




Australian Government
Department of Agriculture

Draft risk analysis report for the release of *Tachardiaephagus somervillei* for the biological control of yellow lac scale (*Tachardina aurantiaca*)

July 2015



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Submissions

This draft report has been issued to give all interested parties an opportunity to comment and draw attention to any scientific, technical, or other gaps in the data, misinterpretations and errors. Any comments should be submitted to the Australian Department of Agriculture within the comment period stated in the related Biosecurity Advice on the website. The draft report will then be revised as necessary to take account of the comments received and a final report prepared.

Comments on the draft report should be submitted to:

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
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Map 1 Map of Australia



Map 2 A guide to Australia's bio-climatic zones



Acronyms and abbreviations

Term or abbreviation	Definition
ACT	Australian Capital Territory
ALOP	Appropriate level of protection
BA	Biosecurity Advice
BCA	Biological Control Agent
CSIRO	Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation
EP	Existing policy
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
ICON	The Australian Department of Agriculture Import Conditions database
IPC	International Phytosanitary Certificate
IPPC	International Plant Protection Convention
IRA	Import risk analysis
ISPM	International Standard for Phytosanitary Measures
NSW	New South Wales
NPPO	National Plant Protection Organisation
NT	Northern Territory
PRA	Pest risk assessment
Qld	Queensland
SA	South Australia
SPS	Sanitary and Phytosanitary
Tas.	Tasmania
Vic.	Victoria
WA	Western Australia
WTO	World Trade Organization

Summary

The Australian Government Department of Agriculture has prepared this draft risk analysis report to assess the proposal by the Director of National Parks to release *Tachardiaephagus somervillei* for the biological control of yellow lac scale (*Tachardina aurantiaca*) on Christmas Island.

This draft report proposes that the release of *Tachardiaephagus somervillei* should be permitted. The draft report has identified moderate off-target effects with negligible potential consequences that would be associated with the release of *Tachardiaephagus somervillei*. The risk is estimated to be negligible, which meets Australia's appropriate level of protection (ALOP).

The Department of the Environment also has an approval process for the import and release of biological control agents under the *Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act (EPBC) 1999*.

This draft report contains details of the risk assessment for potential off-target effects associated with the proposed release of *Tachardiaephagus somervillei*. The application from the Director of National Parks and eight additional supporting documents are included as Attachment 1. Interested parties are invited to provide comments and submissions to the Department of Agriculture within the consultation period.

1 Introduction

1.1 Australia's biosecurity policy framework

Australia's biosecurity policies aim to protect Australia against the risks that may arise from exotic pests entering, establishing and spreading in Australia, thereby threatening Australia's unique flora and fauna, as well as those agricultural industries that are relatively free from serious pests.

The risk analysis process is an important part of Australia's biosecurity policies. It enables the Australian Government to formally consider the risks that could be associated with proposals to release a new organism into Australia. If the risks are found to exceed Australia's appropriate level of protection (ALOP) then release will not be allowed.

Successive Australian Governments have maintained a conservative, but not a zero risk, approach to the management of biosecurity risks. This approach is expressed in terms of Australia's ALOP, which reflects community expectations through government policy and is currently described as providing a high level of protection aimed at reducing risk to a very low level, but not to zero.

Australia's risk analyses are undertaken by the Department of Agriculture using technical and scientific experts in relevant fields, and involve consultation with stakeholders at various stages during the process.

The Department of Agriculture's assessment may take the form of an import risk analysis (IRA), a non-regulated analysis of existing policy, or technical advice.

Further information about Australia's biosecurity framework is provided in Appendix B of this report and in the *Import Risk Analysis Handbook 2011* located on the [Department of Agriculture](#) website.

1.2 This risk analysis

1.2.1 Background

An application has been submitted by the Director of National Parks to release a biological control agent (Attachment 1). The biological control agent, *Tachardiaephagus somervillei* is a microhymenopteran parasitoid proposed for the biological control of yellow lac scale (*Tachardina aurantiaca*) on Christmas Island. The applicant has followed the steps outlined in the [Biosecurity Guidelines](#) for the Introduction of Exotic Biological Control Agents for the Control of Weeds and Plant Pests.

1.2.2 Scope

The scope of this risk analysis is to consider the biosecurity risk that may be associated with the release of an exotic biological control agent into the Australian environment, specifically Christmas Island, a territory of Australia in the Indian Ocean. Christmas Island is located 2600 kilometres north-west of Perth, Western Australia and is therefore biologically isolated from the mainland of Australia. In addition, there is a full quarantine barrier between Christmas Island

and the mainland of Australia. The primary risk with a release of this nature is the possibility of unwanted off-target effects on other species already present on Christmas Island. The Department of Agriculture assesses the risk under the *Quarantine Act 1908*. The Department of the Environment also has an approval process under the *Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act (EPBC) 1999*. This risk analysis report may be used by the responsible Minister in making a determination to include the item on the List of Specimens taken to be suitable for live import (live import list).

The Department of Agriculture will not commence an assessment to release a biological control agent unless the target has been approved by an appropriate government body. *Tachardina aurantiaca* was approved as a target for biological control by Plant Health Committee on 9 April 2013.

1.2.3 Contaminating pests

There are other organisms that may arrive with imported exotic biological control agents. These organisms may include parasitoids, mites or fungi. The Department of Agriculture considers these organisms to be contaminating pests that could pose sanitary and phytosanitary risks. Should this application to release be approved, these risks will be addressed by existing operational procedures that apply to the importation and final release of biological control agents. These procedures usually include detailed examination of imported material, confirmation of identity and breeding through one generation before release. For this reason, contaminating pests are not considered in this risk analysis. It should be noted here that the applicant intends to apply for direct release of *Tachardiaephagus somervillei*. Direct release is classified as the release from quarantine where the agent is not reared through one generation in quarantine.

1.2.4 Consultation

In March 2015, a preliminary draft of this report was distributed to state and territory departments of primary industry and the Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation (CSIRO) through the Plant Health Committee (PHC) as well as the Department of the Environment. Comments received via this consultation process were incorporated into this draft risk analysis report. All comments endorsed the preliminary draft and its recommendations.

1.2.5 Next Steps

This draft report gives stakeholders the opportunity to comment and draw attention to any scientific, technical, or other gaps in the data, misinterpretations and errors.

The Department of Agriculture will consider submissions received on the draft report and may consult informally with stakeholders. The department will revise the draft report as appropriate. The department will then prepare a final report, taking into account stakeholder comments.

The final report will be published on the department website along with a notice advising stakeholders of the release. The department will also notify the proposer and the registered stakeholders about the release of the final report. Publication of the final report represents the end of the process. Following the risk analysis process, if the Department of Agriculture

approves release of the biological control agent, then a letter will be sent to the applicant providing conditions of release.

2 Method for risk analysis

Biological control agents (BCAs) intended for release are deliberately introduced, distributed, aided to establish and spread. Therefore it would be inappropriate to assess the probability of entry, establishment and spread using the processes described in ISPM 11 (FAO 2013). This BCA risk analysis will focus only on off-target effects, as this is the only concern with regard to the release of biological control agents.

2.1 Australia's appropriate level of protection (ALOP)

The SPS Agreement defines the concept of an 'appropriate level of sanitary or phytosanitary protection (ALOP)' as the level of protection deemed appropriate by the WTO Member establishing a sanitary or phytosanitary measure to protect human, animal or plant life or health within its territory.

Like many other countries, Australia expresses its ALOP in qualitative terms. Australia's ALOP, which reflects community expectations through government policy, is currently expressed as providing a high level of sanitary or phytosanitary protection aimed at reducing risk to a very low level, but not to zero. The band of cells in Table 5 marked 'very low risk' represents Australia's ALOP.

3 Assessment of off-target risks

This section sets out the assessment of off-target risks that could be associated with the release of the biological control agent. Where appropriate, the methods followed those used for pest risk analysis (PRA) by the Department of Agriculture in accordance with the International Standards for Phytosanitary Measures (ISPMs), including ISPM 2: *Framework for pest risk analysis* (FAO 2007), ISPM 3: *Guidelines for the export, shipment, import and release of biological control agents and other beneficial organisms* (FAO 2011) and ISPM 11: *Pest risk analysis for quarantine pests* (FAO 2013) that have been developed under the SPS Agreement (WTO 1995). The methodology for a commodity-based PRA is provided in Appendix A.

The risk associated with release of a biological control agent is a combination of the probability of off-target effects and the potential magnitude of the consequences of any off-target effects.

3.1 Stage 1: Initiation

Initiation commences when an applicant provides a submission proposing the release of a biological control agent.

The risk analysis area for this assessment is defined as the external Australian territory of Christmas Island and once released it is assumed that there will be no control of spread of the agent on the island, other than environmental constraints related to the biology of the organism. Furthermore, there are quarantine measures in place restricting movement of plants and plant material between Christmas Island and mainland Australia.

3.2 Stage 2: Risk assessment

This assessment evaluates the probability of off-target effects and the potential economic and environmental consequences of these effects.

3.2.1 Assessment of the probability of off-target effects

Given that the proposal is for deliberate release, the probability of entry, establishment and spread is assumed to be certain and therefore the assessment relates to the host specificity of the proposed agent.

A qualitative likelihood is assigned to the estimate of probability of off-target effects. Six descriptors are used: high; moderate; low; very low; extremely low; and negligible. Descriptive definitions for these descriptors and their indicative probability ranges are given in Appendix A, Table 1.

Attachment 1 gives details provided by the applicant of the host specificity testing that was carried out.

Background to this application

Biological control of yellow lac scale (*Tachardina aurantiaca*) on Christmas Island was proposed following the results of three research projects carried out over the period 2009-2013 (Green et al. 2013 – supporting document 2). The primary aim of controlling the yellow lac scale is to achieve indirect biological control of yellow crazy ant (*Anoplolepis gracilipes*). Yellow crazy ants form supercolonies on Christmas Island, threatening native biota. Yellow lac scale in high densities within the yellow crazy ant supercolonies provide a large portion of the honeydew that the ants utilise.

Host specificity testing methodology

The host specificity test list was compiled using the centrifugal approach, a widely accepted method based on phylogenetic similarity, (Kuhlmann et al 2006; Wapshere 1974). Eight species were tested, including representatives from the following families; four Coccidae, three Pseudococcidae and one Diaspididae. The host test list did not include *Paratachardina pseudolobata* (lobate lac scale), the only other species in the Kerriidae family (to which yellow lac scale belongs) present on Christmas Island.

All host specificity testing was conducted in the field in Kuching (Sarawak, Malaysia). Testing took the form of no-choice tests with negative and positive controls. The no-choice tests were conducted with 25 individuals per trials, exposed to 5 female and 5 male parasitoids. Each trial was carried out in an enclosed mesh bag on a branch in the field testing area. Ten replicates were carried out for all test species except one (which had 5 replicates). Negative controls, consisted of 25 test insect species enclosed in mesh bags without the parasitoid. Positive controls consisted of 25 unparasitised adult yellow lac scales, with 5 female and 5 male parasitoids added to the enclosed mesh bag.

Results of host specificity testing

None of the eight test species were parasitised by *T. somervillei* during the no-choice testing. Positive controls showed that all replicates of yellow lac scale were consistently parasitised at a high level.

The results suggest that *T. somervillei* is host specific. This result is consistent with the information from records in literature presented in the application on host specificity for *T. somervillei* and the entire genus *Tachardiaephagus*. All hosts for this genus have been recorded from the lac scale family, Kerriidae. As *Paratachardina pseudolobata* is in the Kerriidae family and was not tested, there is a possibility that there may be off-target effects on this species. This species is not native to Christmas Island and is considered a pest species on the island.

On the basis of the work presented in Attachment 1, it is concluded that the likelihood of off-target effects in Australia is: **Moderate**.

3.2.2 Assessment of potential consequences of off-target effects

The potential consequences of the off-target effects of this biological control agent have been assessed using the same methodology (Appendix A) as used in the import risk analysis process for pests associated with imported fresh produce. It should be noted that the impact scores are based on negative consequences, not positive consequences – which can be expected from the release of host specific biological control agents.

Criterion	Estimate and rationale
Direct	
Plant life or health	A—indiscernible at the local level <i>Tachardiaephagus somervillei</i> is a primary endoparasitoid of species within the Kerriidae family. There are no known direct interactions with plants.
Other aspects of the environment	B— minor significance at the local level There were no off-target effects observed on any of the species tested. Given the host specificity demonstrated throughout the testing and information on host records from literature, it is not anticipated that there will be any off-target effects observed outside the Kerriidae family. As noted above, there is the possibility that there may be some off-target parasitism observed on <i>Paratachardina pseudolobata</i> , as this species is in the Kerriidae family and was not tested during host specificity testing. Any direct off-target effects on this species would not be of concern from an environmental or quarantine perspective as it is an introduced pest. It should be noted however that any significant off-target effects on this species may cause a reduction in parasitism of the target, yellow lac scale.
Indirect	
Eradication, control	A—indiscernible at the local level <i>Tachardiaephagus somervillei</i> is a parasitoid wasp proposed for release for the biological control of the invasive yellow lac scale (<i>Tachardina aurantiaca</i>). It is not likely to cause any negative environmental or economic effects and would be extremely unlikely to meet criterion for eradication or control. Therefore, the need for eradication and or control is not anticipated.
Domestic trade	A—indiscernible at the local level <i>Tachardiaephagus somervillei</i> is a biological control agent

	proposed for the targeting of an exotic pest species. It is therefore highly unlikely, should <i>T. somervillei</i> be released on Christmas Island, that any restrictions would be put in place by state and territory departments on mainland Australia. There are already restrictions on the movement of plants and plant material in place from Christmas Island to the mainland as there are exotic pests present on Christmas Island that are not present on mainland Australia.
International trade	A—indiscernible at the local level <i>Tachardiaephagus somervillei</i> is a biological control agent proposed for the targeting of an exotic pest species. It is therefore highly unlikely, should <i>T. somervillei</i> be released on Christmas Island, that any restrictions would be put in place by international trading partners. There is no agricultural industry with international export capacity on Christmas Island.
Environmental and non-commercial	A—indiscernible at the local level Should there be off-target parasitism on <i>Paratachardina pseudolobata</i> , the effectiveness of the biological control program on the target species, yellow lac scale, may be reduced. There would be no discernible indirect environmental consequences of this, it would only mean a reduction in the anticipated positive indirect environmental consequences. Indirect environmental consequences on Christmas Island are expected, and are the aim of the biological control application. By releasing <i>T. somervillei</i> , and subsequently controlling yellow lac scale, the applicant is hoping to indirectly control yellow crazy ants (<i>Anoplolepis gracilipes</i>) on the island. Furthermore – the invasion and supercolony formation on Christmas Island by yellow crazy ants is listed as a Threatening Process under the <i>EPBC Act</i> . The indirect control of yellow crazy ants is expected to have benefits to biodiversity on Christmas Island. There are no negative indirect environmental and non-commercial consequences predicted.

Based on this assessment the potential consequences of off-target effects are: **Negligible**.

3.2.3 Estimation of off-target risk of release

Unrestricted risk is the result of combining the probability of off-target effects with the outcome of potential consequences. Off-target effects and consequences are combined using the risk estimation matrix shown in Appendix A, Table 5.

Risk estimate for <i>Tachardiaephagus somervillei</i>	
Probability of off-target effects	Moderate
Consequences	Negligible
Risk	Negligible

As indicated, the risk estimate for release of *Tachardiaephagus somervillei* has been assessed as 'negligible', which achieves Australia's ALOP. Therefore, *Tachardiaephagus somervillei* is recommended for release.

4 Draft recommendation on release

Given that the estimate of risk is negligible, it is recommended that *Tachardiaephagus somervillei* may be released, subject to existing operational procedures for import and release of biological control agents, to ensure that the released material is free of other organisms.

5 Attachments

Application to release the microhymenopteran parasitoid *Tachardiaephagus somervillei* for the control of the invasive scale insect *Tachardina aurantiaca* on Christmas Island, Indian Ocean – plus supporting documents.

Appendix A: Method for pest risk analysis

This chapter sets out the method used for the pest risk analysis (PRA) in this report. The Department of Agriculture has conducted this PRA in accordance with the International Standards for Phytosanitary Measures (ISPMs), including ISPM 2: *Framework for pest risk analysis* (FAO 2007) and ISPM 11: *Pest risk analysis for quarantine pests* (FAO 2013) that have been developed under the SPS Agreement (WTO 1995).

A PRA is 'the process of evaluating biological or other scientific and economic evidence to determine whether an organism is a pest, whether it should be regulated, and the strength of any phytosanitary measures to be taken against it' (FAO 2012). A pest is 'any species, strain or biotype of plant, animal, or pathogenic agent injurious to plants or plant products' (FAO 2012).

Quarantine risk consists of two major components: the probability of a pest entering, establishing and spreading in Australia from imports; and the consequences should this happen. These two components are combined to give an overall estimate of the risk.

Unrestricted risk is estimated taking into account the existing commercial production practices of the exporting country and that, on arrival in Australia, the Department of Agriculture will verify that the consignment received is as described on the commercial documents and its integrity has been maintained.

Restricted risk is estimated with phytosanitary measure(s) applied. A phytosanitary measure is 'any legislation, regulation or official procedure having the purpose to prevent the introduction and/or spread of quarantine pests, or to limit the economic impact of regulated non-quarantine pests' (FAO 2012).

A glossary of the terms used is provided at the back of this report.

The PRAs are conducted in the following three consecutive stages: initiation, pest risk assessment and pest risk management.

Stage 1: Initiation

Initiation identifies the pest(s) and pathway(s) that are of quarantine concern and should be considered for risk analysis in relation to the identified PRA area.

For this risk analysis, the 'PRA area' is defined as Australia for pests that are absent, or of limited distribution and under official control. For areas with regional freedom from a pest, the 'PRA area' may be defined on the basis of a state or territory of Australia or may be defined as a region of Australia consisting of parts of a state or territory or several states or territories.

For pests that had been considered by the Department of Agriculture in other risk assessments and for which import policies already exist, a judgement was made on the likelihood of entry of pests on the commodity and whether existing policy is adequate to manage the risks associated with its import. Where appropriate, the previous risk assessment was taken into consideration when developing the new policy.

Stage 2: Pest risk assessment

A pest risk assessment (for quarantine pests) is the 'evaluation of the probability of the introduction and spread of a pest and of the magnitude of the associated potential economic consequences' (FAO 2012).

The following three, consecutive steps were used in pest risk assessment:

Pest categorisation

Pest categorisation identifies which of the pests with the potential to be on the commodity are quarantine pests for Australia and require pest risk assessment. A 'quarantine pest' is a pest of potential economic importance to the area endangered thereby and not yet present there, or present but not widely distributed and being officially controlled (FAO 2012).

The pests identified in Stage 1 were categorised using the following primary elements to identify the quarantine pests for the commodity being assessed:

- identity of the pest
- presence or absence in the PRA area
- regulatory status
- potential for establishment and spread in the PRA area
- potential for economic consequences (including environmental consequences) in the PRA area.

Assessment of the probability of entry, establishment and spread

Details of how to assess the 'probability of entry', 'probability of establishment' and 'probability of spread' of a pest are given in ISPM 11 (FAO 2013). A summary of this process is given below, followed by a description of the qualitative methodology used in this risk analysis.

Probability of entry

The probability of entry describes the probability that a quarantine pest will enter Australia as a result of trade in a given commodity, be distributed in a viable state in the PRA area and subsequently be transferred to a host. It is based on pathway scenarios depicting necessary steps in the sourcing of the commodity for export, its processing, transport and storage, its use in Australia and the generation and disposal of waste. In particular, the ability of the pest to survive is considered for each of these various stages.

The probability of entry estimates for the quarantine pests for a commodity are based on the use of the existing commercial production, packaging and shipping practices of the exporting country. Details of the existing commercial production practices for the commodity are set out in the report. These practices are taken into consideration by the Department of Agriculture when estimating the probability of entry.

For the purpose of considering the probability of entry, the Department of Agriculture divides this step into two components:

- **Probability of importation:** the probability that a pest will arrive in Australia when a given commodity is imported.
- **Probability of distribution:** the probability that the pest will be distributed, as a result of the processing, sale or disposal of the commodity, in the PRA area and subsequently transfer to a susceptible part of a host.

Factors considered in the probability of importation include:

- distribution and incidence of the pest in the source area
- occurrence of the pest in a life-stage that would be associated with the commodity
- mode of trade (for example, bulk, packed)
- volume and frequency of movement of the commodity along each pathway
- seasonal timing of imports
- pest management, cultural and commercial procedures applied at the place of origin
- speed of transport and conditions of storage compared with the duration of the lifecycle of the pest
- vulnerability of the life-stages of the pest during transport or storage
- incidence of the pest likely to be associated with a consignment
- commercial procedures (for example, refrigeration) applied to consignments during transport and storage in the country of origin, and during transport to Australia.

Factors considered in the probability of distribution include:

- commercial procedures (for example, refrigeration) applied to consignments during distribution in Australia
- dispersal mechanisms of the pest, including vectors, to allow movement from the pathway to a host
- whether the imported commodity is to be sent to a few or many destination points in the PRA area
- proximity of entry, transit and destination points to hosts
- time of year at which import takes place
- intended use of the commodity (for example, for planting, processing or consumption)
- risks from by-products and waste.

Probability of establishment

Establishment is defined as the 'perpetuation for the foreseeable future, of a pest within an area after entry' (FAO 2012). In order to estimate the probability of establishment of a pest, reliable biological information (for example, lifecycle, host range, epidemiology, survival) is obtained from the areas where the pest currently occurs. The situation in the PRA area can then be compared with that in the areas where it currently occurs and expert judgement used to assess the probability of establishment.

Factors considered in the probability of establishment in the PRA area include:

- availability of hosts, alternative hosts and vectors
- suitability of the environment
- reproductive strategy and potential for adaptation
- minimum population needed for establishment
- cultural practices and control measures.

Probability of spread

Spread is defined as ‘the expansion of the geographical distribution of a pest within an area’ (FAO 2012). The probability of spread considers the factors relevant to the movement of the pest, after establishment on a host plant or plants, to other susceptible host plants of the same or different species in other areas. In order to estimate the probability of spread of the pest, reliable biological information is obtained from areas where the pest currently occurs. The situation in the PRA area is then carefully compared with that in the areas where the pest currently occurs and expert judgement used to assess the probability of spread.

Factors considered in the probability of spread include:

- suitability of the natural and/or managed environment for natural spread of the pest
- presence of natural barriers
- potential for movement with commodities, conveyances or by vectors
- intended use of the commodity
- potential vectors of the pest in the PRA area
- potential natural enemies of the pest in the PRA area.

Assigning qualitative likelihoods for entry, establishment and spread

In its qualitative PRAs, the Department of Agriculture uses the term ‘likelihood’ for the descriptors it uses for its estimates of probability of entry, establishment and spread. Qualitative likelihoods are assigned to each step of entry, establishment and spread. Six descriptors are used: high; moderate; low; very low; extremely low; and negligible (Table 1). Descriptive definitions for these descriptors and their indicative probability ranges are given in Table 1. The indicative probability ranges are only provided to illustrate the boundaries of the descriptors and are not used beyond this purpose in qualitative PRAs. These indicative probability ranges provide guidance to the risk analyst and promote consistency between different pest risk assessments.

Table 1 Nomenclature of qualitative likelihoods

Likelihood	Descriptive definition	Indicative probability (P) range
High	The event would be very likely to occur	$0.7 < P \leq 1$
Moderate	The event would occur with an even probability	$0.3 < P \leq 0.7$
Low	The event would be unlikely to occur	$0.05 < P \leq 0.3$
Very low	The event would be very unlikely to occur	$0.001 < P \leq 0.05$
Extremely low	The event would be extremely unlikely to occur	$0.000001 < P \leq 0.001$
Negligible	The event would almost certainly not occur	$0 < P \leq 0.000001$

The likelihood of entry is determined by combining the likelihood that the pest will be imported into the PRA area and the likelihood that the pest will be distributed within the PRA area, using a matrix of rules (Table 2). This matrix is then used to combine the likelihood of entry and the likelihood of establishment, and the likelihood of entry and establishment is then combined with the likelihood of spread to determine the overall likelihood of entry, establishment and spread.

For example, if the likelihood of importation is assigned a descriptor of 'low' and the likelihood of distribution is assigned a descriptor of 'moderate', then they are combined to give a likelihood of 'low' for entry. The likelihood for entry is then combined with the likelihood assigned for establishment of 'high' to give a likelihood for entry and establishment of 'low'. The likelihood for entry and establishment is then combined with the likelihood assigned for spread of 'very low' to give the overall likelihood for entry, establishment and spread of 'very low'. This can be summarised as:

importation x distribution = entry [E]

low x moderate = low

entry x [establishment = [EE]

low x high = low

[EE] x spread = [EES]

low x very low = very low

Table 2 Matrix of rules for combining qualitative likelihoods

	High	Moderate	Low	Very low	Extremely low	Negligible
High	High	Moderate	Low	Very low	Extremely low	Negligible
Moderate		Low	Low	Very low	Extremely low	Negligible
Low			Very low	Very low	Extremely low	Negligible
Very low				Extremely low	Extremely low	Negligible
Extremely low					Negligible	Negligible
Negligible						Negligible

Time and volume of trade

One factor affecting the likelihood of entry is the volume and duration of trade. If all other conditions remain the same, the overall likelihood of entry will increase as time passes and the overall volume of trade increases.

The Department of Agriculture normally considers the likelihood of entry on the basis of the estimated volume of one year's trade. This is a convenient value for the analysis that is relatively easy to estimate and allows for expert consideration of seasonal variations in pest presence, incidence and behaviour to be taken into account. The consideration of the likelihood of entry, establishment and spread and subsequent consequences takes into account events that might happen over a number of years even though only one year's volume of trade is being considered. This difference reflects biological and ecological facts, for example where a pest or disease may establish in the year of import but spread may take many years.

The use of a one year volume of trade has been taken into account when setting up the matrix that is used to estimate the risk and therefore any policy based on this analysis does not simply apply to one year of trade. Policy decisions that are based on the Department of Agriculture's method that uses the estimated volume of one year's trade are consistent with Australia's policy on appropriate level of protection and meet the Australian Government's requirement for ongoing quarantine protection. Of course if there are substantial changes in the volume and nature of the trade in specific commodities then the department has an obligation to review the risk analysis and, if necessary, provide updated policy advice.

In assessing the volume of trade in this risk analysis, the Department of Agriculture assumed that a substantial volume of trade will occur.

Assessment of potential consequences

The objective of the consequence assessment is to provide a structured and transparent analysis of the likely consequences if the pests or disease agents were to enter, establish and spread in Australia. The assessment considers direct and indirect pest effects and their economic and environmental consequences. The requirements for assessing potential consequences are given in Article 5.3 of the SPS Agreement (WTO 1995), ISPM 5 (FAO 2012) and ISPM 11 (FAO 2013).

Direct pest effects are considered in the context of the effects on:

- plant life or health

- other aspects of the environment.

Indirect pest effects are considered in the context of the effects on:

- eradication, control
- domestic trade
- international trade
- environment.

For each of these six criteria, the consequences were estimated over four geographic levels, defined as:

Local: an aggregate of households or enterprises (a rural community, a town or a local government area).

District: a geographically or geopolitically associated collection of aggregates (generally a recognised section of a state or territory, such as 'Far North Queensland').

Regional: a geographically or geopolitically associated collection of districts in a geographic area (generally a state or territory, although there may be exceptions with larger states such as Western Australia).

National: Australia wide (Australian mainland states and territories and Tasmania).

For each criterion, the magnitude of the potential consequence at each of these levels was described using four categories, defined as:

Indiscernible: pest impact unlikely to be noticeable.

Minor significance: expected to lead to a minor increase in mortality/morbidity of hosts or a minor decrease in production but not expected to threaten the economic viability of production. Expected to decrease the value of non-commercial criteria but not threaten the criterion's intrinsic value. Effects would generally be reversible.

Significant: expected to threaten the economic viability of production through a moderate increase in mortality/morbidity of hosts, or a moderate decrease in production. Expected to significantly diminish or threaten the intrinsic value of non-commercial criteria. Effects may not be reversible.

Major significance: expected to threaten the economic viability through a large increase in mortality/morbidity of hosts, or a large decrease in production. Expected to severely or irreversibly damage the intrinsic 'value' of non-commercial criteria.

The estimates of the magnitude of the potential consequences over the four geographic levels were translated into a qualitative impact score (A-G) using Table 3. For example, a consequence with a magnitude of 'significant' at the 'district' level will have a consequence impact score of D.

Table 3 Decision rules for determining the consequence impact score based on the magnitude of consequences at four geographic scales

Magnitude	Geographic scale			
	Local	District	Region	Nation
Indiscernible	A	A	A	A
Minor significance	B	C	D	E
Significant	C	D	E	F
Major significance	D	E	F	G

Note: In earlier qualitative PRAs, the scale for the impact scores went from A to F and did not explicitly allow for the rating 'indiscernible' at all four levels. This combination might be applicable for some criteria. In this report, the impact scale of A to F has been changed to become B-G and a new lowest category A ('indiscernible' at all four levels) was added. The rules for combining impacts in Table 4 were adjusted accordingly.

The overall consequence for each pest is achieved by combining the qualitative impact scores (A–G) for each direct and indirect consequence using a series of decision rules (Table 4). These rules are mutually exclusive, and are assessed in numerical order until one applies.

Table 4 Decision rules for determining the overall consequence rating for each pest

Rule	The impact scores for consequences of direct and indirect criteria	Overall consequence rating
1	Any criterion has an impact of 'G'; or more than one criterion has an impact of 'F'; or a single criterion has an impact of 'F' and each remaining criterion an 'E'.	Extreme
2	A single criterion has an impact of 'F'; or all criteria have an impact of 'E'.	High
3	One or more criteria have an impact of 'E'; or all criteria have an impact of 'D'.	Moderate
4	One or more criteria have an impact of 'D'; or all criteria have an impact of 'C'.	Low
5	One or more criteria have an impact of 'C'; or all criteria have an impact of 'B'.	Very Low
6	One or more but not all criteria have an impact of 'B', and all remaining criteria have an impact of 'A'.	Negligible

Estimation of the unrestricted risk

Once the assessment of the probability of entry, establishment and spread and for potential consequences are completed, the unrestricted risk can be determined for each pest or groups of pests. This is determined by using a risk estimation matrix (Table 5) to combine the estimates of the probability of entry, establishment and spread and the overall consequences of pest establishment and spread. Therefore, risk is the product of likelihood and consequence.

When interpreting the risk estimation matrix, note the descriptors for each axis are similar (for example, low, moderate, high) but the vertical axis refers to likelihood and the horizontal axis refers to consequences. Accordingly, a 'low' likelihood combined with 'high' consequences, is not the same as a 'high' likelihood combined with 'low' consequences—the matrix is not symmetrical. For example, the former combination would give an unrestricted risk rating of 'moderate', whereas, the latter would be rated as a 'low' unrestricted risk.

Table 5 Risk estimation matrix

Likelihood of off-target effects	Consequences of off-target effects					
	Negligible	Very low	Low	Moderate	High	Extreme
High	Negligible risk	Very low risk	Low risk	Moderate risk	High risk	Extreme risk
Moderate	Negligible risk	Very low risk	Low risk	Moderate risk	High risk	Extreme risk
Low	Negligible risk	Negligible risk	Very low risk	Low risk	Moderate risk	High risk
Very low	Negligible risk	Negligible risk	Negligible risk	Very low risk	Low risk	Moderate risk
Extremely low	Negligible risk	Negligible risk	Negligible risk	Negligible risk	Very low risk	Low risk
Negligible	Negligible risk	Negligible risk	Negligible risk	Negligible risk	Negligible risk	Very low risk

Australia's appropriate level of protection (ALOP)

The SPS Agreement defines the concept of an 'appropriate level of sanitary or phytosanitary protection (ALOP)' as the level of protection deemed appropriate by the WTO Member establishing a sanitary or phytosanitary measure to protect human, animal or plant life or health within its territory.

Like many other countries, Australia expresses its ALOP in qualitative terms. Australia's ALOP, which reflects community expectations through government policy, is currently expressed as providing a high level of sanitary or phytosanitary protection aimed at reducing risk to a very low level, but not to zero. The band of cells in Table 5 marked 'very low risk' represents Australia's ALOP.

Stage 3: Pest risk management

Pest risk management describes the process of identifying and implementing phytosanitary measures to manage risks to achieve Australia's ALOP, while ensuring that any negative effects on trade are minimised.

The conclusions from pest risk assessment are used to decide whether risk management is required and if so, the appropriate measures to be used. Where the unrestricted risk estimate exceeds Australia's ALOP, risk management measures are required to reduce this risk to a very low level. The guiding principle for risk management is to manage risk to achieve Australia's ALOP. The effectiveness of any proposed phytosanitary measures (or combination of measures) is evaluated, using the same approach as used to evaluate the unrestricted risk, to ensure it reduces the restricted risk for the relevant pest or pests to meet Australia's ALOP.

ISPM 11 (FAO 2013) provides details on the identification and selection of appropriate risk management options and notes that the choice of measures should be based on their effectiveness in reducing the probability of entry of the pest.

Examples given of measures commonly applied to traded commodities include:

- options for consignments—for example, inspection or testing for freedom from pests, prohibition of parts of the host, a pre-entry or post-entry quarantine system, specified conditions on preparation of the consignment, specified treatment of the consignment, restrictions on end-use, distribution and periods of entry of the commodity
- options preventing or reducing infestation in the crop—for example, treatment of the crop, restriction on the composition of a consignment so it is composed of plants belonging to resistant or less susceptible species, harvesting of plants at a certain age or specified time of the year, production in a certification scheme
- options ensuring that the area, place or site of production or crop is free from the pest—for example, pest-free area, pest-free place of production or pest-free production site
- options for other types of pathways—for example, consider natural spread, measures for human travellers and their baggage, cleaning or disinfestations of contaminated machinery
- options within the importing country—for example, surveillance and eradication programs
- prohibition of commodities—if no satisfactory measure can be found.

Risk management measures are identified for each quarantine pest where the risk exceeds Australia's ALOP.

Appendix B: Biosecurity framework

Australia's biosecurity policies

The objective of Australia's biosecurity policies and risk management measures is the prevention or control of the entry, establishment or spread of pests and diseases that could cause significant harm to people, animals, plants and other aspects of the environment.

Australia has diverse native flora and fauna and a large agricultural sector, and is relatively free from the more significant pests and diseases present in other countries. Therefore, successive Australian Governments have maintained a conservative, but not a zero-risk, approach to the management of biosecurity risks. This approach is consistent with the World Trade Organization's (WTO's) Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS Agreement).

The SPS Agreement defines the concept of an 'appropriate level of protection' (ALOP) as the level of protection deemed appropriate by a WTO Member establishing a sanitary or phytosanitary measure to protect human, animal or plant life or health within its territory. Among a number of obligations, a WTO Member should take into account the objective of minimising negative trade effects in setting its ALOP.

Like many other countries, Australia expresses its ALOP in qualitative terms. Australia's ALOP, which reflects community expectations through Australian Government policy, is currently expressed as providing a high level of sanitary and phytosanitary protection, aimed at reducing risk to a very low level, but not to zero.

Consistent with the SPS Agreement, in conducting risk analyses Australia takes into account as relevant economic factors:

- the potential damage in terms of loss of production or sales in the event of the entry, establishment or spread of a pest or disease in the territory of Australia
- the costs of control or eradication of a pest or disease
- and the relative cost-effectiveness of alternative approaches to limiting risks.

Roles and responsibilities within Australia's quarantine system

Australia protects its human, animal and plant life or health through a comprehensive quarantine system that covers the quarantine continuum, from pre-border to border and post-border activities. The Australian Government Department of Health is responsible for human health aspects of quarantine. The Australian Government Department of Agriculture is responsible for animal and plant life or health.

Pre-border, Australia participates in international standard-setting bodies, undertakes risk analyses, develops offshore quarantine arrangements where appropriate, and engages with our neighbours to counter the spread of exotic pests and diseases.

At the border, Australia screens vessels (including aircraft), people and goods entering the country to detect potential threats to Australian human, animal and plant health.

The Australian Government also undertakes targeted measures at the immediate post-border level within Australia. This includes national co-ordination of emergency responses to pest and disease incursions. The movement of goods of quarantine concern within Australia's border is the responsibility of relevant state and territory authorities, which undertake inter- and intra-state quarantine operations that reflect regional differences in pest and disease status, as a part of their wider plant and animal health responsibilities.

Roles and responsibilities within the Department

The Australian Government Department of Agriculture is responsible for the Australian Government's animal and plant biosecurity policy development and the establishment of risk management measures. The Secretary of the Department is appointed as the Director of Animal and Plant Quarantine under the *Quarantine Act 1908* (the Act).

The Department takes the lead in biosecurity and quarantine policy development and the establishment and implementation of risk management measures across the biosecurity continuum, and:

- **Pre-border** conducts risk analyses, including IRAs, and develops recommendations for biosecurity policy as well as providing quarantine policy advice to the Director of Animal and Plant Quarantine
- **At the border** develops operational procedures, makes a range of quarantine decisions under the Act (including import permit decisions under delegation from the Director of Animal and Plant Quarantine) and delivers quarantine services
- **Post-border** coordinates pest and disease preparedness, emergency responses and liaison on inter- and intra-state quarantine arrangements for the Australian Government, in conjunction with Australia's state and territory governments.

Roles and responsibilities of other government agencies

State and territory governments play a vital role in the quarantine continuum. The department works in partnership with state and territory governments to address regional differences in pest and disease status and risk within Australia, and develops appropriate sanitary and phytosanitary measures to account for those differences. Australia's partnership approach to quarantine is supported by a formal Memorandum of Understanding that provides for consultation between the Australian Government and the state and territory governments.

Depending on the nature of the good being imported or proposed for importation, the Department of Agriculture may consult other Australian Government authorities or agencies in developing its recommendations and providing advice.

As well as a Director of Animal and Plant Quarantine, the Act provides for a Director of Human Quarantine. The Australian Government Department of Health is responsible for human health aspects of quarantine and Australia's Chief Medical Officer within that Department holds the position of Director of Human Quarantine. The Department of Agriculture may, where appropriate, consult with that Department on relevant matters that may have implications for human health.

The Act also requires the Director of Animal and Plant Quarantine, before making certain decisions, to request advice from the Environment Minister and to take the advice into account when making those decisions. The Australian Government Department of the Environment is responsible under the *Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999* for assessing the environmental impact associated with proposals to import live species. Anyone proposing to import such material should contact the Department of the Environment directly for further information.

When undertaking risk analyses, the Department of Agriculture consults with the Department of the Environment about environmental issues and may use or refer to the Department of the Environment's assessment.

Australian quarantine legislation

The Australian quarantine system is supported by Commonwealth, state and territory quarantine laws. Under the Australian Constitution, the Commonwealth Government does not have exclusive power to make laws in relation to quarantine, and as a result, Commonwealth and state quarantine laws can co-exist.

Commonwealth quarantine laws are contained in the *Quarantine Act 1908* and subordinate legislation including the Quarantine Regulations 2000, the Quarantine Proclamation 1998, the Quarantine (Cocos Islands) Proclamation 2004 and the Quarantine (Christmas Island) Proclamation 2004.

The quarantine proclamations identify goods, which cannot be imported, into Australia, the Cocos Islands and or Christmas Island unless the Director of Animal and Plant Quarantine or delegate grants an import permit or unless they comply with other conditions specified in the proclamations. Section 70 of the Quarantine Proclamation 1998, section 34 of the Quarantine (Cocos Islands) Proclamation 2004 and section 34 of the Quarantine (Christmas Island) Proclamation 2004 specify the things a Director of Animal and Plant Quarantine must take into account when deciding whether to grant a permit.

In particular, a Director of Animal and Plant Quarantine (or delegate):

- must consider the level of quarantine risk if the permit were granted, and
- must consider whether, if the permit were granted, the imposition of conditions would be necessary to limit the level of quarantine risk to one that is acceptably low, and
- for a permit to import a seed of a plant that was produced by genetic manipulation—must take into account any risk assessment prepared, and any decision made, in relation to the seed under the *Gene Technology Act*, and
- may take into account anything else that he or she knows is relevant.

The level of quarantine risk is defined in section 5D of the *Quarantine Act 1908*. The definition is as follows:

reference in this Act to a *level of quarantine risk* is a reference to:

- a) the probability of:

- i) a disease or pest being introduced, established or spread in Australia, the Cocos Islands or Christmas Island; and
 - ii) the disease or pest causing harm to human beings, animals, plants, other aspects of the environment, or economic activities; and
- b) the probable extent of the harm.

The Quarantine Regulations 2000 were amended in 2007 to regulate key steps of the import risk analysis process. The Regulations:

- define both a standard and an expanded IRA;
- identify certain steps, which must be included in each type of IRA;
- specify time limits for certain steps and overall timeframes for the completion of IRAs (up to 24 months for a standard IRA and up to 30 months for an expanded IRA);
- specify publication requirements;
- make provision for termination of an IRA; and
- allow for a partially completed risk analysis to be completed as an IRA under the Regulations.

The Regulations are available on the [ComLaw](#) website.

International agreements and standards

The process set out in the *Import Risk Analysis Handbook 2011* is consistent with Australia's international obligations under the SPS Agreement. It also takes into account relevant international standards on risk assessment developed under the International Plant Protection Convention (IPPC) and by the World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE).

Australia bases its national risk management measures on international standards where they exist and when they achieve Australia's ALOP. Otherwise, Australia exercises its right under the SPS Agreement to apply science-based sanitary and phytosanitary measures that are not more trade restrictive than required to achieve Australia's ALOP.

Notification obligations

Under the transparency provisions of the SPS Agreement, WTO Members are required, among other things, to notify other members of proposed sanitary or phytosanitary regulations, or changes to existing regulations, that are not substantially the same as the content of an international standard and that may have a significant effect on trade of other WTO Members.

Risk analysis

Within Australia's quarantine framework, the Australian Government uses risk analyses to assist it in considering the level of quarantine risk that may be associated with the importation or proposed importation of animals, plants or other goods.

In conducting a risk analysis, the Department of Agriculture:

- identifies the pests and diseases of quarantine concern that may be carried by the good

- assesses the likelihood that an identified pest or disease would enter, establish or spread
- assesses the probable extent of the harm that would result.

If the assessed level of quarantine risk exceeds Australia's ALOP, the Department of Agriculture will consider whether there are any risk management measures that will reduce quarantine risk to achieve the ALOP. If there are no risk management measures that reduce the risk to that level, trade will not be allowed.

Risk analyses may be carried out by the Department of Agriculture's specialists, but may also involve relevant experts from state and territory agencies, the Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation (CSIRO), universities and industry to access the technical expertise needed for a particular analysis.

Risk analyses are conducted across a spectrum of scientific complexity and available scientific information. An IRA is a type of risk analysis with key steps regulated under the Quarantine Regulations 2000. The Department of Agriculture's assessment of risk may also take the form of a non-regulated analysis of existing policy or technical advice. Further information on the types of risk analysis is provided in the *Import Risk Analysis Handbook 2011*.

Glossary

Term or abbreviation	Definition
Additional declaration	A statement that is required by an importing country to be entered on a phytosanitary certificate and which provides specific additional information on a consignment in relation to regulated pests (FAO 2012).
Appropriate level of protection (ALOP)	The level of protection deemed appropriate by the Member establishing a sanitary or phytosanitary measure to protect human, animal or plant life or health within its territory (WTO 1995).
Area	An officially defined country, part of a country or all or parts of several countries (FAO 2012).
Area of low pest prevalence	An area, whether all of a country, part of a country, or all parts of several countries, as identified by the competent authorities, in which a specific pest occurs at low levels and which is subject to effective surveillance, control or eradication measures (FAO 2012).
Arthropod	The largest phylum of animals, including the insects, arachnids and crustaceans.
Asexual reproduction	The development of new individual from a single cell or group of cells in the absence of meiosis.
Biological Control Agent (BCA)	A natural enemy, antagonist or competitor, or other organism, used for pest control (FAO 2012).
Biosecurity	The prevention of the entry, establishment or spread of unwanted pests and infectious disease agents to protect human, animal or plant health or life, and the environment (DAFF 2011).
Calyx	A collective term referring to all of the sepals in a flower.
Consignment	A quantity of plants, plant products or other articles being moved from one country to another and covered, when required, by a single phytosanitary certificate (a consignment may be composed of one or more commodities or lots) (FAO 2012).
Control (of a pest)	Suppression, containment or eradication of a pest population (FAO 2012).
Crawler	Intermediate mobile nymph stage of certain Arthropods.
Diapause	Period of suspended development/growth occurring in some insects, in which metabolism is decreased.
The department	The Commonwealth Department of Agriculture.
Endangered area	An area where ecological factors favour the establishment of a pest whose presence in the area will result in economically important loss (FAO 2012).
Endemic	Belonging to, native to, or prevalent in a particular geography, area or environment.
Entry (of a pest)	Movement of a pest into an area where it is not yet present, or present but not widely distributed and being officially controlled (FAO 2012).
Establishment (of a pest)	Perpetuation, for the foreseeable future, of a pest within an area after entry (FAO 2012).
Fresh	Living; not dried, deep-frozen or otherwise conserved (FAO 2012).
Fumigation	A method of pest control that completely fills an area with gaseous pesticides to suffocate or poison the pests within.
Genus	A taxonomic category ranking below a family and above a species and generally consisting of a group of species exhibiting similar characteristics. In taxonomic nomenclature the genus name is used, either alone or followed by a Latin adjective or epithet, to form the name of a species.
Host	An organism that harbours a parasite, mutual partner, or commensal partner, typically providing nourishment and shelter.

Host range	Species capable, under natural conditions, of sustaining a specific pest or other organism (FAO 2012).
Import permit	Official document authorising importation of a commodity in accordance with specified phytosanitary import requirements (FAO 2012).
Import risk analysis	An administrative process through which quarantine policy is developed or reviewed, incorporating risk assessment, risk management and risk communication.
Infection	The internal 'endophytic' colonisation of a plant, or plant organ, and is generally associated with the development of disease symptoms as the integrity of cells and/or biological processes are disrupted.
Infestation (of a commodity)	Presence in a commodity of a living pest of the plant or plant product concerned. Infestation includes infection (FAO 2012).
Inspection	Official visual examination of plants, plant products or other regulated articles to determine if pests are present or to determine compliance with phytosanitary regulations (FAO 2012).
Intended use	Declared purpose for which plants, plant products, or other regulated articles are imported, produced or used (FAO 2012).
Interception (of a pest)	The detection of a pest during inspection or testing of an imported consignment (FAO 2012).
International Standard for Phytosanitary Measures (ISPM)	An international standard adopted by the Conference of the Food and Agriculture Organization, the Interim Commission on Phytosanitary Measures or the Commission on Phytosanitary Measures, established under the IPPC (FAO 2012).
Introduction (of a pest)	The entry of a pest resulting in its establishment (FAO 2012).
Larva	A juvenile form of animal with indirect development, undergoing metamorphosis (for example, insects or amphibians).
Lot	A number of units of a single commodity, identifiable by its homogeneity of composition, origin et cetera, forming part of a consignment (FAO 2012). Within this report a 'lot' refers to a quantity of fruit of a single variety, harvested from a single production site during a single pick and packed at one time.
Mature fruit	Commercial maturity is the start of the ripening process. The ripening process will then continue and provide a product that is consumer-acceptable. Maturity assessments include colour, starch, index, soluble solids content, flesh firmness, acidity, and ethylene production rate.
National Plant Protection Organization (NPPO)	Official service established by a government to discharge the functions specified by the IPPC (FAO 2012).
Nymph	The immature form of some insect species that undergoes incomplete metamorphosis. It is not to be confused with larva, as its overall form is already that of the adult.
Official control	The active enforcement of mandatory phytosanitary regulations and the application of mandatory phytosanitary procedures with the objective of eradication or containment of quarantine pests or for the management of regulated non-quarantine pests (FAO 2012).
Pathogen	A biological agent that can cause disease to its host.
Pathway	Any means that allows the entry or spread of a pest (FAO 2012).
Pest	Any species, strain or biotype of plant, animal, or pathogenic agent injurious to plants or plant products (FAO 2012).
Pest categorisation	The process for determining whether a pest has or has not the characteristics of a quarantine pest or those of a regulated non-quarantine pest (FAO 2012).
Pest free area (PFA)	An area in which a specific pest does not occur as demonstrated by scientific evidence and in which, where appropriate, this condition is being officially maintained (FAO 2012).
Pest free place of production	Place of production in which a specific pest does not occur as demonstrated by scientific evidence and in which, where appropriate, this condition is being

	officially maintained for a defined period (FAO 2012).
Pest free production site	A defined portion of a place of production in which a specific pest does not occur as demonstrated by scientific evidence and in which, where appropriate, this condition is being officially maintained for a defined period and that is managed as a separate unit in the same way as a pest free place of production (FAO 2012).
Pest risk analysis (PRA)	The process of evaluating biological or other scientific and economic evidence to determine whether an organism is a pest, whether it should be regulated, and the strength of any phytosanitary measures to be taken against it (FAO 2012).
Pest risk assessment (for quarantine pests)	Evaluation of the probability of the introduction and spread of a pest and of the magnitude of the associated potential economic consequences (FAO 2012).
Pest risk assessment (for regulated non-quarantine pests)	Evaluation of the probability that a pest in plants for planting affects the intended use of those plants with an economically unacceptable impact (FAO 2012).
Pest risk management (for quarantine pests)	Evaluation and selection of options to reduce the risk of introduction and spread of a pest (FAO 2012).
Pest risk management (for regulated non-quarantine pests)	Evaluation and selection of options to reduce the risk that a pest in plants for planting causes an economically unacceptable impact on the intended use of those plants (FAO 2012).
Pest status (in an area)	Presence or absence, at the present time, of a pest in an area, including where appropriate its distribution, as officially determined using expert judgement on the basis of current and historical pest records and other information (FAO 2012).
Phytosanitary certificate	An official paper document or its official electronic equivalent, consistent with the model of certificates of the IPPC, attesting that a consignment meets phytosanitary import requirements (FAO 2012).
Phytosanitary certification	Use of phytosanitary procedures leading to the issue of a phytosanitary certificate (FAO 2012).
Phytosanitary measure	Any legislation, regulation or official procedure having the purpose to prevent the introduction and/or spread of quarantine pests, or to limit the economic impact of regulated non-quarantine pests (FAO 2012).
Phytosanitary procedure	Any official method for implementing phytosanitary measures including the performance of inspections, tests, surveillance or treatments in connection with regulated pests (FAO 2012).
Phytosanitary regulation	Official rule to prevent the introduction and/or spread of quarantine pests, or to limit the economic impact of regulated non-quarantine pests, including establishment of procedures for phytosanitary certification (FAO 2012).
Polyphagous	Feeding on a relatively large number of hosts from different plant family and/or genera.
PRA area	Area in relation to which a pest risk analysis is conducted (FAO 2012).
Practically free	Of a consignment, field or place of production, without pests (or a specific pests) in numbers or quantities in excess of those that can be expected to result from, and be consistent with good cultural and handling practices employed in the production and marketing of the commodity (FAO 2012).
Pupa	An inactive life stage that only occurs in insects that undergo complete metamorphosis, for example butterflies and moths (Lepidoptera), beetles (Coleoptera) and bees, wasps and ants (Hymenoptera).
Quarantine	Official confinement of regulated articles for observation and research or for further inspection, testing or treatment (FAO 2012).
Quarantine pest	A pest of potential economic importance to the area endangered thereby and not yet present there, or present but not widely distributed and being officially controlled (FAO 2012).
Regulated article	Any plant, plant product, storage place, packaging, conveyance, container, soil and any other organism, object or material capable of harbouring or spreading pests, deemed to require phytosanitary measures, particularly where international transportation is involved (FAO 2012).

Regulated non-quarantine pest	A non-quarantine pest whose presence in plants for planting affects the intended use of those plants with an economically unacceptable impact and which is therefore regulated within the territory of the importing contracting party (FAO 2012).
Regulated pest	A quarantine pest or a regulated non-quarantine pest (FAO 2012).
Restricted risk	Risk estimate with phytosanitary measure(s) applied.
Saprophyte	An organism deriving its nourishment from dead organic matter.
Spread (of a pest)	Expansion of the geographical distribution of a pest within an area (FAO 2012).
SPS Agreement	WTO Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures.
Stakeholders	Government agencies, individuals, community or industry groups or organizations, whether in Australia or overseas, including the proponent/applicant for a specific proposal, who have an interest in the policy issues.
Surveillance	An official process which collects and records data on pest occurrence or absence by surveying, monitoring or other procedures (FAO 2012).
Systems approach(es)	The integration of different risk management measures, at least two of which act independently, and which cumulatively achieve the appropriate level of protection against regulated pests.
Trash	Soil, splinters, twigs, leaves, and other plant material, other than fruit stalks.
Treatment	Official procedure for the killing, inactivation or removal of pests, or for rendering pests infertile or for devitalisation (FAO 2012).
Unrestricted risk	Unrestricted risk estimates apply in the absence of risk mitigation measures.
Vector	An organism that does not cause disease itself, but which causes infection by conveying pathogens from one host to another.
Viable	Alive, able to germinate or capable of growth.

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