incident scale or complexity exceeds their capability or capacity. See [Roles and responsibilities](#) for more information on Lead Business Areas.

The CIRP may also be used when an incident has consequences that multiple business areas have responsibility to manage and enhanced coordination is required.

2.2.2 Out of scope

The CIRP does not apply to incidents affecting business continuity, security, property, emergency evacuations, health and safety or internal ICT disruptions.

2.3 Guiding principles

The guiding principles that inform the CIRP are:

- DAFF manages incidents in accordance with relevant legislative authority, response agreements and sector-specific response plans.
- DAFF uses an all-hazards and all-consequences approach.

- DAFF uses contemporary incident management doctrine and crisis management best practice. Doctrine includes the Australasian Inter-Service Incident Management System (AIIMS). Best practice includes the Crisis Appreciation and Strategic Planning (CASP) methodology.
- DAFF uses incident management systems to facilitate unity of effort and unified coordination. This does not remove business area legislative, administrative and policy responsibilities.
- The CIRP is interoperable with internal or whole-of-government arrangements. DAFF can use the CIRP in support of a crisis managed under the AGCMF, the [Australian Government Biosecurity and Agricultural Response Plan](#) (AUSBIOAGPLAN) or other relevant state and territory arrangements.
- DAFF engages with relevant Australian Government and state and territory agencies at all levels of operation.

2.4 Legislation

Commonwealth legislation that provides the authority for response and recovery operations includes:

- *Agricultural and Veterinary Chemicals Act 1994*
- *Biological Control Act 1984*
- *Biosecurity Act 2015*
- *Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999*
- *Export Control Act 2020*
- *Food Standards Australia New Zealand Act 1991*
- *Gene Technology Act 2000*
- *Imported Food Control Act 1992*
- *National Emergency Declaration Act 2020*
- *National Health Security Act 2007*.

2.5 Response plan parts

The CIRP has 4 parts (Table 1). This document describes the response arrangements. Other parts guide how to implement the arrangements.

Table 1 Crisis and Incident Response Plan parts

Part	Document	Description
1	Response arrangements	Outline of DAFF's crisis management arrangements to support DAFF's response to hazards or consequences affecting the agricultural sector. It includes response coordination arrangements and roles and responsibilities of key positions and areas.
2	Job cards	Role descriptions and tasks for a specific role or function during a response.
3	Procedures	Descriptions of how to undertake key tasks.
4	Templates	Templates including checklists and forms for use during response.

3 Context

States and territories have primary responsibility for responding to an incident within their jurisdiction. DAFF has primary responsibility for incidents within its authority. DAFF uses the CIRP for responses it leads and for responses led by other agencies or organisations. DAFF coordinates through direct liaison and specific coordination mechanisms.

3.1 National biosecurity coordination

DAFF facilitates national coordination of the response to biosecurity incidents. To support a consistent approach to biosecurity incidents, DAFF leads the National Management Group (NMG) and consultative committees. For more information on NMG and consultative committees, see [Appendix A](#).

Where DAFF coordinates a biosecurity response at a national level, the DAFF Incident Control Centre (ICC) may be referred to as the National Coordination Centre (NCC). For information about the DAFF ICC, see [Incident management facilities](#).

3.1.1 States and territories

DAFF coordinates with relevant state and territory agencies either directly or through their biosecurity operations centres.

Affected state and territory biosecurity agencies could establish:

- State Coordination Centres (SCCs) – to coordinate activities across the state or territory
- Local Control Centres (LCCs) – to control activities within a smaller geographical area
- Forward Command Posts (FCPs) or field teams – to conduct on-ground operations, run out of an LCC.

3.2 Other plans and arrangements

The AUSBIOAGPLAN sets out Australian Government arrangements to respond to domestic biosecurity and agricultural crises and lists key relevant all-hazards and sector-specific arrangements.

4 Response

The CIRP has 3 phases: standby, alert and active (Table 2). See [Appendix B](#) for more information on phases.

The Secretary approves phase changes with advice from the relevant Lead Business Area guided by Assistant Secretary, CEMB (AS, CEMB). See [Roles and responsibilities](#) for information on Lead Business Areas.

Table 2 Phases

Phase	Description
Standby	Getting ready for a future response. Preparedness activities are undertaken to monitor potential situations, plan for potential responses, train, and exercise response capabilities.
Alert	Actions when an incident is about to happen and will need coordination. The alert phase occurs when there is a reasonably held suspicion that a coordinated departmental response will be required and capabilities are brought to an enhanced level of readiness.
Active	Responding to an incident that has happened. This active phase occurs when an incident requires enhanced coordination capabilities.

4.1 Triggers

A phase change from standby to alert or active could be triggered:

- by a domestic or international incident that impacts on the agricultural sector and requires a coordinated departmental response
- in support of Australian Government, state or territory, national or international arrangements
- in anticipation of a coordinated departmental response to an incident.

4.2 Phase changes

Following a phase change from standby to alert or active, the person designated to lead the response will:

- advise all Deputy Secretaries
- notify the National Situation Room (NSR) where applicable, via DAFF's [Agriculture Crisis Coordination Centre](#) (AgriCCC)
- inform relevant Australian Government agencies and state and territory agencies (where appropriate).


4.2.1 Scale down

When the incident has resolved to a point where enhanced coordination is no longer required, transition to recovery, program management or business as usual activity will occur. See [Recovery](#) for more information on these activities. See [Appendix B](#) for more information on scale down.

4.3 Phase change sequence of events

Figure 1 shows a general sequence of events. This figure is not comprehensive, but a guide to how a response could evolve. Key steps include:

- When a trigger is met, written approval is sought from the Secretary for a phase change to alert or active.
- The request for approval is sought via a templated email which includes: the current situation, the level of the incident, the coordination arrangements that are required for the response and who will lead the response.
- The Secretary appoints a Response Coordinator (RC) to lead the [Response Coordination Group](#) (RCG) and an Incident Controller (IC) to lead the [Incident Management Team](#) (IMT), if needed.
- If the situation escalates in the alert phase, the Secretary may approve a phase change to active.
- Response actions may decrease as the situation improves. The RC and IC consider the ongoing need for the RCG and IMT. When no longer needed, the RC and IC stand down the RCG and IMT.
- The incident is over when there is not a need for further activity or business as usual arrangements are sufficient. The phase is standby when the incident is over.
- The phase may change from alert to standby if the situation resolves during the alert phase.
- The Secretary approves the change to standby.

Figure 1 Sequence of events

4.4 Incident classification

There are 3 incident levels (Table 3). The potential consequences are based on the [Enterprise Risk Management Framework and Policy](#).

Table 3 Incident levels

Level	Potential consequences	Resources for DAFF's response	National resources
1	- Temporary loss of export market for a single industry. - Moderate instances of damage to Australia's food security, fisheries or forestry that could be reversed with intensive efforts. - An industry, local area or other stakeholder experiences a moderate degree of economic or other damage. Level 1 incidents are typically of a moderate consequence risk rating.	Level 1 incidents are managed using local resources. Control is limited to the immediate business area. If appointed, the IC can usually do all functions with support from response personnel within their area. A RCG (see Response Coordination Group) is likely to be needed for coordination.	Affected jurisdictions could seek resource support in incidents involving a pest or disease outbreak.
2	- Temporary loss of export market for a high value industry or several industries at once. - Major loss of, or damage, to Australia's food security, fisheries or forestry. - Industries, a region or other stakeholders experience a significant degree of economic or other damage. Level 2 incidents are typically of a major consequence risk rating.	Level 2 incidents are more complex, and characterised by the need for: - deployment of resources beyond the initial response personnel or business area - functional sections within an IMT due to the complexity of the incident, or - both deployment of resources and IMT functional sections. A RCG and IMT (see Incident Management Team) are likely to be needed for coordination and control.	Multiple affected jurisdictions are likely to seek resource support in incidents involving a pest or disease outbreak.
3	- Loss of trust in Australia's export certification system. - Permanent or persisting loss of export market for a high value industry or multiple industries at once. - Severe widespread loss of, or damage, to Australia's food security, fisheries or forestry. - Stakeholders experience negative impacts from which they cannot recover. Level 3 incidents are typically of a catastrophic consequence risk rating.	Level 3 incidents are characterised by - the requirement for national coordination of deployment of resources across jurisdictions or internationally - high complexity with multiple agencies and multiple industries being involved - the activation of numerous functions within an IMT to respond to the situation.	Multiple affected jurisdictions are highly likely to seek resource support in incidents involving a pest or disease outbreak.

Note: The AGCMF describes 4 tiers of crisis coordination. The tiers are based on Australian Government coordination. DAFF's incident levels are separate to the AGCMF tiers. The incident level used is based on potential consequences for the agriculture, fisheries and forestry portfolio. Potential consequences listed are examples and do not cover every situation.

4.5 Coordination arrangements

One or more of the following groups could be used to support response activities:

- Response Coordination Group (RCG) – for oversight and strategic direction
- Incident Management Team (IMT) – for managing the operational response
- field teams – for undertaking tactical activities in the field (if required).

The groups used depend on the level of incident and response requirements. A response may need an RCG or IMT or both. The need for field teams is based on operational requirements. Figure 2 sets

out the relationship between the RCG and IMT and internal and external briefing arrangements. Table 4 describes the main IMT functions.

Figure 2 Coordination arrangements




Table 4 Incident Management Team function description

Function	Description
Control	The management of all activities necessary for the resolution of an incident.
Planning	The development of objectives, strategies and plans for the resolution of an incident based on the outcomes of collection and analysis of information.
Intelligence	The task of collecting and analysing information or data, that is recorded and disseminated as intelligence to support decision-making and planning.
Public Information	Provision of information and advice to the public, and liaison with the media and affected communities.
Operations	The tasking and application of resources to achieve resolution of an incident.
Investigation	The task of conducting investigations to determine the cause of an incident and/or to determine factors that contributed to the impact of the incident or specific events.
Logistics	The acquisition and provision of human and physical resources, facilities, services and materials to support achievement of incident objectives.
Finance	The task of managing: - accounts for purchases of supplies and hire of equipment - insurance and compensation for personnel, property and vehicles - the collection of cost data and provision of cost-effective analyses and providing cost estimates for the incident.

4.5.1 Response Coordination Group

The RCG provides an agency-wide coordination function to facilitate leadership and strategic oversight of DAFF's response efforts. The RCG supports shared situational awareness across the department. The RCG provides a common understanding of values at risk, impacts and consequences and operational tempo.

The RCG meeting tempo is relative to the scale of response.

RCG members are relevant senior executives. The Secretary appoints the RC. The RC is the RCG chair.

The RCG will:

- set the strategic intent for the response
- ensure appropriate prioritisation and allocation of resources
- monitor business continuity impacts
- receive regular briefing from the IMT
- maintain overall situational awareness of the response.

The RC can request other Australian Government agencies provide representatives for the RCG. Agency representatives may be sought when AGCMF mechanisms have not been activated, but enhanced coordination is needed.

Where established, the RCG may task the IMT (through the IC). If there is no IMT established, RCG members task their respective business areas with any agreed actions.

4.5.2 Incident Management Team

The IMT controls DAFF's operational response and provides a centralised command and control capability based on AIIMS principles. The IMT reports to the RCG where established. Where appropriate, other agencies can provide Liaison Officers to the IMT. If responding to more than 1 incident, DAFF can establish multiple IMTs.

The IC leads the IMT. The Secretary appoints the IC. The appointed IC will manage workflow and tasking within the IMT.

Depending on the scale and complexity of the incident, the IC could delegate 1 or more IMT functions. See Table 4 for function definitions. For more detail on functions, see [Job cards](#).

The IMT's Operations function establishes and manages field teams when needed.

4.5.3 Liaison Officers

In addition to the Liaison Officers received from other agencies, DAFF can deploy Liaison Officers to other operations centres or agencies to facilitate situational awareness and response coordination. For example, DAFF could send Liaison Officers:

- to the NSR (through the AgriCCC)
- to individual jurisdictions (for example, to support information flows or deployments)

- to other Australian Government agencies.

DAFF discusses placement of Liaison Officers with the receiving agency. The agency agrees to receive people before DAFF deploys them.

DAFF can deploy its officers to the Australian Government Crisis Coordination Team (CCT) in NEMA. The CCT supports coordination of Australian Government actions in line with the strategic intent set by the National Coordination Mechanism (NCM).

4.5.4 Business areas

The IC can task business areas to assist with specific tasks to support response activities. If there is no IMT, the RC can task business areas to assist with specific tasks to support response activities.

4.5.5 Agriculture Crisis Coordination Centre

The Agriculture Crisis Coordination Centre (AgriCCC) is a virtual conduit between DAFF and the NSR within NEMA and the Global Watch Office (GWO) within the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. The AgriCCC shares situational awareness between agencies, coordinates general communication and facilitates agency representation on coordination tools and mechanisms, such as the Australian Government National Coordination Mechanism (NCM-AUSGOV) and the NCM. The AgriCCC sits within the IMT Liaison function in the IMT.

4.6 Resourcing

The Secretary, in authorising transition to alert or active phase, authorises the RC and IC (or delegate) to co-opt people and resources as appropriate to resolve the incident.

The IC is responsible for ensuring their response team has adequate people and resources, supported by the Resource Planning and Logistics functions, where established.

4.6.1 Resources (including surge capacity)

Business areas are responsible for providing resources to do the activities they are responsible for. If a business area or division exceeds its capacity, they could need additional resources. In addition, state and territory agencies could ask for surge capabilities. This could include assistance to coordinate resources across jurisdictions.

Internal surge capacity

The IC can request resource support from divisions with relevant functions. If this is insufficient, they can request additional resources through the RC or the Executive Board (EB). The Secretary can instruct business areas to release people or resources as requested by the RC or IC to support response operations.

External surge capacity

If DAFF's resources are inadequate for its response activities, or another jurisdiction requests assistance, the IC (through the RCG) will need to consider external surge capacity. Potential external surge options are set out in AUSBIOAGPLAN. The IMT Logistics function manages surge arrangements for DAFF's response activities. The National Biosecurity Deployment Coordinator leads coordination with state and territory agencies. See [Biosecurity Emergency Management Interstate Deployment](#)


[Arrangements for Biosecurity Response](#) for further information. If there is no IMT, the CEMB manages surge capacity.

4.6.2 Incident management facilities

Figure 3 shows key incident control and coordination centres.

DAFF's IMT operates out of the ICC established for the incident. [s. 47E\(d\)](#)

Figure 3 Control and coordination centres and lead agencies



4.6.3 Records management

Records management during an incident must comply with DAFF's [Information Management Policy](#). Everyone is responsible for record keeping.

4.6.4 Work health and safety

DAFF's existing [work health and safety \(WHS\) advice](#) is the basis for safety during response activities.

The RC or IC may appoint a Safety Officer to assist with monitoring and reviewing the safety and welfare of all responders. Safety is the responsibility of everyone in the response and is an inherent task of all functions.

5 Recovery

See the AGCMF and the AUSBIOAGPLAN for information about Australian Government coordination of recovery activities, and direct recovery support to communities, or to state and territory governments. The NCM is the key recovery mechanism. The NCM focuses on near-term recovery.

If appropriate, seek advice from NEMA on recovery activities for incidents where the NCM has not been used.

5.1 Industries and communities

Under most circumstances, responsibility for the management of industry and community recovery from incidents that fall within the scope of the CIRP sits with state and territory agencies. If DAFF is involved, recovery initiatives could include existing programs or the development of targeted programs. Recovery initiatives aimed at industries and communities could include farm assistance and/or specifically developed and targeted programs.

For more information on programs and services, see [Drought, disaster and rural support](#).

DAFF may need to manage the consequences of trade and market impacts for an extended period beyond the response phase.

5.2 Department

DAFF's internal recovery process focuses on a return to business as usual, or an improved state that has bolstered resilience and improved practises. The range and extent of recovery activities depends on the impacts to DAFF's business as usual functions.

6 Roles and responsibilities

See the AUSBIOAGPLAN for key Australian Government agency responsibilities to respond to domestic biosecurity and agricultural crises.

Job cards list the responsibilities of specific roles and functions within the department. Learn more about [job cards](#) on The Source.

The Lead Business Area job card lists its role and responsibilities. Lead business areas are listed in the *Notification protocol – events impacting departmental operations*. See [Associated documents](#) for where to find the protocol. Other business areas have responsibilities consistent with their day to day functions.

7 Situational awareness

DAFF achieves shared situational awareness through the coordination mechanisms referenced in [Coordination arrangements](#) and [Context](#). Additionally, the NSR facilitates shared situational awareness. The NSR manages a National Joint Common Operating Picture (NJCOP). The NJCOP is a near real-time, all-hazards platform designed to display all active significant crisis events. NEMA manages the NSR and the NJCOP on behalf of the Australian Government.

People in the response communicate with each other using a range of methods. This includes regular situation reporting and liaison between response teams at all levels of operation.

8 Public information

DAFF works with other jurisdictions and agencies to ensure consistent public messaging through the [National Biosecurity Communication and Engagement Network](#) (NBCEN). The NBCEN develops and delivers nationally consistent public information through a range of channels and engagement activities. This includes national talking points and updates to the [Outbreak.gov.au](https://www.outbreak.gov.au) website.

DAFF uses the [Biosecurity Incident Public Information Manual](#) (BIPIM). The BIPIM is a best practice guide on public information activities.

9 Financial arrangements

The Finance function oversees financial management during a response.

s. 47E(d)

If assistance in the form of personnel or physical resources is provided across agencies or jurisdictions, then financial considerations are managed according to the arrangements the assistance is provided under.

10 Associated documents

Read the CIRP with the following documents:

- [AGCMF](#) – for whole of government coordination supported or led by NEMA
- [AUSBIOAGPLAN](#) – for whole of government coordination led by DAFF, drawing on the AGCMF
- [Australian Emergency Management Arrangements](#)
- [Biosecurity Emergency Management Interstate Deployment Arrangements for Biosecurity Response](#) – for resource coordination in a biosecurity response
- [Crisis Appreciation and Strategic Planning Guidebook](#) – for planning ahead of and during an incident
- [Crisis and Emergency Management Framework and Policy](#) – for policy on how DAFF applies emergency management arrangements and doctrine
- *Notification protocol – events impacting departmental operations* – for notification of the AgriCCC and business continuity team and business areas – this document is available in the [Executive emergency management briefing pack](#).

Appendix A: National biosecurity coordination arrangements

DAFF facilitates national coordination of biosecurity incidents. DAFF undertakes its role in line with sector-specific national biosecurity emergency response agreements (cost-sharing deeds). The cost sharing deeds include collaborative decision-making and coordination structures. The structures include:

- National Management Group (NMG)
- Consultative Committees (CC).

See [How we coordinate a response to an outbreak](#) for information on national coordination.

National Management Group

The NMG is the decision-making body for national biosecurity emergency responses. The NMG considers national pest or disease emergency response plans and agrees the proportional sharing of costs between affected parties. It comprises the Australian, state and territory biosecurity agencies, affected industry parties, and custodians of the relevant agreement. DAFF chairs, participates in and provides secretariat support to the group.

Consultative Committees

The CC is the technical body that coordinates the national technical response to biosecurity emergencies and advises the NMG on response strategies. It comprises the Australian, state and territory biosecurity agencies, affected industry parties, and custodians of the relevant agreement. DAFF chairs, participates in, and provides secretariat support to consultative committees.

National Biosecurity Communication and Engagement Network

The [National Biosecurity Communication and Engagement Network](#) (NBCEN) operates under the national biosecurity response arrangements and produces public information in response to pest or disease incursions. It advises the CCs and NMG on best practice communication.

The NBCEN's core members are communication managers from Australian and state and territory agencies responsible for biosecurity, Animal Health Australia, and Plant Health Australia. During an incident the NBCEN also includes communication managers from affected industries, other agencies or organisations and groups critical to the response.

DAFF participates in and provides secretariat support to the NBCEN. DAFF chairs the NBCEN on a rotational basis.

Appendix B: Response phases in detail

Table B1 Phases, triggers and key actions

Phase	Description	Triggers	Key actions
Standby	Getting ready for a future response.	- Standby is the default phase of CIRP. - CIRP is changed to standby if active phase finishes or alert phase finishes and does not proceed to active phase.	- The Crisis and Emergency Management Branch (CEMB) maintains readiness for the activation of CIRP when required. - Business areas undertake preparedness activities, monitor hazards, plan for potential responses and build emergency management capabilities. This includes to: - deliver or participate in training - conduct or participate in exercises - deliver or participate in lessons management. - Undertake near-term preparedness if there is a need to rapidly prepare for an imminent crisis.
Alert	Actions when an incident is about to happen and will need coordination.	- Reasonably held suspicion that a coordinated response will be required and transition to active phase is likely. - Developing situation that requires pre-emptive measures to support enhanced readiness. - Concurrent incidents could be likely to severely stretch resources within 1 or more jurisdictions and contingency planning could be appropriate. - Expectations of timely departmental and/or Australian Government coordination if incident is realised or develops.	- Seek approval of phase change and appropriate response coordination arrangements. - Secretary authorises phase change to alert. - Inform key stakeholders the plan has moved to alert. - Maintain and support shared situational awareness. - Undertake crisis appreciation and strategic planning methodology to identify potential interagency and intersectoral consequences, response options and capabilities. - Establish the Incident Control Centre (ICC) and response teams, as required. - Real time lessons capture and hot debriefs. - If the active phase is not required, alert also includes scale down actions.
Active	Responding to a crisis or incident that has happened.	- Heightened coordination is required to manage a situation. - Resourcing capacities within 1 or more jurisdictions have been exceeded or will be exceeded in the near term to respond to current agricultural or plant or animal biosecurity incidents. - Expectations of proactive departmental and/or Australian Government coordinated response.	- Seek approval of phase change and appropriate response coordination arrangements. - Secretary authorises phase change to active. - Inform key stakeholders plan has moved to active phase. - Ongoing activities to support shared situational awareness. - Detailed planning and response action. - Establish the ICC and response teams, as required.

Phase	Description	Triggers	Key actions
			• Convene coordination forums to support shared situational awareness and coordinate response activities. Provide updates to relevant agencies directly if whole of government coordination is not required. • Real time lessons capture and hot debriefs. • Once the incident has resolved or can be effectively managed without enhanced coordination, undertake scale down actions.

Note: National coordination and other activities could be needed regardless of this plan being used. For example, national biosecurity committees could meet. Rules for national committees are set out in other arrangements. The AUSBIOAGPLAN lists key arrangements.

Scale down

Undertake the following actions to scale down once the incident is resolved or can be effectively managed without enhanced coordination:

- inform key stakeholders the CIRP is moving to standby for the incident, or that an operation centre is closing
- finalise accounts
- finalise secretariat and administrative activities
- finalise record keeping
- recover, decommission and dispose of stores and equipment
- stand down the operations centres and/or teams, if established for the incident
- conduct debriefs and after action review.

Also undertake scale down actions when an individual function is no longer needed.

Glossary

Term	Definition
after action review	A debriefing process following an event or activity by those involved with, or interested in, that event and whose purpose is to learn from it.
AGCMF	Australian Government Crisis Management Framework
AgriCCC	Agriculture Crisis Coordination Centre
agricultural sector	agriculture, fisheries and forestry
AIIMS	Australasian Inter-Service Incident Management System
AUSBIOAGPLAN	Australian Government Biosecurity and Agricultural Response Plan
biosecurity incident	An incident relating to pests and diseases entering, emerging, establishing or spreading in Australia and its external territories.
BIPIM	Biosecurity Incident Public Information Manual
business area	A division, branch, section or team within the department.
capability	The collective ability and power to deliver and sustain an effect within a specific context and timeframe.
capacity	The key determinant of how long a capability can be sustained for at a particular level of ability.
CCT	Australian Government Crisis Coordination Team
CEMB	Crisis and Emergency Management Branch
CIRP	Crisis and Incident Response Plan
command	The internal direction of the members and resources of an agency in the performance of the organisation's roles and tasks. Command operates vertically within an organisation.
consequence	The outcome of an event or incident described as the effects on persons, society, the environment and the economy.
control	The overall direction of activities in an emergency situation. Authority for control is established in legislation or in an emergency plan. Control carries with it the responsibility for tasking other organisations in accordance with the needs of the situation. Control relates to situations and operates horizontally across organisations.
coordination	The bringing together of organisations and other resources to support an emergency management response. It involves the systematic acquisition and application of resources (organisational, human and equipment) in an emergency.
crisis	An event that exceeds business-as-usual emergency management systems and capability design parameters, resulting in: - overwhelmed technical and non-technical systems and resources - degraded or disabled governance structures - ineffective strategic and operational decision-making functions.
debrief	To gather information from the participants in an action to gauge the success or otherwise of the action at the end of the task, shift, day/period, deployment or incident.
EB	Executive Board

Term	Definition
emergency	An event, actual or imminent, which endangers or threatens to endanger life, property or the environment, and which requires a significant and coordinated response.
emergency management	A range of measures to manage risks and deal with all aspects of emergencies across the phases of prevention, preparedness, response and recovery (PPRR). The measures include plans, systems and arrangements.
environmental biosecurity	The protection of the environment and/or social amenity from the risks and negative effects of pests and diseases entering, emerging, establishing or spreading in Australia. - Environment includes Australia's natural terrestrial, inland water and marine ecosystems and their constituent parts, and its natural and physical resources. - Social amenity includes the social, economic and cultural aspects of the environment, including tourism, human infrastructure, cultural assets and national image.
exercise	A controlled, objective-driven activity used for testing, practising or evaluating processes or capabilities.
function	An activity or grouping of activities addressing core responsibilities of the Incident Controller. See Table 4 for further information on functions.
GWO	Global Watch Office
hazard	A process, phenomenon or human activity that may cause loss of life, injury or other health impacts, property damage, social and economic disruption or environmental degradation.
incident	Events for which the management of realised or potential or cumulative consequences requires the activation of arrangements under CIRP. In general, an incident is an event, occurrence or set of circumstances that: - has a definite spatial extent and duration - calls for human intervention - has a set of concluding conditions that can be defined - will be under the control of an individual who has the authority to make decisions about how it will be brought to an end.
Incident Control Centre (ICC)	The location where the Incident Controller and various members of the Incident Management Team provide overall direction of response activities.
Incident Controller (IC)	The individual responsible for management of all incident control activities across the department for the department's operational response.
Incident Management Team (IMT)	The group of incident management personnel comprised of the Incident Controller and any appointed Deputy Incident Controllers, the Safety Officer, and any appointed functional officers leading the sections of planning, intelligence, public information, operations, investigation, logistics and finance and administration. The Incident Controller has power to co-opt others as members of the Incident Management Team from time to time.
LCC	Local Control Centre
Lead Business Area	The business area with primary responsibility for responding to an incident.
lessons management	The collection, analysis, implementation, monitoring and review of experiences from events, exercises, programs and reviews.
National Coordination Mechanism (NCM)	The peak senior officials' crisis coordination mechanism providing a national picture of crisis to governments and key stakeholders. The NCM provides the convening mechanism to bring together Australian Government, state and territory government and non-government representatives immediately before, during and after a crisis.

Term	Definition
NBCEN	National Biosecurity Communication and Engagement Network
NCM-AUSGOV	Australian Government National Coordination Mechanism
near-term preparedness	Rapid preparedness activities to respond to forecast or potential impacts and consequences of an imminent crisis.
NEMA	National Emergency Management Agency
NJCOP	National Joint Common Operating Picture
NMG	National Management Group
NSR	National Situation Room
operational	Deals with agency-wide or functional group considerations and is where the strategic intent and objectives are linked to tactical (on-ground) actions. It is at this level that strategy is implemented by assigning activities, tasks and resources to the response efforts. Focus is generally medium term in nature and oriented towards the impact internal factors may have on implementing actions.
preparedness	The ability to be ready for, or to anticipate action, in response to or recovery from a hazard or emergency.
prevention	Measures to eliminate or reduce the incidence or severity of emergencies.
recovery	The restoring or improving of livelihoods and health, as well as economic, physical, social, cultural and environmental assets, systems and activities, of a disaster-affected community or society, aligning with the principles of sustainable development and 'build back better', to avoid or reduce future disaster risk.
response	Actions taken directly before, during or immediately after a disaster in order to save lives, reduce health impacts, ensure public safety and meet the basic subsistence needs of the people affected.
Response Coordination Group (RCG)	An agency-wide crisis coordination group which provides governance over response arrangements across the department and supports shared situational awareness. It is a strategic, forward-looking group. Its focus is 'upwards and outwards' across the department and whole of government.
Response Coordinator (RC)	The individual responsible for management of all activities across the department for the department's response.
SCC	State Coordination Centre
strategic	Deals with whole-of-department and whole-of-government considerations. This is where the overall intent and objectives for the response are set. Focus is generally longer term in nature and is mindful of the impact that other external or future factors may have on achieving the overall response objectives.
tactical	Deals with the business area considerations and is where the 'on-ground' activities are carried out to achieve a specific task. Focus is generally shorter term in nature and directed to the task at hand, with work undertaken by individual teams.
WHS	work health and safety

Document control

The Crisis Capability Section in the Crisis and Emergency Management Branch (CEMB) maintains the Crisis and Incident Response Plan (CIRP).

Version	Date of issue	Comments
1.0	December 2004	Initial version
2.0	December 2009	Review of parts 1 and 2
2.0	September 2012	Review of parts 3 and 4
3.0	March 2014	Review of all parts
4.0	September 2024	Interim CIRP (i-CIRP) while CIRP under comprehensive review. Interim update of response arrangements and select job cards. Response Coordination Group added. Phases changed to standby, alert, active.
4.1	12 August 2025	Review and rewrite part 1. Title changed from Critical Incident Response Plan to Crisis and Incident Response Plan. Align functions to Australasian Inter-Service Incident Management System.

Amendments

The CEMB reviews the plan regularly. Reviews ensure the plan is current and aligned with contemporary emergency management principles and arrangements. A review could occur after:

- DAFF uses the plan in an incident
- elements of the plan are assessed through exercises
- changes to
 - department name or structure
 - Australian Government or DAFF's emergency management arrangements
 - legislation
 - other supporting or complementary arrangements
- every 3 years.

The Assistant Secretary, CEMB approves minor amendments. Minor changes are edits that do not significantly change the response and coordination arrangements or multiple divisional roles and responsibilities. Minor amendments result in a new sub-version.

The Secretary approves significant changes. Significant changes result in an updated version.

Send suggestions for improvement to [s. 47E\(d\)](#) .

Lean Forward Protocol – Emergency Animal Disease (EAD)

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Version Control

Version	Date of issue	Author	Comments
1.0	18 May 2023	Biosecurity Response and Reform	Cleared by Assistant Secretary Biosecurity Response and Reform
1.1	30 November 2023	Crisis and Emergency Management	Remove out of date contact information
1.2	14 November 2024	Crisis and Emergency Management	Declassify from Official: Sensitive to Official (see D24/858065)
1.3	2 December 2025	Crisis and Emergency Management	Updated based on changes to CONOPS EAD and CIRP (v4.1) updates.

1 Parameters

Purpose	This protocol establishes a consistent and repeatable approach to act on strongly suspected or rumoured Emergency Animal Disease (EAD) detections. It provides the Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry the ability to enhance readiness in a proportionate manner and rapidly scale-up a response if required. It facilitates a forward-leaning posture without the need to change the phase of emergency response arrangements.
Scope	This protocol applies to strongly suspected or rumoured detections of EADs.
Triggers	- Notification received from jurisdictional Chief Veterinary Officer of a suspected EAD. - Information/misinformation from unknown origin is disseminated (including through social media) about a rumoured EAD detection that is not known to the department.
Mission	To enhance the department's readiness to respond by establishing a collaborative, proportionate and risk-based decision-making capability in the event of a strongly suspected or rumoured EAD detection.
End State	All relevant senior officers have effectively enhanced their readiness to manage a suspected or perceived EAD detection. Trust in the biosecurity system has been maintained during a period of uncertainty, key stakeholders have remained appropriately informed and the department has adopted a defensible position to mitigate potential negative reputational impacts.

2 Authority

The *Biosecurity Act 2015* (the Act) provides the Director of Biosecurity and the department with the legislative authority to manage biosecurity risks.

The Deputy Secretary Biosecurity, Operations and Compliance Group is responsible for departmental biosecurity risk management policy and procedures.

3 Activation

This protocol is activated by the Deputy Secretary, Biosecurity, Operations and Compliance Group at their discretion.

The process, phases and actions that apply to this protocol are set out at [Attachment A](#).

4 Advisory group

The advisory group provides the Deputy Secretary, Biosecurity, Operations and Compliance Group with a decision support function to inform a proportionate response to a strongly suspected or rumoured EAD detection.

Position
Deputy Secretary, Biosecurity, Operations and Compliance
Deputy Secretary, Agricultural Trade and Regulation
First Assistant Secretary, Biosecurity Animal
Australian Chief Veterinary Officer
First Assistant Secretary, Biosecurity Strategy and Reform
First Assistant Secretary, Strategy, Performance and Engagement
General Counsel, Advising, Regulatory and Compliance Legal

In addition, a list of pre-determined business areas that may be placed on standby is set out at [Attachment B](#).

5 De-activation

This protocol is de-activated by the Deputy Secretary, Biosecurity, Operations and Compliance Group at their discretion.

The protocol will no longer be required when either:

- a) a negative diagnostic result has been received and all activities under the protocol can cease
- b) a positive diagnostic result has been received from the Australian Centre for Disease Preparedness (ACDP) and appropriate departmental emergency management arrangements have been activated (such as the Crisis and Incident Response Plan (CIRP) and the Concept of Operations (CONOPS) – EAD Crisis).
- c) public reports of a suspected EAD are not supported by evidence and have been successfully managed with tolerable risk to the department.

6 Record keeping

The Deputy Secretary, Biosecurity, Operations and Compliance's Executive Team is responsible for record keeping relating to the activation and deactivation of the protocol.

7 Review

This protocol will be reviewed by Deputy Secretary, Biosecurity, Operations and Compliance, supported by Strategy, Performance and Engagement Division, after each activation to ensure it remains fit-for-purpose.

8 Attachments

Attachment A – Protocols, Phases and Actions

Attachment B – Pre-determined response personnel

Attachment A – Protocols, Phases and Actions

Protocol Alpha

Trigger: Notification received from jurisdictional Chief Veterinary Officer (CVO) of a suspected Emergency Animal Disease (EAD)

Phase	Officer	Actions
Receive	Australian Chief Veterinary Officer (ACVO)	☐ Receive notification of strongly suspected EAD result from a jurisdictional CVO. ☐ Determine with the notifying jurisdictional CVO whether a CCEAD meeting is required and convene if appropriate. ☐ Notify Deputy Secretary, Biosecurity, Operations and Compliance of suspected detection and provide verbal situation report. ☐ Notify Agriculture Crisis Coordination Centre (AgriCCC)
Convene	Deputy Secretary Biosecurity, Operations and Compliance	☐ Convene advisory group (Section 4 refers) ○ Brief advisory group on situation and receive advice on proportionate actions. ○ Determine whether the National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA) and other relevant Australian Government agencies should be informed, noting national response is contingent on confirmatory testing. ○ Determine whether to advise pre-determined responders and issue directions for reduced notice to move. ☐ Convene NMG meeting in consultation with NMG secretariat and ACVO, following initial CCEAD meeting. ☐ Brief Secretary and Minister for Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry as appropriate.
Monitor	ACVO	☐ Liaise with the Australian Centre for Disease Preparedness (ACDP) and jurisdictional CVOs to ensure timely notification of diagnostic results.
	Advisory Group	☐ Remain available to convene at short notice (within 30 mins). ☐ Convene prior to expected diagnostics results (within 30 mins).
	Responders	☐ Comply with reduced notice to move directions
Act	Advisory Group	ZERO HOUR ☐ Receive results of confirmatory diagnostics result from ACDP ○ If POSITIVE – Activate CIRP and CONOPS EAD ○ If negative – De-activate and notify all responders
Review	Deputy Secretary Biosecurity, Operations and Compliance	☐ Conduct review of Lean Forward Protocol to incorporate lessons and ensure continual improvement

Protocol Bravo

Trigger: Information/misinformation from unknown origin is disseminated (including through social media) about a rumoured EAD detection that is not known to the department.

Phase	Officer	Actions
Receive	Any officer	☐ Receive notification of information/misinformation about a rumoured EAD being publicly reported ☐ Notify Assistant Secretary Communication and Media
	Assistant Secretary Communication and Media	☐ Receive notification of information/misinformation about a rumoured EAD in the public sphere ☐ Notify Deputy Secretary Biosecurity, Operations and Compliance Group and provide verbal situation report
Convene	Deputy Secretary Biosecurity, Operations and Compliance	☐ Convene advisory group (Section 4 refers) ○ Brief advisory group on situation and receive advice on proportionate actions ○ Assess risk to inform proportionate actions ○ Determine whether the National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA) and other relevant Australian Government agencies should be informed, noting national response is contingent on confirmatory testing ○ Determine whether to advise pre-determined responders and issue directions for reduced notice to move ☐ Brief Secretary and Minister for Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry as appropriate
Monitor	Advisory Group	☐ Seek situation updates from jurisdictional counterparts ☐ Remain available to convene at short notice (within 30 mins)
	Responders	☐ Comply with reduced notice to move directions
Act	Advisory Group	ZERO HOUR ☐ Risk assessment informs response actions ○ If EAD suspected – Apply protocol Alpha (above) ○ If risk is <u>NOT</u> tolerable – Activate public relations response (refer Crisis Communication Playbook) ○ If risk <u>IS</u> tolerable – Stand Down and notify all responders
Review	Deputy Secretary Biosecurity, Operations and Compliance	☐ Conduct review of Lean Forward Protocol to incorporate lessons and continual improvement

Attachment B – Pre-determined response personnel

As at 5 December 2025

This list is indicative of business areas that may be called upon to an Incident Management Team function lead (through the relevant SES officer). This list is subject to availability and training currency. It will be continually reviewed as part of ongoing lessons management process.

Position	Primary division/branch
Incident Controller	s. 47E(d)
Public Information Manager	s. 47E(d)
Planning Manager	s. 47E(d)
Operations Manager	s. 47E(d)
Logistics Manager	s. 47E(d)
Finance & Administration Manager	s. 47E(d)



Australian Government
**Department of Agriculture,
Fisheries and Forestry**

Business Continuity Plan

Version 4.0



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This publication is available at agriculture.gov.au/publications.

Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry

GPO Box 858 Canberra ACT 2601

Telephone 1800 900 090

Web agriculture.gov.au

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Acknowledgements

The authors thank divisions and areas for their input.

Acknowledgement of Country

We acknowledge the continuous connection of First Nations Traditional Owners and Custodians to the lands, seas and waters of Australia. We recognise their care for and cultivation of Country. We pay respect to Elders past and present, and recognise their knowledge and contribution to the productivity, innovation and sustainability of Australia's agriculture, fisheries and forestry industries.

Version control

File	Version	Date	Date of next annual review
2020/013585E-01	4.0	November 2025	November 2026

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Introduction

We use the Business Continuity Management System (BCMS) to effectively manage business disruptions. The BCMS comprises a suite of policies and plans that set out our commitment to business continuity (BC).

Our DAFF Business Continuity Plan (BCP) describes the arrangements we use to manage business disruptions. Other supporting plans provide scalability in response and recovery and address specific business disruptions at regional or group level (Table 1).

The [Business continuity guideline](#) describes how we restore and maintain critical functions during business disruptions. It includes templates, checklists and role cards.

1.1 Purpose

The BCP defines our roles, responsibilities and coordination arrangements during response to and recovery from business disruptions. It supports a scalable response to managing business disruptions proportionate to the level of severity.

1.2 Scope

The BCP applies to business disruptions that either:

- affect the entire department
- warrant oversight or management by the senior executive team, or
- require enhanced coordination to resolve or stabilise – this includes disruptions of a scale or complexity that exceed regional or divisional capability or capacity to effectively manage.

Figure 1 illustrates the level of coordination required to manage severe incidents.

1.2.1 Out of scope

The BCP does not apply to:

- preparedness and response activities relating to agricultural or biosecurity emergencies – see the [Crisis and Incident Response Plan](#)
- emergency evacuation plans for departmental sites – see the relevant [emergency evacuation management](#) page on the Source.

1.3 Guiding principles

The BCP is consistent with ISO 22301 and the Business Continuity Institute's [Good practice guidelines](#).

The guiding principles of the BCP are:

- The health, safety and wellbeing of our staff and visitors, including site-specific Emergency Control Organisation (ECO) arrangements established under AS 3745-2010: Planning for emergencies in facilities take precedence over the continuity of business functions.
- If a situation arises that threatens safety, emergency procedures are activated under the ECO arrangements or the Chief Warden.
 - our emergency procedures address immediate safety issues
 - continuity and recovery strategies address the need to recover and continue critical business functions at the first safe opportunity
 - BC arrangements should not be commenced until the health, safety and wellbeing of staff and visitors are assured.
- A departmental response is considered in terms of potential impacts on broader Australian Government priorities, such as social, political and security contexts.
- Incidents are managed at the lowest level feasible but can be escalated or de-escalated relative to scale and complexity. This provides for scalability and interoperability when the scale or complexity of a facilities-based incident requires escalation beyond the relevant site-specific emergency plans.

2 Context

2.1 Business impact analysis

Our business activities are diverse and complex. We undertake a biennial business impact analysis (BIA) to determine our critical functions and maximum acceptable outage times (MAOs). The critical functions list is updated as required.

The BIA process is outlined in the [Business continuity guideline](#). We will direct resources to ensure that the most time-critical functions are restored promptly in the event of a business disruption.

The Business Continuity Team (BC Team) coordinates the completion of the BIA in consultation with divisional business coordinators and each division's executive. The BC Team retain a list of time-critical functions ([Appendix A](#)), which they provide to the Business Continuity Coordination Group (BCCG) as required.

2.2 Severity of incident

The severity of an incident determines the level of coordination and types of arrangements that are required to manage the disruption (Figure 1).

Figure 1 Disruptive incident severity and level of coordination required

S. 47E(d)

BAU Business as usual activities. **BC** Business continuity. **ICT** Information and communications technology. **WoAG** Whole-of-Australian Government arrangements.

Note: The pyramid levels represent the consequence statements as described in the department's enterprise risk matrix. As severity of the disruptive incident increases, the requirement for a coordinated business continuity response increase.

2.3 Other plans and arrangements

The type of business disruption event determines which plan is used to manage the disruption. The BCMS provides interoperability between plans and coordination arrangements to ensure the response can be scaled up or down relative to the scale and complexity of the disruption.

These plans comprise:

- Business Continuity Procedures
- Pandemic Contingency Plan
- Industrial Action Contingency Plan
- IT Disaster Recovery Plan/Service Continuity Plan
- Crisis and Incident Response Plan
- Site security plans.

2.3.1 Activation authority

Each plan or arrangement is activated by an appropriate officer, relative to the severity of the incident (Table 1).

Table 1 Relevant authority

Severity	Consequences	Plan used	Activation authority
National	Moderate – Catastrophic	Departmental BCP	Secretary
Localised	Minor	• Regional BCP • Divisional BCP	• People and Place Lead • FAS of affected division
Business as usual (BAU)	Insignificant	BAU procedures	n/a

BCP Business Continuity Plan. **FAS** First Assistant Secretary. **n/a** Not applicable.

2.4 Functional approach


A functional approach to the establishment of a Business Continuity Coordination Group (BCCG) ensures key response functions are addressed. Structuring the BCCG around key response functions rather than specific individuals or divisions ensures that all critical aspects of the business continuity response are covered, regardless of who is available or the type of disruption.

The main pillars of the BCCG (Figure 2) include:

- BCCG Secretariat
- BC Coordinators
- BC Team
- People and Work Health and Safety
- Emergency Control Organisation
- Information and Communications Technology

- Security and Property
- Communications
- any impacted business areas.

Figure 2 National Business Continuity Coordination Group structure – examples



BC Business continuity. **WHS** Work health and safety.

Note: The involvement of contributing areas may change depending on the nature of the incident. The BC Coordination function is provided by the departmental BC Team and BC Coordinators, regardless of the level of disruption, incident and severity.

2.5 Embedding climate change risks

Our BCMS aims to minimise the impact of any business disruption events on our operations, including climate-driven risks. We run higher risk weather season (HRWS) exercises annually across regions. The scenarios for the exercises are based on the latest climate data and forecasts. This ensures that regions are better prepared to respond to the impacts of HRWS events on communities and time-critical departmental business operations.


3 Response

3.1 Activation

The Secretary, as the Accountable Authority, activates our BCP in response to a business disruption that exceeds, or is expected to exceed, the MAO time for a critical function or functions. The Secretary activates the BCP by approving a phase change following advice from the relevant business area and guided by the Assistant Secretary, Crisis and Emergency Management Branch (Assistant Secretary of CEMB) (Figure 3).

The Secretary appoints a Business Continuity Response Coordinator (BCRC) to lead the relevant National BCCG.

Figure 3 Activation flowchart



BAU Business as usual activities. **BCP** Business Continuity Plan. **FAS** First Assistant Secretary.

3.2 Business Continuity Plan phases

The BCP has 3 phases: standby, alert and active (Table 2). For more information on phases, see [Appendix B](#). The default phase is standby.

Table 2 Business Continuity Plan phases

Phase	Description
Standby	Getting ready for a future response. Preparedness activities are undertaken to monitor potential situations, plan for potential responses, train, and exercise response capabilities.
Alert	Taking actions when an incident is about to happen and will need coordination. The alert phase occurs when there is a reasonably held suspicion that a coordinated departmental response will be required. As a result, capabilities are brought to an enhanced level of readiness.
Active	Responding to an incident that has happened. This active phase occurs when an incident requires enhanced coordination capabilities.

3.3 Triggers

A phase change of the BCP from standby to alert or active could be triggered:

- by a departmental or national business disruption that requires a coordinated departmental response.
- in anticipation of a coordinated departmental response to a business disruption.

3.4 Phase changes

Following advice from the BC Team, the Assistant Secretary of CEMB provides guidance on these phase change triggers and processes:

- When there is a potential business disruption, the Secretary approves a phase change to alert. The Secretary changes the phase to active if an incident has happened.
- The phase may change from alert to standby if the situation resolves during the alert phase.
- If the situation escalates during the alert phase or when there is an actual business disruption, the Secretary may approve a phase change to active. In such cases, the
 - Secretary appoints a National BCRC to lead the BCCG
 - relevant BCRC notifies the relevant SES and Deputy Secretaries of the phase change to active and establish coordination arrangements as required for the formation of the BCCG.
- The business disruption is over when there is no need for further response activity or business-as-usual arrangements are sufficient. The phase reverts to standby when the business disruption is over and the Secretary approves the change to standby.

3.4.1 Scale up

Our response to business disruptions provides scalability according to the level of severity. The response is managed at the lowest possible level.

The need for escalation is first considered by the relevant BC Coordinator, divisional or regional delegate in consultation with divisional or regional stakeholders and the departmental BC Team.

Should that management level not be able to assess, coordinate and maintain control over the resources required to manage the response, responsibility for managing the incident should be escalated to a higher management level (Figure 1 and Figure 3). For more information on phase triggers, see [Appendix B](#).

Business continuity planning outlines strategies that may be applied to ensure the continuation and recovery of the department's critical functions to an acceptable level of service.

3.4.2 Scale down

When the business disruption has resolved to a point where enhanced coordination is no longer required, transition to recovery or business as usual activity will occur. For more information on these activities, see [section 2.4.3](#) and [chapter 3](#).

3.4.3 Deactivation

The National BCRC advises the Secretary that the incident no longer requires a coordinated departmental response and seeks approval to deactivate the BCP and stand down the National BCCG. For examples of stand up and stand down notifications, see [Appendix C](#).

3.5 Coordination arrangements

The department uses a tiered structure to provide coordination capability that is flexible, scalable and proportionate to the known and assumed risks. The tiered structure comprises BCCG functions at different levels.

Depending on the level of risk, one or more of these groups will support response activities:

- National BCCG – for managing department-wide business disruptions
- Regional or Divisional BCCG – for managing geographically or business area-specific disruptions.

3.5.1 National BCCG

The National BCCG provides an agency-wide coordination function to facilitate leadership and strategic oversight of our response efforts. It supports shared situational awareness across the department and provides a common understanding of the critical business functions at risk, impacts and consequences and available contingencies.

National BCCG members are relevant senior executives. The structure of the National BCCG is situation-dependent but includes representation from the Strategy, Enterprise and Engagement Group, as well as specialist policy areas and regional divisions (Figure 2).

The relevant First Assistant Secretary for the impacted business function is usually appointed as the National BCRC. For the Business Continuity Response Coordinator checklist, see [Appendix D](#).

The National BCCG:

- sets the strategic intent for the response and oversees national-level operations

- ensures appropriate prioritisation and allocation of departmental resources
- monitors department-wide business continuity risks, impacts and consequences
- implements relevant departmental contingencies
- receives regular briefing from the Regional or Divisional BCCG (if established)
- maintains overall situational awareness of the response.

Where established, the National BCCG may task the Regional or Divisional BCCGs with agreed actions. If a Regional or Divisional BCCG has not been established, National BCCG members task their respective business areas with any agreed actions.

3.5.2 Regional and Divisional BCCGs

The Regional People and Place Lead establishes a Regional BCCG to manage geographically-specific disruptions. The Divisional First Assistant Secretary (FAS) establishes a Divisional BCCG to manage business area-specific disruptions. They support shared situational awareness for the affected regional or business area and inform all parties of the critical business functions at risk, impacts and consequences and available contingencies.

Regional or Divisional BCCG members are the relevant senior executive or executive-level staff with operational responsibilities that are affected by the disruption. Those impacted by the disruption report to the Regional or Divisional BCRC.

The relevant People and Place Lead is usually appointed as the Regional BCRC. The relevant First Assistant Secretary for the affected business function is usually appointed as the Divisional BCRC.



Regional and Divisional BCCGs will:

- oversee the operational response to the disruption
- ensure appropriate prioritisation and allocation of local resources
- monitor regional and divisional business continuity risks, impacts and consequences
- implement relevant contingencies
- provide regular briefing to the National BCCG (if established) or the relevant Deputy Secretary
- maintain overall situational awareness of the response.

If the scale or complexity of the business disruption increase, the Regional or Divisional BCRC should contact the Assistant Secretary of CEMB to decide whether escalation to a National BCCG is required.

Depending on the scale and intensity of the disruption, multiple Regional or Divisional BCCGs may have to be established. In such cases, they will report to the National BCCG for situational awareness and decision-making (Figure 4).

Figure 4 Reporting scenarios for Business Continuity Coordination groups of varying complexity – examples



BCCG Business Continuity Coordination Group.

3.6 Communication

Effective communication and proactive stakeholder management are essential to overcoming a business disruption. Timely, accurate and coordinated messaging ensures that stakeholders remain informed, confident and responsive throughout the disruption.

The Crisis Communication team within the Crisis and Emergency Management Branch (CEMB) is responsible for leading internal and external communications during an incident. When appropriate, the Crisis Comms team will be included as part of the BCCG, and will coordinate with relevant teams to ensure that messaging is consistent, aligned with incident response activities and tailored to stakeholder needs.

3.7 Response strategies

Table 3 provides examples of potential strategies.

Table 3 Response strategies – examples

Strategy	Description
Establish a command centre	Depending on the incident, a command centre can be established s. 47E(d)
Implement alternative processes	If there is a digital services outage, we may need to adopt manual procedures to achieve the required outcomes. This may include the use of alternative equipment, suppliers, communication methods, information sources or recordkeeping practices.
Transfer operations	Consider transferring operations to another site within a region or to another region. This can be applied where the function does not have to be undertaken in Agriculture House and can be performed by different staff.
Relocate staff	If the office building is not safe to use, consider: • implementing work-from-home arrangements • relocating staff to another site within a region or to another region. This could include relocating staff to existing departmental facilities, enacting arrangements with other government agencies and/or sourcing a commercial solution. The decision will be influenced by the period of disruption and staff capability to mobilise.
Reduce or suspend activities	Consider reducing or suspending non-critical activities and use the resources from these activities to support critical functions affected by the disruption.

4 Recovery

Recovery planning commences during the continuity phase of an incident (Figure 5). Once critical functions have been restored and acceptable minimal deliverables are being met, we should start planning for:


- a return to 'normal' or a 'new normal'
- the integration of innovations from lessons identified.

See the lessons identified template for consultation in the [Business continuity guideline](#).

National disruption incidents may require considerable time and resources for recovery planning. Recovery provides an opportunity to innovate and improve processes that may have been highlighted during the incident.

To support critical functions, contingency plans at the divisional and regional level may be revised or developed as part of recovery planning. A contingency plan is a response and recovery plan outlining actions that need to be taken to resume a business process. It may or may not have the detailed BIA and critical functions elements of a BCP. Our BC Team help divisions develop relevant business continuity planning.

Figure 5 Incident phases



5 Validation

5.1 Post-incident debriefs

Once the National BCCG has been stood down and the BCP deactivated, the departmental BC Team facilitates a post-incident debrief as soon as practicable, seeking input from key stakeholders. The BC Team will use stakeholder feedback to improve plans and processes.

5.2 Lessons management

During the recovery phase and post-deactivation of the BCP, the BC Team facilitates a series of ‘lessons management’ activities. These activities will capture any efficiencies from the response to the disruptive incident that should be applied to our recovery activities and to any future incidents of a similar nature.

The BC Team will establish a central register to capture and share lessons across the department. The team will monitor implementation of agreed recommendations and periodically to the Security and Business Continuity Committee (SBCC).

5.3 Preparedness exercises

We will run regular business continuity preparedness exercises to ensure the BCP is fit for purpose.

The BC Team will facilitate regular exercises to ensure the department has the capability and capacity to respond consistently with the department’s Business Continuity Policy.

For exercise and training program examples, see the [Business continuity guideline](#).

5.4 Business Continuity Plan review

The BCP will be reviewed annually, following an activation and/or following any significant restructure of the department or change to our scope of responsibilities.

The Secretary approves significant changes. Significant changes are numbered semantically (e.g. 4.0, 5.0). Minor amendments are indicated by an increase of 0.1 (e.g. 4.1, 4.2).

The Assistant Secretary of CEMB approves minor amendments. These are edits that do not significantly change the response and coordination arrangements or multiple divisional or regional roles and responsibilities.

Email suggestions for improvements to the Business Continuity Plan to [s. 47E\(d\)](#)

6 Roles and responsibilities

Roles and responsibilities will be consistent with our organisational structure. Role cards detailing individual responsibilities are published in the [Business continuity guideline](#).

The roles are:

- Secretary
- Regional People and Place Leads
- Assistant Secretary, Crisis and Emergency Management Branch (Assistant Secretary of CEMB)
- Business Continuity Response Coordinator (BC Response Coordinator)
- Director, Business Continuity and Incident Management
- Business Continuity Coordinators
- Senior Executive Service Band 2
- Senior Executive Service Band 1
- All staff.

For details about the responsibilities of each of these positions, see [Appendix E](#).

6.1 Key contacts

See the [Emergency and security contacts](#) page on the Source.

Appendix A: Critical functions

Critical functions and associated maximum acceptable outage (MAO) times.

The time-critical functions and MAOs are essential to the department meeting its strategic objectives.

These functions will be prioritised for resources during incidents that disrupt normal business.

The Business Continuity team retain a list of time-critical functions that they provide to Business Continuity Response Coordination teams as required.

Appendix B: Business Continuity Plan phases

Phase	Description	Triggers	Key actions
Standby	Getting ready for a future response.	- Standby is the default phase of the Business Continuity Plan (BCP). - BCP is changed to standby if either - the active phase finishes, or - the alert phase finishes and does not proceed to active phase.	- Crisis and Emergency Management Branch's Business Continuity Team (BC Team maintains readiness for the activation of BCP when required. - The BC Team works with the business areas undertake preparedness activities, monitor hazards, plan for potential responses and build emergency management capabilities. This includes - delivering or participating in training - conducting or participating in exercises - delivering or participating in lessons management. - Undertake near-term preparedness if there is a need to rapidly prepare for an imminent business disruption event.
Alert	Actions when an incident is about to happen and will need coordination.	- Reasonably held suspicion that a coordinated response will be required and transition to active phase is likely. - Developing situation that requires pre-emptive measures to support enhanced readiness. - Concurrent incidents could be likely to severely stretch resources within one or more divisions or regions, and contingency planning could be appropriate. - Expectations of timely departmental and/or Australian Government coordination if incident is realised or develops.	- Assistant Secretary of CEMB recommends phase change to alert for the Secretary's approval and advises proposed response coordination arrangements. - Secretary authorises phase change to alert. - Inform key stakeholders, including the Secretary, that the plan has moved to alert. - Maintain and support shared situational awareness. - Work with impacted business areas and recovery teams, as required. - Establish Incident Control Centre (ICC) and response teams, as required. - Real-time lessons capture and hot debrief. - If the active phase is not required, alert also includes recovery actions.
Active	Getting ready for a future response.	- Heightened coordination is required to manage a situation. - Resourcing capacities within one or more divisions or regions have been exceeded or will be exceeded in the near term to respond to current business disruption event.	- Assistant Secretary of CEMB recommends phase change to active for the Secretary's approval and recommends proposed response coordination arrangements. - Secretary authorises phase change to active.

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Phase	Description	Triggers	Key actions
			• Inform key stakeholders plan has moved to active phase. • Ongoing activities to support shared situational awareness. • Detailed planning and response action. • Establish ICC and response teams, as required. • Convene coordination forums to support shared situational awareness and coordinate response activities. • Real-time lessons capture and hot debrief. • Once the incident has resolved or can be effectively managed without enhanced coordination, undertake recovery actions.

Appendix C: Stand up and stand down Business Continuity Coordination Group

Stand-up Business Continuity Coordination Group request

To: Secretary
From: Chris Ipkendanz, Assistant Secretary, CEMB
Subject: Stand-Up Business Continuity Coordination Group (BCCG)
Date/Time: *(date/time when this message was sent)*

Incident details

Type: *(fire, natural disaster, terrorist, etc.)*
When occurred: *(date/time when incident occurred)*
Location: *(where did the incident happen)*
Impact: *(details of the impact of the incident)*
Contact: *(provide point of contact for Secretary)*

Stand-up request

Please approve the stand-up of the BCCG to manage the above incident. Regular updates will be provided to yourself and other stakeholders for the duration of the incident.

Signed

Chris Ipkendanz

Assistant Secretary, CEMB

Stand-down Business Continuity Coordination Group request

To: Secretary
From: Chris Ipkendanz, Assistant Secretary, CEMB
Subject: Stand-Down Business Continuity Coordination Group (BCCG)
Date/Time: (date/time when this request was sent)

Stand-down request

Please approve the stand-down of the BCCG. The incident has been resolved as reported by the BCCG at: *(specify date/time when incident resolved)*.

Signed

Chris Ipkendanz

Assistant Secretary, CEMB

Appendix D: Business Continuity Response Coordinator checklist

This checklist is designed to help the BCRC identify tasks required during management of a business disruption.

The BCRC may have other responsibilities that help the department manage business disruption, from establishment of the BCCG until recovery is achieved.

Steps	Tasks
Before Business Continuity Coordination Group (BCCG) meeting	☐ Clear draft agenda prepared by BCCG Secretariat. ☐ Confirm participants with BCCG Secretariat. ☐ Tell participants to come prepared to request and/or share information (e.g. status of critical functions, resources or assistance that they require and/or can provide). ☐ Include a member of the Business Continuity Team on regional BCCG.
During the initial meeting, follow the meeting agenda and include these tasks	☐ Brief participants (or request a briefing) on the current situation. ☐ Request an update on staff welfare. ☐ Seek advice from participants on current and anticipated impacts. ☐ Identify any other representatives required on the BCCG. ☐ Identify key messages and communication activities. ☐ Determine incident objectives. ☐ Identify and assess risks, including legal and regulatory, biosecurity, financial, fraud, security, privacy and work, health and safety, and identify appropriate controls. ☐ Identify actions and resources required to achieve objectives and the officers responsible. ☐ Confirm time and location of the next meeting. ☐ For the duration of the National BCCG, appoint a person who has intranet author permissions to assume responsibility for providing current and accurate information content on intranet hubs.
For subsequent meetings, follow the meeting agenda and include these tasks	☐ Confirm the accuracy of previous meeting minutes and amend as required. ☐ Follow up on actions from previous meetings. ☐ Provide a brief update on the current situation. ☐ Seek reports and comments from functional areas against incident objectives and actions. ☐ Review key messages and communication activities. ☐ Monitor and review risks and controls. ☐ Review the overall effectiveness of the response and identify further actions required. ☐ Appoint additional BCCG members or stand down members as required. ☐ Confirm the time and location of the next meeting. ☐ Maintain flexibility for the BCCG to meet when needed.

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Steps	Tasks
Authorise key communications	☐ Provide regular briefs to the executive on regional and national impacts. ☐ Provide situation reports from each regional BCCG meeting to Regional People and Place Leads and the Agriculture Crisis Control Centre by emailing s. 47E(d) ☐ Maintain regular Chief Operating Officer and regional lead messaging at appropriate frequency. ☐ Ensure provision of accurate and timely advice to the minister, executive, industry, the public, media, all departmental personnel and other key stakeholders. ☐ Clear BCCG meeting minutes and action items and ensure they are distributed within an appropriate timeframe.
Stand down	☐ Advise the Secretary that the incident no longer requires a coordinated departmental response. ☐ Advise BCCG personnel that the department's response has been stood down and issue advice on stand down activities. ☐ Ensure relevant stakeholders are advised that the department's response has concluded. ☐ Ensure an incident after-action review is conducted within one month of the response being stood down or after significant events or milestones during the response. ☐ Participate in incident debrief review activities.

Appendix E: Roles and responsibilities

Role	Key responsibilities
Secretary (Accountable Authority)	• Activate the department's Business Continuity Plan (BCP), appointing a Business Continuity Response Coordinator (BCRC) for a National Business Continuity Coordination Group (BCCG). • Report potential and significant business disruptions to the Minister. • Review recommendations and act on advice from the Audit and Risk Committee (or through the Executive Board) regarding the appropriateness of the department's business continuity arrangements.
Assistant Secretary, Crisis and Emergency Management Branch	• Ensure a cohesive and integrated approach to the Business Continuity Management System across the department. • Facilitate situational awareness to the executive and relevant business areas on potential business disruptions. • Determine whether to initiate phase changes.
Regional People and Place Leads	• Establishes Regional BCCG and appoint members as appropriate in response to regional business disruptions. • Provides regular briefing to the National BCCG (if established) and/or the relevant Deputy Secretary. • Oversees the operational response to the regional disruption. • Monitors regional business continuity risk, impacts and consequences.
Business Continuity Response Coordinator	• Establish centralised coordination and appoint members to the BCCG in response to business disruptions. • Determine whether to deactivate the department's BCP and stand down the National BCCG. • Prioritise risk mitigation strategies for time-critical business functions as per BCP. • Clear all communication material relating to the incident prior to internal or external release.
Director, Business Continuity and Incident Management	• Provide advice and guidance on business continuity matters as required. • Provide advice and support to the Business Continuity Response Coordinator of national, regional and divisional BCCGs as required.
Business Continuity Coordinators	• Perform the functions outlined in Regional Business Continuity Coordinator roles and responsibilities and Divisional Business Continuity Coordinator roles and responsibilities. • Assist with decision-making and coordinating the response for their division or region and determine escalation points during business disruptions.
Senior Executive Service Band 2	• Appoint a Business Continuity Coordinator and backup for business continuity activities within the division. • Approve reviewed business impact analysis and divisional time-critical business functions. • Ensure that staff identified as part of a team that delivers a time-critical business function are aware of their role and responsibilities.
Senior Executive Service Band 1	• Ensure contractors have a business continuity plan that supports their contractual obligations to the department. • Ensure staff who hold positions identified in time-critical business functions, business continuity plans and contingency plans are aware of their roles and responsibilities and have received adequate training.
All staff	• Maintain knowledge of the division, regional BCP or Contingency Plan.

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Role	Key responsibilities
	• Report to manager if business continuity arrangements are activated.

Glossary

Term	Definition
Assistant Secretary of CEMB	Assistant Secretary of Crisis and Emergency Management Branch
BAU	business as usual activities
BC	business continuity
BCCG	Business Continuity Coordination Group
BCP	Business Continuity Plan
BCMS	Business Continuity Management System
BCRC	Business Continuity Response Coordinator
BC Team	Business Continuity Coordination Group
BIA	biennial business impact analysis
CEMB	Crisis and Emergency Management Branch
FAS	First Assistant Secretary
HRWS	higher risk weather season
ICC	Establish Incident Control Centre
MAO	maximum acceptable outage

H5 HPAI in Wildlife – Initial triggers and Actions - Suspect Detection Phase – ‘Lean Forward’

Strategic Intent: The Australian Government works collaboratively to coordinate a national response to a H5 HPAI incursion to minimise social, environmental and economic impacts on human and animal health, communities, wildlife, agricultural production systems and trade.

Documents referred to in developing this document: CIRP, CASP, Executive Emergency Management Briefing, AGCMF, EADRA, AUSBIOAGPLAN

Protocol’ Initiated

Lean Forward Protocol Triggers

1. Notification received from jurisdictional Chief Veterinary Officer (CVO) of a suspected emergency animal disease (EAD). For Australian external territories, the jurisdictional CVO is the Australian Chief veterinary Officer (ACVO).
2. Information/misinformation from unknown origin is disseminated (including through social media) about a rumoured EAD detection that is not known to the department.

Actions following suspect detection of HPAI

1. Jurisdictional CVO informed
 - a. The jurisdictional CVO informed by the state testing laboratory of the 1st result. For the external territories all samples will be sent to Australian Centre for Disease Preparedness (ACDP)
 - b. 2nd sample sent to ACDP for testing
 - c. Combat jurisdiction public information officer/National Biosecurity Communication and Engagement Network (NBCEN) member to complete Critical Information Report
 - d. Jurisdictional National Biosecurity Committee member informed; and possibly jurisdictional Minister
2. State/territory CVO informs Australian CVO (ACVO). Depending on the nature of the event, including the level of concern or likelihood of an EAD being confirmed, this notification will occur prior to the laboratory result being received and disease confirmation.
 - a. ACVO notifies the following people of suspected detection and provides a written situation report as appropriate:
 - i. DAFF Deputy Secretaries: (1) Biosecurity and Compliance; (2) Agricultural Trade, (3) Strategy Enterprise and Engagement
 - ii. DAFF First Assistant Secretaries (FAS): (1) Biosecurity Animal Division; (2) Biosecurity Strategy and Reform; (3) Strategy, Performance and Engagement; (4) Agriculture Policy; Exports and Veterinary Services, Trade and International
 - iii. and (5) relevant Assistant Secretaries,
 - iv. Australian Chief Environmental Biosecurity Officer,

- v. General Counsel, Regulatory and Compliance Legal,
 - vi. Other Australian Government agencies: (1) Department of Climate Change, Energy, the Environment and Water (DCCEEW) – Threatened Species Commissioner; (2) Department of Health, Disability and Ageing (DHDA)– Australian Chief Medical Officer; (3) National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA) (4) ACDP
- b. If the situation is sufficiently concerning, an advisory group (Commonwealth Interdepartmental Committee) could also be formed. This group would be briefed by the Deputy Secretary and advises on proportionate actions, determines whether other Australian Government agencies should be informed and determines whether to advise pre-determined responders (see Attachment B of the Lean Forward Protocol) and issue directions for reduced notice to move. Membership will include those people that were notified by the ACVO at 2.a.
3. Deputy Secretary Biosecurity, Operations and Compliance briefs the Secretary and Agriculture Minister, as appropriate. DHDA and DCCEEW to notify their respective Secretary and Minister/s.
4. In consultation with the CVO of the combat jurisdiction, ACVO may convene a meeting of the Consultative Committee on Emergency Animal Disease (CCEAD) in accordance with the Emergency Animal Disease Response Agreement (EADRA). When an initial CCEAD meeting is convened depends on a range of factors including the nature of the detection, availability of testing/sequencing information, availability of CCEAD members and the need for CCEAD to meet to discuss the situation and response activities (e.g. communications). It is possible that the initial CCEAD meeting is convened after confirmatory testing results are available from ACDP (i.e. after CONOPS – EAD is activated).
- a. See below for further information about the CCEAD meeting.
5. ACEBO/Threatened Species Commissioner to lead engagement with national wildlife peak industry groups as appropriate, in coordination with ACVO stakeholder engagement activities.
6. If ACDP results come back positive for H5 HPAI, the *Concept of Operations (CONOPS)* – *Emergency Animal Disease* is executed.

Confirmed Positive H5 HPAI from ACDP – Concept of Operations (CONOPS) – EAD Activated

0-2 hours

1. The following stakeholders are notified (refer to *CONOPS – EAD* for details on who is responsible for these notifications):
 - a. Agriculture, health and environment Ministers and other Ministers as appropriate
 - b. Prime Minister
 - c. Secretary of Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet and other key secretaries
 - d. CEO of Food Standards Australia New Zealand
 - e. Key industry stakeholders
 - f. Relevant non-government organisations
 - g. Agriculture, health and environment Senior Officials Committees (Commonwealth IDC)
 - h. National Management Group (NMG)

- i. National Situation Room
 - j. Executive Leadership Team of DAFF, DCCEEW and DHAC
- 2. Additional internal notification procedures occur (refer to *CONOPS – EAD* for details).
- 3. As noted above, the ACVO may convene CCEAD after ACDP provide confirmatory testing results.
 - a. CCEAD will initially meet under the EADRA to confirm the incident relates to H5 HPAI and develop advice to NMG on whether it is capable of eradication or containment, noting NMG is responsible for determining (based on CCEAD's recommendations) whether the incident is not capable of being eradicated or contained.
 - b. If CCEAD agrees to recommend to NMG that the outbreak is not capable of eradication or containment, a further CCEAD meeting will be immediately convened under the H5 NMA to consider a response plan for the wildlife outbreak. This CCEAD meeting under the H5 NMA will be convened on the presumption that NMG will agree with CCEAD's recommendation that the outbreak is not capable of eradication or containment.
 - c. If CCEAD cannot determine whether the outbreak is capable of eradication at its initial meeting, CCEAD may need to meet again to discuss this when relevant information becomes available (e.g. sequencing results from ACDP to confirm pathogenicity and clade of the avian influenza strain detected, which may take more than 24 hours after the initial jurisdictional testing results).

The members of CCEAD under the EADRA comprise of all CVOs, ACDP and Relevant Industry Parties to the EADRA (i.e. Australian Eggs Limited, Australian Chicken Meat Federation and Australian Duck Meat Association). Observers of CCEAD include Animal Health Australia and Wildlife Health Australia. The members of the CCEAD convened under the H5 NMA are all CVOs and ACDP. Observers include relevant industry representatives, jurisdictional environment agency representatives and health representatives from the combat jurisdiction.
- 4. Environment and Invasives Committee (EIC) is informed of the incident.
- 5. Secretary activates:
 - a. DAFF Critical Incident Response Plan (CIRP); appoints an Incident Controller.
 - a. AUSBIOAGPLAN; appoints Deputy Secretary Biosecurity and Compliance as Response Coordinator.
- 6. Notify NEMA that CIRP and AUSBIOAGPLAN activated and request that the Australian Government Crisis and Recovery Committee (AGCRC) is convened to notify and brief other agencies.
- 7. DAFF Incident Management Team (IMT) established. DCCEEW will provide a representative to sit on the DAFF IMT.
- 8. DHAC will stand up the National Incident Centre.
- 9. Joint Senior Officials Response Coordination Group (Joint RCG) activated, comprising representatives from DAFF, DCCEEW and DHAC. In the event of an outbreak in an Australian external territory, RCG may seek to co-opt the support of representatives from other Australian Government agencies such as DITRDCSA to support enhanced coordination where AGCMF mechanisms may not be activated.
- 10. Deputy Secretary Biosecurity and Compliance to consider if biosecurity emergency control declaration needs to be made by Governor-General and advise Secretary.

11. Crisis communications playbook activated; spokes person/s appointed. In line with the National H5 bird flu response communication strategy, national communications coordination arrangements are activated, including early notification of NBCEN members and dissemination of National Talking Points (NTPs) to support consistent cross-jurisdictional messaging prior to public announcement.
12. Preparation of trade-related activities commences (refer to *CONOPS – EAD* for further details).

2-6 hours

1. Joint RCG convenes.
2. NBCEN convenes.
3. Decision brief for the Minister is prepared and biosecurity emergency declaration and/or direction to the Director of Biosecurity is drafted.
4. Impose Biosecurity Response Zones, as required.
5. National Coordination Mechanism convenes (aim within 2 hours of CCEAD/NMG meetings)

6-12 hours

1. Notifications for international reporting developed.
2. International counterparts briefed, including formal notifications as appropriate.
3. Australian Government Crisis and Recovery Committee (AGCRC) briefed on departmental response actions and expected future requirements.
4. Minister advised on requirements, directions and actions to be taken in relation to emergency.
5. Proposed communications approach agreed to, including Ministers' involvement in press conferences.

12-24 hours

1. NMG is convened within 24 hours, or as otherwise appropriate, following the initial CCEAD meeting(s).
 - a. If in wildlife only, NMG will need to determine whether the outbreak is capable of eradication or containment. If NMG determines that the outbreak is not capable of eradication or containment, it will need to decide that EADRA does not apply and that the response would be managed under the H5 NMA.
2. Additional CCEAD and NMG meetings held as required.
3. Press conferences delivered with Agriculture Minister and other spokespersons as appropriate. Combat jurisdiction to announce first, followed by the Commonwealth where the combat jurisdiction is not an external territory.
4. Director of Biosecurity provided with final risk assessments, if required.
5. World Organisation for Animal Health notified.
6. Minister signs decision brief and the need for and recommendation to the Governor-General to declare a biosecurity emergency under the *Biosecurity Act 2015* is determined where required.
7. Ministerial directions implemented.
8. National response agencies are designated by the Minister.
9. Governor-General makes biosecurity emergency declaration, where required.

s. 22(1)(a)(ii)

From: Hamilton, Sam
Sent: Thursday, 18 June 2026 8:22 PM
To: **s. 47E(d)**
Subject: FW: Suspect H5 positive seabird (skua) in WA coastline [SEC=OFFICIAL]
Importance: High

FYI, not for forwarding pls

Sam

Sam Hamilton

Deputy Australian Chief Veterinary Officer

P: **s. 47F(1)**

E: sam.hamilton@aff.gov.au

Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry

GPO Box 858 Canberra ACT 2601 Australia

From: Cookson, Beth <Beth.Cookson@aff.gov.au>
Sent: Thursday, 18 June 2026 8:21 PM
To: Anderson, Victoria <Victoria.Anderson@aff.gov.au>; Lowe, Matt <Matt.Lowe@aff.gov.au>; Collins, Monica <Monica.Collins@aff.gov.au>; Smith, Brant <Brant.Smith@aff.gov.au>; Finnin, Peter <Peter.Finnin@aff.gov.au>; Crosthwaite, Kerren <Kerren.Crosthwaite@aff.gov.au>; Wellington, Michelle <Michelle.Wellington@aff.gov.au>; Ipkendanz, Chris <Chris.Ipkendanz@aff.gov.au>; Palfreyman, Louise <Louise.Palfreyman@aff.gov.au>; Hamilton, Sam <Sam.Hamilton@aff.gov.au>; Ireland, Cassandra <Cassandra.Ireland@aff.gov.au>
Cc: **s. 47E(d)** @aff.gov.au; **s. 47E(d)** @aff.gov.au
Subject: Suspect H5 positive seabird (skua) in WA coastline [SEC=OFFICIAL]
Importance: High

OFFICIAL

Dear all

- I was advised earlier this evening by the WA CVO of a single vagrant skua (species of seabird with known distribution through subantarctic) east of Esperance that has tested positive at WA DPIRD laboratory for H5 Influenza A. The skua was found sick on 14/6 with clinical signs of leg paralysis, weakness and dehydration. It subsequently died overnight after being treated in isolation at Esperance wildlife centre.
- A sick petrel, also with a distribution to subantarctic has also been taken into care at the same wildlife hospital and tested. Preliminary results tomorrow.
- Samples from the skua are en route to the Australian Centre for Disease Preparedness for confirmatory testing.
- There are no other reported sick birds or other animals in the vicinity. It is possible that individual infected animals can arrive and not establish infection in local populations, however if confirmed, would raise concern about active pathways.
- Petrels and skuas are known to arrive periodically as vagrant species, any onward spread (if confirmed) is undetermined at this stage.

Next steps

- ACDP need to complete a series of tests before confirmation of the strain of Influenza A will be known.
 - Samples should arrive from WA tomorrow morning. If this happens as expected, we should have preliminary test results from ACDP by early afternoon tomorrow confirming whether test positive for H5 Influenza A. We will not have confirmation of the strain being high pathogenicity and the clade of concern for another 24-28 hours following this, however I would treat it as highly suspicious that it is the H5 strain of concern given the species and location if ACDP confirm the WA lab results of H5 positive.
- I will work with the WA CVO on the timing for the Consultative Committee on Emergency Animal Disease to meet which is the next step. It is likely this will occur after the test results from ACDP are received tomorrow.
- Industry have not been advised. We will do this as part of the CCEAD meeting requests, following ACDP preliminary test results.


I will keep you informed as we have new information. **s. 47B(a)**

We'll prepare media holding lines,
if needed.

Beth.

Dr Beth Cookson BVSc (Hons), EMPA, MANZCVS (Epidemiology)
Chief Veterinary Officer
Australian Government Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry
T. **s. 47F(1)** E. beth.cookson@aff.gov.au

agriculture.gov.au



We acknowledge the continuous connection of First Nations Traditional Owners and Custodians to the lands, seas and waters of Australia. We recognise their care for and cultivation of Country. We pay respect to Elders past and present, and recognise their knowledge and contribution to the productivity, innovation and sustainability of Australia's agriculture, fisheries and forestry industries.

OFFICIAL

s. 22(1)(a)(ii)

From: s. 47F(1)
Sent: Friday, 19 June 2026 4:49 PM
To: Hamilton, Sam; s. 47F(1)
Subject: Good luck re HPAI

Hi Sam and s. 47F(1)

Sorry to read the news just now. Hoping it does turn out to be an isolated incident but probably unlikely.

Don't respond to this. Just wishing you luck. At least if confirmed it changes the risk equation for domestic poultry and might need a rethink of protection including use of killed antigen vaccine as a first step.

Best regards

s. 47F(1)

Hi Louise

Beth just called and there is a dead skua in Esperance WA that has apparently tested positive for H5. Also a dead petrel. Pls don't share further including within BAD as Beth had to cut short the call and I don't have the full information. She should be the single source of truth on this. Could be a busy Friday! Sam

7:43 pm 

Thanks Sam. I have spoken to Beth and at the ready to help

9:18 pm

Ok great. Won't know more late tomorrow anyway. Early Friday special!

Edited 9:19 pm 

Yes timing was a little interesting given the news at himi.

9:20 pm



11:16

184 of 349

5G 97



BC



Beth >

Fri, 19 Jun at 3:59 pm

Will need to try to confirm timing of CCEAD for tomorrow with WA at end of meeting.

They are 2 hours behind. So tomorrow early afternoon likely better.

Noted thanks

Edited

Fri, 19 Jun at 3:52 pm

s. 22(1)(a)(ii) should be about to call you. I'm just on tarmac about to take off.

Have spoken to s. 22(1)(a)(ii) He was ok with the briefing and knows about plans for tomorrow

Thanks Sam.

Can you keep me looped into IMT arrangements as progress. Will need to be clear on go-tos/handling, clearance lines etc.



iMessage



national TPs now.

11:16

185 of 349

5G 97



BC



Beth

Yes, should do.

Did WA Min say anything new?

Yes, that it was a positive skua and a petrel and Cape Le Grand national park. She said it was H5 positive at the WA lab.

s. 47E(d)

1 Reply

Petrel positive too?

No. But mentioned petrel was sick.

s. 47E(d)

Can you check that with s. 22(1)(a)(ii) re the CCEAD op guidelines - I think we said no to NGOs? May need to consider standing up a



iMessage



11:17

No. But mentioned petre was sick.

186 of 349

5G 97



BC



s. 47E(d)

Beth

s. 47E(d)

Can you check that with s. 22(1)(a)(ii) re the CCEAD op guidelines - I think we said no to NGOs? May need to consider standing up a separate 'daily briefing' of interested stakeholders to avoid CCEAD being the situation update channel.

s. 22(1)(a)(ii) has said there is no option for ngos to attend CCEAD in the current or future operating guidelines.



There is consideration of an NCM on Sunday which might assist with briefings of stakeholders.

Good idea.

Brant is across planned meeting cadence. Will aim try to consolidate this in a run sheet.



iMessage



National TPs are in your inbox for clearance

11:28

LEX 36284

187 of 349

5G 95



BC



Beth >

Of course. When will you be contactable. Working on national TPs now.

Contactable by phone at 6pm for about 30 mins.

Do you have scope to clear the national TPs then? We have amended consistent with the WA ministers press conference.

Yes, should do.

Did WA Min say anything new?

Yes, that it was a positive skua and a petrel and Cape Le Grand national park. She said it was H5 positive at the WA lab.

S. 47E(d)

1 Reply

Petrel positive too?



iMessage



sick.

11:28

188 of 349

5G 95



BC



Beth >

Good idea.

Brant is across planned meeting cadence. Will aim try to consolidate this in a run sheet.



National TPs are in your inbox for clearance

Fri, 19 Jun at 7:11 pm

Back on flight again Sam. I don't think this one will have wifi. Land 9pm ish.

Ok thanks. Draft TPs are going to the MO before 8pm subject to change. Louise and I are working on them. Hope you get a rest!

Thanks Sam. Appreciate you all being there.

Hope you guys get some rest too. Were there any curveball questions coming out of media



iMessage



11:28

LEX 36384



189 of 349

5G 95



BC



Thanks Sam. Appreciate you all
being there.

Beth

Hope you guys get some rest
too. Were there any curveball
questions coming out of media
today that you picked up on?



Not really. I will be in the office
at 730 to prep for CCEAD

Sat, 20 Jun at 3:31 pm

LEX-36384

190 of 349

Just spoke to s. 22(1)(a)(ii)
WA will mention species after
this was made known in
CCEAD. But will try and hold
the info on the testing until the
pathogenicity testing comes
through tonight.

Also Esperance will be made
known too.



iMessage



s. 22(1)(a)(ii)

From: s. 22(1)(a)(ii)
Sent: Friday, 19 June 2026 5:42 PM
To: Hamilton, Sam; s. 47F(1) s. 47F(1)
Cc: s. 47E(d) Cookson, Beth; s. 47F(1)
Subject: RE: [EXT] suspected avian influenza incident - contact in Australian eggs.
[SEC=OFFICIAL:Sensitive]

OFFICIAL: Sensitive

Hi all,

Just to confirm, we understand that ^{s. 22(1)} will attend tomorrow's CCEAD meeting as a member on behalf of AEL and so we will include him in the meeting invitation. Please let us know if this is incorrect or if we should also forward this invitation to an additional person in AEL (noting AEL may nominate an advisor to attend the meeting in support of their CCEAD member).

Thanks
s. 22(1)(a)(ii)

OFFICIAL: Sensitive

From: Hamilton, Sam <Sam.Hamilton@aff.gov.au>
Sent: Friday, 19 June 2026 4:43 PM
To: s. 47F(1) @australianeggs.org.au; s. 47F(1) @australianeggs.org.au>
Cc: s. 47E(d) @aff.gov.au; s. 22(1)(a)(ii) @aff.gov.au; Cookson, Beth <Beth.Cookson@aff.gov.au>; s. 47F(1) @australianeggs.org.au>
Subject: RE: [EXT] suspected avian influenza incident - contact in Australian eggs. [SEC=OFFICIAL:Sensitive]

OFFICIAL: Sensitive

Thanks for your assistance ^{s. 47F(1) s. 22(1)(i)} and I have spoken and he is across the issue now.

Sam

Sam Hamilton

Deputy Australian Chief Veterinary Officer
P: s. 47F(1)
E: sam.hamilton@aff.gov.au
Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry
GPO Box 858 Canberra ACT 2601 Australia

OFFICIAL: Sensitive

From: s. 47F(1) <@australianeggs.org.au>
Sent: Friday, 19 June 2026 4:42 PM
To: Hamilton, Sam <Sam.Hamilton@aff.gov.au>; s. 47F(1) <@australianeggs.org.au>
Cc: s. 47E(d) <@aff.gov.au>; s. 22(1)(a)(ii) <@aff.gov.au>; Cookson, Beth <Beth.Cookson@aff.gov.au>; s. 47F(1) <@australianeggs.org.au>
Subject: RE: [EXT] suspected avian influenza incident - contact in Australian eggs. [SEC=OFFICIAL:Sensitive]

OFFICIAL: Sensitive

Hi Sam,

Have included s. 47F(1), Manager - Emergency Animal Disease Preparedness at Australian Eggs in email as she will attend the meeting tomorrow. Please send meeting details to her when they are available.

Thanks

Kind regards,

s. 47F(1)

Manager – Engagement & Innovation

Australian Eggs

Suite 7.01, Level 7, 1 Pacific Highway, North Sydney NSW 2060

Direct s. 47F(1) | s. 47F(1) Switch 02 9409 6999 Web www.australianeggs.org.au



OFFICIAL: Sensitive

From: s. 47F(1) <@australianeggs.org.au>
Sent: Friday, 19 June 2026 4:06 PM
To: Sam Hamilton <sam.hamilton@aff.gov.au>
Cc: s. 47E(d) <@aff.gov.au>; s. 47F(1) <@australianeggs.org.au>; s. 22(1)(a)(ii) <@aff.gov.au>; Beth Cookson <Beth.Cookson@aff.gov.au>
Subject: Re: [EXT] suspected avian influenza incident - contact in Australian eggs. [SEC=OFFICIAL:Sensitive]

This is sorted -we will attend.

Sent from my iPhone

On 19 Jun 2026, at 3:55 pm, Hamilton, Sam <sam.hamilton@aff.gov.au> wrote:

OFFICIAL: Sensitive

Dear s. 22(1)(a)(ii)

I have contacted **s. 47F(1)**
s. 22(1)(a)(ii) has not been contactable on the phone.

s. 47F(1) should be able to sort out an alternative CCEAD contact for Australian Eggs at tomorrow's meeting.

Sam

Sam Hamilton

Deputy Australian Chief Veterinary Officer
P: **s. 47F(1)**
E: sam.hamilton@aff.gov.au
Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry
GPO Box 858 Canberra ACT 2601 Australia

OFFICIAL: Sensitive

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s. 22(1)(a)(ii)

From: Hamilton, Sam
Sent: Friday, 19 June 2026 7:56 PM
To: Ag Media; s. 22(1)(a)(ii); Cookson, Beth; Smith, Brant
Cc: Ipkendanz, Chris; s. 22(1)(a)(ii) Palfreyman, Louise
Subject: RE: 20 June MR and TPs/Q+A - Due 7:30pm tonight (19 June) [SEC=OFFICIAL]

Hi ^{s. 22(1)(a)(ii)}

I have reviewed the MR and TPs, but both will need a tidy up and clearance. Thanks.

Sam

Sam Hamilton

Deputy Australian Chief Veterinary Officer
P: s. 47F(1)
E: sam.hamilton@aff.gov.au
Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry
GPO Box 858 Canberra ACT 2601 Australia

From: Ag Media <Media@aff.gov.au>
Sent: Friday, 19 June 2026 7:38 PM
To: Hamilton, Sam <Sam.Hamilton@aff.gov.au>; s. 22(1)(a)(ii) @aff.gov.au; Cookson, Beth <Beth.Cookson@aff.gov.au>; Smith, Brant <Brant.Smith@aff.gov.au>
Cc: Ag Media <Media@aff.gov.au>; Ipkendanz, Chris <Chris.Ipkendanz@aff.gov.au>; s. 22(1)(a)(ii) @aff.gov.au; Palfreyman, Louise <Louise.Palfreyman@aff.gov.au>
Subject: RE: 20 June MR and TPs/Q+A - Due 7:30pm tonight (19 June) [SEC=OFFICIAL]

OFFICIAL

Thank you Sam, just want to confirm the same with the media release please?

And, we'll share with DCCEEW as well noting all the same things.

The links are live so any changes you/Beth/anyone makes will be seen by the MO too so they'll get live updates as we progress internally.

Thanks!

Kindest,
^{s. 22(1)(a)(ii)}

Media
Public Affairs Officer
Communications and Media Branch
Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry
P: s. 22(1)(a)(ii) | E: ^{s. 22(1)(a)(ii)} @aff.gov.au or media@aff.gov.au

OFFICIAL

From: Hamilton, Sam <Sam.Hamilton@aff.gov.au>
Sent: Friday, 19 June 2026 7:36 PM
To: s. 22(1)(a)(ii) <[s.22\(1\)\(a\)\(ii\)@aff.gov.au](mailto:s.22(1)(a)(ii)@aff.gov.au)>; Cookson, Beth <Beth.Cookson@aff.gov.au>; Smith, Brant <Brant.Smith@aff.gov.au>
Cc: Ag Media <Media@aff.gov.au>; Ipkendanz, Chris <Chris.Ipkendanz@aff.gov.au>; s. 22(1)(a)(ii) <[s.22\(1\)\(a\)\(ii\)@aff.gov.au](mailto:s.22(1)(a)(ii)@aff.gov.au)>; Palfreyman, Louise <Louise.Palfreyman@aff.gov.au>
Subject: RE: 20 June MR and TPs/Q+A - Due 7:30pm tonight (19 June) [SEC=OFFICIAL]

OFFICIAL

Hi ^{s. 22(1)(a)(ii)}

Beth and Brant are unavailable.

Louise and I have reviewed the draft TPS, these are ok to go to the MO noting that they are subject to confirmation and are likely to change.

Sam

Sam Hamilton

Deputy Australian Chief Veterinary Officer
P: s. 47F(1)
E: sam.hamilton@aff.gov.au
Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry
GPO Box 858 Canberra ACT 2601 Australia

OFFICIAL

From: s. 22(1)(a)(ii) <[s.22\(1\)\(a\)\(ii\)@aff.gov.au](mailto:s.22(1)(a)(ii)@aff.gov.au)>
Sent: Friday, 19 June 2026 6:48 PM
To: Cookson, Beth <Beth.Cookson@aff.gov.au>; Smith, Brant <Brant.Smith@aff.gov.au>
Cc: Ag Media <Media@aff.gov.au>; Hamilton, Sam <Sam.Hamilton@aff.gov.au>; Ipkendanz, Chris <Chris.Ipkendanz@aff.gov.au>; s. 22(1)(a)(ii) <[s.22\(1\)\(a\)\(ii\)@aff.gov.au](mailto:s.22(1)(a)(ii)@aff.gov.au)>; Palfreyman, Louise <Louise.Palfreyman@aff.gov.au>; s. 22(1)(a)(ii) <[s.22\(1\)\(a\)\(ii\)@aff.gov.au](mailto:s.22(1)(a)(ii)@aff.gov.au)>
Subject: 20 June MR and TPs/Q+A - Due 7:30pm tonight (19 June) [SEC=OFFICIAL]

OFFICIAL

Good afternoon,

Please see TPs and Q+A draft for tomorrow here - [20 June TPs - H5 WA.docx](#)

And media release drafted for positive results here - [IF CONFIRMED MR.docx](#)

If you could please edit and come back to me by 7:30pm that would be the most appreciated, then I'll share with the MO.

Thank you!

Kindest,
s. 22(1)(a)(ii)

Media

Public Affairs Officer

Communications and Media Branch

Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry

P: s. 22(1)(a)(ii) | E: s. 22(1)(a)(ii) @aff.gov.au or media@aff.gov.au

OFFICIAL

OFFICIAL

TALKING POINTS ARE SUBJECT TO CHANGE AND ARE NOT FOR EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION



Australian Government
Department of Agriculture,
Fisheries and Forestry

Media Talking Points

Confirmed H5 Detection in Western Australia

20 June 2026

Positive result of H5 bird flu near Esperance, Western Australia.

Minister's/DAFF's Role

- DAFF will coordinate a rapid national response, with the Western Australian government leading response activities within their borders.

Key messages

- Testing at the CSIRO's Australian Centre for Disease Preparedness has confirmed H5 bird flu in a skua – a type of seabird – which was found sick in an isolated area near Esperance, Western Australia.
- This is the highly pathogenic strain of concern that has been circulating globally, and is the first detection in Australia.
- The samples from another sick bird (giant petrel) have now been tested at Western Australia's Department of Primary Industries and Regional Development laboratory, and also returned a suspected positive result for H5 influenza.
- The samples will also be sent to the CSIRO's ACDP for confirmatory testing.
- While disappointing, this is not unexpected, given the global spread of this virus.
- I can confirm that there is still no evidence of any mass mortality at this time nor any evidence of infection in poultry.
- The Consultative Committee for Emergency Animal Diseases met earlier this morning to discuss the new information and to consider WA's response plan.
- The Western Australia Department of Primary Industries and Regional Development is leading on-ground activities and the Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry supporting national coordination.

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1 of 4

OFFICIAL

OFFICIAL

TALKING POINTS ARE SUBJECT TO CHANGE AND ARE NOT FOR EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION

- A key priority of the response is to determine the extent of infection in wildlife. We thank the community for their response to the media yesterday and I understand that our WA colleagues are responding to a number of calls to the EAD hotline.
- This is a sign of our strong biosecurity system working.
 - The Albanese Government has invested more than \$113 million to strengthen our nation's preparedness for H5 bird flu.
 - The latest funding in the 2026-27 Budget including \$11.2 million to further bolster preparedness activities, including invasive species control and habitat improvement across the country, and a focus on eradicating invasive species on Australia's offshore islands.
 - This includes more than \$2 million to Western Australia to purchase mission critical supplies for preparing for and responding to high pathogenicity avian influenza (HPAI) outbreaks in the production sector and/or in Australian wildlife.
 - It also includes funds to help the Western Australian Government develop plans for priority native species, to assist wildlife facilities holding important populations of threatened native species with enhanced biosecurity, and on-ground threat mitigation efforts for priority native species and sites.
- A series of national simulation exercises have been undertaken since 2024 to prepare for this event. Government, industry and stakeholders have been working together to strengthen planning and governance arrangements for disease response and are ready to activate.

If asked**Where/how was the first bird found?**

- The skua (seabird) was found sick near Esperance, WA on the 14 June by a member of the public, and subsequently died after being cared for in isolation.

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- The second bird potentially affected is a giant petrel, samples were tested yesterday at the WA DPIRD laboratory and returned a positive result for H5 influenza. The samples will be sent to the CSIRO's ACDP for confirmatory testing.

Could the person who found the bird have caught bird flu? Did the carer have any other animals it could spread to?

- H5 bird flu rarely affects humans and the risk is low.
- The sick bird was cared for carefully by a wildlife carer in isolation.
- There are national guidelines in place to help protect people who work with and care for birds from bird flu.

Does this detection impact the poultry industry?

- There have been no detections of H5 bird flu in poultry in Australia.
- The two seabirds were found in a remote area and isolated during their care.
- The Australian poultry industries remain free of bird flu.

What about the bird flu vaccines?

- The Australian Government is actively working through regulatory and policy arrangements for the potential vaccination of some rare, protected or valuable bird species to help protect them in the event of a H5 bird flu outbreak in Australia.

Funding

- The Australian Government has committed more than \$113 million to strengthen surveillance, preparedness and response capability for a potential incursion. This includes:
 - \$43.9 million to enhance national coordination of response arrangements and communications, strengthen surveillance and boost biosecurity capacity and capability.

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- o \$47.1 million to accelerate protective action for threatened species and priority biodiversity.
- o \$22.1 million to increase the amount of ready-to-use pandemic flu vaccines and antivirals in the National Medical Stockpile (NMS).

Which departments are collaborating on the response?

- A dedicated Australian Government Taskforce was established in 2024 to strengthen preparedness for a possible incursion, jointly led by the Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry (DAFF), Department of Climate Change, Energy, the Environment and Water (DCCEEW), the Australian Centre for Disease Control (CDC) on behalf of the Department of Health, Disability and Ageing (DHDA) and the National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA).Background (for use if required)
- Testing at CSIRO ACDP has confirmed that this virus is Clade 2.3.4.4b and related to strains from in the Southern Indian Ocean Sub-Antarctic Territories (including Heard Island).

s. 22(1)(a)(ii)

OFFICIAL

s. 22(1)(a)(ii)

From: Hamilton, Sam
Sent: Friday, 19 June 2026 7:00 PM
To: s. 22(1)(a)(ii); Cookson, Beth; Smith, Brant
Cc: Ag Media; Ipkendanz, Chris; s. 22(1)(a)(ii) Palfreyman, Louise
Subject: RE: 20 June MR and TPs/Q+A - Due 7:30pm tonight (19 June) [SEC=OFFICIAL]

Thanks s. 22(1)(a)(ii)

s. 22(1)(a)(ii) and I spoke earlier and I wanted to set out a proposed approach to prepare for the press conference tomorrow.

- Overnight Sam to make changes to [20 June TPs - H5 WA.docx](#) based on test results from ACDP.
- s. 22(1)(a)(ii) to review at 0700 for finalisation by 0800.
- By 0830 (after CCEAD) finalise presser TPs.

I will be in the office about 0730 for the CCEAD meeting.

Sam

Sam Hamilton

Deputy Australian Chief Veterinary Officer

P: s. 47F(1)

E: sam.hamilton@aff.gov.au

Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry

GPO Box 858 Canberra ACT 2601 Australia

From: s. 22(1)(a)(ii) @aff.gov.au>
Sent: Friday, 19 June 2026 6:48 PM
To: Cookson, Beth <Beth.Cookson@aff.gov.au>; Smith, Brant <Brant.Smith@aff.gov.au>
Cc: Ag Media <Media@aff.gov.au>; Hamilton, Sam <Sam.Hamilton@aff.gov.au>; Ipkendanz, Chris <Chris.Ipkendanz@aff.gov.au>; s. 22(1)(a)(ii) @aff.gov.au>; Palfreyman, Louise <Louise.Palfreyman@aff.gov.au>; s. 22(1)(a)(ii) @aff.gov.au>
Subject: 20 June MR and TPs/Q+A - Due 7:30pm tonight (19 June) [SEC=OFFICIAL]

OFFICIAL

Good afternoon,

Please see TPs and Q+A draft for tomorrow here - [20 June TPs - H5 WA.docx](#)

And media release drafted for positive results here - [IF CONFIRMED MR.docx](#)

If you could please edit and come back to me by 7:30pm that would be the most appreciated, then I'll share with the MO.

Thank you!

Kindest,
s. 22(1)(a)(ii)

Media

Public Affairs Officer

Communications and Media Branch

Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry

P: s. 22(1)(a)(ii) | E: s. 22(1)(a)(ii) @aff.gov.au or media@aff.gov.au

OFFICIAL

s. 22(1)(a)(ii)

From: Curran, Carmel
Sent: Friday, 19 June 2026 3:58 PM
To: Ag Media; Cookson, Beth
Cc: Wellington, Michelle; Ipkendanz, Chris; Collins, Monica; Smith, Brant; Hamilton, Sam; Palfreyman, Louise
Subject: RE: ABC Newsroom call [SEC=OFFICIAL]

OFFICIAL

Thanks Beth – safe travels

Carmel

OFFICIAL

From: Ag Media <Media@aff.gov.au>
Sent: Friday, 19 June 2026 3:49 PM
To: Cookson, Beth <Beth.Cookson@aff.gov.au>; Ag Media <Media@aff.gov.au>
Cc: Wellington, Michelle <Michelle.Wellington@aff.gov.au>; Ipkendanz, Chris <Chris.Ipkendanz@aff.gov.au>; Curran, Carmel <Carmel.Curran1@aff.gov.au>; Collins, Monica <Monica.Collins@aff.gov.au>; Smith, Brant <Brant.Smith@aff.gov.au>; Hamilton, Sam <Sam.Hamilton@aff.gov.au>; Palfreyman, Louise <Louise.Palfreyman@aff.gov.au>
Subject: RE: ABC Newsroom call [SEC=OFFICIAL]

OFFICIAL

Thanks Beth, fly safe!

Kindest,
s. 22(1)(a)(ii)

Media

Public Affairs Officer
Communications and Media Branch
Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry
P: s. 22(1)(a)(ii) | E: s. 22(1)(a)(ii)@aff.gov.au or media@aff.gov.au

OFFICIAL

From: Cookson, Beth <Beth.Cookson@aff.gov.au>
Sent: Friday, 19 June 2026 3:47 PM
To: Ag Media <Media@aff.gov.au>
Cc: Wellington, Michelle <Michelle.Wellington@aff.gov.au>; Ipkendanz, Chris <Chris.Ipkendanz@aff.gov.au>; Curran, Carmel <Carmel.Curran1@aff.gov.au>; Collins, Monica <Monica.Collins@aff.gov.au>; Smith, Brant <Brant.Smith@aff.gov.au>; Hamilton, Sam <Sam.Hamilton@aff.gov.au>; Palfreyman, Louise <Louise.Palfreyman@aff.gov.au>
Subject: ABC Newsroom call [SEC=OFFICIAL]

OFFICIAL

Hi all

I just took a call from ABC newsroom looking for an interview. Have referred to Ag media. I've just boarded flight offline for next couple of hours.

Beth.

OFFICIAL

s. 22(1)(a)(ii)

From: Fiona FRASER <Fiona.Fraser@dcceew.gov.au>
Sent: Friday, 19 June 2026 7:11 PM
To: Cookson, Beth; Hamilton, Sam
Cc: Smith, Brant; **s. 22(1)(a)(ii)** ; Palfreyman, Louise; **s. 47F(1)**
Subject: RE: For urgent clearance: national talking points for H5 bird flu suspect case [SEC=OFFICIAL:Sensitive]

OFFICIAL: Sensitive

OFFICIAL Sensitive

Hi **s. 22(1)(a)(ii)**

I understand you will be sending through as an attachment for us DCCEEW folk - thanks.
All – I plan to share with a small no. of eNGOs (you will see several have been doing media this afternoon – and asking us for TPs – we are keen they have available for as much consistency as possible.)

Cheers Fiona

OFFICIAL Sensitive

OFFICIAL: Sensitive

From: Cookson, Beth <Beth.Cookson@aff.gov.au>
Sent: Friday, 19 June 2026 6:48 PM
To: Hamilton, Sam <Sam.Hamilton@aff.gov.au>
Cc: Smith, Brant <Brant.Smith@aff.gov.au>; **s. 22(1)(a)(ii)** @aff.gov.au>; Palfreyman, Louise <Louise.Palfreyman@aff.gov.au>; Fiona FRASER <Fiona.Fraser@dcceew.gov.au>; **s. 47F(1)** @dcceew.gov.au>
Subject: RE: For urgent clearance: national talking points for H5 bird flu suspect case [SEC=OFFICIAL:Sensitive]

OFFICIAL Sensitive

OFFICIAL: Sensitive

Thanks all – I added a point about enhanced surveillance given the frequency this has been raised – fine to finalise please.

OFFICIAL: Sensitive

OFFICIAL Sensitive

From: Hamilton, Sam <Sam.Hamilton@aff.gov.au>

Sent: Friday, 19 June 2026 5:41 PM

To: Cookson, Beth <Beth.Cookson@aff.gov.au>

Cc: Smith, Brant <Brant.Smith@aff.gov.au>; s. 22(1)(a)(ii) [@aff.gov.au](mailto:)>; Palfreyman, Louise <Louise.Palfreyman@aff.gov.au>; Fiona FRASER <Fiona.Fraser@dcceew.gov.au>; s. 47F(1) @dcceew.gov.au>

Subject: For urgent clearance: national talking points for H5 bird flu suspect case [SEC=OFFICIAL:Sensitive]

OFFICIAL: Sensitive

Dear Beth

Brant has reviewed the national talking points. For your clearance please.

This is consistent with the information disclosed in the WA minister's press conference.

 [260619 H5 Bird Flu National Talking Points DRAFT.docx](#)

Sam

Sam Hamilton

Deputy Australian Chief Veterinary Officer

P: s. 47F(1)

E: sam.hamilton@aff.gov.au

Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry

GPO Box 858 Canberra ACT 2601 Australia

OFFICIAL: Sensitive

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s. 22(1)(a)(ii)

From: s. 22(1)(a)(ii)
Sent: Friday, 19 June 2026 11:32 PM
To: Palfreyman, Louise; Hamilton, Sam
Cc: s. 22(1)(a)(ii)
Subject: RE: Information on HPAI and brown skuas from recent OFFLU reports [SEC=OFFICIAL]
Attachments: 10.1111-cobi.70052Figurecobi70052fig0004.pptx


OFFICIAL

Potentially also useful is the paper we published in 2025 – figure pasted below and attached showing the potential connectivity of (a) wild bird and (b) seal species between southern South America, Antarctic regions where HPAI previously detected, and southern Australia.

Emergence, spread, and impact of high-pathogenicity avian influenza H5 in wild birds and mammals of South America and Antarctica

<https://conbio.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/cobi.70052>

Skuas and giant petrels, through their predatory and scavenging behavior, visit numerous sites along the southern tip of South America and in sub-Antarctic islands and Antarctica. These habits and frequent incursions into breeding colonies of other species suggest these species could also play a significant role in the spread of HPAI H5 among sites in the Antarctic region. Brown skuas, southern fulmars, and kelp gulls have repeatedly been affected on the Falkland Islands and South Georgia and thus far have been among the first species affected in new locations. Predatory and scavenging birds such as great skuas (*Catharacta skua*), gulls, corvids, raptors, and vultures have been involved in HPAI H5 outbreaks in the Northern Hemisphere (Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, U.S. Department Of Agriculture, 2024; Camphuysen & Gear, 2022; Giacinti et al., 2024; van den Brand et al., 2015; Wunschmann et al., 2024).



Best wishes

s. 22(1)(a)(ii)

OFFICIAL

From: s. 22(1)(a)(ii)

Sent: Friday, 19 June 2026 11:22 PM

To: Palfreyman, Louise <Louise.Palfreyman@aff.gov.au>; Hamilton, Sam <Sam.Hamilton@aff.gov.au>

Cc: s. 22(1)(a)(ii) @aff.gov.au>

Subject: Information on HPAI and brown skuas from recent OFFLU reports

Hi Louise and Sam,

In case useful, I've done a quick skim for mentions of brown skuas from the three most recent reports from the OFFLU wildlife group. Please see pasted text below.

Happy to look into providing text on any particular questions over the weekend if useful – just let me know.

Best wishes

s. 22(1)(a)(ii)

Southward expansion of high pathogenicity avian influenza H5 in wildlife in South America: estimated impact on wildlife populations, and risk of incursion into Antarctica (August 2023)

<https://offlu.org/technical-activities/offlu-statement-on-hpai-h5-in-wildlife-in-south-america-and-risk-of-incursion-to-antarctica/>

A number of avian species have been identified as potential vector species for viral introduction and spread through the region, including skuas, gulls, giant petrels, and sheathbills. LPAI has already been detected in many of these species, demonstrating susceptibility to influenza viruses. Many of these species are known to traverse the Drake Passage and connect South America with the Sub-Antarctic Islands and Antarctic Peninsula through nomadic and migratory movements (Figure).

Predatory behaviour of skuas and giant petrels leads to visitation of numerous sites along the southern tip of South America, Sub-Antarctic Islands and the Antarctic Peninsula. These predatory/scavenging habits and frequent incursions into breeding colonies of other species, suggest these species are also likely to play a significant role in the spread of HPAI H5 among sites in the Subantarctic and Antarctic regions.

Brown skuas are fully migratory and are found on or around Subantarctic Islands populated by burrow-nesting seabirds or penguins. They are highly predatory, feeding mainly on other birds but will also scavenge around fishing boats and feed at sea. Breeding begins in October and November. Birds are loosely colonial but highly territorial, nesting on grass, gravel or bare rock (Anderson et al, 2009). Brown skuas are commonly recorded in high numbers in Antarctica; Argentina; Australia; Falkland Islands (Islas Malvinas), New Zealand; South Georgia (Islas Georgia del Sur) and the South Sandwich Islands (Islas Sándwich del Sur).

Continued expansion of high pathogenicity avian influenza H5 in wildlife in South America and incursion into the Antarctic region (December 2023)

<https://offlu.org/technical-activities/continued-expansion-of-hpai-h5-in-wildlife-in-south-america-and-incursion-into-the-antarctic-region-offlu-statement-2/>

The first incursion of HPAI H5 virus into the Antarctic region was detected in October 2023 in South Georgia (Islas Georgia del Sur), part of the Scotia Arc. At the same time, virus incursion was detected in the Falkland Islands (Islas Malvinas), on the continental shelf of South America. The species found infected or suspected infected with HPAI H5 virus include brown skua (*Stercorarius antarcticus*), kelp gull (*Larus dominicanus*), southern fulmar (*Fulmarus glacialis*), black-browed albatross (*Thalassarche melanophrys*), grey-headed albatross (*Thalassarche chrysostoma*) and southern elephant seal, and could be involved in the next stage of spread of HPAI H5 virus in the Antarctic region. The risk of viral transmission to other islands of the Scotia Arc and the Antarctic Peninsula is considered high, and considered medium to several islands that lie in the southern parts of the Pacific, Atlantic and Indian Oceans. From these locations, HPAI H5 virus is likely to spread further in the Antarctic region; and from there, incursion into Oceania is plausible.

The first indication of HPAI H5 virus incursion in South Georgia (Islas Georgia del Sur) was on 17 September 2023, when a southern giant petrel with neurological signs consistent with HPAI was observed on Bird Island. It died and its carcass was scavenged by brown skuas and other southern giant petrels. On 8 October, brown skuas with neurological signs were observed at the same location, and by 17 November 57 brown skuas had been found dead there. By virological analysis, all 15 brown skuas and 6 of 18 kelp gulls found dead and sampled on Bird Island and four other locations on South Georgia (Islas Georgia del Sur) between 8 October and 3 November were found to be infected with HPAI H5N1 virus.

Between 4 and 26 November, further suspected cases in brown skuas, kelp gulls, southern giant petrels and Antarctic terns (*Sterna vittata*) have been reported along the east coast of South Georgia (Islas Georgia del Sur) (28, 29) .

Assuming that these avian species (brown skua, southern fulmar, black-browed albatross, grey-headed albatross, Antarctic prion) did become infected on the Patagonian Shelf, to which locations could they introduce HPAI H5 virus?

Brown skuas that spend the austral winter on the Patagonian shelf breed on other islands of the Scotia Arc and on the northern part of the Antarctic Peninsula. Alternatively, they may fly to breeding sites on Subantarctic islands in the southern Atlantic Ocean (Tristan da Cunha, Gough and Bouvet Islands) and may come in contact with brown skuas that have been wintering around Africa and breed on Subantarctic Islands in the southern Indian Ocean (Prince Edward, Crozet, and Kerguelen Islands) (38).

For southern fulmars, the closest breeding sites from the Falkland Islands (Islas Malvinas) are the South Sandwich Islands (Islas Sándwich del Sur), the South Orkney Islands (Islas Orcadas del Sur), the Antarctic Peninsula and Peter I Island (39).

Black-browed albatrosses—besides breeding on the Falkland Islands (Islas Malvinas) and South Georgia—also breed on other (sub-)Antarctic islands including Crozet, Kerguelen, and Heard & McDonald Islands. Later in the breeding season, birds from South Georgia (Islas Georgias del Sur) may also travel up to c. 3000 km from their breeding sites, especially to the Antarctic Peninsula and South Orkney Islands (Islas Orcadas del Sur), but birds from the Falkland Islands (Islas Malvinas) remain close to their colonies during the whole breeding

period. Post-breeding, the majority of Falkland Islands (Islas Malvinas) birds remain on the Patagonian Shelf throughout the year, while birds from South Georgia (Islas Georgias del Sur) migrate primarily northeast across the South Atlantic to the coastal shelf of South Africa and the Benguela Current area, with small proportions wintering on the Patagonian Shelf or around Australia (40).

Grey-headed albatrosses—besides breeding on South Georgia (Islas Georgia del Sur)—also breed at other Subantarctic islands including Prince Edward, Crozet, Kerguelen, and Macquarie. This species has a circumpolar distribution over cold Subantarctic and Antarctic waters (41). Movements of non-breeding grey-headed albatrosses have only been reported for birds breeding on South Georgia (Islas Georgia del Sur). They showed one of three migratory movements, (i) residence in the southwest Atlantic and adjacent areas (including the Patagonian Shelf); (ii) return migrations to winter in habitats known to be used by other albatrosses in the Indian Ocean; and (iii) one or more global circumnavigations—always in eastward direction—with foraging in areas and habitats used in options (i) and (ii) and also in additional staging areas in the Indian and Pacific Oceans (42).

Antarctic prions are the most southerly breeding of all prion species. Individuals that spend the austral winter on the Patagonian shelf may nest in large numbers on all islands of the Scotia Arc. Large numbers of subspecies of Antarctic Prion breed on subantarctic islands in the Indian Ocean, near New Zealand, and probably near the Antarctic continent on Scott Island. This species breeds in large colonies in self-excavated burrows in areas with moss vegetation, or in rock crevices. They congregate in large rafts at sea just before dusk and attend the colonies in huge flocks just after dark. After the breeding season, Antarctic Prions disperse in a wide geographical range between the Antarctic pack-ice in the South and about 35 degrees south. They are commonly found on the Patagonian Shelf and in the Humboldt Current off South America during the austral winter. One infected Antarctic Prion was found in Brazil (Annex 1). This bird probably originates from the breeding colonies in the South Atlantic (based on (43)), although Antarctic Prions from South Georgia can also disperse into the Pacific (44).

Could Gs/GD HPAI H5 virus arrive with the long-distance movements of seabirds directly from the Antarctic region adjacent to South America?

Numerous seabird species have circumpolar distributions that include South Georgia and the Subantarctic Islands of Oceania, such as brown skua and northern giant petrel (*Macronectes halli*). Limited available tracking data, largely from breeding individuals, demonstrate regionally restricted movements (65). However, kernel density analysis of non-breeding brown skuas tagged on Crozet and Kerguelen Islands indicate that birds connect Southern Africa with Australia, demonstrating potentially vast long-distance movements in this species, which has been shown to be infected with HPAI H5 (38). Northern giant petrels, which visit Australia, New Zealand and associated islands have long-distance movement whereby young birds tend to disperse great distances from the breeding colonies, often with an eastward movement likely due to prevailing westerly winds such that birds from the Oceania Subantarctic islands (e.g. Macquarie Island) may disperse to South America, including one confirmed detection of a bird banded on Macquarie Island found on South Georgia (66-69). Unfortunately, there is no available tracking data from kelp gulls and southern fulmars from Oceania's Subantarctic islands, as these species similarly have large circumpolar distributions, are a "scavenger species", and have been found infected with H5 HPAI on South Georgia and the Falkland Islands. Given the almost 10,000 km between the Subantarctic islands around South America and Oceania, this scenario would require (a) birds be capable of long-distance flight while infected, and (b) this distance be covered in a short period of time (i.e. no longer than the duration of infection). Studies of albatross flight indicate a maximum speed of ~20 m/sec (~70 km/hr) (70), such that a wandering albatross (*Diomedea exulans*) could theoretically take a minimum of 5.7 days to fly from Tierra del Fuego to New Zealand, which is within the expected range of duration of infection.

Global overview of the spread and impact of H5 clade 2.3.4.4b high pathogenicity avian influenza virus in wildlife, 2020-2024 (March 2026)

https://offlu.org/publications/2026_offlu-statement-iii/

South Georgia (Islas Georgia del Sur) reported HPAI between October 2023 and March 2024 in seabirds and marine mammals [166, 185]. Although archipelago-wide mortality estimates are not available to date, significant mortalities were reported for brown skuas, wandering albatrosses, gentoo penguins, Antarctic fur seals and southern elephant seals [158, 159, 185, 186]. At Bird Island, where wildlife mortality was intensively monitored, brown skuas were the most affected species, experiencing earlier and more severe mortality than other species [158].

South Indian Ocean

The first suspected HPAI case in the South Indian Ocean was a brown skua with clinical signs suggestive of HPAI at Marion Island (Prince Edward Islands) in September 2024 [203]. More mortalities in multiple species were reported from early November to March 2025, though the overall occurrence of mortality slowed significantly in January. HPAI was confirmed in six species: wandering albatross, king penguin, brown skua, southern giant petrel, northern giant petrel, and sooty albatross.

The highest HPAI-associated mortality was observed in wandering albatrosses (at least 150 chicks dead out of approximately 1900 chicks from the 2024 cohort), brown skuas (80 adults dead), and king penguins (120 adults dead) [203, 204].

In October 2024, unusual mortality was reported at Possession Island (Crozet Islands) involving several hundreds of southern elephant seals, tens of king penguins, wandering albatrosses and brown skuas, with HPAI H5 detected in southern elephant seals and king penguins. In November 2024, mortality of southern elephant seals from HPAI H5 also was reported at La Grande Terre (Kerguelen Islands). Other species with suspected cases in Crozet and Kerguelen archipelagos comprised kelp gulls, gentoo penguins, Kerguelen shags and pintado petrels. The population impacts of these outbreaks have yet to be assessed, but southern elephant seals and king penguins appeared most affected [184]. It is expected that HPAI also arrived on Heard Island, which is uninhabited, and HPAI was confirmed on Heard Island one year later following a dedicated mission to investigate [205].

Antarctica

The cause of mortality of hundreds of crabeater seals found dead in the northwestern Weddell Sea in November and December 2024 [199] was attributed to HPAI H5 based on positive testing of crabeater seal carcasses from the same area in January 2025 [206]. Additional mortality events and HPAI detections were recorded at various sites in the Antarctic Peninsula and South Shetland Islands from November 2024 to March 2025, with affected species including Antarctic fur seal, kelp gull, gentoo penguin, pintado petrel, skua, and southern elephant seal [187, 199, 206-210].

The distribution of suspected and confirmed cases suggests the virus spread widely, especially among seabirds, but remained essentially confined to the Antarctic Peninsula and the nearby South Shetland Islands. The population impacts of these outbreaks have yet to be assessed, but it seems that skuas and crabeater seals were most affected [206-208, 210].

The only continental region not yet affected by HPAI H5 during this reporting period is Oceania [240]. The spread patterns observed in the last five years have implications for understanding potential introduction pathways to Oceania in future. The potential for spread of HPAI H5 via wild birds to Oceania from Asia has long been recognised, but recent events in South America and Antarctica reveal a potential southern introduction pathway not previously considered [161].

This is highlighted by recent detections in the Antarctic region and southern Indian Ocean (Crozet islands, Kerguelen islands and Heard and McDonald Islands) with southern giant petrels, northern giant petrels, brown skuas and kelp gulls identified as species that may have facilitated long-distance spread in the region [184].

Best wishes,


s. 22(1)(a)(ii)

s. 22(1)(a)(ii)

European Veterinary Specialist Zoological Medicine

Epidemiology, Surveillance and Laboratory Section | Animal Health Policy Branch | Biosecurity Animal Division
Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry
Ngunnawal Country
Agriculture House, Canberra ACT 2600, Australia

s. 22(1)(a)(ii)



The department acknowledges the traditional custodians of Australia and their continuing connection to land, sea, environment, water and community. We pay our respect to the traditional custodians, their culture, and elders both past and present.

s. 22(1)(a)(ii)

From: Smith, Brant
Sent: Friday, 19 June 2026 7:06 PM
To: RCG-H5-2026; Collins, Monica; Anderson, Victoria; Curran, Alison; s. 22(1)(a)(ii); Preece, Jason; Cookson, Beth; Hamilton, Sam; Vivian-Smith, Gabrielle; Palfreyman, Louise; s. 22(1)(a)(ii); s. 22(1)(a)(ii); Osborne, Luke; Finnin, Peter; Gavin, David; Granton-Smith, Rachel; Hutchison, Tina; Greenville, Jared; Black, Tom; McDonald, Andrew; Lowe, Matt; Galeano, David; Denny, Paul; Crosthwaite, Kerren; Ireland, Cassandra; Sanson -Fisher, Jadd; Simpson, Tim; Geysen, Matthew; Curran, Carmel; s. 22(1)(a)(ii) Ipkendanz, Chris; s. 47E(d)
Subject: Re: Response Coordination Group H5 2026 [SEC=UNOFFICIAL]

UNOFFICIAL

Hi. Is this supposed to be 10am? It has 10pm.

UNOFFICIAL

From: RCG-H5-2026 <RCG-H5-2026@aff.gov.au>
Sent: Friday, 19 June 2026 19:05:31
To: Collins, Monica <Monica.Collins@aff.gov.au>; Anderson, Victoria <Victoria.Anderson@aff.gov.au>; Curran, Alison <Alison.Curran@aff.gov.au>; s. 22(1)(a)(ii) @aff.gov.au>; Preece, Jason <Jason.Preece@aff.gov.au>; Cookson, Beth <Beth.Cookson@aff.gov.au>; Hamilton, Sam <Sam.Hamilton@aff.gov.au>; Vivian-Smith, Gabrielle <Gabrielle.Vivian-Smith@aff.gov.au>; Smith, Brant <Brant.Smith@aff.gov.au>; Palfreyman, Louise <Louise.Palfreyman@aff.gov.au>; s. 22(1)(a)(ii) @aff.gov.au>; s. 22(1)(a)(ii) @aff.gov.au>; Osborne, Luke <Luke.Osborne@aff.gov.au>; Finnin, Peter <Peter.Finnin@aff.gov.au>; Gavin, David <David.Gavin@aff.gov.au>; Granton-Smith, Rachel <Rachel.Granton-Smith@aff.gov.au>; Hutchison, Tina <Tina.Hutchison@aff.gov.au>; Greenville, Jared <Jared.Greenville@aff.gov.au>; Black, Tom <Tom.Black@aff.gov.au>; McDonald, Andrew <Andrew.McDonald@aff.gov.au>; Lowe, Matt <Matt.Lowe@aff.gov.au>; Galeano, David <David.Galeano@aff.gov.au>; Denny, Paul <Paul.Denny@aff.gov.au>; Crosthwaite, Kerren <Kerren.Crosthwaite@aff.gov.au>; Ireland, Cassandra <Cassandra.Ireland@aff.gov.au>; Sanson -Fisher, Jadd <Jadd.Sanson-Fisher@aff.gov.au>; Simpson, Tim <Tim.Simpson@aff.gov.au>; Geysen, Matthew <Matthew.Geysen@aff.gov.au>; Curran, Carmel <Carmel.Curran1@aff.gov.au>; s. 22(1)(a)(ii) @aff.gov.au>; s. 22(1)(a)(ii) @aff.gov.au>; Ipkendanz, Chris <Chris.Ipkendanz@aff.gov.au>; s. 47E(d)

Subject: Response Coordination Group H5 2026

When: Saturday, 20 June 2026 10:00 pm-10:30 pm.

Where:

Good evening,

This is a placeholder for meeting 1 of the Response Coordination Group for H5 2026.

Standing agenda

Response Coordinator: Monica Collins, A/g Deputy Secretary, BOCG
 Incident Controller: Chris Ipkendanz

No.	Title	Presenter
1	Meeting open	Response Coordinator
2	Outcomes of previous meeting	Response Coordinator
3	Action items	Response Coordinator
4	Current situation Discuss the current situation	All
5	Key lines of effort - National coordination - Media, communication and engagement - Trade impacts and coordination - Resourcing	Leads
6	Response coordination arrangements Discuss whether the situation requires additional response capabilities	Response Coordinator
7	Other business	All
8	Next meeting	Response Coordinator

Please forward meeting request as necessary.

Regards

s. 22(1)(a)(ii)

Logistics Officer

H5 2026 Response

Ph: s. 22(1)(a)(ii)

Mobile: s. 22(1)(a)(ii)

S. 47E(d)

S. 47E(d)

s. 22(1)(a)(ii)

From: Cookson, Beth
Sent: Thursday, 18 June 2026 8:38 PM
To: Hamilton, Sam
Subject: RE: Suspect H5 detection in WA [SEC=OFFICIAL:Sensitive]

OFFICIAL: Sensitive

Thanks Sam. Have copied you into advice just sent. Louise and Michelle W onto the briefing/media but will let you know if need more hands on deck.

OFFICIAL: Sensitive

From: Hamilton, Sam <Sam.Hamilton@aff.gov.au>
Sent: Thursday, 18 June 2026 7:49 PM
To: Cookson, Beth <Beth.Cookson@aff.gov.au>
Subject: Suspect H5 detection in WA [SEC=OFFICIAL:Sensitive]

OFFICIAL: Sensitive

Hi Beth

I appreciate you calling earlier, thank you for the heads up.

Tonight I'm happy to support any action required such as drafting up a sit rep/email and assisting in any coordination. Whatever is needed.

Tomorrow I expect that there will be lines of effort including briefing, preparing for CCEAD, media statements tomorrow. Please let me know how I can assist.

Of course I can step out of Incident Coordinator training as required.

Sam

Sam Hamilton

Deputy Australian Chief Veterinary Officer
P: **s. 47F(1)**
E: sam.hamilton@aff.gov.au
Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry
GPO Box 858 Canberra ACT 2601 Australia

OFFICIAL: Sensitive

s. 22(1)(a)(ii)

From: Hamilton, Sam
Sent: Friday, 19 June 2026 6:46 PM
To: Cookson, Beth
Subject: RE: UPDATE - situation report to CCEAD - Suspect H5 positive seabird (skua) in WA coastline [SEC=OFFICIAL]

Thanks Beth, I just had a verbal update from Louise that WA will not seek cost sharing at this point.

Sam

Sam Hamilton

Deputy Australian Chief Veterinary Officer

P: **s. 47F(1)**

E: sam.hamilton@aff.gov.au

Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry

GPO Box 858 Canberra ACT 2601 Australia

From: Cookson, Beth <Beth.Cookson@aff.gov.au>
Sent: Friday, 19 June 2026 6:44 PM
To: **s. 22(1)(a)(ii)** @aff.gov.au
Cc: DLO Collins **s. 47E(d)** Collins, Monica <Monica.Collins@aff.gov.au>; **s. 47E(d)** Smith, Brant <Brant.Smith@aff.gov.au>; Hamilton, Sam <Sam.Hamilton@aff.gov.au>; Palfreyman, Louise <Louise.Palfreyman@aff.gov.au>
Subject: UPDATE - situation report to CCEAD - Suspect H5 positive seabird (skua) in WA coastline [SEC=OFFICIAL]

OFFICIAL

Hi **s. 22(1)(a)(ii)**

See full readout from situation update of CCEAD members and observers below, including the ACDP result that I relayed earlier via Signal.

Beth.

OFFICIAL

From: Cookson, Beth <Beth.Cookson@aff.gov.au>
Sent: Friday, 19 June 2026 6:22 PM
To: Anderson, Victoria <Victoria.Anderson@aff.gov.au>; Lowe, Matt <Matt.LOWE@aff.gov.au>; Collins, Monica <Monica.Collins@aff.gov.au>; Smith, Brant <Brant.Smith@aff.gov.au>; Finnin, Peter <Peter.Finnin@aff.gov.au>; Crosthwaite, Kerren <Kerren.Crosthwaite@aff.gov.au>; Wellington, Michelle <Michelle.Wellington@aff.gov.au>; Ipkendanz, Chris <Chris.Ipkendanz@aff.gov.au>; Palfreyman, Louise <Louise.Palfreyman@aff.gov.au>; Hamilton, Sam <Sam.Hamilton@aff.gov.au>; Ireland, Cassandra <Cassandra.Ireland@aff.gov.au>
Cc: **s. 47E(d)** @aff.gov.au; **s. 47E(d)** @aff.gov.au; Curran, Alison <Alison.Curran@aff.gov.au>; **s. 22(1)(a)(ii)** @aff.gov.au; **s. 47E(d)** @agriculture.gov.au; **s. 47E(d)** @agriculture.gov.au
Subject: RE: Suspect H5 positive seabird (skua) in WA coastline

s. 47B(a)

Regards
Beth.

From: Cookson, Beth

Sent: Thursday, 18 June 2026 8:21 PM

To: Anderson, Victoria <Victoria.Anderson@aff.gov.au>; Lowe, Matt <Matt.LOWE@aff.gov.au>; Collins, Monica <Monica.Collins@aff.gov.au>; Smith, Brant <Brant.Smith@aff.gov.au>; Finnin, Peter <Peter.Finnin@aff.gov.au>; Crosthwaite, Kerren <Kerren.Crosthwaite@aff.gov.au>; Wellington, Michelle <Michelle.Wellington@aff.gov.au>; Ipkendanz, Chris <Chris.Ipkendanz@aff.gov.au>; Palfreyman, Louise <Louise.Palfreyman@aff.gov.au>; Hamilton, Sam <Sam.Hamilton@aff.gov.au>; Ireland, Cassandra <Cassandra.Ireland@aff.gov.au>

Cc: s. 47E(d) <[s.47E\(d\)@aff.gov.au](mailto:s.47E(d)@aff.gov.au)>; s. 47E(d) <[s.47E\(d\)@aff.gov.au](mailto:s.47E(d)@aff.gov.au)>

Subject: Suspect H5 positive seabird (skua) in WA coastline

Importance: High

Dear all

- I was advised earlier this evening by the WA CVO of a single vagrant skua (species of seabird with known distribution through subantarctic) east of Esperance that has tested positive at WA DPIRD laboratory for H5 Influenza A. The skua was found sick on 14/6 with clinical signs of leg paralysis, weakness and dehydration. It subsequently died overnight after being treated in isolation at Esperance wildlife centre.
- A sick petrel, also with a distribution to subantarctic has also been taken into care at the same wildlife hospital and tested. Preliminary results tomorrow.
- Samples from the skua are en route to the Australian Centre for Disease Preparedness for confirmatory testing.
- There are no other reported sick birds or other animals in the vicinity. It is possible that individual infected animals can arrive and not establish infection in local populations, however if confirmed, would raise concern about active pathways.
- Petrels and skuas are known to arrive periodically as vagrant species, any onward spread (if confirmed) is undetermined at this stage.

Next steps

- ACDP need to complete a series of tests before confirmation of the strain of Influenza A will be known.
 - Samples should arrive from WA tomorrow morning. If this happens as expected, we should have preliminary test results from ACDP by early afternoon tomorrow confirming whether test positive for H5 Influenza A. We will not have confirmation of the strain being high pathogenicity and the clade of concern for another 24-28 hours following this, however I would treat it as highly suspicious that it is the H5 strain of concern given the species and location if ACDP confirm the WA lab results of H5 positive.
- I will work with the WA CVO on the timing for the Consultative Committee on Emergency Animal Disease to meet which is the next step. It is likely this will occur after the test results from ACDP are received tomorrow.
- Industry have not been advised. We will do this as part of the CCEAD meeting requests, following ACDP preliminary test results.

I will keep you informed as we have new information. s. 47B(a)

We'll prepare media holding lines, if needed.

Beth.


Dr Beth Cookson BVSc (Hons), EMPA, MANZCVS (Epidemiology)

Chief Veterinary Officer

Australian Government Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry

T. **s. 47F(1)** E. beth.cookson@aff.gov.au

agriculture.gov.au



We acknowledge the continuous connection of First Nations Traditional Owners and Custodians to the lands, seas and waters of Australia. We recognise their care for and cultivation of Country. We pay respect to Elders past and present, and recognise their knowledge and contribution to the productivity, innovation and sustainability of Australia's agriculture, fisheries and forestry industries.

s. 22(1)(a)(ii)

From: NBC Secretariat
Sent: Friday, 19 June 2026 7:50 PM
To: s. 47F(1) Finnin, Peter; Collins,
Monica; s. 47F(1) @dpird.nsw.gov.au
Cc: ACT; ACT; BEMODDG; DPIRD; s. 47E(d) s. 22(1)(a)(ii); s. 47F(1)
Gavin, David; s. 47F(1)
Subject: Cookson, Beth; Smith, Brant
Advice to NMG Members - suspect H5 detection in WA [SEC=OFFICIAL:Sensitive]

OFFICIAL: Sensitive

Dear colleagues,

I am writing to provide early notification of a suspected H5 avian influenza detection in Western Australia in a single migratory bird. Diagnostic samples from a second sick migratory bird (of a different species) have also been collected and are currently being tested by the WA state laboratory; results are pending. Western Australia will implement enhanced general surveillance on a regional basis.

Confirmatory testing on samples from the first bird at the Australian Centre for Disease Preparedness (ACDP) has confirmed a positive PCR result for Influenza A (H5). Sequencing remains in progress to identify the clade and pathogenicity of the virus. The pathogenicity of the virus (that is, whether it is High Pathogenicity Avian Influenza) will determine whether the Consultative Committee for Emergency Animal Diseases will be convened under the Emergency Animal Disease Response Agreement to consider this incident and its response. This will include consideration of whether the virus is eradicable and advice to the National Management Group on whether the CCEAD, under the National Management Arrangements for wildlife, should be convened.

The department has commenced preparatory activities in line with existing response arrangements to ensure readiness should confirmation of High Pathogenicity Avian Influenza be received.

Subject to the outcome of diagnostics and any advice from CCEAD, a meeting of the National Management Group may need to be convened at short notice.

Further information will be provided as it becomes available.

Kind regards,

Peter

Kind regards,

Peter

Dr Peter J Finnin

BSc(Hons), BVSc(Hons), PhD

First Assistant Secretary | Biosecurity Strategy & Reform Division

s. 47F(1) | s. 47F(1)
s. 47E(d) @aff.gov.au

Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry

OFFICIAL: Sensitive

s. 22(1)(a)(ii)

From: s. 47E(d)
Sent: Friday, 19 June 2026 4:57 PM
To: Cookson, Beth; Smith, Brant
Cc: s. 22(1)(a)(ii) s. 22(1)(a)(ii) s. 47E(d) s. 47E(d)
Collins, Monica
Subject: Due SUNDAY AFTERNOON: AGSOC paper [SEC=OFFICIAL]

OFFICIAL

Hi all

There will be an extraordinary AGSOC meeting at midday on Monday, and the Secretary has asked that we prepare points on the possible HPAI detection in WA.

I've set this up in PDMS for action, and you all have access: [EC26-001107](#)

Grateful if you can provide this on **late Sunday 21 June** for Monica's clearance.

Thanks

s. 22(1)(a)(ii)

s. 22(1)(a)(ii)

Executive Officer | Biosecurity, Operations and Compliance Group

Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry

Agriculture House

70 Northbourne Avenue, Canberra City

GPO Box 858 Canberra ACT 2601 AUSTRALIA

M: s. 22(1)(a)(ii)

OFFICIAL

AD HOC AGSOC – H5 BIRD FLU**21 JUNE 2026****PRESENTER:** Victoria Anderson**PAPER:** Detection of H5 HPAI in WA**KEY SPEAKING POINTS:**

- As you will be aware, testing at the CSIRO's Australian Centre for Disease Preparedness (ACDP) has confirmed H5 bird flu in a skua – a type of seabird – which was found sick in an isolated area near Esperance, Western Australia.
- This is the highly pathogenic strain of concern that has been circulating globally and is the first detection in Australia.
- While disappointing, this is not unexpected, given the global spread of this virus.
- I can confirm that there is still no evidence of any mass mortality at this time nor any evidence of infection in poultry.
- We have been carefully preparing for this event over the past few years, particularly with the Australian Government's investment of more than \$113 million to strengthen Australia's preparedness for H5 bird flu and to protect our agricultural industries, wildlife and communities.
- This funding includes \$43.9 million to strengthen surveillance and boost biosecurity capability, with \$12 million provided to states and territories to enhance frontline preparedness and response capability.
- These investments have significantly strengthened our national preparedness and response capability, placing Australia in a strong position to respond quickly and effectively.
- Australia has well established national biosecurity response arrangements which are exercised regularly.
- The Consultative Committee for Emergency Animal Diseases (CCEAD) met yesterday, including with industry members, to consider the confirmation of the H5 bird flu in Western Australia and next steps, including surveillance and the assessment of risk of establishment to Australian birds.

- The Western Australia Department of Primary Industries and Regional Development is leading on-ground activities and the Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry is supporting national coordination.
- I want to acknowledge the ongoing collaboration that has occurred between the Australian and state and territory governments as we have prioritised the uplift of national bird flu preparedness.
- I would also like to acknowledge the quick action taken by WA to identify and respond to this incident. The Australian Government stands ready to support WA throughout this response.

SENSITIVITIES:

- This is the first detection of H5 HPAI clade 2.3.4.4b in Australia. While preparedness has been substantially advanced, overseas experience suggests that a H5 bird flu outbreak in Australia could have far reaching impacts.
- H5 bird flu mostly affects birds but does spread to other animals. Rarely, it can also infect people. The risk to the Australian public remains low.
- **s. 47B(a)**

Trade

- The detection of H5 HPAI in wild birds does not change Australia's HPAI free in poultry status in accordance with international standards (World Organisation for Animal Health (WOAH)). **s. 33(a)(iii)**

ATTACHMENT A: Additional information**Further background information**

- Testing was undertaken at Australia's emergency animal disease reference laboratory, the CSIRO Australian Centre for Disease Preparedness (ACDP), with confirmed results reported on Saturday 20 June 2026.
- Another sick bird (giant petrel) from the same area has tested suspect positive and samples will be sent to ACDP for confirmatory testing. Based on the previous result, it is likely this will also be confirmed.
- These birds are migratory sea birds that travel long distances to Australia from the sub-Antarctic region.
- This H5 HPAI virus has been confirmed to be H5N1 clade 2.3.4.4b, which has spread globally over the past few years. It is highly contagious and has affected over 560 bird species and over 100 mammalian species, including dairy cattle, cats, goats, alpacas, pigs and wild mammals such as seals and sea lions.

National response and cost-sharing arrangements

- Australia has well established arrangements for emergency animal disease (EAD) responses, including the Emergency Animal Disease Response Agreement (EADRA) and the National Management Agreement for H5 HPAI in Wildlife (the H5 NMA).
- The EADRA is a formal deed between the Australian Government, all states/territories, and 14 livestock industry groups. It provides a cost-sharing model between governments and affected industries for responding to EADs in livestock (e.g. poultry) that are considered to be eradicable or containable.
- The H5 NMA is a national arrangement specifically for responding to incursions of H5 HPAI in wildlife where eradication or containment of the disease is unlikely. It supports a rapid, nationally consistent response to H5 HPAI with significant public good considerations and allows for cost sharing between governments.

s. 22(1)(a)(ii)

From: Smith, Brant
Sent: Friday, 19 June 2026 2:44 PM
To: **s. 47E(d)** Collins, Monica; Cookson, Beth; Lowe, Matt; Hutchison, Tina; Crosthwaite, Kerren; Ipkendanz, Chris; Wellington, Michelle; **s. 22(1)(a)(ii)**; **s. 22(1)(a)(ii)**; Curran, Alison; Greenville, Jared
Cc: Hamilton, Sam; Palfreyman, Louise
Subject: FOR INFO - situation update - key meetings and outcomes - technical engagement. [SEC=OFFICIAL]
Importance: High

OFFICIAL

Good afternoon.

Please see below update on consultation on suspect avian influenza case in WA.

HPAI IDC

I chaired the HPAI IDC this morning at 11am. Beth gave a sit rep to members, Chris/Michelle gave an update on crisis management arrangements and communications, and we fielded a range of questions from members. Key agencies and centrals were all in attendance.

We've agreed to meet daily for situational awareness including over the weekend which I will chair, or as and when the formal governance arrangements stand up under Chris. Members were appreciative of the update.

CCEAD

A CCEAD is underway at the moment started at 2:30pm chaired by Beth and Louise P is the Commonwealth rep. This includes all states and territories CVOs, the three industries that are part of the EADRA deeds – chicken meat federation, egg farmers and duck meat federation. AHA is also a member and Wildlife Health Australia.

Commonwealth departmental senior rep from Environment and Health have been invited to attend for awareness.

Ministerial stand up.

Min standup is at 3:15pm in Hobart and points were provided to her on what can be stated publicly at this point in the process.

Test results timing

As we are all aware further more specific test results will be coming from ACDP when completed. Further information will be provided when they come to hand which will be provided and use tomorrow morning should the Minister agree to do a standup in Canberra with officials.

This is all moving swiftly and is going well with a few lumps to iron out on handling, but all in all the right messaging is getting to the right people, noting it is still fluid.


Thanks all

B.

Ps if I forget anyone on the above email please provide to them.

Dr Brant Smith BVSc, MVPHMgt, MAICD
First Assistant Secretary | Biosecurity Animal Division
National Animal Disease Preparedness Coordinator
Mental Health Champion

+61 2 6272 4969 | **s. 47F(1)** | Executive Assistant: **s. 22(1)(a)(ii)**
Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry
70 Northbourne Avenue Canberra City ACT 2601
GPO Box 858, Canberra City ACT 2601
daff.gov.au biosecurity.gov.au



Supporting Flexibility - if you receive an email from me outside of normal business hours, I'm sending it at a time that suits me. Unless it's marked urgent, I'm not expecting you to read or reply until normal business hours.

OFFICIAL

s. 22(1)(a)(ii)

From: s. 22(1)(a)(ii)
Sent: Friday, 19 June 2026 3:16 PM
To: s. 22(1)(a)(ii); s. 22(1)(a)(ii); s. 22(1)(a)(ii)
Cc: Gavin, David; Finnin, Peter; Cookson, Beth; EADRA; s. 22(1)(a)(ii)
Subject: For reference - H5 NMA confidential deed poll [SEC=OFFICIAL]
Attachments: H5 NMA confidential deed poll.docx

OFFICIAL

Good afternoon all,

Please find attached for reference the H5 NMA confidential deed poll.

Industry representatives participating as observers, on both the Consultative Committee and National Management Group, under the H5 NMA will be asked to sign the document.

Cheers s. 22(1)(a)(ii)

s. 22(1)(a)(ii)

A/g Director

Biosecurity Response Framework and Agreements

H5 NMA Custodian

Biosecurity Response and Reform Branch | Biosecurity Strategy and Reform Division

Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry

Ph: s. 22(1)(a)(ii)

Mobile: s. 22(1)(a)(ii)

Note I finish at 2pm on Mondays and Tuesdays



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OFFICIAL

CONFIDENTIALITY DEED POLL FOR PARTICIPATING IN THE NATIONAL MANAGEMENT AGREEMENT – H5 HPAI IN WILDLIFE (THE H5 NMA)

Except as set out in the following paragraph, this Confidentiality Deed Poll must be completed if you are participating in activities connected to or associated with implementation of the *National Management Agreement – H5 HPAI in Wildlife* (the H5 NMA), and may receive or access Confidential Information, including if you are required/requested to attend a meeting of the Consultative Committee on Emergency Animal Diseases (H5 NMA CCEAD¹) or National Management Group (H5 NMA NMG²) in any capacity (for example but not restricted to; H5 NMA CCEAD member, H5 NMA NMG member, technical expert, observer).

The following individuals are exempt from the requirement to complete this Confidentiality Deed Poll:

- A. Government Parties, their officers and employees, if they are bound by a relevant Public Service Act with respect to confidentiality.
- B. Contractors, if their contract of engagement with a Government Party contains obligations of confidentiality at least as strict as those contained in the Confidentiality Deed Poll including only allowing them to use the Confidential information for the specific purposes for which they have been engaged.

This form must be signed by the individual participant and must be witnessed. Once completed, please return to the H5 NMA Custodian (s. 47E(d)) by email (scanned pdf).

Background

- A. The proper administration of the H5 NMA, leads to the creation or provision of, and the need to share, **Confidential Information**.
- B. In particular, there is the potential for **Confidential Information** to be shared by any of the following parties who are participating in activities connected to or associated with implementation of the H5 NMA:
 - (a) Parties to the H5 NMA and their representatives, advisors or observers;
 - (b) Members of the H5 NMA NMG or H5 NMA CCEAD established under the H5 NMA;
 - (c) Non-Government Entities and their advisers and observers who are involved in meetings of the H5 NMA NMG, or H5 NMA CCEAD;

¹ H5 NMA CCEAD is used to distinguish the group established under the H5 NMA from the respective Consultative Committee on Emergency Animal Diseases (CCEAD) established under the EADRA.

² H5 NMA NMG is used to distinguish the group established under the H5 NMA from the respective National Management Group (NMG) established under the EADRA.

- (d) other persons involved in the H5 NMA activities, including technical experts and advisers;
- (e) contractors engaged by Parties in roles that have a need-to-know the **Confidential Information**,

to any of the parties listed above.

C. The **Confidential Information** may include:

- (a) information relating to individuals or organisations or others affected by or involved in an Incident, or their properties or businesses, including photos, locations, or other information that could be used to identify affected companies or premises;
- (b) information relating to response activities or plans;
- (c) commercial in confidence information relating to a Party, a member of a Non-Government Entity or a third party;
- (d) sensitive information relating to government policies, financial interests or activities, including budget information and cost claims;
- (e) legal advice or information which attracts legal professional privilege;
- (f) internal working documents of the H5 NMA CCEAD or H5 NMA NMG relating to Incidents and Response Plans;
- (g) information relating to, or has the potential to adversely impact, national security or international relations including trade, as a result of the management of H5 HPAI in Wildlife; and
- (h) personal information, as defined under the *Privacy Act 1988*.

D. Non-government individuals participating in activities connected to or associated with implementation of the H5 NMA, in which they may receive or have access to **Confidential Information**, must sign a Confidentiality Deed Poll before they receive or have access to the **Confidential Information**. The Deed Poll will be enforceable against the signatory by any Party or Parties listed above in Part B of the Background.

I, (name) _____,

of (party/organisation) _____,

of (address) _____,

make this Deed Poll in favour of all the parties listed under Part B of the Background.

Agreed Terms

1. In this Deed Poll, unless the contrary intention appears, words and phrases have the same meaning as given in the National Management Agreement – H5 HPAL in Wildlife (**the H5 NMA**).
2. I am participating in consultations and activities conducted in connection to or associated with implementation of the H5 NMA in one or more of the capacities referred to in Part B of the Background (**Activities**).
3. In the context of undertaking the Activities, I will receive or have access to **Confidential Information** which I understand may be acquired or produced by or made available to me and which has arisen out of or in connection with my participation in meetings, teleconferences and other activities forming part of a response plan under the H5 NMA.
4. I understand that **Confidential Information**:
 - (a) includes information that:
 - (i) is of one of the types referred to in Part C of the Background; or
 - (ii) a Party indicates to be confidential; or
 - (iii) I should otherwise reasonably be aware is confidential,
 - (b) but does not include information that:
 - (i) is already in the public domain or, after the date of this Deed Poll, becomes part of the public domain otherwise than as a result of an unauthorised disclosure by a Party or its representatives; or
 - (ii) is or becomes available to me from a third party lawfully in possession of this information and who has the lawful power to disclose such information to me on a non-confidential basis; or
 - (iii) was in my possession without restrictions as to its use, or was developed by me (as shown by my written record or other competent evidence) prior to the date of disclosure to me by a Party or its representatives in connection with the H5 NMA activities.

5. I hereby undertake to each Party:
- (a) subject to paragraph 5(f), to comply with the requirements notified to me by the H5 NMA NMG, H5 NMA CCEAD, the H5 NMA Custodian or another Party regarding use, protection and disclosure of **Confidential Information**;
 - (b) not to use or disclose **Confidential Information** for purposes other than those for which it is provided to me;
 - (c) to only make **Confidential Information** available to persons who have signed a Confidentiality Deed Poll on these terms and who have a need to know for the proper administration of the H5 NMA or associated activities;
 - (d) to ensure that **Confidential Information** is stored with or protected by appropriate security, having regard to the nature of the **Confidential Information** and the medium in which it is found;
 - (e) to ensure that **Confidential Information** is used only in accordance with any conditions or limitations advised by the disclosing Party or Parties or by any of their representatives with whose material or verbal information I am working; and
 - (f) to ensure that **Confidential Information** is not, except as required by law, disclosed to any other party or made public without the prior approval in writing of the disclosing Party or Parties as the case may be.
6. Disclosure of **Confidential Information** by me that is required by law will not be in breach of this Deed Poll, but I will use reasonable endeavours to:
- (a) limit that disclosure to the extent reasonably possible;
 - (b) advise the recipient that the information that I am required to disclose is confidential; and
 - (c) advise the H5 NMA Custodian and/or the Party who has provided that information in advance of the disclosure; and
 - (d) assist the Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry and/or the Party who has provided that information if they seek to resist the obligation to disclose the information.
7. This Deed Poll is governed by the laws of the Australian Capital Territory.

Executed as a DEED POLL

Signed, sealed and delivered by:

In the presence of:

(name printed)

(witness name printed)

Date:

Date:

s. 22(1)(a)(ii)

From: s. 22(1)(a)(ii)
Sent: Friday, 19 June 2026 6:41 PM
To: Cookson, Beth
Subject: FW: [EXT] - FOR IMMEDIATE ACTION: Please confirm member, permanent advisors details for CCEAD H5 Avian Influenza Virus - WA by 5pm (AEST), 19 June 2026 [SEC=OFFICIAL:Sensitive]

OFFICIAL: Sensitive

FYI

OFFICIAL: Sensitive

From: CCEAD
Sent: Friday, 19 June 2026 6:38 PM
To: s. 47F(1) @dpird.wa.gov.au>; CCEAD s. 47E(d)
Cc: Finkelstein, Jamie <s. 47F(1) @dpird.wa.gov.au>; Palfreyman, Louise <Louise.Palfreyman@aff.gov.au>
Subject: RE: [EXT] - FOR IMMEDIATE ACTION: Please confirm member, permanent advisors details for CCEAD H5 Avian Influenza Virus - WA by 5pm (AEST), 19 June 2026 [SEC=OFFICIAL:Sensitive]

Great, that lines up with our thinking too. So just to clarify, the paper will:

- Note the situation report
- Note the EADRP that WA have prepared (and seek comment/feedback?)
- Note that WA is undertaking further investigatory work which will help CCEAD determine capability of eradication, which will in turn inform considerations on whether the response is managed under the EADRA or H5 NMA. In the meantime, no national cost sharing will be sought.

Does that sound right to you? Or were there any other recommendations you were proposing?

Happy to discuss.


Thanks

s. 22(1)(a)(ii) (he/him)

Director | Animal Health Projects

Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry
Animal Health Policy Branch, Biosecurity Animal Division
1-21 Dean Street, Moonee Ponds VIC 3039
GPO Box 858, Canberra ACT 2601
M: s. 22(1)(a)(ii) | E: s. 22(1)(a)(ii)@aff.gov.au

aff.gov.au



The department acknowledges the Traditional Custodians of Australia and their continuing connection to land, sea environment, water and community. We pay our respect to the Traditional Custodians, their culture, and elders both past and present.

From: s. 47F(1) @dpird.wa.gov.au
Sent: Friday, 19 June 2026 6:30 PM
To: s. 47E(d) @aff.gov.au
Cc: s. 47F(1) @dpird.wa.gov.au
Subject: RE: [EXT] - FOR IMMEDIATE ACTION: Please confirm member, permanent advisors details for CCEAD H5 Avian Influenza Virus - WA by 5pm (AEST), 19 June 2026 [SEC=OFFICIAL:Sensitive]

OFFICIAL: Sensitive

OFFICIAL

I don't think so as not for funding approval, Noting and comments paper

s. 47F(1)

s. 47F(1) Chief Veterinary Officer, WA
 I mobile s. 47F(1)

OFFICIAL: Sensitive

From: s. 47E(d) @aff.gov.au
Sent: Friday, 19 June 2026 4:26 PM
To: s. 47F(1) @dpird.wa.gov.au; s. 47E(d) @aff.gov.au
Cc: s. 47F(1) @dpird.wa.gov.au
Subject: RE: [EXT] - FOR IMMEDIATE ACTION: Please confirm member, permanent advisors details for CCEAD H5 Avian Influenza Virus - WA by 5pm (AEST), 19 June 2026 [SEC=OFFICIAL:Sensitive]

OFFICIAL: Sensitive

Thanks s. 47F(1) Just on the papers for tomorrow's meeting, would you or s. 47F(1) be available for a quick chat about this? We have a few questions relating to what will be recommended to CCEAD to support planning/briefings for the CCEAD meeting (e.g. will the EADRP be presented to CCEAD for approval, and will you be asking for it to be recommended by CCEAD to NMG for approval?).

Thanks
 s. 22(1)(a)(ii)

OFFICIAL: Sensitive

From: s. 47F(1) @dpird.wa.gov.au
Sent: Friday, 19 June 2026 5:58 PM
To: s. 47E(d) @aff.gov.au
Cc: s. 47F(1) @dpird.wa.gov.au

Subject: RE: [EXT] - FOR IMMEDIATE ACTION: Please confirm member, permanent advisors details for CCEAD H5 Avian Influenza Virus - WA by 5pm (AEST), 19 June 2026 [SEC=OFFICIAL:Sensitive]

OFFICIAL: Sensitive

OFFICIAL

I have done table 1

I didn't get TABLE 2 but it hasn't changed from what was previously advised

We will have a SITREP and EADRP, but won't be seeking cost sharing at this meeting

s. 47F(1)

s. 47F(1), Chief Veterinary Officer, WA

I mobile s. 47F(1)

OFFICIAL: Sensitive

From: s. 47E(d) <@aff.gov.au>

Sent: Friday, 19 June 2026 2:04 PM

To: s. 47F(1) <@dpird.wa.gov.au>

Cc: s. 47E(d) <@aff.gov.au>; s. 47F(1) <@dpird.wa.gov.au>

Subject: [EXT] - FOR IMMEDIATE ACTION: Please confirm member, permanent advisors details for CCEAD H5 Avian Influenza Virus - WA by 5pm (AEST), 19 June 2026 [SEC=OFFICIAL:Sensitive]

Importance: High

CAUTION: This email originated from outside of DPIRD. Do not click links or open attachments unless you recognise the sender and know the content is safe.

OFFICIAL: Sensitive

This email has been sent IN-CONFIDENCE.

Dear s. 47F(1)

CCEAD will convene on 6am (AWST) 20 June 2026 to discuss a confirmed diagnosis of H5 avian influenza in wild birds in Western Australia.

Please complete the 2 tables below and return to CCEAD secretariat by **5pm (AEST), Friday, 19 June 2026.**

1. In **Table 1** – Please confirm CCEAD member details and advise of any known upcoming changes (leave, acting arrangements). Please also advise any **permanent** CCEAD advisors in the table in accordance with the below instructions and guidance included in the attached *CCEAD operating guidelines v1*.

2. In **Table 2** – Please confirm CCEAD observer details for your environment and health agencies.

Secretariat will add the people nominated in the table to its email distribution list for meeting invitations and papers and provide them access to the [CCEAD GovTEAMS site](#), once this has been setup. Further information on CCEAD attendee roles and responsibilities and using the GovTEAMS site are attached to this email.

Instructions to nominate permanent advisors

- Non-combat jurisdictions and ACDP may be accompanied by **1** advisor at each CCEAD meeting. Combat jurisdictions may be accompanied by **more than 1** advisor at meetings, but numbers must be kept to the essential minimum.
- If the advisor/s is/are expected to remain consistent throughout the CCEAD and attend all meetings to support their member, they may be considered as a **permanent CCEAD advisor**.
- Secretariat will add permanent CCEAD advisors to its distribution list so they will receive meeting invitations and papers directly from the secretariat and provide them access to CCEAD GovTEAMS.
- If a small number of staff (2 or 3) will rotate the position of advisor, and it would be appropriate for them to receive all meeting invitations and papers (e.g. as they will attend a large proportion of the meetings) – they may be nominated as permanent advisors with the designation (*rotating*).
- If the member will not be accompanied by an advisor, or, they may be, but it won't necessarily be a consistent person – do not nominate any 'permanent advisors.'

Table 1 CCEAD member and permanent advisor nominations

CCEAD Member	CCEAD member name. <i>Default is AHC member. Please indicate any expected changes – e.g., acting arrangements, known leave</i>	CCEAD permanent advisor/s name and email <i>If rotating, include the designation (rotating) after the name.</i>
EXAMPLE	[Member C] <i>A combat jurisdiction with two permanent advisors</i>	[CCEAD advisor 1 name], CCEADadvisor1@email.com ; [CCEAD advisor 2 name], CCEADadvisor2@email.com ;
WA	s. 47F(1)	s. 47F(1) @dpird.wa.gov.au

Could you also please confirm what papers WA will be providing (e.g. a sitrep and EADRP), when we (the secretariat) can expect to receive them, and when you would expect them to be circulated to CCEAD?


Thank you

Consultative Committee on Emergency Animal Diseases Secretariat

s. 47E(d) | s. 47E(d)


Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry
Animal Health Policy | Biosecurity Animal
Ngunnawal Country
70 Northbourne Avenue, Canberra ACT 2601 Australia
GPO Box 858, Canberra City ACT 2601 Australia

agriculture.gov.au



We acknowledge the continuous connection of First Nations Traditional Owners and Custodians to the lands, seas and waters of Australia. We recognise their care for and cultivation of Country. We pay respect to Elders past and present, and recognise their knowledge and contribution to the productivity, innovation and sustainability of Australia's agriculture, fisheries and forestry industries.

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
DPIRD acknowledges the Traditional Custodians of Country, the Aboriginal people of the many lands that we work on and their language groups throughout Western Australia and recognise their continuing connection to the land and waters.

We respect their continuing culture and the contribution they make to the life of our regions and we pay our respects to their Elders past, present and emerging.

Artwork: "Kangaroos going to the Waterhole" by Willarra Barker.

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s. 22(1)(a)(ii)

From: s. 47F(1) @dpird.wa.gov.au>
Sent: Thursday, 18 June 2026 7:04 PM
To: Cookson, Beth
Subject: Fw: AS-26-1348 BRIEF 3 - Subantarctic Skua death, AI and NDV exclusion - INFLUENZA A qPCR POSITIVE - H5
Attachments: AS-26-1348-I-V4.pdf

OFFICIAL

Hi Beth
Results of Skua
We also have a sick petrel also subantarctic
It has been tested today with preliminary results tomorrow (and submitting to ACDP if positive).
Regards
s. 47F(1)

OFFICIAL

DPIRD

ANIMAL BIOSECURITY & WELFARE BRIEFING**NOTE – 3****18/6/2026**

Issue

AS-26-1348 exclusion of Avian Influenza and Newcastle Disease from one Subantarctic Skua –
INFLUENZA A qPCR POSITIVE; H5

Background**History**

- Skua was found sick on Cape Le Grand beach, east of Esperance. An unusual species to be found at that location, with a known distribution from Antarctica to Heard Island, to coastal regions of Tasmania.
- Skua was initially treated in isolation at Esperance wildlife centre on 14/6/2026, and was described to have clinical signs of leg paralysis, weakness and dehydration. It subsequently died overnight.
- **Degree of suspicion for HPAI - HIGH**

Current Situation

- Choanal and cloacal swabs only received at DDLS 16/6/26
- DDLS:
 - Influenza A qPCR - POSITIVE
 - Characterisation PCRs – H5
 - Nanopore-based subtyping – pending (ETA tomorrow 19/6/26)
 - Newcastle Disease Virus qPCR – negative
- ACDP: sent today 18/6/26 for **prioritised category 3 testing** (ETA interim tomorrow 19/6/26)

Recommendation/Action

TAM notes the information and attached interim I-V4 report and acts accordingly

Updated by –


s. 47F(1) | Senior Veterinary Pathologist
 DPIRD Diagnostics and Laboratory Services
 Sustainability and Biosecurity
 Department of Primary Industries and Regional Development
 3 Baron-Hay Court, South Perth, WA, 6151
E-mail: **s. 47F(1)** | [@dpird.wa.gov.au](mailto:s.47f(1)@dpird.wa.gov.au)
Mob **s. 47F(1)** | **Web** dpird.wa.gov.au

Please note I work part-time (Tuesday to Friday).

Our diagnostic services continue to be impacted by restricted access to the DPIRD site at 3 Baron-Hay Court, South Perth. Site access has been restricted since 14 June 2024 following asbestos testing results. For the most current information on DDLS services please visit: [Animal pathology | Department of Primary Industries and Regional Development](#)

s. 47F(1) | Veterinary Pathologist
 DPIRD Diagnostics and Laboratory Services
 Biosecurity and Sustainability
 Department of Primary Industries and Regional Development
 3 Baron-Hay Court, South Perth WA 6151
t **s. 47F(1)** | **m** **s. 47F(1)** |





DPIRD acknowledges the Traditional Custodians of Country, the Aboriginal people of the many lands that we work on and their language groups throughout Western Australia and recognise their continuing connection to the land and waters.

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Artwork: "Kangaroos going to the Waterhole" by Willarra Barker.

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3 Baron-Hay Court South Perth, WA 6151 . Tel: s. 47F(1)

. Email: DDLS@dpird.wa.gov.au

Case Number: AS-26-1348-I-V4

Interim Report

1/3



Date: 18-Jun-2026 Your Ref: Esperance Wildlife Hospital

Enquiries: s. 47F(1) (Senior Veterinary Pathologist)

To: s. 47F(1) CC:

DPIRD - Agriculture and Food - Esperance
Melijinup Road
Esperance
WA 6450

Owner: ESPERANCE WILDLIFE HOSPITAL PIC: Not Specified

Project: Diagnostic animal disease-subsidised

Species: Avian

Samples Received: 2 Swabs

Date Collected: 15-Jun-2026 Date Received: 16-Jun-2026 Submission:

Testing performed on a charge exempt basis

Laboratory testing in this case was valued at \$ TBA.

Laboratory fees for this case were paid by DPIRD. Livestock disease investigation provides evidence of Australia's freedom from many trade sensitive diseases and ensures WA's access to export markets.

History summary

A wild Skua presented with weakness, dehydration and hindlimb paralysis. It was initially found alive on Cape Le Grand Beach, east of Esperance on 14/6/2026 and subsequently died overnight.

Samples submitted consist of choanal and cloaca swabs in VTM. Provisional exclusion testing for Avian Influenza virus and Newcastle Disease Virus (Paramyxovirus) was requested.

Aetiological diagnoses

Pending, see comments below.

Comments

Both the choanal and cloacal swabs have tested **POSITIVE** by qPCR for influenza A. **Further PCR characterisation has identified it as H5**. Nanopore-based subtyping is pending. Samples have been sent to ACDP today for prioritised urgent testing.

NDV (paramyxovirus) qPCRs were uniformly negative.

Results pending

- DDLS: nanopore-based sub-typing
- ACDP analyses.

3 Baron-Hay Court South Perth, WA 6151 . Tel: **s. 47F(1)**

. Email: **DDLS@dpird.wa.gov.au**

Case Number: **AS-26-1348-I-V4**

Interim Report

2/3

DDLS Laboratory Results

Animal Molecular (DPIRD Stirling) Results

Testing conducted at Stirling NATA Site No: 26089

Test Type: Influenza A qPCR.

Date Tested: 18/06/2026

Spec No	Spec ID	Spec Description	Result
0001		Choanal Swab in VTM	POSITIVE
0002		Cloacal Swab in VTM	POSITIVE

Test Type: H5 Influenza qPCR.

Date Tested: 18/06/2026

Spec No	Spec ID	Spec Description	Result
0001		Choanal Swab in VTM	POSITIVE
0002		Cloacal Swab in VTM	POSITIVE

Test Type: Influenza H5 Australian strain RT-qPCR (CSIRO-ACDP). NATA accreditation does not cover the performance of this service.

Date Tested: 18/06/2026

Spec No	Spec ID	Spec Description	Result
0001		Choanal Swab in VTM	POSITIVE
0002		Cloacal Swab in VTM	POSITIVE

Test Type: H7 Influenza qPCR.

Date Tested: 18/06/2026

Spec No	Spec ID	Spec Description	Result
0001		Choanal Swab in VTM	Negative
0002		Cloacal Swab in VTM	Negative



Accreditation Number: 13724
 Accredited for compliance with ISO/IEC 17025 – Testing.
 This document shall not be reproduced, except in full.

3 Baron-Hay Court South Perth, WA 6151 . Tel: s. 47F(1)

. Email: s. 47E(d)

Case Number: AS-26-1348-I-V4

Interim Report

3/3

Test Type: Influenza A H9 qPCR (CSIRO Assay). NATA accreditation does not cover the performance of this service.

Date Tested: 18/06/2026

Spec No	Spec ID	Spec Description	Result
0001		Choanal Swab in VTM	Negative
0002		Cloacal Swab in VTM	Negative

Test Type: Influenza A N2 qPCR (CSIRO Assay). NATA accreditation does not cover the performance of this service.

Date Tested: 18/06/2026

Spec No	Spec ID	Spec Description	Result
0001		Choanal Swab in VTM	Negative
0002		Cloacal Swab in VTM	Negative

Test Type: Newcastle Disease Virus qPCR.

Date Tested: 18/06/2026

Spec No	Spec ID	Spec Description	NDV F gene RRT PCR	NDV L gene RRT PCR	NDV M gene RRT PCR
0001		Choanal Swab in VTM	Negative	Negative	Negative
0002		Cloacal Swab in VTM	Negative	Negative	Negative

Yours faithfully

s. 47F(1)

s. 47F(1)

Senior Veterinary Pathologist

s. 22(1)(a)(ii)

From: Smith, Brant
Sent: Friday, 19 June 2026 10:30 PM
To: Cookson, Beth
Subject: Fw: HPAI WA investments [SEC=OFFICIAL]

OFFICIAL

OFFICIAL

From: Palfreyman, Louise <Louise.Palfreyman@aff.gov.au>
Sent: Friday, June 19, 2026 12:35 pm
To: s. 22(1)(a)(ii) @aff.gov.au>; Smith, Brant <Brant.Smith@aff.gov.au>
Cc: s. 22(1)(a)(ii) @aff.gov.au>; s. 22(1)(a)(ii) @aff.gov.au>;
s. 22(1)(a)(ii) @aff.gov.au>; s. 22(1)(a)(ii) @aff.gov.au>; s. 47E(d)
Subject: HPAI WA investments [SEC=OFFICIAL]

OFFICIAL

Hi Brant and ^{s. 22(1)(a)(ii)}

As requested:

The Australian Government has provided **\$2,046,667** to Western Australia, as part of \$12 million in funding for states and territories through the Federation Funding Agreement (FFA), '*Boosting HPAI Biosecurity Response Capability*'. The purpose of the FFA was to facilitate the purchase of mission critical supplies for preparing for and responding to high pathogenicity avian influenza (HPAI) outbreaks in the production sector and/or in Australian wildlife.

- These include critical equipment to strengthen preparedness and response capability, such as response assets (e.g. biosecurity and cleaning equipment), diagnostic and surveillance tools to enhance detection and testing capacity, depopulation systems for humane disease control, and disposal solutions to ensure biosecure carcass management.

Western Australia has invested in:

- **enhanced diagnostic capacity**, including next-generation sequencing equipment and PCR-compatible laboratory systems to enable rapid identification and genomic characterisation of avian influenza strains, and deployment of a digital slide scanning system to support pathology assessment, improving turnaround time for disease diagnosis.
- **high-pressure cleaning units** to support disease containment and biosecurity in high-risk agricultural settings.
- **large-scale mobile signage** to support public awareness, quarantine compliance, and incident response communication.

Western Australia are also progressing investments in establishing high-welfare depopulation systems, multi-purpose Emergency Animal Disease (EAD) response trailers, additional PCR machines, DNA extraction robots, and laboratory upgrades to significantly increase testing capacity.

Western Australia has made a substantial co-contribution alongside Australian Government FFA funding. This includes dedicated staffing, training for equipment use, expanded biosecurity engagement and communications, PPE and sampling readiness, and strengthened call centre and data management systems to support HPAI preparedness and response.

We are seeking words from DDCCEW about their investments in WA including planning for site specific preparedness work, which can be added once received.

Cheers, Louise

OFFICIAL

s. 22(1)(a)(ii)

From: Fiona FRASER <Fiona.Fraser@dcceew.gov.au>
Sent: Friday, 19 June 2026 7:44 PM
To: s. 47F(1) @birdlife.org.au; s. 47F(1) @deakin.edu.au;
s. 47F(1) @unimelb.edu.au; s. 47F(1) @amcs.org.au>;
s. 47F(1) @biodiversitycouncil.org.au; s. 47F(1) @wildlifehealthaustralia.com.au;
s. 47F(1)@birdlife.org.au; s. 47F(1) @birdlife.org.au;
s. 47F(1) @birdlife.org.au; s. 47F(1)@birdlife.org.au;
s. 47F(1)@zooaquarium.org.au; s. 47F(1) @cdu.edu.au;
s. 47F(1) @birdlife.org.au
Cc: s. 47F(1)
Subject: FW: Suspect H5 bird flu case [SEC=OFFICIAL]
Attachments: H5 Bird Flu National Talking Points 19June26.docx

OFFICIAL

OFFICIAL

Dear H5 biodiversity stakeholders

You will by now have seen Minister Collins and Minister Jarvis press conferences regarding a suspected H5 bird flu case in SW WA. We expect further information to become available over the weekend. In the meantime I have attached the current national talking points, hopefully a useful resource for those of you responding to media enquires (for which thank you).

We (DAFF and DCCEEW) would like to offer a stakeholder briefing on Sunday (apologies!), possibly around 3pm. A Teams invite will go out ahead of this and will include people copied here. Please feel free to delegate attendance to others in your organisation if you're unable to attend.

Regards Fiona

Dr Fiona Fraser
Threatened Species Commissioner
Biodiversity Division
Department of Climate Change, Energy, the Environment and Water

OFFICIAL

OFFICIAL

From: High Pathogenicity Avian Influenza Protected Species s. 47E(d) @dcceew.gov.au>
Sent: Friday, 19 June 2026 3:30 PM
Cc: s. 47F(1) @dcceew.gov.au>; High Pathogenicity Avian Influenza Protected Species
s. 47E(d) @dcceew.gov.au>; Fiona FRASER <Fiona.Fraser@dcceew.gov.au>
Subject: Suspect H5 bird flu case [SEC=OFFICIAL]

OFFICIAL

Good afternoon

We're emailing to let you know that a suspect case of H5 bird flu has been detected. Minister Collins is holding a press conference to share what is currently known, namely that a wild bird with clinical signs has presented in south-west Western Australia.

At this stage, there is no indication of further spread.


With thanks

s. 47F(1)

s. 47F(1)

Biodiversity Division | Threatened Species Commissioner Branch| HPAI – Protected Species
Ngunnawal Country, John Gorton Building, King Edward Terrace | GPO Box 3090
ACT 2601
Department of Climate Change, Energy, the Environment and Water

DCCEEW.gov.au ABN 63 573 932 849



Acknowledgement of Country

Our department recognises the First Peoples of this nation and their ongoing connection to culture and country. We acknowledge Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Peoples as the Traditional Owners, Custodians and Lore Keepers of the world's oldest living culture and pay respects to their Elders past, present and emerging.

OFFICIAL

s. 22(1)(a)(ii)

From: Cookson, Beth
Sent: Thursday, 18 June 2026 10:24 PM
To: s. 47E(d) s. 47E(d)
Cc: Palfreyman, Louise; Hamilton, Sam
Subject: FW: Suspect H5 positive seabird (skua) in WA coastline

Importance: High

Please note – this advice is to alert you to a potential EAD situation that may require CCEAD Secretariat or WOAHA reporting action – no external communication about the situation is to occur until further direction is provided.

Thanks
 Beth.

From: Cookson, Beth
Sent: Thursday, 18 June 2026 8:21 PM
To: Anderson, Victoria <Victoria.Anderson@aff.gov.au>; Lowe, Matt <Matt.LOWE@aff.gov.au>; Collins, Monica <Monica.Collins@aff.gov.au>; Smith, Brant <Brant.Smith@aff.gov.au>; Finnin, Peter <Peter.Finnin@aff.gov.au>; Crosthwaite, Kerren <Kerren.Crosthwaite@aff.gov.au>; Wellington, Michelle <Michelle.Wellington@aff.gov.au>; Ipkendanz, Chris <Chris.Ipkendanz@aff.gov.au>; Palfreyman, Louise <Louise.Palfreyman@aff.gov.au>; Hamilton, Sam <Sam.Hamilton@aff.gov.au>; Ireland, Cassandra <Cassandra.Ireland@aff.gov.au>
Cc: s. 47E(d) @aff.gov.au; s. 47E(d) @aff.gov.au
Subject: Suspect H5 positive seabird (skua) in WA coastline
Importance: High

Dear all

- I was advised earlier this evening by the WA CVO of a single vagrant skua (species of seabird with known distribution through subantarctic) east of Esperance that has tested positive at WA DPIRD laboratory for H5 Influenza A. The skua was found sick on 14/6 with clinical signs of leg paralysis, weakness and dehydration. It subsequently died overnight after being treated in isolation at Esperance wildlife centre.
- A sick petrel, also with a distribution to subantarctic has also been taken into care at the same wildlife hospital and tested. Preliminary results tomorrow.
- Samples from the skua are en route to the Australian Centre for Disease Preparedness for confirmatory testing.
- There are no other reported sick birds or other animals in the vicinity. It is possible that individual infected animals can arrive and not establish infection in local populations, however if confirmed, would raise concern about active pathways.
- Petrels and skuas are known to arrive periodically as vagrant species, any onward spread (if confirmed) is undetermined at this stage.

Next steps

- ACDP need to complete a series of tests before confirmation of the strain of Influenza A will be known.
 - Samples should arrive from WA tomorrow morning. If this happens as expected, we should have preliminary test results from ACDP by early afternoon tomorrow confirming whether test positive for H5 Influenza A. We will not have confirmation of

the strain being high pathogenicity and the clade of concern for another 24-28 hours following this, however I would treat it as highly suspicious that it is the H5 strain of concern given the species and location if ACDP confirm the WA lab results of H5 positive.

- I will work with the WA CVO on the timing for the Consultative Committee on Emergency Animal Disease to meet which is the next step. It is likely this will occur after the test results from ACDP are received tomorrow.
- Industry have not been advised. We will do this as part of the CCEAD meeting requests, following ACDP preliminary test results.


I will keep you informed as we have new information. **s. 47B(a)**

We'll prepare media holding lines,
if needed.

Beth.

Dr Beth Cookson BVSc (Hons), EMPA, MANZCVS (Epidemiology)
Chief Veterinary Officer
Australian Government Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry
T. **s. 47F(1)** E. beth.cookson@aff.gov.au

agriculture.gov.au



We acknowledge the continuous connection of First Nations Traditional Owners and Custodians to the lands, seas and waters of Australia. We recognise their care for and cultivation of Country. We pay respect to Elders past and present, and recognise their knowledge and contribution to the productivity, innovation and sustainability of Australia's agriculture, fisheries and forestry industries.

s. 22(1)(a)(ii)

From: Collins, Monica
Sent: Friday, 19 June 2026 6:51 PM
To: Anderson, Victoria; **s. 47E(d)** **s. 47E(d)** Cookson, Beth
Subject: Fw: UPDATE - situation report to CCEAD - Suspect H5 positive seabird (skua) in WA coastline [SEC=OFFICIAL]

OFFICIAL

Vic, for visibility MO has been advised also.

Monica

Monica Collins
 Acting Deputy Secretary
 Biosecurity Operations and Compliance Group
 Department of Agriculture Fisheries and Forestry
s. 47F(1)

OFFICIAL

From: Cookson, Beth <Beth.Cookson@aff.gov.au>
Sent: Friday, 19 June 2026 18:43:53
To: **s. 22(1)(a)(ii)** @aff.gov.au
Cc: DLO Collins **s. 47E(d)** Collins, Monica <Monica.Collins@aff.gov.au>; **s. 47E(d)** @agriculture.gov.au>; Smith, Brant <Brant.Smith@aff.gov.au>; Hamilton, Sam <Sam.Hamilton@aff.gov.au>; Palfreyman, Louise <Louise.Palfreyman@aff.gov.au>
Subject: UPDATE - situation report to CCEAD - Suspect H5 positive seabird (skua) in WA coastline [SEC=OFFICIAL]

OFFICIAL

Hi **s. 22(1)(a)(ii)**

See full readout from situation update of CCEAD members and observers below, including the ACDP result that I relayed earlier via Signal.

Beth.

OFFICIAL

From: Cookson, Beth <Beth.Cookson@aff.gov.au>
Sent: Friday, 19 June 2026 6:22 PM
To: Anderson, Victoria <Victoria.Anderson@aff.gov.au>; Lowe, Matt <Matt.LOWE@aff.gov.au>; Collins, Monica <Monica.Collins@aff.gov.au>; Smith, Brant <Brant.Smith@aff.gov.au>; Finnin, Peter <Peter.Finnin@aff.gov.au>; Crosthwaite, Kerren <Kerren.Crosthwaite@aff.gov.au>; Wellington, Michelle <Michelle.Wellington@aff.gov.au>; Ipkendanz, Chris <Chris.Ipkendanz@aff.gov.au>; Palfreyman, Louise <Louise.Palfreyman@aff.gov.au>; Hamilton, Sam <Sam.Hamilton@aff.gov.au>; Ireland, Cassandra <Cassandra.Ireland@aff.gov.au>

Cc: s. 47E(d) @aff.gov.au>; s. 47E(d) @aff.gov.au>; Curran, Alison
<Alison.Curran@aff.gov.au>; s. 22(1)(a)(ii) @aff.gov.au>; s. 47E(d)
@agriculture.gov.au>; s. 47E(d) @agriculture.gov.au>
Subject: RE: Suspect H5 positive seabird (skua) in WA coastline

s. 47B(a)

- **s. 47B(a)**

Regards
Beth.

From: Cookson, Beth

Sent: Thursday, 18 June 2026 8:21 PM

To: Anderson, Victoria <Victoria.Anderson@aff.gov.au>; Lowe, Matt <Matt.LOWE@aff.gov.au>; Collins, Monica <Monica.Collins@aff.gov.au>; Smith, Brant <Brant.Smith@aff.gov.au>; Finnin, Peter <Peter.Finnin@aff.gov.au>; Crosthwaite, Kerren <Kerren.Crosthwaite@aff.gov.au>; Wellington, Michelle <Michelle.Wellington@aff.gov.au>; Ipkendanz, Chris <Chris.Ipkendanz@aff.gov.au>; Palfreyman, Louise <Louise.Palfreyman@aff.gov.au>; Hamilton, Sam <Sam.Hamilton@aff.gov.au>; Ireland, Cassandra <Cassandra.Ireland@aff.gov.au>

Cc: **s. 47E(d)** <@aff.gov.au>; **s. 47E(d)** <@aff.gov.au>

Subject: Suspect H5 positive seabird (skua) in WA coastline

Importance: High

Dear all

- I was advised earlier this evening by the WA CVO of a single vagrant skua (species of seabird with known distribution through subantarctic) east of Esperance that has tested positive at WA DPIRD laboratory for H5 Influenza A. The skua was found sick on 14/6 with clinical signs of leg paralysis, weakness and dehydration. It subsequently died overnight after being treated in isolation at Esperance wildlife centre.
- A sick petrel, also with a distribution to subantarctic has also been taken into care at the same wildlife hospital and tested. Preliminary results tomorrow.
- Samples from the skua are en route to the Australian Centre for Disease Preparedness for confirmatory testing.
- There are no other reported sick birds or other animals in the vicinity. It is possible that individual infected animals can arrive and not establish infection in local populations, however if confirmed, would raise concern about active pathways.
- Petrels and skuas are known to arrive periodically as vagrant species, any onward spread (if confirmed) is undetermined at this stage.

Next steps


- ACDP need to complete a series of tests before confirmation of the strain of Influenza A will be known.
 - Samples should arrive from WA tomorrow morning. If this happens as expected, we should have preliminary test results from ACDP by early afternoon tomorrow confirming whether test positive for H5 Influenza A. We will not have confirmation of the strain being high pathogenicity and the clade of concern for another 24-28 hours following this, however I would treat it as highly suspicious that it is the H5 strain of concern given the species and location if ACDP confirm the WA lab results of H5 positive.
- I will work with the WA CVO on the timing for the Consultative Committee on Emergency Animal Disease to meet which is the next step. It is likely this will occur after the test results from ACDP are received tomorrow.
- Industry have not been advised. We will do this as part of the CCEAD meeting requests, following ACDP preliminary test results.

I will keep you informed as we have new information. **s. 47B(a)**

We'll prepare media holding lines,
if needed.

Beth.

Dr Beth Cookson BVSc (Hons), EMPA, MANZCVS (Epidemiology)
Chief Veterinary Officer
Australian Government Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry
T. **s. 47F(1)** E. beth.cookson@aff.gov.au
agriculture.gov.au



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s. 22(1)(a)(ii)

From: Finnin, Peter
Sent: Friday, 19 June 2026 11:56 AM
To: Cookson, Beth; Wellington, Michelle
Cc: Gavin, David
Subject: H5 [SEC=OFFICIAL]

Categories: FOR ACTION

OFFICIAL

Hi Beth,

I know your going to be inundated on this one. Be good if you could give me vis on timing on any CCEAD meetings etc and we are tooling up and making sure were ready to support through any process that may trigger the H5 NMA. Also be good to get vis on who knows what and when – there is potentially a case for some reasonably early engagement with PMC if there starts to look like we are heading down the path of activating the NMA

I also note from the CONOPs that I am identified as notifying NMG members in the 0-2h timeframe of confirmation of a positive – I'm assuming the trigger for this would be the results of the confirmatory testing from ACDP noting the clade information will be in the 24-48 post the H5 confirmation

Pete

Dr Peter J Finnin

BSc(Hons), BVSc(Hons), PhD

First Assistant Secretary | Biosecurity Strategy & Reform Division

s. 47F(1) | s. 47F(1)

s. 47E(d) @aff.gov.au

Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry
GPO Box 858 Canberra ACT 2601 Australia

OFFICIAL

s. 22(1)(a)(ii)

From: Palfreyman, Louise
Sent: Thursday, 18 June 2026 8:56 PM
To: Cookson, Beth
Subject: notification and exec breifing packs [SEC=OFFICIAL]
Attachments: Executive-emergency-management-briefing-pack (1).pdf

OFFICIAL

Hi Beth

The exec pack - Pages 88-89 has the notification protocols for EAD events.

I am tidying up the H5 specific version.

Louise

OFFICIAL

s. 22(1)(a)(ii)

From: Finnin, Peter
Sent: Friday, 19 June 2026 7:17 PM
To: Collins, Monica; Cookson, Beth; Smith, Brant
Cc: Gavin, David; s. 22(1)(a)(ii)
Subject: Operation of EADRA and NMA [SEC=OFFICIAL]

OFFICIAL

Some points around how these arrangements interact.

Key points

- The initial suspect detection of H5 HPAI is pending confirmation from CSIRO's Australian Centre for Disease Preparedness.
- Two cost-sharing Deeds are available to manage H5 high pathogenicity avian influenza (HPAI) incidents in Australia:
[Emergency Animal Disease Response Agreement](#) (EADRA), and
[National Management Agreement for H5 HPAI in Wildlife](#) (the H5 NMA)
- Under each, a national consultative committee on emergency animal diseases (CCEAD) provides technical advice, and a national management group (NMG) oversees key policy and cost-sharing decisions.
- Initial considerations will be made under EADRA. Subject to further considerations, if the NMG agrees, **based on advice from the CCEAD**, that H5 HPAI is **not eradicable** in wildlife, **the H5 NMA will be activated**. This provides a cost-sharing arrangement for governments to mitigate risks to human health, animal health, and the environment from outbreaks of H5 HPAI in wildlife.
- Any subsequent eradication consideration for detections in livestock industries would be considered under the EADRA.

Sensitivities

- Western Australia may seek to cost-share increase surveillance activities in the area surrounding the detection to determine if H5 HPAI has spread to other species in the area, if considered beyond their normal commitments.
- While not explicitly defined in the H5 NMA, certain surveillance activities may be eligible for cost-sharing under the H5 NMA.
- NMG would need to consider if retrospective claims would be appropriate to cost-share under the H5 NMA on a case-by-case basis, within a jurisdiction's response plan.

Background

The **EADRA** is signed by the Australian Government, all state and territory governments, and 14 livestock industry groups. It enables a coordinated, cost-shared response by governments and industry to a range of potential emergency animal disease (EAD) incidents, including H5 HPAI. It is primarily used to contain and eradicate EADs impacting livestock industries.

The **H5 NMA** is signed by the Australian Government and all state and territory governments. It enables a coordinated, cost-shared response by governments to manage the potentially nationally significant impacts of H5 HPAI in wildlife. It is only used where it has been determined H5 HPAI cannot be eradicated from wildlife.

We work flexibly at DAFF. If you have received an email from me outside of normal business hours, I'm sending it at a time that suits me. I'm not expecting you to read or reply until normal business hours.

Dr Peter J Finnin

BSc(Hons), BVSc(Hons), PhD

First Assistant Secretary | Biosecurity Strategy & Reform Division

s. 47F(1) | s. 47F(1)

s. 47E(d) | [@aff.gov.au](mailto:p.finnin@aff.gov.au)

Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry

GPO Box 858 Canberra ACT 2601 Australia

OFFICIAL

s. 22(1)(a)(ii)

From: s. 47E(d)
Sent: Friday, 19 June 2026 4:29 PM
To: DLO Collins; Cookson, Beth; Collins, Monica; s. 22(1)(a)(ii) ; s. 47E(d)
Subject: RE: MB26-000216 - URGENT - Meeting with the Hon Roger Cook MLC, Premier of WA - Monday 22 June 2026, 8:30am - 9:00am [SEC=OFFICIAL:Sensitive]

Importance: High

Categories: EO actioning

OFFICIAL: Sensitive

Hi Team – registered and assigned to OCVO in PDMS – MB26-000216 refers.

Due to MO 10am Sunday 21 June.

Grateful that once finalised that you please email the documents directly to s. 47E(d) and copy in s. 47E(d) inbox.

Please also progress in PDMS as per usual process.

Thankyou

s. 22(1)(a)(ii) (she/her)

Parliamentary Officer |Ministerial and Parliamentary Services (MPS)

Ministerial and Budget Strategy Branch | Finance and Investment Division

Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry | GPO Box 858 Canberra ACT 2601

Ph: s. 22(1)(a)(ii)

Part-time Monday, Thursday & Friday



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OFFICIAL: Sensitive

From: DLO Collins s. 47E(d)
Sent: Friday, 19 June 2026 4:19 PM
To: Cookson, Beth <Beth.Cookson@aff.gov.au>; Collins, Monica <Monica.Collins@aff.gov.au>; s. 22(1)(a)(ii) @aff.gov.au; s. 47E(d)
Subject: MB26-000216 - URGENT - Meeting with the Hon Roger Cook MLC, Premier of WA - Monday 22 June 2026, 8:30am - 9:00am
Importance: High

OFFICIAL: Sensitive

Hi team,

Requesting an **Meeting Brief** from OCVO, due 10 am Sunday 21 June.

The Minister is meeting with Hon Roger Cook MLC, Premier of WA.

Timing: Monday, 22 June 2026 8:30 AM-9:00 AM

Location: APH

Happy to discuss.

s. 22(1)(a)(ii)

s. 22(1)(a)(ii)

Departmental Liaison Officer | Office of Julie Collins MP
Minister for Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry

M: s. 22(1)(a)(ii) E: s. 47E(d)

Parliament House, Canberra, ACT 2600 Australia

OFFICIAL: Sensitive

s. 22(1)(a)(ii)

From: NORRIS, Wez <Wez.NORRIS@afma.gov.au>
Sent: Friday, 19 June 2026 6:07 PM
To: s. 22(1)(a)(ii); s. 47F(1) s. 47E(d) s. 22(1)(a)(ii)
Cc: s. 47E(d) Palfreyman, Louise; s. 22(1)(a)(ii) ;
s. 22(1)(a)(ii) ; s. 22(1)(a)(ii) ; Ipkendanz, Chris; DLO Collins; Collins, Monica;
Cookson, Beth; Smith, Brant; s. 47E(d)
Subject: RE: Meeting with Hon Roger Cook MLC, Premier of WA [SEC=OFFICIAL:Sensitive]
Attachments: 19 June 2026 - MB26-000216.docx; Attachment A - Talking Points.docx

OFFICIAL: Sensitive

OFFICIAL: Sensitive

Hi all,

s. 22(1)(a)(ii)

Please see attached. Please yell out if anything further is needed.


Thanks

W

Wez Norris
Chief Executive Officer
Australian Fisheries Management Authority

Ph: s. 47F(1)
Mo: s. 47F(1)

EA: s. 47F(1) I (s. 47F(1) I s. 47F(1) @afma.gov.au



OFFICIAL: Sensitive

OFFICIAL: Sensitive

From: s. 22(1)(a)(ii) @aff.gov.au>
Sent: Friday, 19 June 2026 17:10
To: NORRIS, Wez <Wez.NORRIS@afma.gov.au>; s. 47F(1) @afma.gov.au>; s. 47E(d)
 @aff.gov.au>; s. 22(1)(a)(ii) @aff.gov.au>
Cc: s. 47E(d) @aff.gov.au>; Palfreyman, Louise
 <Louise.Palfreyman@aff.gov.au>; s. 22(1)(a)(ii) @aff.gov.au>; s. 22(1)(a)(ii)
 @aff.gov.au>; s. 22(1)(a)(ii) @aff.gov.au>; Ipkendanz, Chris
 <Chris.Ipkendanz@aff.gov.au>; DLO Collins s. 47E(d) Collins, Monica <Monica.Collins@aff.gov.au>;
 Cookson, Beth <Beth.Cookson@aff.gov.au>; Smith, Brant <Brant.Smith@aff.gov.au>; s. 47E(d)

Subject: FW: Meeting with Hon Roger Cook MLC, Premier of WA [SEC=OFFICIAL:Sensitive]

OFFICIAL: Sensitive

Lovely to e-meet you all!

Please find the link to the MB and TPs linked below. Grateful if you could action **ASAP** and seek **FAS** level clearance for your content. Please let me know when you are done, so I can progress to my SES as soon as possible this evening. Thank you!

 [19 June 2026 - MB26-000216.docx](#)
 [Attachment A - Talking Points.docx](#)

Kind Regards,
 s. 22(1)(a)(i)

OFFICIAL: Sensitive

OFFICIAL: Sensitive

From: DLO Collins s. 47E(d)
Sent: Friday, 19 June 2026 4:44 PM
To: DLO Collins s. 47E(d) Collins, Monica <Monica.Collins@aff.gov.au>; Cookson, Beth
 <Beth.Cookson@aff.gov.au>; s. 22(1)(a)(ii) @aff.gov.au>; s. 47E(d)
 Smith, Brant <Brant.Smith@aff.gov.au>; 'NORRIS, Wez' <wez.norris@afma.gov.au>;
 s. 47F(1) @afma.gov.au>; s. 47E(d) s. 22(1)(a)(ii)
 @aff.gov.au>
Cc: s. 47E(d) Ipkendanz, Chris
 <Chris.Ipkendanz@aff.gov.au>
Subject: RE: Meeting with Hon Roger Cook MLC, Premier of WA [SEC=OFFICIAL:Sensitive]

OFFICIAL: Sensitive

Hi again all,

Please also note additional attendees added:

- Daniel Smith, Chief of Staff

- s. 47F(1)

Director Environmental Policy

Many thanks

s. 22(1)(a)(ii)

Departmental Liaison Officer | Office of Julie Collins MP
Minister for Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry

M: s. 22(1)(a)(ii) E: s. 47E(d)

Parliament House, Canberra, ACT 2600 Australia

OFFICIAL: Sensitive

From: DLO Collins s. 47E(d)**Sent:** Friday, 19 June 2026 4:39 PM

To: Collins, Monica <Monica.Collins@aff.gov.au>; DLO Collins s. 47E(d) Cookson, Beth
<Beth.Cookson@aff.gov.au>; s. 22(1)(a)(ii) @aff.gov.au>; s. 47E(d)
Smith, Brant <Brant.Smith@aff.gov.au>; 'NORRIS, Wez' <wez.norris@afma.gov.au>;
s. 47F(1) @afma.gov.au>; s. 47E(d) s. 22(1)(a)(ii)
@aff.gov.au>

Cc: s. 47E(d)

Ipkendanz, Chris

<Chris.Ipkendanz@aff.gov.au>**Subject:** RE: Meeting with Hon Roger Cook MLC, Premier of WA [SEC=OFFICIAL:Sensitive]

OFFICIAL: Sensitive

Hi all,

We have been advised that the brief scope is to be expanded to include points on:

- s. 22(1)(a)(ii) (@NORRIS, Wez s. 47F(1) s. 47E(d)
- s. 22(1)(a)(ii) (s. 22(1)(a)(ii))

Due to this, the brief must now be provided by **9am tomorrow morning**.

BIG thank you in advance everyone for the quick work that will be required tonight

s. 22(1)(a)(ii)

Departmental Liaison Officer | Office of Julie Collins MP
Minister for Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry

M: s. 22(1)(a)(ii) E: s. 47E(d)

Parliament House, Canberra, ACT 2600 Australia

OFFICIAL: Sensitive

From: Collins, Monica <Monica.Collins@aff.gov.au>**Sent:** Friday, 19 June 2026 4:33 PM

To: DLO Collins s. 47E(d) Cookson, Beth <Beth.Cookson@aff.gov.au>; s. 22(1)(a)(ii)
@aff.gov.au>; s. 47E(d) Smith, Brant <Brant.Smith@aff.gov.au>
Cc: s. 47E(d) Ipkendanz, Chris
<Chris.Ipkendanz@aff.gov.au>

Subject: RE: Meeting with Hon Roger Cook MLC, Premier of WA [SEC=OFFICIAL:Sensitive]

OFFICIAL: Sensitive

Copying to Brant too for action please.
Thanks
Monica

Monica Collins
Acting Deputy Secretary
Biosecurity Operations and Compliance Group
Department of Agriculture Fisheries and Forestry
M. s. 47F(1)

OFFICIAL: Sensitive

From: s. 47E(d)
Sent: Friday, 19 June 2026 4:19 PM
To: Cookson, Beth <Beth.Cookson@aff.gov.au>; Collins, Monica <Monica.Collins@aff.gov.au>; s. 22(1)(a)(ii) @aff.gov.au>; s. 47E(d)
Subject: Meeting with Hon Roger Cook MLC, Premier of WA [SEC=OFFICIAL:Sensitive]
Importance: High

OFFICIAL: Sensitive

Hi team,

Requesting an **Meeting Brief** from OCVO, due 10 am Sunday 21 June.

The Minister is meeting with Hon Roger Cook MLC, Premier of WA.

Timing: Monday, 22 June 2026 8:30 AM-9:00 AM
Location: APH

Happy to discuss.
Lauren

s. 22(1)(a)(ii)
Departmental Liaison Officer | Office of Julie Collins MP
Minister for Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry

M: s. 22(1)(a)(ii) Es. 47E(d)
Parliament House, Canberra, ACT 2600 Australia

OFFICIAL: Sensitive

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DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, FISHERIES AND FORESTRY

MB26-000216

To: Julie Collins**URGENT - MEETING WITH THE HON ROGER COOK MLC, PREMIER OF WA - MONDAY
22 JUNE 2026, 8:30AM - 9:00AM****Timing:** For meeting on 22 June 2026, 8:30 – 9:00am**Location:** Australian Parliament House**Meeting with:**

- Hon Roger Cook MLC, Premier of Western Australia
- Daniel Smith, Chief of Staff, Office of the Premier of WA
- s. 47F(1) Director Environmental Policy, Office of the Premier of WA

Prior meetings: N/A**Proposed note taker (if requested):** Nil**What we want:**

- H5 bird flu topic: to reinforce that HPAI preparedness has been a priority of the Australian Government for the past 2 years. Over \$113 million has been committed since 2024 and a dedicated HPAI Preparedness Taskforce has been overseeing this investment, ensuring a coordinated One Health approach to uplifting national preparedness. Australia has well established national response arrangements and the Australian Government stands ready to support Western Australia as the situation evolves.
- s. 22(1)(a)(ii)
- s. 22(1)(a)(ii)

What they want: [provide a brief indication of expected position - if known if not known, note this]

- H5 bird flu topic:
- s. 22(1)(a)(ii)
- s. 22(1)(a)(ii)

Clearing Officer	[name]	[position], [branch division or agency]	Ph: [insert landline] Mob: [insert mobile]
Contact Officer:	[name]	[position], [section/branch division]	Ph: [insert landline] Mob: [insert mobile]

Issues and Sensitivities:

1. List any sensitivities the Minister should be aware of before the meeting.
2. H5 bird flu topic:
3. s. 22(1)(a)(ii)

4. s. 22(1)(a)(ii)

Consultation: YES/NIL [this is a mandatory heading]

5. You should note if you have consulted within the department and/or outside the department and list those you consulted with (i.e. external agencies and/or stakeholders).
6. H5 bird flu topic: Biosecurity Animal Division (HPAI Preparedness Taskforce)
7. s. 22(1)(a)(ii)
8. s. 22(1)(a)(ii)

Attachments

A: Talking points

DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, FISHERIES AND FORESTRY

MB26-000216

Attachment A

TALKING POINTS

Suspect H5 bird flu detection

- The Australian Government has committed more than \$113 million to prepare and protect the nation against H5 bird flu.
- This includes \$12 million in funding for states and territories through the Federation Funding Agreement (FFA), '*Boosting HPAI Biosecurity Response Capability*'. As part of this agreement, Western Australia (WA) has been provided **\$2,046,667**.
- The purpose of the FFA was to facilitate the purchase of mission critical supplies for preparing for and responding to high pathogenicity avian influenza (HPAI) outbreaks in the production sector and/or in Australian wildlife.
 - These include critical equipment to strengthen preparedness and response capability, such as response assets (e.g. biosecurity and cleaning equipment), diagnostic and surveillance tools to enhance detection and testing capacity, depopulation systems for humane disease control, and disposal solutions to ensure biosecure carcass management.
- Western Australia has invested in:
 - **enhanced diagnostic capacity**, including next-generation sequencing equipment and PCR-compatible laboratory systems to enable rapid identification and genomic characterisation of avian influenza strains, and deployment of a digital slide scanning system to support pathology assessment, improving turnaround time for disease diagnosis.
 - **high-pressure cleaning units** to support disease containment and biosecurity in high-risk agricultural settings.
 - **large-scale mobile signage** to support public awareness, quarantine compliance, and incident response communication.
- Western Australia are also progressing investments in establishing high-welfare depopulation systems, multi-purpose Emergency Animal Disease (EAD) response trailers, additional PCR machines, DNA extraction robots, and laboratory upgrades to significantly increase testing capacity.
- Western Australia has made a substantial co-contribution alongside Australian Government FFA funding. This includes dedicated staffing, training for equipment use, expanded biosecurity engagement and communications, PPE and sampling readiness,

DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, FISHERIES AND FORESTRY

and strengthened call centre and data management systems to support HPAI preparedness and response.

- As part of the Australian Government's HPAI investment, \$35.9 million is already being invested in boosting environment measures and accelerating protective action for threatened species and priority biodiversity, and a further \$11.2 million was announced in the recent Budget.
- For **Western Australia** specifically, this includes:
 - **\$400,000 to help the West Australian Government develop plans for priority species.** Species include the Australian and long-nosed fur seals, western ground parrot, recherche cape barren goose, black cockatoos, blue-billed duck, black swan and little penguin.
 - **More than \$700,000 for 3 wildlife facilities** to help safeguard their captive populations of native threatened species by enhancing biosecurity. This includes the greater bilby, black cockatoos, western ground parrot and numbat.
 - **On-ground threat mitigation efforts to prepare native species for H5 bird flu are well underway in Western Australia.** This includes activities like invasive rat and mouse eradication on key offshore islands and feral animal control at key mainland sites.

s. 22(1)(a)(ii)

s. 22(1)(a)(ii)

s. 22(1)(a)(ii)

From: Ipkendanz, Chris
Sent: Thursday, 18 June 2026 9:14 PM
To: Cookson, Beth; Wellington, Michelle
Subject: RE: Suspect H5 positive seabird (skua) in WA coastline - comms strategy and holding lines [SEC=OFFICIAL]
Attachments: 20260106 National H5 Response Communication Strategy_NBCEN updates.docx; NBCEN suggestion - H5 Holding statement wildlife.docx

OFFICIAL

Hi both,

As discussed, please see attached the H5 communication strategy and current (draft) holding lines.

Regards,

Chris Ipkendanz
Assistant Secretary | Crisis and Emergency Management
M: **s. 47F(1)**

OFFICIAL

From: Cookson, Beth <Beth.Cookson@aff.gov.au>
Sent: Thursday, 18 June 2026 8:21 PM
To: Anderson, Victoria <Victoria.Anderson@aff.gov.au>; Lowe, Matt <Matt.Lowe@aff.gov.au>; Collins, Monica <Monica.Collins@aff.gov.au>; Smith, Brant <Brant.Smith@aff.gov.au>; Finnin, Peter <Peter.Finnin@aff.gov.au>; Crosthwaite, Kerren <Kerren.Crosthwaite@aff.gov.au>; Wellington, Michelle <Michelle.Wellington@aff.gov.au>; Ipkendanz, Chris <Chris.Ipkendanz@aff.gov.au>; Palfreyman, Louise <Louise.Palfreyman@aff.gov.au>; Hamilton, Sam <Sam.Hamilton@aff.gov.au>; Ireland, Cassandra <Cassandra.Ireland@aff.gov.au>
Cc: **s. 47E(d)** @aff.gov.au; **s. 47E(d)** @aff.gov.au
Subject: Suspect H5 positive seabird (skua) in WA coastline [SEC=OFFICIAL]
Importance: High

OFFICIAL

Dear all

- I was advised earlier this evening by the WA CVO of a single vagrant skua (species of seabird with known distribution through subantarctic) east of Esperance that has tested positive at WA DPIRD laboratory for H5 Influenza A. The skua was found sick on 14/6 with clinical signs of leg paralysis, weakness and dehydration. It subsequently died overnight after being treated in isolation at Esperance wildlife centre.
- A sick petrel, also with a distribution to subantarctic has also been taken into care at the same wildlife hospital and tested. Preliminary results tomorrow.
- Samples from the skua are en route to the Australian Centre for Disease Preparedness for confirmatory testing.

- There are no other reported sick birds or other animals in the vicinity. It is possible that individual infected animals can arrive and not establish infection in local populations, however if confirmed, would raise concern about active pathways.
- Petrels and skuas are known to arrive periodically as vagrant species, any onward spread (if confirmed) is undetermined at this stage.

Next steps

- ACDP need to complete a series of tests before confirmation of the strain of Influenza A will be known.
 - Samples should arrive from WA tomorrow morning. If this happens as expected, we should have preliminary test results from ACDP by early afternoon tomorrow confirming whether test positive for H5 Influenza A. We will not have confirmation of the strain being high pathogenicity and the clade of concern for another 24-28 hours following this, however I would treat it as highly suspicious that it is the H5 strain of concern given the species and location if ACDP confirm the WA lab results of H5 positive.
- I will work with the WA CVO on the timing for the Consultative Committee on Emergency Animal Disease to meet which is the next step. It is likely this will occur after the test results from ACDP are received tomorrow.
- Industry have not been advised. We will do this as part of the CCEAD meeting requests, following ACDP preliminary test results.

I will keep you informed as we have new information. **s. 47B(a)**

if needed.

We'll prepare media holding lines,

Beth.


Dr Beth Cookson BVSc (Hons), EMPA, MANZCVS (Epidemiology)

Chief Veterinary Officer

Australian Government Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry

T. **s. 47F(1)** E. beth.cookson@aff.gov.au

agriculture.gov.au



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OFFICIAL

Holding Statement - Wildlife

Date: <<Insert date of issue>>

To be attributed to a spokesperson for **XX** :

Situation: Media reporting of mortality event, no test results

The XX Government is aware of dead [wildlife species] reported in the [location (high level)] region on [day/date].

Initial testing is underway to determine the cause of death.

The community is asked to avoid the area while [department] works to determine the cause of death.

Situation: Initial positive result, confirmatory testing pending

The XX Government is working closely with [who has control over affected location and other relevant organisations] in response to dead [wildlife species] at [location] on [day/date].

Initial testing has confirmed avian influenza. Further testing is underway to determine the strain.

The XX Department has [insert any actions taken e.g. restricted access to the area] and investigations are continuing.

Situation: HPAI confirmed, full sequencing/clade pending

The XX Government is working closely with [who has control over affected location] and other relevant organisations in response to dead [wildlife species] at [location] on [day/date].

Testing has confirmed H5 high pathogenicity avian influenza (H5 bird flu). Further testing is underway to confirm the exact strain of H5 bird flu.

The XX Department has [insert any actions taken e.g. restricted access to the area] and investigations are continuing.

s. 22(1)(a)(ii)

From: Collins, Monica
Sent: Thursday, 18 June 2026 9:05 PM
To: Lowe, Matt; Anderson, Victoria
Cc: Cookson, Beth; **s. 47E(d)** Crosthwaite, Kerren; Wellington, Michelle; **s. 47E(d)**
Subject: RE: Suspect H5 positive seabird (skua) in WA coastline [SEC=OFFICIAL]

OFFICIAL

For clarity (Beth has confirmed)

- The previous outbreak of HPAI in Australian poultry have been associated with the H7 HPAI strains.
- There have been previous detections of low pathogenicity H5 in wild birds in Australia.
- I have qualified the statement with HPAI highlighted below.

Thanks
Monica

Monica Collins
Acting Deputy Secretary
Biosecurity Operations and Compliance Group
Department of Agriculture Fisheries and Forestry
M. s. 47F(1)

OFFICIAL

From: Collins, Monica
Sent: Thursday, 18 June 2026 8:50 PM
To: Lowe, Matt <Matt.LOWE@aff.gov.au>; Anderson, Victoria <Victoria.Anderson@aff.gov.au>
Cc: Cookson, Beth <Beth.Cookson@aff.gov.au>; **s. 47E(d)** @agriculture.gov.au;
Crosthwaite, Kerren <Kerren.Crosthwaite@aff.gov.au>; Wellington, Michelle <Michelle.Wellington@aff.gov.au>;
s. 47E(d) @agriculture.gov.au
Subject: FW: Suspect H5 positive seabird (skua) in WA coastline [SEC=OFFICIAL]
Importance: High

Hi Matt

Further to advice from CVO Beth Cookson below, key points to note at this stage is:

- One wildlife vagrant bird (Brown Skua) has tested positive to H5 Influenza A in a WA laboratory. The bird has died and a second bird (Petrel) has been taken into care, showing similar symptoms (testing results pending).
- Samples will be provided to the Australian Centre for Disease Preparedness (ACDP) for confirmatory testing.
- If confirmed, this will be the first positive case of H5 **HPAI** in Australia, and the implication is that the disease has an arrival pathway in Australia.

- Further testing will confirm if it is the Highly Pathogenetic variety, and if it is the clade that is known to be impacting wild birds around the globe.

Next steps

- WA will lead the response.
- If ACDP testing confirms, the Consultative Committee on Emergency Animal Disease (CCEAD) will be convened to notify them of the report.
- A surveillance plan will need to be implemented.
- Media and community will be advised, with a call to the public to report any sick wildlife.

Will update you further as information becomes available.

Thanks

Monica

Monica Collins

Acting Deputy Secretary

Biosecurity Operations and Compliance Group

Department of Agriculture Fisheries and Forestry

M. S. 47F(1)

From: Cookson, Beth <Beth.Cookson@aff.gov.au>

Sent: Thursday, 18 June 2026 8:21 PM

To: Anderson, Victoria <Victoria.Anderson@aff.gov.au>; Lowe, Matt <Matt.Lowe@aff.gov.au>; Collins, Monica <Monica.Collins@aff.gov.au>; Smith, Brant <Brant.Smith@aff.gov.au>; Finnin, Peter <Peter.Finnin@aff.gov.au>; Crosthwaite, Kerren <Kerren.Crosthwaite@aff.gov.au>; Wellington, Michelle <Michelle.Wellington@aff.gov.au>; Ipkendanz, Chris <Chris.Ipkendanz@aff.gov.au>; Palfreyman, Louise <Louise.Palfreyman@aff.gov.au>; Hamilton, Sam <Sam.Hamilton@aff.gov.au>; Ireland, Cassandra <Cassandra.Ireland@aff.gov.au>

Cc: s. 47E(d) <[s.47E\(d\)@aff.gov.au](mailto:s.47E(d)@aff.gov.au)>; s. 47E(d) <[s.47E\(d\)@aff.gov.au](mailto:s.47E(d)@aff.gov.au)>

Subject: Suspect H5 positive seabird (skua) in WA coastline [SEC=OFFICIAL]

Importance: High

OFFICIAL

Dear all

- I was advised earlier this evening by the WA CVO of a single vagrant skua (species of seabird with known distribution through subantarctic) east of Esperance that has tested positive at WA DPIRD laboratory for H5 Influenza A. The skua was found sick on 14/6 with clinical signs of leg paralysis, weakness and dehydration. It subsequently died overnight after being treated in isolation at Esperance wildlife centre.
- A sick petrel, also with a distribution to subantarctic has also been taken into care at the same wildlife hospital and tested. Preliminary results tomorrow.
- Samples from the skua are en route to the Australian Centre for Disease Preparedness for confirmatory testing.
- There are no other reported sick birds or other animals in the vicinity. It is possible that individual infected animals can arrive and not establish infection in local populations, however if confirmed, would raise concern about active pathways.
- Petrels and skuas are known to arrive periodically as vagrant species, any onward spread (if confirmed) is undetermined at this stage.

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- I will work with the WA CVO on the timing for the Consultative Committee on Emergency Animal Disease to meet which is the next step. It is likely this will occur after the test results from ACDP are received tomorrow.
- Industry have not been advised. We will do this as part of the CCEAD meeting requests, following ACDP preliminary test results.

I will keep you informed as we have new information. **s. 47B(a)**

We'll prepare media holding lines,
if needed.

Beth.


Dr Beth Cookson BVSc (Hons), EMPA, MANZCVS (Epidemiology)

Chief Veterinary Officer

Australian Government Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry

T. **s. 47F(1)** E. beth.cookson@aff.gov.au

agriculture.gov.au



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OFFICIAL

s. 22(1)(a)(ii)

From: Palfreyman, Louise
Sent: Thursday, 18 June 2026 8:46 PM
To: Cookson, Beth
Cc: **s. 22(1)(a)(ii)** Smith, Brant
Subject: RE: Suspect H5 positive seabird (skua) in WA coastline [SEC=OFFICIAL:Sensitive]
Attachments: holding lines - Esperance suspect case.docx

OFFICIAL

Hi Beth.

Please find attached draft holding lines –based on the NBCEN coord undertaken recently – if needed quickly.

Cheers, Louise

Louise Palfreyman
s. 47F(1) | **s. 47F(1)**

OFFICIAL

From: Cookson, Beth <Beth.Cookson@aff.gov.au>
Sent: Thursday, 18 June 2026 8:21 PM
To: Anderson, Victoria <Victoria.Anderson@aff.gov.au>; Lowe, Matt <Matt.Lowe@aff.gov.au>; Collins, Monica <Monica.Collins@aff.gov.au>; Smith, Brant <Brant.Smith@aff.gov.au>; Finnin, Peter <Peter.Finnin@aff.gov.au>; Crosthwaite, Kerren <Kerren.Crosthwaite@aff.gov.au>; Wellington, Michelle <Michelle.Wellington@aff.gov.au>; Ipkendanz, Chris <Chris.Ipkendanz@aff.gov.au>; Palfreyman, Louise <Louise.Palfreyman@aff.gov.au>; Hamilton, Sam <Sam.Hamilton@aff.gov.au>; Ireland, Cassandra <Cassandra.Ireland@aff.gov.au>
Cc: **s. 47E(d)** @aff.gov.au; **s. 47E(d)** @aff.gov.au
Subject: Suspect H5 positive seabird (skua) in WA coastline [SEC=OFFICIAL]
Importance: High

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I will keep you informed as we have new information. **s. 47B(a)**

if needed.

We'll prepare media holding lines,

Beth.


Dr Beth Cookson BVSc (Hons), EMPA, MANZCVS (Epidemiology)

Chief Veterinary Officer

Australian Government Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry

T. **s. 47F(1)** E. beth.cookson@aff.gov.au

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OFFICIAL

DRAFT Holding lines**Situation: Initial positive result, confirmatory testing pending**

The WA Government has undertaken testing for avian influenza following the detection of a single sick skua, east of Esperance on 14 June 2026.

Initial testing has detected H5 avian influenza in samples taken from the affected bird.

The CSIRO's Australian Centre for Disease Preparedness in Geelong is currently undertaking confirmatory testing to determine the strain, including if this is H5 high pathogenicity avian influenza (H5 bird flu), which can infect a wide range of bird species as well as marine and land mammals.

We are expecting the results back on **date**. We will not know if this is H5 bird flu until we receive the confirmatory test results. To date there have been no detections of H5 bird flu in mainland Australia.

There were no other reported sick birds or other animals in the vicinity of the sick skua. It is possible that an individual infected animals could arrive and not establish infection in local populations.

More details will be provided as results are available.

[The xx Department has restricted access to the area and is working closely with [who has control over affected location] and other relevant organisations].

From: Cookson, Beth
Sent: Friday, 19 June 2026 6:44 PM
To: s. 22(1)(a)(ii) @aff.gov.au>
Cc: DLO Collins s. 47E(d) @aff.gov.au>; Collins, Monica <Monica.Collins@aff.gov.au>; s. 47E(d) @agriculture.gov.au>; Smith, Brant <Brant.Smith@aff.gov.au>; Hamilton, Sam <Sam.Hamilton@aff.gov.au>; Palfreyman, Louise <Louise.Palfreyman@aff.gov.au>
Subject: UPDATE - situation report to CCEAD - Suspect H5 positive seabird (skua) in WA coastline

Hi s. 22(1)(a)(ii)

See full readout from situation update of CCEAD members and observers below, including the ACDP result that I relayed earlier via Signal.

Beth.

From: Cookson, Beth <Beth.Cookson@aff.gov.au>
Sent: Friday, 19 June 2026 6:22 PM
To: Anderson, Victoria <Victoria.Anderson@aff.gov.au>; Lowe, Matt <Matt.LOWE@aff.gov.au>; Collins, Monica <Monica.Collins@aff.gov.au>; Smith, Brant <Brant.Smith@aff.gov.au>; Finnin, Peter <Peter.Finnin@aff.gov.au>; Crosthwaite, Kerren <Kerren.Crosthwaite@aff.gov.au>; Wellington, Michelle <Michelle.Wellington@aff.gov.au>; Ipkendanz, Chris <Chris.Ipkendanz@aff.gov.au>; Palfreyman, Louise <Louise.Palfreyman@aff.gov.au>; Hamilton, Sam <Sam.Hamilton@aff.gov.au>; Ireland, Cassandra <Cassandra.Ireland@aff.gov.au>
Cc: s. 47E(d) @aff.gov.au>; s. 47E(d) @aff.gov.au>; Curran, Alison <Alison.Curran@aff.gov.au>; s. 22(1)(a)(ii) @aff.gov.au>; s. 47E(d) @agriculture.gov.au>; s. 47E(d) @agriculture.gov.au>
Subject: RE: Suspect H5 positive seabird (skua) in WA coastline

s. 47B(a)

Regards
Beth.

From: Cookson, Beth

Sent: Thursday, 18 June 2026 8:21 PM

To: Anderson, Victoria <Victoria.Anderson@aff.gov.au>; Lowe, Matt <Matt.LOWE@aff.gov.au>; Collins, Monica <Monica.Collins@aff.gov.au>; Smith, Brant <Brant.Smith@aff.gov.au>; Finnin, Peter <Peter.Finnin@aff.gov.au>; Crosthwaite, Kerren <Kerren.Crosthwaite@aff.gov.au>; Wellington, Michelle <Michelle.Wellington@aff.gov.au>; Ipkendanz, Chris <Chris.Ipkendanz@aff.gov.au>; Palfreyman, Louise <Louise.Palfreyman@aff.gov.au>; Hamilton, Sam <Sam.Hamilton@aff.gov.au>; Ireland, Cassandra <Cassandra.Ireland@aff.gov.au>

Cc: s. 47E(d) <[s.47E\(d\)@aff.gov.au](mailto:s.47E(d)@aff.gov.au)>; s. 47E(d) <[s.47E\(d\)@aff.gov.au](mailto:s.47E(d)@aff.gov.au)>

Subject: Suspect H5 positive seabird (skua) in WA coastline

Importance: High

Dear all

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I will keep you informed as we have new information. **s. 47B(a)**

if needed.

We'll prepare media holding lines,

Beth.


Dr Beth Cookson BVSc (Hons), EMPA, MANZCVS (Epidemiology)

Chief Veterinary Officer

Australian Government Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry

T. **s. 47F(1)** E. beth.cookson@aff.gov.au

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s. 22(1)(a)(ii)

From: Lowe, Matt
Sent: Thursday, 18 June 2026 9:18 PM
To: Minister Collins; julie.collins.mp@aph.gov.au
Cc: Benson, Stuart; **s. 22(1)(a)(ii)** Anderson, Victoria; Collins, Monica; Cookson, Beth; Curran, Alison
Subject: Suspect H5 positive seabird (skua) in WA coastline [SEC=OFFICIAL:Sensitive]

OFFICIAL: Sensitive

Minister,

Further to advice from CVO Beth Cookson below, **key points** to note at this stage are:

- One wildlife vagrant bird (Brown Skua) **has tested positive to H5 Influenza A in a WA laboratory**. This bird has died and a second bird (Petrel) has been taken into care, showing similar symptoms (testing results pending).
- Samples will be provided to the Australian Centre for Disease Preparedness (ACDP) for confirmatory testing.
- If confirmed, this will be the first positive case of H5 HPAI in Australia, and the implication is that the disease has an arrival pathway in Australia.
- Further testing will confirm if it is the Highly Pathogenetic variety, and if it is the clade that is known to be impacting wild birds around the globe.

Next steps

- WA will lead the response.
- If ACDP testing confirms, the Consultative Committee on Emergency Animal Disease (CCEAD) will be convened to notify them of the report.
- A surveillance plan will need to be implemented.
- We will work with you and your office to advise media and community, with a call to the public to report any sick wildlife.

Will update you further as information becomes available.

Matt Lowe (he/him)
Acting Secretary
Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry Policy Group
Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry
Email: matt.lowe@aff.gov.au
Ph: **s. 47F(1)**

OFFICIAL: Sensitive

From: Cookson, Beth <Beth.Cookson@aff.gov.au>
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Cc: s. 47E(d) @aff.gov.au>; s. 47E(d) @aff.gov.au>

Subject: Suspect H5 positive seabird (skua) in WA coastline [SEC=OFFICIAL]

Importance: High

OFFICIAL

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I will keep you informed as we have new information. s. 47B(a)

We'll prepare media holding lines,
if needed.


Beth.

Dr Beth Cookson BVSc (Hons), EMPA, MANZCVS (Epidemiology)

Chief Veterinary Officer

Australian Government Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry

T. s. 47F(1) E. beth.cookson@aff.gov.au



We acknowledge the continuous connection of First Nations Traditional Owners and Custodians to the lands, seas and waters of Australia. We recognise their care for and cultivation of Country. We pay respect to Elders past and present, and recognise their knowledge and contribution to the productivity, innovation and sustainability of Australia's agriculture, fisheries and forestry industries.

OFFICIAL

s. 22(1)(a)(ii)

s. 22(1)(a)(ii)

From: Cookson, Beth**Sent:** Friday, 19 June 2026 11:00 PM**To:** Anderson, Victoria <Victoria.Anderson@aff.gov.au>; Lowe, Matt <Matt.LOWE@aff.gov.au>; Collins, Monica <Monica.Collins@aff.gov.au>; Smith, Brant <Brant.Smith@aff.gov.au>; Finnin, Peter <Peter.Finnin@aff.gov.au>; Crosthwaite, Kerren <Kerren.Crosthwaite@aff.gov.au>; Wellington, Michelle <Michelle.Wellington@aff.gov.au>; Ipkendanz, Chris <Chris.Ipkendanz@aff.gov.au>; Palfreyman, Louise <Louise.Palfreyman@aff.gov.au>; Hamilton, Sam <Sam.Hamilton@aff.gov.au>; Ireland, Cassandra <Cassandra.Ireland@aff.gov.au>**Cc:** s. 47E(d) @aff.gov.au; s. 47E(d) @aff.gov.au; Curran, Alison <Alison.Curran@aff.gov.au>; s. 22(1)(a)(ii) @aff.gov.au; s. 47E(d) @agriculture.gov.au; s. 47E(d) @agriculture.gov.au**Subject:** RE: Suspect H5 positive seabird (skua) in WA coastline

Hi all

Further update from WA – the other sick bird (giant petrel) also tested positive at WA DPIRD laboratory. Samples will be sent to ACDP for confirmatory testing. We will update the TPs for tomorrow.

Beth.

From: Cookson, Beth <Beth.Cookson@aff.gov.au>

Sent: Friday, 19 June 2026 6:22 PM

To: Anderson, Victoria <Victoria.Anderson@aff.gov.au>; Lowe, Matt <Matt.LOWE@aff.gov.au>; Collins, Monica <Monica.Collins@aff.gov.au>; Smith, Brant <Brant.Smith@aff.gov.au>; Finnin, Peter <Peter.Finnin@aff.gov.au>; Crosthwaite, Kerren <Kerren.Crosthwaite@aff.gov.au>; Wellington, Michelle <Michelle.Wellington@aff.gov.au>; Ipkendanz, Chris <Chris.Ipkendanz@aff.gov.au>; Palfreyman, Louise <Louise.Palfreyman@aff.gov.au>; Hamilton, Sam <Sam.Hamilton@aff.gov.au>; Ireland, Cassandra <Cassandra.Ireland@aff.gov.au>

Cc: s. 47E(d) <[s. 47E\(d\)@aff.gov.au](mailto:s.47E(d)@aff.gov.au)>; s. 47E(d) <[s. 47E\(d\)@aff.gov.au](mailto:s.47E(d)@aff.gov.au)>; Curran, Alison <Alison.Curran@aff.gov.au>; s. 22(1)(a)(ii) <[s. 22\(1\)\(a\)\(ii\)@aff.gov.au](mailto:s.22(1)(a)(ii)@aff.gov.au)>; s. 47E(d) <[s. 47E\(d\)@agriculture.gov.au](mailto:s.47E(d)@agriculture.gov.au)>; s. 47E(d) <[s. 47E\(d\)@agriculture.gov.au](mailto:s.47E(d)@agriculture.gov.au)>

Subject: RE: Suspect H5 positive seabird (skua) in WA coastline

s. 47B(a)

- s. 47B(a)

Regards
Beth.

From: Cookson, Beth
Sent: Thursday, 18 June 2026 8:21 PM
To: Anderson, Victoria <Victoria.Anderson@aff.gov.au>; Lowe, Matt <Matt.LOWE@aff.gov.au>; Collins, Monica <Monica.Collins@aff.gov.au>; Smith, Brant <Brant.Smith@aff.gov.au>; Finnin, Peter <Peter.Finnin@aff.gov.au>; Crosthwaite, Kerren <Kerren.Crosthwaite@aff.gov.au>; Wellington, Michelle <Michelle.Wellington@aff.gov.au>; Ipkendanz, Chris <Chris.Ipkendanz@aff.gov.au>; Palfreyman, Louise <Louise.Palfreyman@aff.gov.au>; Hamilton, Sam <Sam.Hamilton@aff.gov.au>; Ireland, Cassandra <Cassandra.Ireland@aff.gov.au>
Cc: s. 47E(d) <[s.47E\(d\)@aff.gov.au](mailto:s.47E(d)@aff.gov.au)>; s. 47E(d) <[s.47E\(d\)@aff.gov.au](mailto:s.47E(d)@aff.gov.au)>
Subject: Suspect H5 positive seabird (skua) in WA coastline
Importance: High

Dear all

- I was advised earlier this evening by the WA CVO of a single vagrant skua (species of seabird with known distribution through subantarctic) east of Esperance that has tested positive at WA DPIRD laboratory for H5 Influenza A. The skua was found sick on 14/6 with clinical signs of leg paralysis, weakness and dehydration. It subsequently died overnight after being treated in isolation at Esperance wildlife centre.
- A sick petrel, also with a distribution to subantarctic has also been taken into care at the same wildlife hospital and tested. Preliminary results tomorrow.
- Samples from the skua are en route to the Australian Centre for Disease Preparedness for confirmatory testing.
- There are no other reported sick birds or other animals in the vicinity. It is possible that individual infected animals can arrive and not establish infection in local populations, however if confirmed, would raise concern about active pathways.
- Petrels and skuas are known to arrive periodically as vagrant species, any onward spread (if confirmed) is undetermined at this stage.

Next steps

- ACDP need to complete a series of tests before confirmation of the strain of Influenza A will be known.
 - Samples should arrive from WA tomorrow morning. If this happens as expected, we should have preliminary test results from ACDP by early afternoon tomorrow

confirming whether test positive for H5 Influenza A. We will not have confirmation of the strain being high pathogenicity and the clade of concern for another 24-28 hours following this, however I would treat it as highly suspicious that it is the H5 strain of concern given the species and location if ACDP confirm the WA lab results of H5 positive.


- I will work with the WA CVO on the timing for the Consultative Committee on Emergency Animal Disease to meet which is the next step. It is likely this will occur after the test results from ACDP are received tomorrow.
- Industry have not been advised. We will do this as part of the CCEAD meeting requests, following ACDP preliminary test results.

I will keep you informed as we have new information. **s. 47B(a)**

We'll prepare media holding lines,
if needed.

Beth.

Dr Beth Cookson BVSc (Hons), EMPA, MANZCVS (Epidemiology)
Chief Veterinary Officer
Australian Government Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry
T. **s. 47F(1)** E. beth.cookson@aff.gov.au
agriculture.gov.au



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s. 22(1)(a)(ii)

From: CCEAD
Sent: Friday, 19 June 2026 2:03 PM
To: Cookson, Beth; Palfreyman, Louise; Hamilton, Sam; Smith, Brant
Subject: FW: sit rep [SEC=OFFICIAL]
Attachments: DPIRD CCEAD sitrep 1 H5 avian influenza detection.docx

OFFICIAL

FYI – s. 47F(1) wants to send around a sit rep for the 2:30pm meeting

OFFICIAL

From: CCEAD s. 47E(d)
Sent: Friday, 19 June 2026 2:02 PM
To: s. 47F(1) @dpird.wa.gov.au>
Cc: CCEAD s. 47E(d)
Subject: RE: sit rep [SEC=OFFICIAL]

OFFICIAL

Hi s. 47F(1)

We can add it to the meeting invite if you'd like? It's up to you if you would prefer to do so, if it helps support your verbal update.

Thanks
s. 22(1)(a)(ii)

OFFICIAL


From: s. 47F(1) @dpird.wa.gov.au>
Sent: Friday, 19 June 2026 1:58 PM
To: CCEAD s. 47E(d)
Subject: sit rep

OFFICIAL

If appropriate here is a sit rep, otherwise I can just talk to it

s. 47F(1)

s. 47F(1) | Chief Veterinary Officer Western Australia
Animal Biosecurity and Welfare
Department of Primary Industries and Regional Development
Whadjuk Noongar Country
1 Nash Street, Perth WA 6000 | L5
Locked Bag 4 Bentley DC WA 6983



DPIRD acknowledges the Traditional Custodians of Country, the Aboriginal people of the many lands that we work on and their language groups throughout Western Australia and recognise their continuing connection to the land and waters.

We respect their continuing culture and the contribution they make to the life of our regions and we pay our respects to their Elders past, present and emerging.

Artwork: "Kangaroos going to the Waterhole" by Willarra Barker.

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S. 47E(d)

S. 47E(d)

s. 22(1)(a)(ii)

From: Palfreyman, Louise
Sent: Friday, 19 June 2026 10:28 PM
To: s. 22(1)(a)(ii) s. 22(1)(a)(ii) s. 22(1)(a)(ii) s. 22(1)(a)(ii) s. 22(1)(a)(ii)
Subject: FW: Situation Update – Suspect H5 bird flu – Western Australia – 20260619 – 2000 AEST [SEC=OFFICIAL:Sensitive]
Attachments: 260619 H5 Bird Flu National Talking Points APPROVED.docx

Morning team,

This is the schedule for this next 3 days.
 I will drop a task list in tomorrow morning after I have a chat to Chris.
 This info can be shared with your teams.

L

Saturday 19 June 2026 (Technical engagements and Commonwealth)

1. CCEAD – 8:00-8:30am EST. Confirmed.
2. Min Press conference – 9:30am EST. Confirmed.
3. RCG – 12:00-12:30pm EST. Confirmed.
4. IDC – 12:30-1pm EST. Confirmed
5. NBC – 2:00pm – 2.45 EST. Confirmed.

Sunday 19 June 2026 (Continued engagements – Industry/NGO engagement)

1. CCEAD – depending on meeting on Saturday. TBC.
2. RCG – 12:00-12:30pm EST. Confirmed.
3. IDC – 12:30-1pm EST. Confirmed.
4. NCM – 3:00-3:30pm EST. Proposed.

Monday 20 June (Government engagement/S/T engagement – senior levels).

1. s. 47E(d)
2. Meeting with Roger Cook and Min – TBC timing.
3. s. 47E(d)
4. Extraordinary AgSOC – TBC.

Louise Palfreyman

s. 47F(1) | s. 47F(1)

From: Ipkendanz, Chris <Chris.Ipkendanz@aff.gov.au>
Sent: Friday, 19 June 2026 9:32 PM
To: Anderson, Victoria <Victoria.Anderson@aff.gov.au>; Collins, Monica <Monica.Collins@aff.gov.au>; Curran, Alison <Alison.Curran@aff.gov.au>; s. 22(1)(a)(ii) @aff.gov.au>; Preece, Jason <Jason.Preece@aff.gov.au>; Cookson, Beth <Beth.Cookson@aff.gov.au>; Hamilton, Sam <Sam.Hamilton@aff.gov.au>; Vivian-Smith, Gabrielle <Gabrielle.Vivian-Smith@aff.gov.au>; Smith, Brant <Brant.Smith@aff.gov.au>; Palfreyman, Louise <Louise.Palfreyman@aff.gov.au>; s. 22(1)(a)(ii) @aff.gov.au>; s. 22(1)(a)(ii) @aff.gov.au>; Osborne, Luke <Luke.Osborne@aff.gov.au>;

Finnin, Peter <Peter.Finnin@aff.gov.au>; Gavin, David <David.Gavin@aff.gov.au>; Granton-Smith, Rachel <Rachel.Granton-Smith@aff.gov.au>; Hutchison, Tina <Tina.Hutchison@aff.gov.au>; Greenville, Jared <Jared.Greenville@aff.gov.au>; Black, Tom <Tom.Black@aff.gov.au>; McDonald, Andrew <Andrew.McDonald@aff.gov.au>; Lowe, Matt <Matt.Lowe@aff.gov.au>; Galeano, David <David.Galeano@aff.gov.au>; Denny, Paul <Paul.Denny@aff.gov.au>; Crosthwaite, Kerren <Kerren.Crosthwaite@aff.gov.au>; Ireland, Cassandra <Cassandra.Ireland@aff.gov.au>; Sanson -Fisher, Jadd <Jadd.Sanson-Fisher@aff.gov.au>; Simpson, Tim <Tim.Simpson@aff.gov.au>; Geysen, Matthew <Matthew.Geysen@aff.gov.au>; Curran, Carmel <Carmel.Curran1@aff.gov.au>; s. 22(1)(a)(ii) @aff.gov.au>; s. 22(1)(a)(ii) @aff.gov.au>; Ipkenanz, Chris <Chris.Ipkenanz@aff.gov.au>; Ag Media <Media@aff.gov.au>
Cc: Benson, Stuart <Stuart.Benson@aff.gov.au>; s. 22(1)(a)(ii) @aff.gov.au>; s. 47F(1) @aff.gov.au>; s. 47F(1) @aff.gov.au>
Subject: Situation Update – Suspect H5 bird flu – Western Australia – 20260619 – 2000 AEST
 [SEC=OFFICIAL:Sensitive]

OFFICIAL: Sensitive

Good evening,

Please see below a short summary of the current situation and actions taken today in response to the suspected detection of H5 bird flu in WA. Also attached are the current National Talking Points (NTPs) for reference.

NB: reporting formats and distribution lists will be further refined as the response progresses.

Situation Update – Suspect H5 bird flu – Western Australia – 20260619 – 2000 AEST

Current situation

- On 18 June 2026, initial state-based testing detected avian influenza in a wild brown skua (seabird) that was found sick on an isolated beach in Southern WA and later died while being cared for in isolation.
- On 19 June 2026, the Australian Centre for Disease Preparedness (ACDP) confirmed a positive PCR result for Influenza A (H5), but sequencing testing remains in progress.
 - Sequencing testing will confirm the virus's clade, pathogenicity and level of relatedness with other Antarctic and sub-Antarctic detections.
 - Sequencing results are expected to be available at midnight tonight.
- DAFF will consider implications for international reporting (including to the World Organisation for Animal Health) informed by ACDP's diagnostic results tonight.

Completed Actions

- DAFF Crisis and Incident Response Plan to moved ALERT phase in anticipation of high pathogenicity avian influenza (HPAI) H5 being confirmed.
- Convened HPAI Interdepartmental Committee (IDC) to provide situation update.
- Provided support to Minister Collins to deliver a doorstep on the suspected detection.
- The Australian Chief Veterinary Officer (ACVO) chaired a situation update meeting with members and observers of the Consultative Committee for Emergency Animal Disease (CCEAD).
- National Talking Points developed and circulated via National Biosecurity Communication and Engagement Network (NBCEN) (attached).

Planned Actions (next 24hrs)

- Scheduled meetings
 - 0800 AEST – CCEAD meeting
 - 1200 AEST – DAFF Response Coordination Group (RCG) meeting
 - 1230 AEST – HPAI IDC meeting

- 1330 AEST – National Biosecurity Committee (NBC) meeting (to be confirmed)
- Media and communication
 - 0930 AEST – Press conference – Minister Collins and ACVO
 - Media Release following confirmation of results by ACDP (to be confirmed)
 - National Talking Points to be updated
- Planning and reporting
 - Embed daily situation reporting into operational tempo
 - Finalise crisis appreciation and strategic plan following ACDP confirmation
 - Progress scenario-based contingency planning

Regards,

Chris Ipkendanz

Assistant Secretary | Crisis and Emergency Management Branch | **S. 47F(1)**

Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry
Strategy, Performance and Engagement Division
Agriculture House, 70 Northbourne Avenue, Canberra ACT 2601 Australia
GPO Box 858 Canberra ACT 2601 Australia

OFFICIAL: Sensitive

s. 22(1)(a)(ii)

From: Palfreyman, Louise
Sent: Thursday, 18 June 2026 8:41 PM
To: s. 22(1)(a)(ii) s. 22(1)(a)(ii) s. 22(1)(a)(ii) s. 22(1)(a)(ii) s. 22(1)(a)(ii)
Subject: FW: Suspect H5 positive seabird (skua) in WA coastline [SEC=OFFICIAL]
Importance: High

Hi team – please see message below and hold in confidence. We will be busy tomorrow.

Louise Palfreyman
s. 47F(1) | s. 47F(1)

From: Cookson, Beth <Beth.Cookson@aff.gov.au>
Sent: Thursday, 18 June 2026 8:21 PM
To: Anderson, Victoria <Victoria.Anderson@aff.gov.au>; Lowe, Matt <Matt.Lowe@aff.gov.au>; Collins, Monica <Monica.Collins@aff.gov.au>; Smith, Brant <Brant.Smith@aff.gov.au>; Finnin, Peter <Peter.Finnin@aff.gov.au>; Crosthwaite, Kerren <Kerren.Crosthwaite@aff.gov.au>; Wellington, Michelle <Michelle.Wellington@aff.gov.au>; Ipkendanz, Chris <Chris.Ipkendanz@aff.gov.au>; Palfreyman, Louise <Louise.Palfreyman@aff.gov.au>; Hamilton, Sam <Sam.Hamilton@aff.gov.au>; Ireland, Cassandra <Cassandra.Ireland@aff.gov.au>
Cc: s. 47E(d) @aff.gov.au; s. 47E(d) @aff.gov.au
Subject: Suspect H5 positive seabird (skua) in WA coastline [SEC=OFFICIAL]
Importance: High

OFFICIAL

Dear all

- I was advised earlier this evening by the WA CVO of a single vagrant skua (species of seabird with known distribution through subantarctic) east of Esperance that has tested positive at WA DPIRD laboratory for H5 Influenza A. The skua was found sick on 14/6 with clinical signs of leg paralysis, weakness and dehydration. It subsequently died overnight after being treated in isolation at Esperance wildlife centre.
- A sick petrel, also with a distribution to subantarctic has also been taken into care at the same wildlife hospital and tested. Preliminary results tomorrow.
- Samples from the skua are en route to the Australian Centre for Disease Preparedness for confirmatory testing.
- There are no other reported sick birds or other animals in the vicinity. It is possible that individual infected animals can arrive and not establish infection in local populations, however if confirmed, would raise concern about active pathways.
- Petrels and skuas are known to arrive periodically as vagrant species, any onward spread (if confirmed) is undetermined at this stage.

Next steps

- ACDP need to complete a series of tests before confirmation of the strain of Influenza A will be known.
 - Samples should arrive from WA tomorrow morning. If this happens as expected, we should have preliminary test results from ACDP by early afternoon tomorrow

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- I will work with the WA CVO on the timing for the Consultative Committee on Emergency Animal Disease to meet which is the next step. It is likely this will occur after the test results from ACDP are received tomorrow.
- Industry have not been advised. We will do this as part of the CCEAD meeting requests, following ACDP preliminary test results.


I will keep you informed as we have new information. **s. 47B(a)**

We'll prepare media holding lines,
if needed.

Beth.

Dr Beth Cookson BVSc (Hons), EMPA, MANZCVS (Epidemiology)
Chief Veterinary Officer
Australian Government Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry
T. **s. 47F(1)** E. beth.cookson@aff.gov.au

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OFFICIAL

s. 22(1)(a)(ii)

From: Palfreyman, Louise
Sent: Friday, 19 June 2026 10:18 AM
To: **s. 22(1)(a)(ii)**
Subject: FW: URGENT - IDC at 11am [SEC=OFFICIAL:Sensitive]

Hi – can you please get your team to run this into a quick script for Brant for IDC.

Louise Palfreyman
s. 47F(1) | s. 47F(1)

From: **s. 22(1)(a)(ii)** @aff.gov.au>
Sent: Friday, 19 June 2026 10:09 AM
To: Palfreyman, Louise <Louise.Palfreyman@aff.gov.au>
Subject: URGENT - IDC at 11am [SEC=OFFICIAL:Sensitive]

OFFICIAL: Sensitive

Hi,

Using the below as the base, can you please very quickly get some TPs/script points for Brant to run the IDC at 11am.

Thank you!

OFFICIAL: Sensitive

OFFICIAL: Sensitive

From: Lowe, Matt <Matt.Lowe@aff.gov.au>
Sent: Thursday, 18 June 2026 9:18 PM
To: Minister Collins <Minister.Collins@aff.gov.au>; julie.collins.mp@aph.gov.au
Cc: Benson, Stuart <Stuart.Benson@aff.gov.au>; **s. 22(1)(a)(ii)** @aff.gov.au>; Anderson, Victoria <Victoria.Anderson@aff.gov.au>; Collins, Monica <Monica.Collins@aff.gov.au>; Cookson, Beth <Beth.Cookson@aff.gov.au>; Curran, Alison <Alison.Curran@aff.gov.au>
Subject: Suspect H5 positive seabird (skua) in WA coastline [SEC=OFFICIAL:Sensitive]

OFFICIAL: Sensitive

Minister,

Further to advice from CVO Beth Cookson below, **key points** to note at this stage are:

- One wildlife vagrant bird (Brown Skua) **has tested positive to H5 Influenza A in a WA laboratory**. This bird has died and a second bird (Petrel) has been taken into care, showing similar symptoms (testing results pending).

- Samples will be provided to the Australian Centre for Disease Preparedness (ACDP) for confirmatory testing.
- If confirmed, this will be the first positive case of H5 HPAI in Australia, and the implication is that the disease has an arrival pathway in Australia.
- Further testing will confirm if it is the Highly Pathogenic variety, and if it is the clade that is known to be impacting wild birds around the globe.

Next steps

- WA will lead the response.
- If ACDP testing confirms, the Consultative Committee on Emergency Animal Disease (CCEAD) will be convened to notify them of the report.
- A surveillance plan will need to be implemented.
- We will work with you and your office to advise media and community, with a call to the public to report any sick wildlife.

Will update you further as information becomes available.

Matt Lowe (he/him)

Acting Secretary

Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry Policy Group

Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry

Email: matt.lowe@aff.gov.au

Ph: **s. 47F(1)**

OFFICIAL: Sensitive

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Cc: **s. 47E(d)** <[s.47E\(d\)@aff.gov.au](mailto:s.47E(d)@aff.gov.au)>; **s. 47E(d)** <[s.47E\(d\)@aff.gov.au](mailto:s.47E(d)@aff.gov.au)>

Subject: Suspect H5 positive seabird (skua) in WA coastline [SEC=OFFICIAL]

Importance: High

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
I will keep you informed as we have new information. **s. 47B(a)**

if needed.

We'll prepare media holding lines,

Beth.

Dr Beth Cookson BVSc (Hons), EMPA, MANZCVS (Epidemiology)
 Chief Veterinary Officer
 Australian Government Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry
 T. **s. 47F(1)** E. beth.cookson@aff.gov.au
agriculture.gov.au



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OFFICIAL

s. 22(1)(a)(ii)

From: s. 47F(1) @dcceew.gov.au>
Sent: Friday, 19 June 2026 7:31 PM
To: Palfreyman, Louise; s. 22(1)(a)(ii)
Cc: s. 47E(d) s. 47F(1) Fiona FRASER
Subject: RE: HPAI WA investments [SEC=OFFICIAL]

OFFICIAL

OFFICIAL

Thanks Louise – a couple of green additions suggested below

OFFICIAL

OFFICIAL

From: Palfreyman, Louise <Louise.Palfreyman@aff.gov.au>
Sent: Friday, 19 June 2026 7:26 PM
To: s. 47F(1) @dcceew.gov.au>; s. 22(1)(a)(ii) @aff.gov.au>
Cc: s. 47E(d) @dcceew.gov.au>; s. 47F(1) @aff.gov.au>; Fiona FRASER <Fiona.Fraser@dcceew.gov.au>
Subject: RE: HPAI WA investments [SEC=OFFICIAL]

OFFICIAL

Fiona^{s. 47F(1)} – you ok if these words turn up in my minister's TPs for tmrw morning?

This includes more than \$2 million to Western Australia to purchase of mission critical supplies for preparing for and responding to high pathogenicity avian influenza (HPAI) outbreaks in the production sector and/or in Australian wildlife. Further funding has also been provided to help the West Australian Government develop plans for priority native species, to assist wildlife facilities holding important populations of threatened native species with enhanced biosecurity, and on-ground threat mitigation efforts for priority native species and sites.

Louise Palfreyman
s. 47F(1) | s. 47F(1)

OFFICIAL

OFFICIAL

From: s. 47F(1) <@dcceew.gov.au>
Sent: Friday, 19 June 2026 1:59 PM
To: s. 22(1)(a)(ii) <@aff.gov.au>
Cc: Palfreyman, Louise <Louise.Palfreyman@aff.gov.au>; s. 47E(d) <@dcceew.gov.au>; Fiona FRASER <Fiona.Fraser@dcceew.gov.au>
Subject: RE: HPAI WA investments [SEC=OFFICIAL]

OFFICIAL

OFFICIAL

Hi s. 22(1)(a)(ii)

Many thanks. WA specifics on the environment measures side below.

s. 47

Preparedness for Western Australia

- The Australian Government has committed more than \$113 million to prepare and protect the nation against H5 bird flu.
- Of this, \$35.9 million is already being invested in boosting environment measures and accelerating protective action for threatened species and priority biodiversity, and a further \$11.2 million was announced in the recent Budget.
- For **Western Australia** specifically, this includes:
 - **\$400,000 to help the West Australian Government develop plans for priority species.** Species include the Australian and long-nosed fur seals, western ground parrot, recherche cape barren goose, black cockatoos, blue-billed duck, black swan and little penguin.
 - **More than \$700,000 for 3 wildlife facilities** to help safeguard their captive populations of native threatened species by enhancing biosecurity. This includes the greater bilby, black cockatoos, western ground parrot and numbat.
 - **On-ground threat mitigation efforts to prepare native species for H5 bird flu are well underway in Western Australia.** This includes activities like invasive rat and mouse eradication on key offshore islands and feral animal control at key mainland sites.

OFFICIAL

OFFICIAL

From: s. 22(1)(a)(ii) <@aff.gov.au>
Sent: Friday, 19 June 2026 12:48 PM
To: s. 47F(1) <@dcceew.gov.au>
Cc: Palfreyman, Louise <Louise.Palfreyman@aff.gov.au>; s. 47E(d) <@dcceew.gov.au>
Subject: FW: HPAI WA investments [SEC=OFFICIAL]

OFFICIAL

OFFICIAL

Hi ^{s. 47F(1)}

As requested, please find points on the Ag funding for WA below. We would be grateful if you could share points on the environment investments for WA, including planning for site specific preparedness work. Thank you!

Kind Regards,

^{s. 22(1)(a)(i)}

OFFICIAL

OFFICIAL

OFFICIAL

From: Palfreyman, Louise <Louise.Palfreyman@aff.gov.au>**Sent:** Friday, 19 June 2026 12:36 PM**To:** ^{s. 22(1)(a)(ii)} @aff.gov.au; Smith, Brant <Brant.Smith@aff.gov.au>**Cc:** ^{s. 22(1)(a)(ii)} @aff.gov.au; ^{s. 22(1)(a)(ii)} @aff.gov.au; ^{s. 22(1)(a)(ii)} @aff.gov.au; ^{s. 22(1)(a)(ii)} @aff.gov.au; ^{s. 47E(d)}**Subject:** HPAI WA investments [SEC=OFFICIAL]

OFFICIAL

Hi Brant and ^{s. 22(1)(a)(i)}

As requested:

The Australian Government has provided **\$2,046,667** to Western Australia, as part of \$12 million in funding for states and territories through the Federation Funding Agreement (FFA), '*Boosting HPAI Biosecurity Response Capability*'. The purpose of the FFA was to facilitate the purchase of mission critical supplies for preparing for and responding to high pathogenicity avian influenza (HPAI) outbreaks in the production sector and/or in Australian wildlife.

- These include critical equipment to strengthen preparedness and response capability, such as response assets (e.g. biosecurity and cleaning equipment), diagnostic and surveillance tools to enhance detection and testing capacity, depopulation systems for humane disease control, and disposal solutions to ensure biosecure carcass management.

Western Australia has invested in:

- **enhanced diagnostic capacity**, including next-generation sequencing equipment and PCR-compatible laboratory systems to enable rapid identification and genomic characterisation of avian influenza strains, and deployment of a digital slide scanning system to support pathology assessment, improving turnaround time for disease diagnosis.
- **high-pressure cleaning units** to support disease containment and biosecurity in high-risk agricultural settings.

- **large-scale mobile signage** to support public awareness, quarantine compliance, and incident response communication.

Western Australia are also progressing investments in establishing high-welfare depopulation systems, multi-purpose Emergency Animal Disease (EAD) response trailers, additional PCR machines, DNA extraction robots, and laboratory upgrades to significantly increase testing capacity.

Western Australia has made a substantial co-contribution alongside Australian Government FFA funding. This includes dedicated staffing, training for equipment use, expanded biosecurity engagement and communications, PPE and sampling readiness, and strengthened call centre and data management systems to support HPAI preparedness and response.

We are seeking words from DDCCEW about their investments in WA including planning for site specific preparedness work, which can be added once received.

Cheers, Louise

OFFICIAL

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s. 22(1)(a)(ii)

From: Palfreyman, Louise
Sent: Friday, 19 June 2026 8:53 PM
To: Smith, Brant; Fiona FRASER; s. 47F(1) NESS, David; s. 47F(1) Cookson, Beth; Vivian-Smith, Gabrielle; Wellington, Michelle; Ipkendanz, Chris; 'Rush, Rebecca'; 'MARTIN, Rajan'; 'louise.sasaki@finance.gov.au'; 'sandra.cuthbert@foodstandards.gov.au'; s. 47F(1) @pmc.gov.au; s. 47F(1) @nema.gov.au; s. 47F(1) ; simon.banks@dcceew.gov.au; maya.stuart-fox@dcceew.gov.au
Cc: s. 22(1)(a)(ii) s. 22(1)(a)(ii)
Subject: RE: APPROVED updated H5 bird flu National talking points
Attachments: 260619 H5 Bird Flu National Talking Points APPROVED.docx

Well it would have helped if it was attached. Sorry all... Fixed now.

Louise Palfreyman
 s. 47F(1) | s. 47F(1)

From: Palfreyman, Louise
Sent: Friday, 19 June 2026 8:49 PM
To: Smith, Brant <Brant.Smith@aff.gov.au>; Fiona FRASER <fiona.fraser@dcceew.gov.au>; s. 47F(1) @dcceew.gov.au>; NESS, David <david.ness@health.gov.au>; s. 47F(1) @nema.gov.au>; Cookson, Beth <Beth.Cookson@aff.gov.au>; Vivian-Smith, Gabrielle <Gabrielle.Vivian-Smith@aff.gov.au>; Wellington, Michelle <Michelle.Wellington@aff.gov.au>; Ipkendanz, Chris <Chris.Ipkendanz@aff.gov.au>; 'Rush, Rebecca' <rebecca.rush@infrastructure.gov.au>; 'MARTIN, Rajan' <rajan.martin@cdc.gov.au>; 'louise.sasaki@finance.gov.au' <louise.sasaki@finance.gov.au>; 'sandra.cuthbert@foodstandards.gov.au' <sandra.cuthbert@foodstandards.gov.au>; s. 47F(1) @pmc.gov.au' s. 47F(1) @pmc.gov.au>; s. 47F(1) @nema.gov.au s. 47F(1) @nema.gov.au>; s. 47F(1) @pmc.gov.au>; 'simon.banks@dcceew.gov.au' <simon.banks@dcceew.gov.au>; 'maya.stuart-fox@dcceew.gov.au' <maya.stuart-fox@dcceew.gov.au>
Cc: s. 22(1)(a)(ii) @aff.gov.au>; s. 22(1)(a)(ii) @aff.gov.au>
Subject: APPROVED updated H5 bird flu National talking points

Hi IDC members,

APPROVED and updated H5 bird flu National talking points attached.

See you tomorrow

Louise Palfreyman
 A/g Assistant Secretary
 Animal Health Policy and HPAI Taskforce
 Phone s. 47F(1) | s. 47F(1) |

Executive Assistant: s. 22(1)(a)(ii) Phone s. 22(1)(a)(ii) | s. 22(1)(a)(ii)@aff.gov.au



Australian Government

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agriculture.gov.au/subscribe



s. 22(1)(a)(ii)

From: Palfreyman, Louise
Sent: Friday, 19 June 2026 2:06 PM
To: Collins, Monica; Smith, Brant
Cc: Cookson, Beth; Wellington, Michelle; Ipkendanz, Chris; Curran, Alison; Hamilton, Sam
Subject: RE: CLEARED - points for the Minister for 3:15pm media event. [SEC=OFFICIAL]

Hi Monica

At the moment we do not have it confirmed that this is High Path.
We know it is avian influenza.

Louise Palfreyman
s. 47F(1) | s. 47F(1)

From: Collins, Monica <Monica.Collins@aff.gov.au>
Sent: Friday, 19 June 2026 2:00 PM
To: Smith, Brant <Brant.Smith@aff.gov.au>
Cc: Cookson, Beth <Beth.Cookson@aff.gov.au>; Wellington, Michelle <Michelle.Wellington@aff.gov.au>; Ipkendanz, Chris <Chris.Ipkendanz@aff.gov.au>; Curran, Alison <Alison.Curran@aff.gov.au>; Palfreyman, Louise <Louise.Palfreyman@aff.gov.au>; Hamilton, Sam <Sam.Hamilton@aff.gov.au>
Subject: RE: CLEARED - points for the Minister for 3:15pm media event. [SEC=OFFICIAL]

OFFICIAL

Thanks Brant

Could you also clarify please – do we need to include ‘highly pathogenic’ when talking about H5 bird flu?

Thanks
Monica

Monica Collins
Acting Deputy Secretary
Biosecurity Operations and Compliance Group
Department of Agriculture Fisheries and Forestry
M. s. 47F(1)

OFFICIAL

From: Smith, Brant <Brant.Smith@aff.gov.au>
Sent: Friday, 19 June 2026 1:51 PM

To: s. 22(1)(a)(ii) @aff.gov.au

Cc: Cookson, Beth <Beth.Cookson@aff.gov.au>; Wellington, Michelle <Michelle.Wellington@aff.gov.au>; Ipkendanz, Chris <Chris.Ipkendanz@aff.gov.au>; Collins, Monica <Monica.Collins@aff.gov.au>; Curran, Alison <Alison.Curran@aff.gov.au>; Palfreyman, Louise <Louise.Palfreyman@aff.gov.au>; Hamilton, Sam <Sam.Hamilton@aff.gov.au>

Subject: CLEARED - points for the Minister for 3:15pm media event. [SEC=OFFICIAL]

OFFICIAL

s. 22(1)(a)(ii) See below.

The WA Department of Primary Industries and Regional Development (DPIRD) is investigating a suspect detection of avian influenza (or bird flu) in a single wild bird found sick in an isolated area in southern Western Australia.

Initial testing at DPIRD's laboratory has returned a suspected positive result for avian influenza. Samples have been sent to CSIRO's Australian Centre for Disease Preparedness for confirmatory testing, with results expected tomorrow.

We cannot confirm yet whether it is the strain of concern circulating at this stage, known as H5 bird flu.

There is no evidence of any mass mortality at this time, nor any evidence of infection in poultry.

WA as the lead jurisdiction, will coordinate a response with national coordination led by the Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry.

A key message for everyone is please do not touch sick or dead birds or animals. If you see multiple sick or dead birds or other animals, take photos or a video from a safe distance. Record your location and report it to the Emergency Animal Disease Hotline on 1800 675 888.

I want everyone to know this is what we've been preparing for. We've undertaken a series of national exercises and invested \$113m to strengthen our nations preparedness for H5 bird flu, including an additional \$11.2m in the recent 2026-2027 Budget.

If confirmed to be H5 bird flu this will be sobering but not unexpected given the spread globally.

I want to reassure the public that we are well placed to respond to and manage this situation.

We will keep you regularly updated as information comes to hand, and please go to birdflu.gov.au for further information on bird flu.

B.

Dr Brant Smith BVSc, MVPHMgt, MAICD
First Assistant Secretary | Biosecurity Animal Division
National Animal Disease Preparedness Coordinator
Mental Health Champion

s. 47F(1) | s. 47F(1) | Executive Assistant: s. 22(1)(a)(ii)

Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry

70 Northbourne Avenue Canberra City ACT 2601

GPO Box 858, Canberra City ACT 2601

daff.gov.au biosecurity.gov.au



We acknowledge the continuous connection of First Nations people to the lands, seas and waters of Australia. We recognise and pay respect to Elders past and present, and recognise the ongoing contribution of all Australians.

Supporting Flexibility - if you receive an email from me outside of normal business hours, I'm sending it at a time that suits me. Unless it's marked urgent, I'm not expecting you to read or reply until normal business hours.

OFFICIAL

s. 22(1)(a)(ii)

From: Palfreyman, Louise
Sent: Friday, 19 June 2026 5:35 PM
To: s. 22(1)(a)(ii)
Subject: RE: H5 detection in WA [SEC=OFFICIAL]

thanks

Louise Palfreyman
s. 47F(1) | s. 47F(1)

From: s. 22(1)(a)(ii) @aff.gov.au>
Sent: Friday, 19 June 2026 5:30 PM
To: Palfreyman, Louise <Louise.Palfreyman@aff.gov.au>
Subject: FW: H5 detection in WA [SEC=OFFICIAL]

OFFICIAL

FYI, from CDC...

s. 22(1)(a)(ii)

OFFICIAL

From: s. 47F(1) @cdc.gov.au>
Sent: Friday, 19 June 2026 4:51 PM
To: s. 47F(1) @dcceew.gov.au; s. 47F(1) @dcceew.gov.au; s. 22(1)(a)(ii) @aff.gov.au; s. 47F(1) @cdc.gov.au; s. 47F(1) @cdc.gov.au; s. 47F(1) @health.nsw.gov.au; s. 47F(1) @health.qld.gov.au; s. 47F(1) @sa.gov.au; s. 47F(1) @health.tas.gov.au; s. 47F(1) @health.vic.gov.au; s. 47F(1) @barwonhealth.org.au; s. 47F(1) @health.wa.gov.au; s. 47F(1) @health.qld.gov.au; s. 47F(1) @dcceew.gov.au; s. 22(1)(a)(ii) @aff.gov.au; s. 22(1)(a)(ii) @aff.gov.au; s. 47F(1) @cdc.gov.au; s. 47F(1) @cdc.gov.au; s. 47F(1) @cdc.gov.au
Cc: s. 47E(d) @dcceew.gov.au; s. 47E(d) @cdc.gov.au
Subject: H5 detection in WA [SEC=OFFICIAL]

OFFICIAL

OFFICIAL

Hi AIH working group,

Apologies for the late email on a Friday! I just thought I would write to acknowledge the detection of H5 virus in a migratory bird in WA, the further typing of which is still pending.

The management of this incident is with DAFF, with the Ag minister as the primary lead/spokesperson. The risk to human health is currently considered low – I'll touch base with CDNA chairs early next week, but for now it is expected that this working group will continue with developing the two guidelines as planned. If there is talk of expedited deadlines etc I will let you all know ASAP



I have sent around the invite for the next meeting, but if we need to meet sooner as this situation evolves we will.

Have a wonderful weekend,
Warm regards,

s. 47F(1) (She/her)
Assistant Director - Public Health Advisory Section
(Work hours 8.30am–4.30pm, Mon-Fri)



Preparedness Branch | Public Health Division
Australian Centre for Disease Control
E: s. 47F(1) [@cdc.gov.au](mailto:s.47F(1)@cdc.gov.au)
This email comes to you from Nggunawal Country
Level 6, Aviation House, 16 Furzer St, Phillip ACT 2606
PO Box 798, Canberra ACT 2601, Australia

The Australian Centre for Disease Control acknowledges First Nations peoples as the Traditional Owners of Country throughout Australia, and their continuing connection to land, sea and community. We pay our respects to them and their cultures, and to all Elders both past and present.

OFFICIAL

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OFFICIAL

s. 22(1)(a)(ii)

From: Palfreyman, Louise
Sent: Friday, 19 June 2026 12:46 PM
To: **s. 22(1)(a)(ii)**
Subject: RE: HPAI WA investments [SEC=OFFICIAL]

Yes

Louise Palfreyman
s. 47F(1) | **s. 47F(1)**

From: **s. 22(1)(a)(ii)** @aff.gov.au>
Sent: Friday, 19 June 2026 12:42 PM
To: Palfreyman, Louise <Louise.Palfreyman@aff.gov.au>
Subject: FW: HPAI WA investments [SEC=OFFICIAL]

OFFICIAL

s. 47F(1) asked if we could swap points. Are you happy if I share these with her?

Kind Regards,
s. 22(1)(a)(ii)

OFFICIAL

From: Palfreyman, Louise <Louise.Palfreyman@aff.gov.au>
Sent: Friday, 19 June 2026 12:36 PM
To: **s. 22(1)(a)(ii)** @aff.gov.au>; Smith, Brant <Brant.Smith@aff.gov.au>
Cc: **s. 22(1)(a)(ii)** @aff.gov.au>; **s. 22(1)(a)(ii)** @aff.gov.au>; **s. 22(1)(a)(ii)** @aff.gov.au>; **s. 22(1)(a)(ii)** @aff.gov.au>; **s. 22(1)(a)(ii)** @aff.gov.au>; **s. 22(1)(a)(ii)** @aff.gov.au>; **s. 22(1)(a)(ii)** @aff.gov.au>; **s. 47E(d)** @aff.gov.au>
Subject: HPAI WA investments [SEC=OFFICIAL]

OFFICIAL

Hi Brant and **s. 22(1)(a)(ii)**

As requested:

The Australian Government has provided **\$2,046,667** to Western Australia, as part of \$12 million in funding for states and territories through the Federation Funding Agreement (FFA), '*Boosting HPAI Biosecurity Response Capability*'. The purpose of the FFA was to facilitate the purchase of mission critical supplies for preparing for and responding to high pathogenicity avian influenza (HPAI) outbreaks in the production sector and/or in Australian wildlife.

- These include critical equipment to strengthen preparedness and response capability, such as response assets (e.g. biosecurity and cleaning equipment), diagnostic and surveillance

tools to enhance detection and testing capacity, depopulation systems for humane disease control, and disposal solutions to ensure biosecure carcass management.

Western Australia has invested in:

- **enhanced diagnostic capacity**, including next-generation sequencing equipment and PCR-compatible laboratory systems to enable rapid identification and genomic characterisation of avian influenza strains, and deployment of a digital slide scanning system to support pathology assessment, improving turnaround time for disease diagnosis.
- **high-pressure cleaning units** to support disease containment and biosecurity in high-risk agricultural settings.
- **large-scale mobile signage** to support public awareness, quarantine compliance, and incident response communication.

Western Australia are also progressing investments in establishing high-welfare depopulation systems, multi-purpose Emergency Animal Disease (EAD) response trailers, additional PCR machines, DNA extraction robots, and laboratory upgrades to significantly increase testing capacity.

Western Australia has made a substantial co-contribution alongside Australian Government FFA funding. This includes dedicated staffing, training for equipment use, expanded biosecurity engagement and communications, PPE and sampling readiness, and strengthened call centre and data management systems to support HPAI preparedness and response.

We are seeking words from DDCCEW about their investments in WA including planning for site specific preparedness work, which can be added once received.

Cheers, Louise

OFFICIAL

s. 22(1)(a)(ii)

From: Palfreyman, Louise
Sent: Friday, 19 June 2026 11:24 PM
To: s. 22(1)(a)(ii) Hamilton, Sam
Cc: s. 22(1)(a)(ii)
Subject: RE: Information on HPAI and brown skuas from recent OFFLU reports [SEC=OFFICIAL]

Thankyou s. 22(1)(a)(ii) . At this unseasonable hour of the night too! Much appreciated.

Louise Palfreyman
s. 47F(1) | s. 47F(1)

From: s. 22(1)(a)(ii) @aff.gov.au>
Sent: Friday, 19 June 2026 11:22 PM
To: Palfreyman, Louise <Louise.Palfreyman@aff.gov.au>; Hamilton, Sam <Sam.Hamilton@aff.gov.au>
Cc: s. 22(1)(a)(ii) @aff.gov.au>
Subject: Information on HPAI and brown skuas from recent OFFLU reports [SEC=OFFICIAL]

OFFICIAL

Hi Louise and Sam,

In case useful, I've done a quick skim for mentions of brown skuas from the three most recent reports from the OFFLU wildlife group. Please see pasted text below.

Happy to look into providing text on any particular questions over the weekend if useful – just let me know.

Best wishes

s. 22(1)(a)(ii)

Southward expansion of high pathogenicity avian influenza H5 in wildlife in South America: estimated impact on wildlife populations, and risk of incursion into Antarctica (August 2023)

<https://offlu.org/technical-activities/offlu-statement-on-hpai-h5-in-wildlife-in-south-america-and-risk-of-incursion-to-antarctica/>

A number of avian species have been identified as potential vector species for viral introduction and spread through the region, including skuas, gulls, giant petrels, and sheathbills. LPAI has already been detected in many of these species, demonstrating susceptibility to influenza viruses. Many of these species are known to traverse the Drake Passage and connect South America with the Sub-Antarctic Islands and Antarctic Peninsula through nomadic and migratory movements (Figure).

Predatory behaviour of skuas and giant petrels leads to visitation of numerous sites along the southern tip of South America, Sub-Antarctic Islands and the Antarctic Peninsula. These predatory/scavenging habits and frequent incursions into breeding colonies of other species, suggest these species are also likely to play a significant role in the spread of HPAI H5 among sites in the Subantarctic and Antarctic regions.

Brown skuas are fully migratory and are found on or around Subantarctic Islands populated by burrow-nesting seabirds or penguins. They are highly predatory, feeding mainly on other birds but will also scavenge around fishing boats and feed at sea. Breeding begins in October and November. Birds are loosely colonial but highly territorial, nesting on grass, gravel or bare rock (Anderson et al, 2009). Brown skuas are commonly recorded in high numbers in Antarctica; Argentina; Australia; Falkland Islands (Islas Malvinas), New Zealand; South Georgia (Islas Georgia del Sur) and the South Sandwich Islands (Islas Sándwich del Sur).

Continued expansion of high pathogenicity avian influenza H5 in wildlife in South America and incursion into the Antarctic region (December 2023)

<https://offlu.org/technical-activities/continued-expansion-of-hpai-h5-in-wildlife-in-south-america-and-incursion-into-the-antarctic-region-offlu-statement-2/>

The first incursion of HPAI H5 virus into the Antarctic region was detected in October 2023 in South Georgia (Islas Georgia del Sur), part of the Scotia Arc. At the same time, virus incursion was detected in the Falkland Islands (Islas Malvinas), on the continental shelf of South America. The species found infected or suspected infected with HPAI H5 virus include brown skua (*Stercorarius antarcticus*), kelp gull (*Larus dominicanus*), southern fulmar (*Fulmarus glacialis*), black-browed albatross (*Thalassarche melanophrys*), grey-headed albatross (*Thalassarche chrysostoma*) and southern elephant seal, and could be involved in the next stage of spread of HPAI H5 virus in the Antarctic region. The risk of viral transmission to other islands of the Scotia Arc and the Antarctic Peninsula is considered high, and considered medium to several islands that lie in the southern parts of the Pacific, Atlantic and Indian Oceans. From these locations, HPAI H5 virus is likely to spread further in the Antarctic region; and from there, incursion into Oceania is plausible.

The first indication of HPAI H5 virus incursion in South Georgia (Islas Georgia del Sur) was on 17 September 2023, when a southern giant petrel with neurological signs consistent with HPAI was observed on Bird Island. It died and its carcass was scavenged by brown skuas and other southern giant petrels. On 8 October, brown skuas with neurological signs were observed at the same location, and by 17 November 57 brown skuas had been found dead there. By virological analysis, all 15 brown skuas and 6 of 18 kelp gulls found dead and sampled on Bird Island and four other locations on South Georgia (Islas Georgia del Sur) between 8 October and 3 November were found to be infected with HPAI H5N1 virus.

Between 4 and 26 November, further suspected cases in brown skuas, kelp gulls, southern giant petrels and Antarctic terns (*Sterna vittata*) have been reported along the east coast of South Georgia (Islas Georgia del Sur) (28, 29).

Assuming that these avian species (brown skua, southern fulmar, black-browed albatross, grey-headed albatross, Antarctic prion) did become infected on the Patagonian Shelf, to which locations could they introduce HPAI H5 virus?

Brown skuas that spend the austral winter on the Patagonian shelf breed on other islands of the Scotia Arc and on the northern part of the Antarctic Peninsula. Alternatively, they may fly to breeding sites on Subantarctic islands in the southern Atlantic Ocean (Tristan da Cunha, Gough and Bouvet Islands) and may come in contact with brown skuas that have been wintering around Africa and breed on Subantarctic Islands in the southern Indian Ocean (Prince Edward, Crozet, and Kerguelen Islands) (38).

For southern fulmars, the closest breeding sites from the Falkland Islands (Islas Malvinas) are the South Sandwich Islands (Islas Sándwich del Sur), the South Orkney Islands (Islas Orcadas del Sur), the Antarctic Peninsula and Peter I Island (39).

Black-browed albatrosses—besides breeding on the Falkland Islands (Islas Malvinas) and South Georgia—also breed on other (sub-)Antarctic islands including Crozet, Kerguelen, and Heard & McDonald Islands. Later in the breeding season, birds from South Georgia (Islas Georgias del Sur) may also travel up to c. 3000 km from their breeding sites, especially to the Antarctic Peninsula and South Orkney Islands (Islas Orcadas del Sur), but birds from the Falkland Islands (Islas Malvinas) remain close to their colonies during the whole breeding period. Post-breeding, the majority of Falkland Islands (Islas Malvinas) birds remain on the Patagonian Shelf throughout the year, while birds from South Georgia (Islas Georgias del Sur) migrate primarily northeast across the South Atlantic to the coastal shelf of South Africa and the Benguela Current area, with small proportions wintering on the Patagonian Shelf or around Australia (40).

Grey-headed albatrosses—besides breeding on South Georgia (Islas Georgia del Sur)—also breed at other Subantarctic islands including Prince Edward, Crozet, Kerguelen, and Macquarie. This species has a circumpolar distribution over cold Subantarctic and Antarctic waters (41). Movements of non-breeding grey-headed albatrosses have only been reported for birds breeding on South Georgia (Islas Georgia del Sur). They showed one of three migratory movements, (i) residence in the southwest Atlantic and adjacent areas (including the Patagonian Shelf); (ii) return migrations to winter in habitats known to be used by other albatrosses in the Indian Ocean; and (iii) one or more global circumnavigations—always in eastward direction—with foraging in areas and habitats used in options (i) and (ii) and also in additional staging areas in the Indian and Pacific Oceans (42).

Antarctic prions are the most southerly breeding of all prion species. Individuals that spend the austral winter on the Patagonian shelf may nest in large numbers on all islands of the Scotia Arc. Large numbers of subspecies of Antarctic Prion breed on subantarctic islands in the Indian Ocean, near New Zealand, and

probably near the Antarctic continent on Scott Island. This species breeds in large colonies in self-excavated burrows in areas with moss vegetation, or in rock crevices. They congregate in large rafts at sea just before dusk and attend the colonies in huge flocks just after dark. After the breeding season, Antarctic Prions disperse in a wide geographical range between the Antarctic pack-ice in the South and about 35 degrees south. They are commonly found on the Patagonian Shelf and in the Humboldt Current off South America during the austral winter. One infected Antarctic Prion was found in Brazil (Annex 1). This bird probably originates from the breeding colonies in the South Atlantic (based on (43)), although Antarctic Prions from South Georgia can also disperse into the Pacific (44).

Could Gs/GD HPAI H5 virus arrive with the long-distance movements of seabirds directly from the Antarctic region adjacent to South America?

Numerous seabird species have circumpolar distributions that include South Georgia and the Subantarctic Islands of Oceania, such as brown skua and northern giant petrel (*Macronectes halli*). Limited available tracking data, largely from breeding individuals, demonstrate regionally restricted movements (65). However, kernel density analysis of non-breeding brown skuas tagged on Crozet and Kerguelen Islands indicate that birds connect Southern Africa with Australia, demonstrating potentially vast long-distance movements in this species, which has been shown to be infected with HPAI H5 (38). Northern giant petrels, which visit Australia, New Zealand and associated islands have long-distance movement whereby young birds tend to disperse great distances from the breeding colonies, often with an eastward movement likely due to prevailing westerly winds such that birds from the Oceania Subantarctic islands (e.g. Macquarie Island) may disperse to South America, including one confirmed detection of a bird banded on Macquarie Island found on South Georgia (66-69). Unfortunately, there is no available tracking data from kelp gulls and southern fulmars from Oceania's Subantarctic islands, as these species similarly have large circumpolar distributions, are a "scavenger species", and have been found infected with H5 HPAI on South Georgia and the Falkland Islands. Given the almost 10,000 km between the Subantarctic islands around South America and Oceania, this scenario would require (a) birds be capable of long-distance flight while infected, and (b) this distance be covered in a short period of time (i.e. no longer than the duration of infection). Studies of albatross flight indicate a maximum speed of ~20 m/sec (~70 km/hr) (70), such that a wandering albatross (*Diomedea exulans*) could theoretically take a minimum of 5.7 days to fly from Tierra del Fuego to New Zealand, which is within the expected range of duration of infection.

Global overview of the spread and impact of H5 clade 2.3.4.4b high pathogenicity avian influenza virus in wildlife, 2020-2024 (March 2026)

https://offlu.org/publications/2026_offlu-statement-iii/

South Georgia (Islas Georgia del Sur) reported HPAI between October 2023 and March 2024 in seabirds and marine mammals [166, 185]. Although archipelago-wide mortality estimates are not available to date, significant mortalities were reported for brown skuas, wandering albatrosses, gentoo penguins, Antarctic fur seals and southern elephant seals [158, 159, 185, 186]. At Bird Island, where wildlife mortality was intensively monitored, brown skuas were the most affected species, experiencing earlier and more severe mortality than other species [158].

South Indian Ocean

The first suspected HPAI case in the South Indian Ocean was a brown skua with clinical signs suggestive of HPAI at Marion Island (Prince Edward Islands) in September 2024 [203]. More mortalities in multiple species were reported from early November to March 2025, though the overall occurrence of mortality slowed significantly in January. HPAI was confirmed in six species: wandering albatross, king penguin, brown skua, southern giant petrel, northern giant petrel, and sooty albatross.

The highest HPAI-associated mortality was observed in wandering albatrosses (at least 150 chicks dead out of approximately 1900 chicks from the 2024 cohort), brown skuas (80 adults dead), and king penguins (120 adults dead) [203, 204].

In October 2024, unusual mortality was reported at Possession Island (Crozet Islands) involving several hundreds of southern elephant seals, tens of king penguins, wandering albatrosses and brown skuas, with HPAI H5 detected in southern elephant seals and king penguins. In November 2024, mortality of southern elephant seals from HPAI H5 also was reported at La Grande Terre (Kerguelen Islands). Other species with suspected cases in Crozet and Kerguelen archipelagos comprised kelp gulls, gentoo penguins, Kerguelen shags and pintado petrels. The population impacts of these outbreaks have yet to be assessed, but southern elephant seals and king penguins appeared most affected [184]. It is expected that HPAI also arrived on Heard

Island, which is uninhabited, and HPAI was confirmed on Heard Island one year later following a dedicated mission to investigate [205].

Antarctica

The cause of mortality of hundreds of crabeater seals found dead in the northwestern Weddell Sea in November and December 2024 [199] was attributed to HPAI H5 based on positive testing of crabeater seal carcasses from the same area in January 2025 [206]. Additional mortality events and HPAI detections were recorded at various sites in the Antarctic Peninsula and South Shetland Islands from November 2024 to March 2025, with affected species including Antarctic fur seal, kelp gull, gentoo penguin, pintado petrel, **skua**, and southern elephant seal [187, 199, 206-210].

The distribution of suspected and confirmed cases suggests the virus spread widely, especially among seabirds, but remained essentially confined to the Antarctic Peninsula and the nearby South Shetland Islands. The population impacts of these outbreaks have yet to be assessed, but it seems that skuas and crabeater seals were most affected [206-208, 210].

The only continental region not yet affected by HPAI H5 during this reporting period is Oceania [240]. The spread patterns observed in the last five years have implications for understanding potential introduction pathways to Oceania in future. The potential for spread of HPAI H5 via wild birds to Oceania from Asia has long been recognised, but recent events in South America and Antarctica reveal a potential southern introduction pathway not previously considered [161].

This is highlighted by recent detections in the Antarctic region and southern Indian Ocean (Crozet islands, Kerguelen islands and Heard and McDonald Islands) with southern giant petrels, northern giant petrels, **brown skuas** and kelp gulls identified as species that may have facilitated long-distance spread in the region [184].

Best wishes,

s. 22(1)(a)(ii)

s. 22(1)(a)(ii)

European Veterinary Specialist Zoological Medicine

Epidemiology, Surveillance and Laboratory Section | Animal Health Policy Branch | Biosecurity Animal Division

Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry

Ngunnawal Country

Agriculture House, Canberra ACT 2600, Australia

s. 22(1)(a)(ii)@aff.gov.au



The department acknowledges the traditional custodians of Australia and their continuing connection to land, sea, environment, water and community. We pay our respect to the traditional custodians, their culture, and elders both past and present.

OFFICIAL

s. 22(1)(a)(ii)

From: Palfreyman, Louise
Sent: Friday, 19 June 2026 11:08 PM
To: s. 22(1)(a)(ii)
Cc: s. 22(1)(a)(ii)
Subject: RE: NMA considerations for CCEAD [SEC=OFFICIAL:Sensitive]

Thank you ^{s. 22(1)(a)(ii)} – this was extremely helpful for me tonight.

Louise Palfreyman
s. 47F(1) | s. 47F(1)

From: s. 22(1)(a)(ii) @aff.gov.au>
Sent: Friday, 19 June 2026 6:33 PM
To: Palfreyman, Louise <Louise.Palfreyman@aff.gov.au>
Cc: s. 22(1)(a)(ii) @aff.gov.au>; s. 22(1)(a)(ii) @aff.gov.au>
Subject: FW: NMA considerations for CCEAD [SEC=OFFICIAL:Sensitive]

OFFICIAL: Sensitive

NMA points from ^{s. 22(1)(a)(ii)}.

Kind Regards,
^{s. 22(1)(a)(ii)}

OFFICIAL: Sensitive

From: s. 22(1)(a)(ii) @aff.gov.au>
Sent: Friday, 19 June 2026 5:24 PM
To: s. 22(1)(a)(ii) @aff.gov.au>; s. 22(1)(a)(ii) @aff.gov.au>
Subject: NMA considerations for CCEAD [SEC=OFFICIAL:Sensitive]

OFFICIAL: Sensitive

Hi ^{s. 22(1)(a)(ii)} and s. 22(1)(a)(ii)

Please find my wording for Louise below for your review. I'm not sure whether this is what she is after or whether I've got it totally wrong, so I appreciate your advice.

- Current situation in WA (as far as we are aware) is that there is potentially one confirmed H5 HPAI case, with another bird being tested. These are both vagrant wild individual birds from a pelagic species (i.e. spend the majority of life flying, swimming, and foraging on the open ocean, away from land, except for breeding).
- The purpose of the H5 NMA is: *"to establish a national arrangement for Cost-sharing and governance of a National response to manage the impact of incursions of H5 high pathogenicity avian influenza (HPAI) in Wildlife, where it is determined the disease is not capable of Eradication or containment, and where managing the impacts of the disease in Wildlife is of National significance."*

- The incident definition phase under EADRA is the investigation period following Formal Notification to the CCEAD, as defined in clause 5.1 of an Incident (*Obligation to advise of an EAD within 24 hours*, page 18 of EADRA).
- The incident definition phase continues until an EADRP is agreed by NMG (following determination by CCEAD) that the incident relates to an EAD that is capable of being eradicated or contained, or that the incident is either **NOT** an EAD (e.g. it's not HPAI) or the incident **IS** an EAD, but it is not capable of being eradicated or contained.
- The current incident appears to be in an incident definition phase at the moment, where the scale and extent is being determined.
- On Page 23 of the EADRA, under 10.1 Cost Sharing- incident definition phase, it states that once an EADRP has been agreed, that cost sharing principles will apply in respect of compensation costs from the date of first notification of the incident to the Lead agency OR such earlier date as may be agreed by the NMG on advice of the CCEAD. This cost sharing under the EADRA apply in respect of:
 - (i) salaries and wages;
 - (ii) operating expenses;
 - (iii) capital costs; and
 - (iv) Compensation
- So we take this to imply that WA may request cost sharing for this phase of the incident until such time as they can determine whether this incident is eradicable or containable.
- Depending on this outcome, will depend on whether the H5 NMA will be enlivened/activated (if it is determined and agreed that this incident is not eradicable or containable).

Kind regards

s. 22(1)(a)(ii)

s. 22(1)(a)(ii)

HPAI Preparedness Taskforce

OFFICIAL: Sensitive

s. 22(1)(a)(ii)

From: Palfreyman, Louise
Sent: Friday, 19 June 2026 6:03 PM
To: **s. 22(1)(a)(ii)** Cookson, Beth
Cc: CCEAD
Subject: RE: Situation update meeting on suspected H5 AI in WA wild birds [SEC=OFFICIAL]

Looks good to me

From: **s. 22(1)(a)(ii)** @aff.gov.au>
Sent: Friday, 19 June 2026 5:34 PM
To: Cookson, Beth <Beth.Cookson@aff.gov.au>
Cc: Palfreyman, Louise <Louise.Palfreyman@aff.gov.au>; CCEAD **s. 47E(d)**
Subject: RE: Situation update meeting on suspected H5 AI in WA wild birds [SEC=OFFICIAL]

OFFICIAL

Good point, you are right – no one from AEL was at the meeting. I've removed that reference below.

Thanks
s. 22(1)(a)(ii)

OFFICIAL

From: Cookson, Beth <Beth.Cookson@aff.gov.au>
Sent: Friday, 19 June 2026 5:28 PM
To: **s. 22(1)(a)(ii)** @aff.gov.au>
Cc: Palfreyman, Louise <Louise.Palfreyman@aff.gov.au>; CCEAD **s. 47E(d)**
Subject: Re: Situation update meeting on suspected H5 AI in WA wild birds [SEC=OFFICIAL]

OFFICIAL

Hi **s. 22(1)(a)(ii)** - were AEL online? Also added the Min media from this afternoon.

OFFICIAL

From: **s. 22(1)(a)(ii)** @aff.gov.au>
Sent: Friday, June 19, 2026 5:22 pm
To: Cookson, Beth <Beth.Cookson@aff.gov.au>
Cc: Palfreyman, Louise <Louise.Palfreyman@aff.gov.au>; CCEAD **s. 47E(d)**
Subject: Situation update meeting on suspected H5 AI in WA wild birds [SEC=OFFICIAL]

OFFICIAL

Hi Beth,

As requested, here is an email to send to Mon (for her circulation to NBC members) on the situation update meeting with CCEAD members/observers today.

Thanks

s. 22(1)(a)(ii)

Hi all,

Today Beth Cookson, the Australian Chief Veterinary Officer, chaired a situation update meeting with members and observers of the Consultative Committee for Emergency Animal Disease (CCEAD) on a suspected detection of H5 Avian Influenza in wild birds in Western Australia. CCEAD members and observers in attendance included CVOs, representatives from the Australian Centre for Disease Preparedness, Australian Chicken Meat Federation, Australian Duck Meat Association, the Australian CDC, the Commonwealth Department of Climate Change, Energy, the Environment and Water, Wildlife Health Australia and Animal Health Australia.

Situation update

s. 47F(1) the WA CVO, provided a situation update.

- On 18 June 2026, the WA Department of Primary Industries and Regional Development (DPIRD) reported a positive PCR result for influenza A (H5) from a single brown skua. The skua was found by a member of the public on Cape Le Grand beach, Esperance, on 14 June 2026, and provided to a wildlife carer in Esperance. The skua died overnight after being treated in isolation.
- A sick giant petrel, found in the same region as the skua, has since been taken into care at the same wildlife hospital. Preliminary testing results from WA are anticipated later today.
- There are no other birds or wildlife at the wildlife carer.
- Both the skua and giant petrel species have a known distribution from Antarctica to Heard Island and are known to arrive in this region of western Australia periodically.
- The Australian Centre for Disease Preparedness (ACDP) received a sample from the skua this morning. ACDP confirmed a positive PCR result for Influenza A (H5), but sequencing testing remains in progress. Sequencing testing will confirm the virus's clade, pathogenicity and level of relatedness with other Antarctic and sub-Antarctic detections. Sequencing results are expected to be available at midnight tonight.
 - The pathogenicity of the virus will determine whether the Emergency Animal Disease Response Agreement (EADRA) would be activated as H5 HPAI is listed under this Agreement.
- A WA DPIRD incident management team has been established to manage the response to this incident.
- WA will implement enhanced general surveillance on a regional basis.
- WA is considering whether to implement a 'housing order' on a regional basis under the *Exotic Diseases of Animals Act 1993*.

Communications

- WA will undertake targeted engagement with veterinarians and wildlife carers this afternoon.
- The WA Minister for Agriculture and Food is intending to make a media statement on the incident this afternoon.
- The Commonwealth Minister for Agriculture intends to make a media statement on the incident *this afternoon* and on the morning of Saturday 20 June 2026.
- National talking points are currently being prepared in consultation with NBCEN.

International reporting

- DAFF will consider implications for international reporting (including to the World Organisation for Animal Health) informed ACDP's diagnostic results tonight. This will be discussed further at tomorrow's meeting of the CCEAD.

Outcomes and actions

- A CCEAD meeting on this incident, informed by ACDP's diagnostic testing results, will be on Saturday 20 June 2026 at 8am AEST / 6am AWST.

OFFICIAL

s. 22(1)(a)(ii)

From: Palfreyman, Louise
Sent: Friday, 19 June 2026 8:18 PM
To: s. 22(1)(a)(ii)
Cc: s. 47E(d) s. 22(1)(a)(ii) DLO Collins
Subject: RE: Meeting with Hon Roger Cook MLC, Premier of WA [SEC=OFFICIAL:Sensitive]

Cleared to go to Beth – via PDMS.

Thank you so much for a HUGE day s. 22(1)(a)(ii)

Louise Palfreyman

s. 47F(1) | s. 47F(1)

From: s. 22(1)(a)(ii) @aff.gov.au>
Sent: Friday, 19 June 2026 6:57 PM
To: Palfreyman, Louise <Louise.Palfreyman@aff.gov.au>
Cc: s. 47E(d) @aff.gov.au>; Palfreyman, Louise
 <Louise.Palfreyman@aff.gov.au>; s. 22(1)(a)(ii) @aff.gov.au>; DLO Collins
 s. 47E(d) @aff.gov.au>
Subject: FW: Meeting with Hon Roger Cook MLC, Premier of WA [SEC=OFFICIAL:Sensitive]

OFFICIAL: Sensitive

Hi Louise,

For your clearance, please find the MB and TPs linked below. Input from other areas has been FAS cleared.

 [19 June 2026 - MB26-000216.docx](#)
 [Attachment A - Talking Points.docx](#)

Kind Regards,

s. 22(1)(a)(ii)

OFFICIAL: Sensitive

From: s. 22(1)(a)(ii) @aff.gov.au>
Sent: Friday, 19 June 2026 6:38 PM
To: s. 22(1)(a)(ii) @aff.gov.au>; wez.norris@afma.gov.au; s. 47F(1) @afma.gov.au; s. 47E(d)
Cc: s. 47E(d) Palfreyman, Louise
 <Louise.Palfreyman@aff.gov.au>; s. 22(1)(a)(ii) @aff.gov.au>; s. 22(1)(a)(ii) @aff.gov.au>; Ipkendanz, Chris
 <Chris.Ipkendanz@aff.gov.au>; DLO Collins s. 47E(d) @aff.gov.au>; Collins, Monica <Monica.Collins@aff.gov.au>;
 Cookson, Beth <Beth.Cookson@aff.gov.au>; Smith, Brant <Brant.Smith@aff.gov.au>; s. 47E(d)
 Grainger, Jo <Jo.Grainger@aff.gov.au>
Subject: RE: Meeting with Hon Roger Cook MLC, Premier of WA [SEC=OFFICIAL:Sensitive]

OFFICIAL: Sensitive

Hi ^{s. 22(1)(a)(ii)},

LSPO content has been FAS cleared.

Regards,

^{s. 22(1)(a)(ii)}

OFFICIAL: Sensitive

From: ^{s. 22(1)(a)(ii)} @aff.gov.au>

Sent: Friday, 19 June 2026 5:10 PM

To: wez.norris@afma.gov.au; ^{s. 47F(1)} @afma.gov.au; ^{s. 47E(d)}

^{s. 22(1)(a)(ii)} @aff.gov.au>

Cc: ^{s. 47E(d)}

Palfreyman, Louise

<Louise.Palfreyman@aff.gov.au>; ^{s. 22(1)(a)(ii)} @aff.gov.au>; ^{s. 22(1)(a)(ii)}

@aff.gov.au>; ^{s. 22(1)(a)(ii)}

@aff.gov.au>; Ipkendanz, Chris

<Chris.Ipkendanz@aff.gov.au>; DLO Collins ^{s. 47E(d)} @aff.gov.au>; Collins, Monica <Monica.Collins@aff.gov.au>;

Cookson, Beth <Beth.Cookson@aff.gov.au>; Smith, Brant <Brant.Smith@aff.gov.au>; ^{s. 47E(d)}

Subject: FW: Meeting with Hon Roger Cook MLC, Premier of WA [SEC=OFFICIAL:Sensitive]

OFFICIAL: Sensitive

Lovely to e-meet you all!

Please find the link to the MB and TPs linked below. Grateful if you could action **ASAP** and seek **FAS** level clearance for your content. Please let me know when you are done, so I can progress to my SES as soon as possible this evening. Thank you!

 [19 June 2026 - MB26-000216.docx](#)

 [Attachment A - Talking Points.docx](#)

Kind Regards,

^{s. 22(1)(a)(ii)}

OFFICIAL: Sensitive

OFFICIAL: Sensitive

From: DLO Collins ^{s. 47E(d)} @aff.gov.au>

Sent: Friday, 19 June 2026 4:44 PM

To: DLO Collins ^{s. 47E(d)} @aff.gov.au>; Collins, Monica <Monica.Collins@aff.gov.au>; Cookson, Beth

<Beth.Cookson@aff.gov.au>; ^{s. 22(1)(a)(ii)} @aff.gov.au>; ^{s. 47E(d)}

Smith, Brant <Brant.Smith@aff.gov.au>; 'NORRIS, Wez' <wez.norris@afma.gov.au>;

^{s. 47F(1)} @afma.gov.au>; ^{s. 47E(d)}

^{s. 22(1)(a)(ii)}

@aff.gov.au>

Cc: ^{s. 47E(d)}

Ipkendanz, Chris

<Chris.Ipkendanz@aff.gov.au>

Subject: RE: Meeting with Hon Roger Cook MLC, Premier of WA [SEC=OFFICIAL:Sensitive]

OFFICIAL: Sensitive

Hi again all,

Please also note additional attendees added:

- Daniel Smith, Chief of Staff
- s. 47F(1) Director Environmental Policy

Many thanks

s. 22(1)(a)(ii)

Departmental Liaison Officer | Office of Julie Collins MP
Minister for Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry

M: s. 22(1)(a)(ii) E: s. 47E(d) @aff.gov.au
Parliament House, Canberra, ACT 2600 Australia

OFFICIAL: Sensitive

From: DLO Collins s. 47E(d) @aff.gov.au>

Sent: Friday, 19 June 2026 4:39 PM

To: Collins, Monica <Monica.Collins@aff.gov.au>; DLO Collins s. 47E(d) @aff.gov.au>; Cookson, Beth <Beth.Cookson@aff.gov.au>; s. 22(1)(a)(ii) @aff.gov.au>; s. 47E(d) @aff.gov.au>; Smith, Brant <Brant.Smith@aff.gov.au>; 'NORRIS, Wez' <wez.norris@afma.gov.au>; s. 47F(1) @afma.gov.au>; s. 47E(d) s. 22(1)(a)(ii) @aff.gov.au>

Cc: s. 47E(d)

Ipkendanz, Chris

<Chris.Ipkendanz@aff.gov.au>

Subject: RE: Meeting with Hon Roger Cook MLC, Premier of WA [SEC=OFFICIAL:Sensitive]

OFFICIAL: Sensitive

Hi all,

We have been advised that the brief scope is to be expanded to include points on:

- s. 22(1)(a)(ii) (@NORRIS, Wez s. 47F(1) s. 47E(d)
- s. 22(1)(a)(ii) (@s. 22(1)(a)(ii))

Due to this, the brief must now be provided by **9am tomorrow morning**.

BIG thank you in advance everyone for the quick work that will be required tonight

s. 22(1)(a)(ii)

Departmental Liaison Officer | Office of Julie Collins MP
Minister for Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry

M: s. 22(1)(a)(ii) E: s. 47E(d) @aff.gov.au
Parliament House, Canberra, ACT 2600 Australia

OFFICIAL: Sensitive

From: Collins, Monica <Monica.Collins@aff.gov.au>

Sent: Friday, 19 June 2026 4:33 PM

To: DLO Collins **s. 47E(d)** @aff.gov.au; Cookson, Beth <Beth.Cookson@aff.gov.au>; **s. 22(1)(a)(ii)** @aff.gov.au; **s. 47E(d)** @aff.gov.au; Smith, Brant <Brant.Smith@aff.gov.au>

Cc: **s. 47E(d)** @agriculture.gov.au; Ipkendanz, Chris <Chris.Ipkendanz@aff.gov.au>

Subject: RE: Meeting with Hon Roger Cook MLC, Premier of WA [SEC=OFFICIAL:Sensitive]

OFFICIAL: Sensitive

Copying to Brant too for action please.

Thanks

Monica

Monica Collins

Acting Deputy Secretary

Biosecurity Operations and Compliance Group

Department of Agriculture Fisheries and Forestry

M. s. 47F(1)

OFFICIAL: Sensitive

From: DLO Collins **s. 47E(d)** @aff.gov.au

Sent: Friday, 19 June 2026 4:19 PM

To: Cookson, Beth <Beth.Cookson@aff.gov.au>; Collins, Monica <Monica.Collins@aff.gov.au>; **s. 22(1)(a)(ii)** @aff.gov.au; **s. 47E(d)**

Subject: Meeting with Hon Roger Cook MLC, Premier of WA [SEC=OFFICIAL:Sensitive]

Importance: High

OFFICIAL: Sensitive

Hi team,

Requesting an **Meeting Brief** from OCVO, due 10 am Sunday 21 June.

The Minister is meeting with Hon Roger Cook MLC, Premier of WA.

Timing: Monday, 22 June 2026 8:30 AM-9:00 AM

Location: APH

Happy to discuss.

s. 22(1)(a)(ii)

s. 22(1)(a)(ii)

Departmental Liaison Officer | Office of Julie Collins MP
Minister for Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry

M: **s. 22(1)(a)(ii)** E: **s. 47E(d)** @aff.gov.au
Parliament House, Canberra, ACT 2600 Australia

OFFICIAL: Sensitive

DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, FISHERIES AND FORESTRY

MB26-000216

To: Julie Collins**URGENT - MEETING WITH THE HON ROGER COOK MLC, PREMIER OF WA - MONDAY
22 JUNE 2026, 8:30AM - 9:00AM****Timing:** For meeting on 22 June 2026, 8:30 – 9:00am**Location:** Australian Parliament House**Meeting with:**

- Hon Roger Cook MLC, Premier of Western Australia
- Daniel Smith, Chief of Staff, Office of the Premier of WA
- s. 47F(1) Director Environmental Policy, Office of the Premier of WA

Prior meetings: N/A**Proposed note taker (if requested):** Nil**What we want:**

- H5 bird flu topic: to acknowledge the ongoing collaboration that has occurred between the Australian and Western Australian Governments over the past 2 years as national bird flu preparedness has been uplifted. Australia has well established national response arrangements and the Australian Government stands ready to support Western Australia as the situation evolves.

s. 22(1)(a)(ii)

What they want:

- H5 bird flu topic: to reinforce the importance of ongoing close collaboration between the WA and Australian Governments as the situation evolves and potentially request additional wildlife response funding.

Clearing Officer:	Beth Cookson	Australian Chief Veterinary Officer, Office of the Chief Veterinary Officer	Mob: s. 47F(1)
Contact Officer:	Louise Palfreyman	Assistant Secretary, Animal Health Policy Branch and HPAI Taskforce	Ph: s. 47F(1) Mob: s. 47F(1)

s. 22(1)(a)(ii)

Issues and Sensitivities:

1. s. 47B(a)

2. s. 22(1)(a)(ii)

3. s. 22(1)(a)(ii)

Consultation: YES

4. H5 bird flu topic: Biosecurity Animal Division (HPAI Preparedness Taskforce)

5. s. 22(1)(a)(ii)

6. s. 22(1)(a)(ii)

Attachments

A: Talking points

B: Participant biographies

DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, FISHERIES AND FORESTRY

MB26-000216

Attachment A**TALKING POINTS****Suspect H5 bird flu detection**

- I want to acknowledge the ongoing collaboration that has occurred between the Australian and Western Australian Governments over the past 2 years as we have prioritised the uplift of national bird flu preparedness.
- The Australian Government has committed more than \$113 million to strengthen Australia's preparedness for H5 bird flu and to protect our agricultural industries, wildlife and communities. These investments have significantly strengthened our national preparedness and response capability, placing Australia in a strong position to respond quickly and effectively.
- The Australian Government stands ready to support Western Australia throughout this response and we acknowledge the quick action taken already by Western Australia to identify and respond to this disease threat.

Support provided to WA

- The Australian Government HPAI investment includes \$12 million for states and territories to enhance frontline preparedness and response capability. As I am sure you aware, WA received over \$2 million to strengthen critical response capacity.
- I am pleased to hear that WA has invested in:
 - **enhanced diagnostic capacity** including next-generation sequencing equipment and PCR-compatible laboratory systems to enable rapid identification and genomic characterisation of avian influenza strains, and deployment of a digital slide scanning system to support pathology assessment, improving turnaround time for disease diagnosis.
 - **high-pressure cleaning units** to support disease containment and biosecurity in high-risk agricultural settings.
 - **large-scale mobile signage** to support public awareness, quarantine compliance, and incident response communication.
- Importantly, WA has made a substantial co-contribution alongside the Australian Government FFA funding, including dedicated staffing, training for equipment use, expanded biosecurity engagement and communications, PPE and sampling readiness, and strengthened call centre and data management systems.

DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, FISHERIES AND FORESTRY

- As part of the Australian Government's bird flu investment, \$35.9 million is also being invested in boosting environment measures and accelerating protective action for threatened species and priority biodiversity, and a further \$11.2 million was announced in the recent Budget.
- For Western Australia specifically, this includes:
 - **\$400,000 to help the West Australian Government develop plans for priority species.** Species include the Australian and long-nosed fur seals, western ground parrot, recherche cape barren goose, black cockatoos, blue-billed duck, black swan and little penguin.
 - **More than \$700,000 for 3 wildlife facilities** to help safeguard their captive populations of native threatened species by enhancing biosecurity. This includes the greater bilby, black cockatoos, western ground parrot and numbat.
 - **On-ground threat mitigation efforts to prepare native species for H5 bird flu are well underway in Western Australia.** This includes activities like invasive rat and mouse eradication on key offshore islands and feral animal control at key mainland sites.
- The investments made by both our governments over the past two years are exactly the types of measures that enable an early, coordinated and effective response.

s. 22(1)(a)(ii)

s. 22(1)(a)(ii)

Cookson, Beth 19/06 8:35 am

 Morning. Can we pull out some simple points for Vic on the different strains of AI, and how to describe the H5 HPAl wildlife-adapted strain.

19/06 8:35 am

yes no probs

19/06 8:58 am

sent

Cookson, Beth 19/06 10:28 am

 I'll call shortly. Likely need a CCEAD-member sit update meeting this afternoon.

19/06 10:32 am

we are preparing for this, s. 22(1)(a)(ii) and i are making plans

take care! it is a bit mad...

we are all ready to help you.

Cookson, Beth 19/06 12:43 pm

 Can you call me re CCEAD sit rep timing pls?

19/06 12:44 pm

can i dial you and s. 22(1)(a)(ii) now

megs will send something now

an invite...

19/06 7:58 pm

FYI - [Video footage emerges of Subantarctic Skua bird suspected of bringing H5 bird flu strain to Austral...](#)

 Video captures bird suspected of bringing ... X
Video footage of the bird suspected of bringing the H5 bird flu to Australia has emerged after the State...
www.mbtimes.com.au

19/06 1:00 pm

ccead update is 2,30pm ...

s. 22(1)(a) s. 22(1)(a)(ii) 19/06 1:10 pm

thanks Louise

s. 22(1)(a) s. 22(1)(a)(ii) 19/06 3:40 pm

[Suspected detection of H5 strain of bird flu in WA, which would mark first detection in Australia -...](#)

 Breaking: Suspected H5 bird flu detection in Au...
The first suspected case of a deadly strain of bird flu that has killed millions of birds and mammals worldwide has...
www.abc.net.au

19/06 3:50 pm

thx

s. 22(1)(a) s. 22(1)(a)(ii) 19/06 4:20 pm

Hi Louise, just chasing NTPs - Brant said you were reviewing?

19/06 4:21 pm

yep just need to review for brant sorry

19/06 4:57 pm

sam is reviewing

19/06 8:43 pm

hi s. 22(1)(a)(i) i just got out of CCEAD for a suspect H5 HPAl



s. 22(1)(a)(i) 22(1)(a)(ii) 19/06 3:50 pm

yes it's on the news

s. 22(1)(a)(i) s. 22(1)(a)(ii) 19/06 3:51 pm

[Suspected detection of H5 strain of bird flu in WA, which would mark first detection in Australia -...](#)



Suspected detection of H5 strain of bird flu in ...
The first suspected case of a deadly strain of bird flu that
has killed millions of birds and mammals worldwide has...

www.abc.net.au

Friday, 19 June

s. 22(1)(a)(i) s. 22(1)(a)(ii) 19/06 3:39 pm

I'm sure you've seen this but just in case: [Suspected detection of H5 strain of bird flu in WA, which would mark first detection in Australia -...](#)



Suspected detection of H5 strain of bird flu in ...
The first suspected case of a deadly strain of bird flu that
has killed millions of birds and mammals worldwide has...

www.abc.net.au

19/06 3:49 pm

thanks

- s. 47F(1) 19/06 3:26 pm
s. 47F(1) Sorry Louise, I'm sure you need us messaging you constantly on top of everything else. Just wanted to clarify if the ACDP results to verify WA DPIRD's testing results have come out, the ones flagged for ~3pm today? Understand further testing will come out later tonight and tomorrow to clarify clade, etc.
- 19/06 3:26 pm
hi sorry. just been in CCEAD. we wont have confirmation of clade till midnight.
- s. 47F(1) 19/06 3:27 pm
s. 47F(1) Cool, but do we have confirmation that the WA testing was verified by ACDP?
- 19/06 3:28 pm
yes confirmed avian influenza.
- s. 47F(1) 19/06 4:33 pm
s. 47F(1) Hello again, we're putting together an internal daily sitrep, wanting to confirm if there are any further updates to capture and any chance of the TPs/handling materials we could offer our exec?
- 19/06 4:44 pm
H.s. 47F(1) we are just finalising the national talking points. key progress for you to report is that IDC and CCEAD have met today and will meet again tomorrow after the results have received. i undertsnd that minister will brief the media again tommorow morning. will get you tps as soon as we have them, cleraed.
- s. 47F(1) 19/06 4:45 pm
s. 47F(1) Excellent, thank you! I will capture. 🙏
- s. 47F(1) 19/06 8:40 pm Edited
s. 47F(1) Thanks for the NTPs - dumb question, did they go to DCCEEW?
(and NEMA)
- 19/06 8:41 pm
DCCEEW helped write them.
- s. 47F(1) 19/06 8:42 pm
s. 47F(1) Ah okay, fantastic.

🔊 Palfreyman, Louise and 16 others were invited to the meeting.

🔊 19/06 4:15 pm Meeting started

s. 22(1)(a)(ii) 19/06 4:22 pm

👍 ❤️ 🤔 🤔 🤔 99 ...

s. 22(1)(a)(ii)

[Suspected detection of H5 strain of bird flu in WA, which would mark first detection in Australia -...](#)

s. 22(1)(a)(ii) 19/06 4:35 pm

s. 22(1)(a)(ii)

s. 22(1)(a)(ii) let me know if you need help with that.

s. 22(1)(a)(ii) 19/06 4:35 pm

s. 22(1)(a)(ii)

Can we be updated on the situation as you know it - to support TPs, scenarios, risk assessments etc - is there a sit rep from WA yet?

s. 22(1)(a)(ii) 19/06 4:37 pm

s. 22(1)(a)(ii)

s. 22(1)(a)(ii) 19/06/2026 4:35 pm

s. 22(1)(a)(ii) let me know if you need help with that.

Thanks s. 22(1)(a)(ii) that would be great. I'll start something off and send it through



I'm available sat and sun

Friday, 19 June

s. 22(1)(a)(ii) s. 22(1)(a)(ii)

🔊 19/06 7:54 pm

FYI - [Video footage emerges of Subantarctic Skua bird suspected of bringing H5 bird flu strain to Austral...](#)



Video captures bird suspected of bringing H5 fl...

Video footage of the bird suspected of bringing the H5 bird flu to Australia has emerged after the State...

www.mbtimes.com.au

s. 22(1)(a)(ii) s. 22(1)(a)(ii) 19/06 7:56 pm

Thanks for sharing Emma



To Sam Hamilton

Friday, 19 June

19/06 7:58 pm

FYI - [Video footage emerges of Subantarctic Skua bird suspected of bringing H5 bird flu strain to Austral...](#)



Video captures bird suspected of bringing ... X

Video footage of the bird suspected of bringing the H5 bird flu to Australia has emerged after the State...

www.mbtimes.com.au

s. 22(1)(a)(ii) 19/06 10:49 pm

in case useful - regarding the recently reported H5 detection, we provided quite a bit of information about the potential role of brown skuas in the long-distance spread of HPAI in the OFFLU document <https://offlu.org/technical-activities/continued-expansion-of-hpai-h5-in-wildlife-in-south-america-...>



Continued expansion of HPAI H5 in wildlife in S...
Skip to PDF content

offlu.org

19/06 10:49 pm

thanks might help when briefing minister

s. 22(1)(a)(ii) 19/06 10:50 pm

just let me know if there's any specific points that would be good to summarise etc



people want to understand more about skuas and petrels coming to Australia, what those birds mingle with (fiona suggested there could be mingling with all sorts, and whether we should be expecting to see mass mortalities of these species).

19/06 12:10 pm

can you grab words from s. 47F on the WA investment. i have s. 22(1)(a) do the ag investment that our MO wants

s. 22(1)(a)(ii) 19/06 12:11 pm

s. 22(1)(a)(ii)

s. 47F(1) on environ WA investment?

19/06 12:11 pm

yes please



also need a call out for your team on anyone able to work on the weekend

s. 22(1)(a)(ii) 19/06 11:52 am

s. 22(1)(a)(ii)

Hi Louise, I assume you haven't heard anything yet from Beth re the WA detections and whether we can go ahead with CC?

19/06 11:52 am

it is likely for this afternoon. i will call as soon as IDC finishes



s. 22(1)(a)(ii) 19/06 11:52 am

s. 22(1)(a)(ii)

great, sounds good

s. 22(1)(a)(ii) 19/06 3:10 pm

it would be helpful to confirm whether WA will submit a paper with an EADRP to tmr's CC meeting

that is what seems to be implied

otherwise we can speak to s. 47F(1) about this offline

Edited

hey louise, would you have a quick min to talk about a couple of CCEAD related things? Any time today is ok

19/06 3:40 pm

Hi all. You will see that Min just did a press conference announcing suspect H5 bird flu in WA. I'm on my way to Canberra. Confirmatory results from ACDP expected overnight.



4



4



s. 22(1)(a)(ii) 19/06 3:40 pm

Good luck Beth

Like



99

...

Suspected detection of H5 strain of bird flu in WA, which would mark first detection in Australia ...



Suspected detection of H5 strain of bird flu in ...

The first suspected case of a deadly strain of bird flu that has killed millions of birds and mammals worldwide has...

www.abc.net.au

s. 22(1)(a)(ii) 19/06 3:42 pm

Sad news but it's in good hands with you and all those involved **Cookson, Beth**, please let us know if there's anyway we can help support you

@



4



19/06 8:35 am

Morning. Can we pull out some simple points for Vic on the different strains of AI, and how to describe the H5 HPAI wildlife-adapted strain.

Palfreyman, Louise 19/06 8:35 am

LP yes no probs

Palfreyman, Louise 19/06 8:58 am

LP sent

19/06 10:28 am

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LP we are preparing for this. s. 22(1)(a)(ii) and i are making plans

take care! it is a bit mad...

we are all ready to help you.

19/06 12:43 pm

Can you call me re CCEAD sit rep timing pls?

Type a message



6:00

5G

< 5



CVO Group

s. 47F(1)



Thu, 18 Jun

s. 47F(1)

Just a heads up we have H5 in a sub Antarctic **Skua** in Esperance, presented sick and died. Also a sick Sub Antarctic Petrel, which has been tested. samples of **Skua** going to ACDP tonight. DPIRD will have preliminary AI results for petrel tomorrow

8:04 pm



3

s. 47F(1)

s. 47F(1)

Just a heads up we have H5 in a sub Antarctic **Skua** in Esperance, presented sick and died. Also a sick Sub Antarctic Petrel, which has been...

Thanks **s. 47F(1)** Do you have an ETA on ACDP results for the **skua**?

8:48 pm

s. 47F(1)

No, they won't have received it yet, so won't be complete results

8:49 pm



s. 47F(1)



9:49 pm



